What if the Washington Naval Treaty Failed

Status
Not open for further replies.

hipper

Banned
Naw. The same dispersion problems and poor aerodynamics due to wrong twist in the rifling and wrong ballistic shell cap shape persisted past Bismarck. I'll unpack the armor in just a bit.



I sure do agree with this. The British 38 cm/45 with its Green Boys was possibly the finest naval artillery ever floated.


Yeah, about that, it absolutely worked to actually doom PoW via shock when she took those bomb misses close aboard.



Agree, but since I think she is the penultimate RN Lessons Learned on how to do it right (A belt of pre-detonate wrapped the final magazine protective belt.), it seems a shame to criticize her for being tardy (Like I facetiously did. (^^^).)



Since the section of Hood that blew up is missing we have no way to trace the final plunge path of the shell that got her. I suspect that the inverted trapezoid armor scheme and the facing aspect as she made her turn actually drove the Bismarck shell BELOW the 4 inch magazine (fire location?) and it was a flash up into the powder room that caused the fatal fire and final explosive burst. IOW moving the powder room around might have done nothing. Inerting the propellant to shock (modern practice) might have been a better fix. YMMV and probably should since too much WAG and hindsight is invoked. Knowing what the RN knew, it was reasonable for them to try the solution they used.



But we have examples of this very exploit being a fatal flaw in several nations' BB's: Arizona, South Dakota (almost), Hood, Yamato, PoW, Roma, Bismarck, etc.



I don't disagree. It just seems that even more experience (Vanguard) shows more evolution of solution.

You keep going about shock, could you back that up a bit the POW for example was sunk by propeller shaft damage caused by a torpedo

I’d be amazed that the RN which suffered more major warship damage than any other navy in WW1 was deficient in designing against damage.

Regards Hipper
 

McPherson

Banned
PoW lost power to her AAA pom poms when the level bombers near missed her. Cleared the way for the torpedo RIKKOs that got her. Also PoW took steering control damage during the level bomber attack that made her a predictable path target for the TBs. The torpedo that hit her aft was able to spring the PTO off the collars to the screw and blew out the shaft seals, too. Hull plating below the belt was stove in from the bombs. It was not just "a torpedo". Whole cumulative chain doomed PoW.

I do not know why the RN did not systemize their battle lessons learned for shock. I know they changed out things they thought were important, like going to inverted trapezoid armor, changed powder handling, changed shell filler for effect, loosened up tactical top down command procedures for fleet evolution and so forth; but it is in the WW II record that they were lousy about shock and the damage control methods to mitigate it. This may be because they did not stage a series of tests to check for the effects of their own weapons against easily recoverable hulks in shallow water. Or it may be because they were in wartime fix it and get it back out there mode in WW I, that they did not do proper ship's bills; which also seems to be a bad WW II habit that persists from their records. The RN for some reason then was not very concerned about this construct and repair aspect of naval warfare. It seems to have something to do with the service culture and how "engineers" and "line officers" were regarded and viewed each other.

Each navy has its own idiosyncrasies that seem inexplicable to me. For example, while the RN did not test for shock, they sure tested their weapons and even when the tests convinced them pre-war that the things worked, and when war later showed that their torpedoes and mines were defective they were astonishingly quick with fixes and solutions which worked. (The Nelsons, after Bismarck, had their guns sorted out. And the RN never gave up on the KGVs with their loopy guns, so those sort of worked by 1943.) Guess what the USN did not do properly until way late in WW II (1944)? Test interwar developed fuses, explosive filler, gun ballistics, torpedoes, bombs, shells and mines.

You should read the scathing correspondence between the forces afloat and Bu-Ord during the whole war. It took threats of court martial and taking the problems away from Bu-Ord to get it all sort of fixed. Just the torpedoes... It was a year and a half into the war, and the USN had 38 separate torpedo programs all going at the same time. 14 of them were to fix the ___ ___ed Mark XIV submarine launched weapon. 6 were to fix the Mark XIII air dropped weapon. Result? By 1955 (Yes 10 years after the war was won...), the Mark XIV was where she should have been in 1939. The Mark XIII was commercially retroed and modified by Bliss Leavitt (Taking it away from the incompetents of the USN torpedo factory at Goat Island), based directly on lessons learned from the IJN counterparts (Pearl Harbor and Guadalcanal), so she was effective by Philippine Sea (June 1944) and the Mark XV destroyer torpedo (Based on lessons learned from the 14 Westinghouse and Washington University Engineering School fixes applied to the nearly identical Mark XIV.), as late as October 1944 (Battle of Leyte Gulf) still did not work as intended and was retired as never properly fixed post-war a decade later.

