Interesting. And a bit of a contrast to popular wisdom on AH.com. Just recently I have read accounts of the Siege of Demyansk where soviet infrantry used human wave tactis repeatedly despite the faliure of all previous attacks, and several tank attacks aimed at AGN were basically dozens of Soviet tanks attacking frontally into prepared German positions. From other accounts, it would appear the Soviets did this -throughout the whole Eastern Front-.
But according to AH.com, situations like these never happened.
In theory at least Soviet attacks were supposed to be supported by artillery, and armor in a concentration of force so that German positions would crumble under sheer wieght of numbers and firepower. From 1941-42 however the Soviets lacked the organization, ability, firepower, ammunition, and equipment to carry out successful attacks of this nature. More often than not the artillery barrage would fail to destroy German defenses, fail to carry out proper counterbattery fire, and fail to support the offensive. The supporting armor would quickly become uncoordinated, blundering into German AT defenses, and rarely carried out it's mission propery. Further, Soviet commanders couldn't handle their formations, quickly losing track of the battle and ordering unimaginative assaults with poor artilery support and intelligence, often contrary to orders from the
Front and STAVKA.
From the German perspective all that was observed was a blind human wave attack. Soviet records however show that disastrous attacks of the kind you describe were more the result of the Soviet's failure to carry out complex offensives operationaly or tactically.
It's not that the attacks didn't happen, it's that the reality was far more complex than the stereotype of hordes of poorly armed Soviet infantrymen charging to their death in the thousands, with plans being no more than that.
If you fast forward to 1943 you see a different story. At Siniavino in January 1943, for instance, the Red Army's assault plan was incredibly complex when compared to offensives carried out even a few months ago. The coordination of infantry, long range artillery, direct fire artillery, logistics, sappers, armor, etc was orders of magnitude greater. Firepower, organization, and concentration all improved. The results were noticeable. Despite attacking into the teeth of the strongest German defenses in the East, the Red Army smashed them and achieved all of it's objectives save for capturing the Siniavino Heights at the very end of the offensive.
The Red Army from late 1942 and beyond had a complexity and quality that went beyond sheer numbers.
"Irrecoverably lost" doesn`t really sound like "repaireable", no?
There are many examples of Soviet formations having several hundred tanks under repair at once.