So, it just happens, you see it in the records, and it is inexplicable.
 

hipper

Banned
PoW lost power to her AAA pom poms when the level bombers near missed her. Cleared the way for the torpedo RIKKOs that got her. Also PoW took steering control damage during the level bomber attack that made her a predictable path target for the TBs. The torpedo that hit her aft was able to spring the PTO off the collars to the screw and blew out the shaft seals, too. Hull plating below the belt was stove in from the bombs. It was not just "a torpedo". Whole cumulative chain doomed PoW.

I do not know why the RN did not systemize their battle lessons learned for shock. I know they changed out things they thought were important, like going to inverted trapezoid armor, changed powder handling, changed shell filler for effect, loosened up tactical top down command procedures for fleet evolution and so forth; but it is in the WW II record that they were lousy about shock and the damage control methods to mitigate it. This may be because they did not stage a series of tests to check for the effects of their own weapons against easily recoverable hulks in shallow water. Or it may be because they were in wartime fix it and get it back out there mode in WW I, that they did not do proper ship's bills; which also seems to be a bad WW II habit that persists from their records. The RN for some reason then was not very concerned about this construct and repair aspect of naval warfare. It seems to have something to do with the service culture and how "engineers" and "line officers" were regarded and viewed each other.

Each navy has its own idiosyncrasies that seem inexplicable to me. For example, while the RN did not test for shock, they sure tested their weapons and even when the tests convinced them pre-war that the things worked, and when war later showed that their torpedoes and mines were defective they were astonishingly quick with fixes and solutions which worked. (The Nelsons, after Bismarck, had their guns sorted out. And the RN never gave up on the KGVs with their loopy guns, so those sort of worked by 1943.) Guess what the USN did not do properly until way late in WW II (1944)? Test interwar developed fuses, explosive filler, gun ballistics, torpedoes, bombs, shells and mines.

You should read the scathing correspondence between the forces afloat and Bu-Ord during the whole war. It took threats of court martial and taking the problems away from Bu-Ord to get it all sort of fixed. Just the torpedoes... It was a year and a half into the war, and the USN had 38 separate torpedo programs all going at the same time. 14 of them were to fix the ___ ___ed Mark XIV submarine launched weapon. 6 were to fix the Mark XIII air dropped weapon. Result? By 1955 (Yes 10 years after the war was won...), the Mark XIV was where she should have been in 1939. The Mark XIII was commercially retroed and modified by Bliss Leavitt (Taking it away from the incompetents of the USN torpedo factory at Goat Island), based directly on lessons learned from the IJN counterparts (Pearl Harbor and Guadalcanal), so she was effective by Philippine Sea (June 1944) and the Mark XV destroyer torpedo (Based on lessons learned from the 14 Westinghouse and Washington University Engineering School fixes applied to the nearly identical Mark XIV.), as late as October 1944 (Battle of Leyte Gulf) still did not work as intended and was retired as never properly fixed post-war a decade later.

So, it just happens, you see it in the records, and it is inexplicable.

Well the first part of your post is Incorrect. POW was not attacked by level bombers prior to the torpedo hit. it was that hit which killed the electrical power to the aft of POW. Which affected the Pom poms & 5.25” guns. it was the shaft damage caused by the restart of the damaged prop shaft that caused the flooding that sank the POW
The rest of the damage did not contribute to the sinking

https://www.pacificwrecks.com/ships/hms/prince_of_wales/death-of-a-battleship-2012-update.pdf

See the link above for details

the repulse was hit by a 500 kg bomb in the first attack and showed no effect of shock or undue damage

I ask again why do you think the RN had a problem with shock?
I’ll agree that damage control was an issue early in Ww2 for the RN it was the same for most navies however the RN had less excuse.
 
The Pom Pom issue was (as I understand it and some what inexplicably to me) due to deteriorating ammunition in the Hot/humid environment of the Far East - where it had been stored in the ready use ammo bins

This had caused feeding issues on the mounts that caused malfunctions during the action.

Other than that I am not aware of any issue affecting them before the torp hit prop damage / dynamo loss robbed them and 6 of the 8 twin 5.25 guns of power.

It was the loss of dynamo power that resulted in the prop being restarted which caused further damage to the area around the shaft and increased flooding which of course resulted in the shaft being stopped and again no power to most of the AAA weapons
 
Generally the RKM did not run when they had to fight
I could list WWII battles but I think we both know the number with RM running is higher than RN doing so and that they where outnumbered is irrelevant as we are talking about building more newer ships for RN (as RM could have anyway if they had cash)......

Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons, Santa Cruz, Truk, Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf
In what time line would any G3 any ever have got to any of the above???

And gun her down. SHW US 40.6 cm could be a nasty surprise. I am not chest thumping or even going to go that ridiculous route. Hear me out. An Iowa's guns and cycling times and fire control were fearsome for a late 1930s design. I think that given the later build and knowledge of her era, any nation's BB even the defective Yamatos would be a lot tougher against the G3 than either of us realize or could imagine. Even a Bismarck might be dangerous. I know a Richelieu would be.
I don't get the above, you say that G3 could be defeated by weaker ships (I agree) as one off 1 v1 combat is very luck dependent...but then say that Iowa would not be just a vulnerable to bad luck when facing G3? All (14/"15"/16"/18") last generation battleships (and I would add G3 to them) could win it just a matter of if they win 40% or 60 % of the time IMO unless we stack it completely with late war crew/radar v pre war design ship.

I can read the General Board minutes as they advised on the WNT. They were the ones who set the characteristics of the USN, not Harding or Congress. Tillman be damned.
And they would compromise as soon as they get told "no money make it cheaper" by congress just like they did every year in peacetime.....

Harding was running a bluff, but Congress (packed full of isolationists) still handed over the chunk of change as if he meant it for real. During the negotiations, there was a lot of infighting about what to do with the ships on the weighs. Given the garbage that the SoDaks were, and the nature of the bluff, it was adjudged that giving up the SoDaks for halting Britain cold, during the Washington conference before she got rolling would give the USN a technical advantage. Ten years holiday, the British would lose any experience edge in the shipwright art as better US designs emerged.

I’d be amazed that the RN which suffered more major warship damage than any other navy in WW1 was deficient in designing against damage.
Maybe just maybe something like actually getting hit a lot in WWII and forced to fight for many years tests more of the potential weakness and then of course you just had to write post battle reports in English....?
 

McPherson

Banned
Well the first part of your post is Incorrect. POW was not attacked by level bombers prior to the torpedo hit. it was that hit which killed the electrical power to the aft of POW. Which affected the Pom poms & 5.25” guns. it was the shaft damage caused by the restart of the damaged prop shaft that caused the flooding that sank the POW

The rest of the damage did not contribute to the sinking

Shrug... the dynamo set was not shock mounted. It was knocked out. You say potato, I say sunk as a result of power loss and shaft alley flooding and sprung plates that overwhelmed the DC parties. All shock related casualties.
 

hipper

Banned
I missed the Iowa bit She would have had the legs on a G3 but only because a F3 would be 20 years older than Iowa

However Iowa had a bit of a glass jaw with the magazines above sea level and directly below the MAD

Still the Americans were right the Iowa’s never were shot at by anything that could hurt them, so even low quality cracked armour and inefficient homogenous armour was sufficient.
 

McPherson

Banned
I could list WWII battles but I think we both know the number with RM running is higher than RN doing so and that they where outnumbered is irrelevant as we are talking about building more newer ships for RN (as RM could have anyway if they had cash)......

Pedestals?

Pacific brouhaha.

In what time line would any G3 any ever have got to any of the above???

Not Pacific, but how about Force Z or how about April 1942 in the Indian Ocean? The G3s were supposed to be battle cruisers; i.e. they would be paired with RN flattops if the RN knows what it is doing. Likely opponents, Kongos. Based on First and Second Guadalcanal and Santa C

I don't get the above, you say that G3 could be defeated by weaker ships (I agree) as one off 1 v1 combat is very luck dependent...but then say that Iowa would not be just a vulnerable to bad luck when facing G3? All (14/"15"/16"/18") last generation battleships (and I would add G3 to them) could win it just a matter of if they win 40% or 60 % of the time IMO unless we stack it completely with late war crew/radar v pre war design ship.

First... nobody should try the single ship dual mantra, least of all, ME, because we both know the WW II norm for a surface action group was 2-4 relatively similar capital ships with attendant cruisers and destroyers. If we are hypothesizing how a G3 performs against its peers we at the least invoke Denmark Strait or more likely Java Sea with Mutsu and Nagato against a pair of G3s. The historicity of the circumstances and the likely opponent sets drives the scenarios.

And they would compromise as soon as they get told "no money make it cheaper" by congress just like they did every year in peacetime.....
It wasn't Congress who wanted the 35,000 ton limit with half fuel provisions. It was the GB. They knew what was possible. A lot of the Congress hawks and Isos wanted something on the order of 40,000 tonnes.

Maybe just maybe something like actually getting hit a lot in WWII and forced to fight for many years tests more of the potential weakness and then of course you just had to write post battle reports in English....?

Except that post action reports about British ship casualties in the Falklands still read out like a litany of general complaints and general estimates about shipwright failure up and down the line, without the attendant detailed engineering recommendations as to how to fix the bolos and prevent them in the future. What was the culprit I saw? SHOCK damage knocked out vital ship systems. Go back to WW II. Same odd thing I read. Compare British BDRs to USN ship bills drawn up when shot up British ships show up in US yards and they get USN inspected and you read a laundry list of items, line by line, with great specificity that either need replacement or repair per ship. That is the way the Germans did it in WW I, and the way the USN learned from them and still does it. Is it better? Sheffield versus Stark. There is only one right way to handle an engineering casualty problem, if you survive it. The USN did NOT adopt British practices. Even when the torpedo crisis hit the Americans, it was the German way of problem solution. Took a lot longer that way with detailed engineering reviews and first echelon engineering with the forces afloat; instead of the RN's usual brilliant (and it was brilliant, I kid you not, send it to the boffins and their labs, ad hockery and they'll solve it.), but post WW II, the US torpedoes that succeeded the Mark XIV were deadly, while it was still a somewhat suspect fish. How did the Conqueror do with her modern Tigerfish torpedoes? She used Mark 8s and the old WW II firing tables to do Belgrano in. Her captain knew the modern Tigerfish torpedoes were no good. Point to me? It seems a strange role reversal that the RN, which did weapons right interwar and the USN which did weapons wrong, flip. I can tell you this happened about 1945. I can even tell you why. The USN was trashed and embarrassed repeatedly by a much better navy and it knew it. They had to fix themselves. The RN did not suffer that lesson learned in WW II, not really, though there were indicators they needed to fix some of their practices. The wakeup call for them did not really happen until the Falklands.
 

McPherson

Banned
I missed the Iowa bit She would have had the legs on a G3 but only because a F3 would be 20 years older than Iowa

However Iowa had a bit of a glass jaw with the magazines above sea level and directly below the MAD

Really? Above the expected deflection path her belt was intended to divert shells inside her immune zone. Not a glass jaw at all.

Still the Americans were right the Iowa’s never were shot at by anything that could hurt them, so even low quality cracked armour and inefficient homogenous armour was sufficient.

Here.

That is source for the cracked armor and inefficient homogenous armor stories. Now the real skivvy. Class B US armor is somewhat inelastic. Against a water hammer it is going to shatter like glass. Water hammers are torpedo and mine problems. This threat was known and bitterly accepted because US production of superior class A armor was insufficient to carry the belt down to the triple bottom. It was war, and you took your chances, with either torpedoes or shells. The Iowas could and did dodge torpedo attacks. Class B armor was sufficient to stop expected enemy naval artillery ordnance. At point blank range the same "defective" armor on the South Dakota held up to IJN 35.5 cm gunfire quite well.

QED.
 
Shrug... the dynamo set was not shock mounted. It was knocked out. You say potato, I say sunk as a result of power loss and shaft alley flooding and sprung plates that overwhelmed the DC parties. All shock related casualties.

No. The Shaft was seriously damaged and not turning as the Damage control officer immediately turned it off. So the Dynamo was not generating power. This knocked out the AAA and a miscommunication resulted in the shaft being reengaged causing further heavy damage to the shaft which caused more damage and further flooding.

The issue was not one of shock damage but of no fall back power source for 3/4s of the ships AAA. All future build BBs and CVs (and future refits of existing vessels) had multiple redundant Diesel Generators due to POWs experience and that of Ark Royal (Power to the Pumps died)

Perhaps the 'shock' damage you are referring to was the very near miss POW received in Belfast while in a dock before being commissioned. She had no crew on board at the time and so there was no DC efforts when she was bombed.

The other issue I read was that because she was rushed into service there had been no time to pressure test the rear compartments to ensure they were fully water tight.

All this contributed.

I blame the Germans.
 
Not Pacific, but how about Force Z or how about April 1942 in the Indian Ocean? The G3s were supposed to be battle cruisers; i.e. they would be paired with RN flattops if the RN knows what it is doing. Likely opponents, Kongos. Based on First and Second Guadalcanal and Santa C
First... nobody should try the single ship dual mantra, least of all, ME, because we both know the WW II norm for a surface action group was 2-4 relatively similar capital ships with attendant cruisers and destroyers. If we are hypothesizing how a G3 performs against its peers we at the least invoke Denmark Strait or more likely Java Sea with Mutsu and Nagato against a pair of G3s. The historicity of the circumstances and the likely opponent sets drives the scenarios.
So what do we think will happen in each case?

A pair of G3s V a pair of Kongos ...... hummmm tarted up 1914 BCs v a fast battleship isn't going to go well 85%-15% and only due to the escorts torps if at night. (G3 win)

Denmark Strait v B & PE, G3 is basically Nelson guns (or better due to less weight cutting) that killed Bismark in OTL and its got better protection and faster.... its two v one as PE is almost irrelevant so 90%-10% (G3 win)

Java Sea with Mutsu and Nagato (I really think more like Amagis ITTL?) but anyway 9 v 16" and faster and much better protected..... much closer than Kongo maube 70%-30% (G3 win)

As CV AA escorts v OTL RN ships ie probably QEs or R&R, they are just if not faster and have more protection as well as space for more AA. (G3 win)

I simply do see any situation that a G3 is worse than OTL using out of date Hood/R&R/R/QEs or slow N&R as not much else was available and worked up in sufficient numbers especially in the decisive stages of the war at sea ie pre 43 when US shipyards are up to full flow.

Except that post action reports about British ship casualties in the Falklands still read out like a litany of general complaints and general estimates about shipwright failure up and down the line, without the attendant detailed engineering recommendations as to how to fix the bolos and prevent them in the future. What was the culprit I saw? SHOCK damage knocked out vital ship systems. Go back to WW II. Same odd thing I read. Compare British BDRs to USN ship bills drawn up when shot up British ships show up in US yards and they get USN inspected and you read a laundry list of items, line by line, with great specificity that either need replacement or repair per ship. That is the way the Germans did it in WW I, and the way the USN learned from them and still does it. Is it better? Sheffield versus Stark. There is only one right way to handle an engineering casualty problem, if you survive it. The USN did NOT adopt British practices. Even when the torpedo crisis hit the Americans, it was the German way of problem solution. Took a lot longer that way with detailed engineering reviews and first echelon engineering with the forces afloat; instead of the RN's usual brilliant (and it was brilliant, I kid you not, send it to the boffins and their labs, ad hockery and they'll solve it.), but post WW II, the US torpedoes that succeeded the Mark XIV were deadly, while it was still a somewhat suspect fish. How did the Conqueror do with her modern Tigerfish torpedoes? She used Mark 8s and the old WW II firing tables to do Belgrano in. Her captain knew the modern Tigerfish torpedoes were no good. Point to me? It seems a strange role reversal that the RN, which did weapons right interwar and the USN which did weapons wrong, flip. I can tell you this happened about 1945. I can even tell you why. The USN was trashed and embarrassed repeatedly by a much better navy and it knew it. They had to fix themselves. The RN did not suffer that lesson learned in WW II, not really, though there were indicators they needed to fix some of their practices. The wakeup call for them did not really happen until the Falklands.
I think you are mixing a lot of different bits together.......

You need to split the post war stuff out as its got very different drivers to the WWII stuff, ie general HMT budget cuts (Tigerfish) and questions of if you really care about making ships survivable if they are throwing NDBs at anything that moves and expect to die anyway in a full WWIII.

A lot of GB shock problems is simply that RN kept deliberately going for the cheap option ie one water main/aluminium superstructure (Falklands) or less backup lights/generators (pre WWII) to save cost as they needed numbers and could not afford to gold plat stuff.
 
On Tigerfish

....nope nothing good to say about it.

Project started in 1959 and it only entered service in 1980 (10 years late) with no originally planned surface attack capability and slower than intended (Max 35 knots over intended 55) - and a failure rate of 40% (fish tended to dive on launch and cut wires)

In 1982 it had no capability (and certainly no trust in its abilities by the Silent Service even if it had) to engage a surface target.

It was only got to run correctly in the late 80s and only reached full capabilities and 80%+ reliability by 1992 - after 33 years of development

Spearfish entered service in 1992
 
It should be noted that this was going to be built. The theory behind it, was exactly the same operational reason as the

I thought it was built so that the US could have more platforms for naval aviation at a time when carriers were limited by treaty terms?

Heavy cruiser tonnage could be used for hybrid flight deck cruisers. This was in the 1930 London Treaty but only the USN was in a position to use it. Tone is more like an upscaled Swedish Gotland seaplane carrier.

It was 25% of all cruiser tonnage, not heavy cruiser tonnage - the US was perfectly happy in 1930 to spend light cruiser tonnage on the hybrids, but did not want to sacrifice any of its 8" gun cruisers.

The USN decided against the "St Louis" because they found that the takeoff run was too short for the next generation of USN scout bomber. Tone was the IJN doctrinal solution to scouting for their aircraft carrier fleet. The Gottland was too slow, too small and laid out wrong. It really was not the inspiration.

Well, part of the issue with the takeoff run is that they refused to install catapults (BuAer saw this as an issue, but the Board decided to overrule them at the time of the design). And which of the warships in question are you referring to being cancelled? From what I recalled, they were delayed due to the Depression halting shipbuilding, and then the resumption of new construction of dedicated carriers in 31 led to the plans for Cruiser No. 39 being shelved.
 

McPherson

Banned
No. The Shaft was seriously damaged and not turning as the Damage control officer immediately turned it off. So the Dynamo was not generating power. This knocked out the AAA and a miscommunication resulted in the shaft being reengaged causing further heavy damage to the shaft which caused more damage and further flooding.

Not...shock...mounted.

The issue was not one of shock damage but of no fall back power source for 3/4s of the ships AAA. All future build BBs and CVs (and future refits of existing vessels) had multiple redundant Diesel Generators due to POWs experience and that of Ark Royal (Power to the Pumps died)

Not fixed.

Perhaps the 'shock' damage you are referring to was the very near miss POW received in Belfast while in a dock before being commissioned. She had no crew on board at the time and so there was no DC efforts when she was bombed.

No I am not referencing the LW attack. I am aware of it. THAT should have been a wakeup call that the protection scheme needed some tweaking.
The other issue I read was that because she was rushed into service there had been no time to pressure test the rear compartments to ensure they were fully water tight.

All this contributed.

I blame the Germans.

That is a fair point. Rushed into service. I think I mentioned it earlier as a problem post LNT.
 

McPherson

Banned
I think you are mixing a lot of different bits together.......

You need to split the post war stuff out as its got very different drivers to the WWII stuff, ie general HMT budget cuts (Tigerfish) and questions of if you really care about making ships survivable if they are throwing NDBs at anything that moves and expect to die anyway in a full WWIII.

A lot of GB shock problems is simply that RN kept deliberately going for the cheap option ie one water main/aluminium superstructure (Falklands) or less backup lights/generators (pre WWII) to save cost as they needed numbers and could not afford to gold plat stuff.

You know, all of that is fair and historical, but it sure still does not explain why the RN did not do due diligence on end effectors (weapons) and sensors (all the stuff that steers the effectors) post WW II. TBF budgets and numbers did hurt, but I will tell you it still does not explain the cultural flip in the RN. Or maybe I am being too harsh a bit. No Navy as depleted as the RN was in 1982 and still able to mount the Falklands campaign can be said to have lost its gung-ho or its fighting expertise. I simply noted that in the RN culture there seems to be a sneer at the engineer as a part of "the club". You cannot ignore those guys or you are going to get hurt. And that part of RN culture has not changed much going clear back to the Sir George Tryon. In the USN, the problem has been that of continual complacency and arrogance. The WW II wakeup call lasted until about Vietnam, but as that generation of WW II combat officers who remembered how badly beaten the USN was continuously until 1944 (Atlantic and Pacific) and the needed attention to make sure things worked and that doctrine fit situation, went into retirement and the old sins returned.

I hope the new reformers have figured it out.

==============================================================



So what do we think will happen in each case?

Let's unpack.

A pair of G3s V a pair of Kongos ...... hummmm tarted up 1914 BCs v a fast battleship isn't going to go well 85%-15% and only due to the escorts torps if at night. (G3 win)

That is an invalid assumption on several grounds. The G3s are not true fast battleships any more than the uprated Kongos are. Then you have to look at the expected scenarios. First you are up against Kido Butai or Japanese RIKKOs in 1942 as well as the SAG. No Japanese SAG fought without scout support or its air cover. Hate to say this, but if the RN naval aviation is not there, it is likely that the RN surface action group is going to wind up like Force Z or the ABDA SAG did at Java Sea. The Kongos are part of a Japanese naval combined arms team. Until you nix their air forces, the IJN have you cold.

Denmark Strait v B & PE, G3 is basically Nelson guns (or better due to less weight cutting) that killed Bismark in OTL and its got better protection and faster.... its two v one as PE is almost irrelevant so 90%-10% (G3 win)

A lot depends on who sees whom on radar and the vector merge. A great deal more depends on the ADMIRALS. Lancelot Holland had the Hood, and he had the not ready for battle PoW, so it is practical to say with a couple of G3s, it is 2 to 1. But then again, look at aspects and firing arcs and the RTL history of the likely naval artillery employed. Holland gets the boot for trying to close the range and get the Hood in close where her belt armor should have worked, but... he turned to bring after batteries to bear too late in what he knew was a 1 vs, 1 situation. (about 15 seconds too late). The G-3s in that case present a 12 gun on 8 solution, exactly the same as the PoW and Hood did and they, too, have to get close because I suspect that same defect in the armor scheme around the fore structure as Hood had will be present. Holland still has the same problem and he probably will try the same solution. Will he succeed? Depends. Rodney says "maybe". Let's look at Rodney.


The Rodney had to close to PBR to punch into Bismarck's belt and consistently hit. KGV during the same action ran into gun issues of her own reminiscent of PoW. So we have no guarantee that the G3 artillery will not have Nelson type issues, but we do have a guarantee they will not be KGV issues. I'll give it 60/40 RN with possible both G3s surviving. I sure would love destroyer support, though.

Java Sea with Mutsu and Nagato (I really think more like Amagis ITTL?) but anyway 9 v 16" and faster and much better protected..... much closer than Kongo maybe 70%-30% (G3 win)

Mutsu and Nagato were tough bears. Braindead Takagi in charge, I give the RN a clear win. Anyone else Japanese (like tough old Kurita?) and the G3s die. Comes down to the torpedoes and air scouting. Japanese ones nose wander a lot. British ones are straight runners, but lack punch and range. If we go Amagis (and the Nagato type rebuilds), then even with Braindead it is an IJN victory. They were the best in the world at night surface actions. They knew how to scout and maintain a tactical plot.
As CV AA escorts v OTL RN ships ie probably QEs or R&R, they are just if not faster and have more protection as well as space for more AA. (G3 win)

RN AAA was NTG. Nobody else had decent AAA until about late 1942 either (all aspect directors and a good MAB auto cannon). I can see Repulse and Renown as CTF escorts. The QEs are too slow. The G3s would have to work in at least 4 x 8 pom poms with all asp directors and I would like to see a 4.7 in the DP battery. Modernized that way, they would be decent bodyguard ships.

I simply do see any situation that a G3 is worse than OTL using out of date Hood/R&R/R/QEs or slow N&R as not much else was available and worked up in sufficient numbers especially in the decisive stages of the war at sea ie pre 43 when US shipyards are up to full flow.

One may realize that in the North Atlantic this holds true, but in the Med and in the IO in the RTL the RN needed no less than 9 BBs to cover RTL needs 1939-1942? With Home Fleet added that is 14 BBs total. If you give up 9 of that RTL lot to get 6 G3s (2 more than the 4 projected) you are going to fall one ocean short and things get very dicey even if you add 3 KGVs.

In the PacFLT there is no effective battleship support until August 1942. Insane Pye has 6 Standards, but those are stuck on the American west coast either being refitted or repaired after Pearl Harbor RTL. They won't be ready until March 1943. ITTL US fast battleship support, assuming SoDak 2.0 ITTL would be 6... probably Atlantic based as in RTL with the North Carolinas to cover RN shortfalls. Makes for an interesting what-if. I can see SoDaks running with a Wasp to Malta easily ITTL.

Hmm. SoDak 2.0 (1 or 2) with Brits as RTL and Wasp (Yorktown version.) vs Littorio and company and LW on a May Malta run 1942. I still don't like those odds at all. It should wind up exactly like it did, a fiasco.
 
Last edited:
Moving back to the OP. The IJN 8:8 goal was a 24 year rolling program of 2 ships per year. The IJN envisaged a ship being 1st rate for 8 years, 2nd rate for 8 years and then 3rd rate in Reserve for its final 8 years. Most other powers typically saw 20 year lives for their ships.

By the failure of this WNT, the 3rd rate ships now passing into Reserve Fleet are the 3 surviving BC Ikoma,Ibuki and Kurama and the BB Katori, Kashima,Satsuma, Aki, Settsu. Japan would hold these until 1928. Japan would pay off it's older pre-Dreadnoughts and Armoured Cruisers.

The ships just moving from 1st rate to 2nd rate are the 14" armed ships, the Kongos, Fusos and Ise class ships. The next generation of 1st rate are the Nagato (No 1) to the (No 16), last of the No13 class. There is no guarantee that Japan would move to the 18" gunned ships perhaps building another 4 of the Kii class. There was little difference between the Amagi and Kii classes so this was perhaps the start of the recognition that the BB and BC had merged.

As the ships grow in size to about 60,000 tons by the early 30's Japan would ease the strain by shifting out the schedule to 3 ships every 2 years. Even to keep expenditure to the 1920 level would only mean pushing out the program by 2-3 years ie. extending ship life from 24 to 26 or 27 years.

The IJN had great political and domestic support. They could probably bear the financial cost but we'd see smaller numbers of cruisers and destroyers and of the smaller types.

The USN could perhaps rely on political support to build 4 ships per year keeping Japan at 10:5 rather than the 5:3 of the WNT.
 
The G3s are not true fast battleships any more than the uprated Kongos are.
If you don't count the G3s as fast battleship what do you count?

First you are up against Kido Butai or Japanese RIKKOs in 1942 as well as the SAG. No Japanese SAG fought without scout support or its air cover. Hate to say this, but if the RN naval aviation is not there, it is likely that the RN surface action group is going to wind up like Force Z or the ABDA SAG did at Java Sea. The Kongos are part of a Japanese naval combined arms team. Until you nix their air forces, the IJN have you cold.
But you comment was "Likely opponents, Kongos. Based on First and Second Guadalcanal and Santa C" if you keep it as a air v surface then the composition of the surface group is indeed far reduced in importance, but I would still want to be on a pair of G3s rather than OTL force Z speed and size matters.

A lot depends on who sees whom on radar and the vector merge. A great deal more depends on the ADMIRALS. Lancelot Holland had the Hood, and he had the not ready for battle PoW, so it is practical to say with a couple of G3s, it is 2 to 1. But then again, look at aspects and firing arcs and the RTL history of the likely naval artillery employed. Holland gets the boot for trying to close the range and get the Hood in close where her belt armor should have worked, but... he turned to bring after batteries to bear too late in what he knew was a 1 vs, 1 situation. (about 15 seconds too late). The G-3s in that case present a 12 gun on 8 solution, exactly the same as the PoW and Hood did and they, too, have to get close because I suspect that same defect in the armor scheme around the fore structure as Hood had will be present. Holland still has the same problem and he probably will try the same solution. Will he succeed? Depends. Rodney says "maybe". Let's look at Rodney.

The Rodney had to close to PBR to punch into Bismarck's belt and consistently hit. KGV during the same action ran into gun issues of her own reminiscent of PoW. So we have no guarantee that the G3 artillery will not have Nelson type issues, but we do have a guarantee they will not be KGV issues. I'll give it 60/40 RN with possible both G3s surviving. I sure would love destroyer support, though.
Errr.... G3 will be faster than Hood &PoW so adding closing stage and giving more options as Bismark cant outrun them even if they screw up the approach angle....

She has a very different (better) protection scheme than Hood and unlike PoW is fully worked up, it also has newer better fire-control and two more guns 12 v 10 OTL (6(3+3)x2 v 4(2+2) + 6 (4+2)) all all larger than OTL during the opening stage.

Mutsu and Nagato were tough bears. Braindead Takagi in charge, I give the RN a clear win. Anyone else Japanese (like tough old Kurita?) and the G3s die. Comes down to the torpedoes and air scouting. Japanese ones nose wander a lot. British ones are straight runners, but lack punch and range. If we go Amagis (and the Nagato type rebuilds), then even with Braindead it is an IJN victory. They were the best in the world at night surface actions. They knew how to scout and maintain a tactical plot.
Have you looked at how much protection G3 is carrying compared to N&M? In day time the TT are nearly irrelevant better protection and one more main gun wins.

At night we are talking about the RN who didn't exactly do that badly at night in the Mediterranean in OTL...

RN AAA was NTG. Nobody else had decent AAA until about late 1942 either (all aspect directors and a good MAB auto cannon). The G3s would have to work in at least 4 x 8 pom poms with all asp directors and I would like to see a 4.7 in the DP battery. Modernized that way, they would be decent bodyguard ships.
  • 6 × 1 - 4.7-inch (120 mm) AA guns
  • 4 × 10 - barrel 2-pounder pom-pom mountings (will become 8 as the design is completed)
Makes her the best protected ship in the world when compete, but even better she is huge so has far more space to fit more light AA as the war goes on she would have gained a significant number of more 2-pounders, 40mm and 20mm by the time of any pacific war.

I can see Repulse and Renown as CTF escorts. The QEs are too slow.
Yes but look at OTL QEs had to be used for want of anything else especially in Med.....

One may realize that in the North Atlantic this holds true, but in the Med and in the IO in the RTL the RN needed no less than 9 BBs to cover RTL needs 1939-1942? With Home Fleet added that is 14 BBs total. If you give up 9 of that RTL lot to get 6 G3s (2 more than the 4 projected) you are going to fall one ocean short and things get very dicey even if you add 3 KGVs.
But that's the main point of a no WNT......!!!!!!!
Since in OTL RN gave up all the 13.5" ships anyway in WNT/LNT getting then scraped for new G3s costs nothing in lost opportunities by WWII.

In OTL RN had,
N&R slow but strong
Hood, R&R fast but weak
5 QE old and slow
5 Rs even worse.......

Gaining 4 G3s or even more (8-12) due to follow on classes in 20s/30s and putting the Rs/QEs into reserve is going to course what problems in WWII? All I can see is more newer ships its not even adding 4 more to 15 its more like adding 4 to the 3 post Jutland ships the ratio of improvement is huge and that's without a long slow build rate over the late 20s/early 30s?

In the PacFLT there is no effective battleship support until August 1942. Insane Pye has 6 Standards, but those are stuck on the American west coast either being refitted or repaired after Pearl Harbor RTL. They won't be ready until March 1943. ITTL US fast battleship support, assuming SoDak 2.0 ITTL would be 6... probably Atlantic based as in RTL with the North Carolinas to cover RN shortfalls. Makes for an interesting what-if. I can see SoDaks running with a Wasp to Malta easily ITTL.

Hmm. SoDak 2.0 (1 or 2) with Brits as RTL and Wasp (Yorktown version.) vs Littorio and company and LW on a May Malta run 1942. I still don't like those odds at all. It should wind up exactly like it did, a fiasco.
With 4-8-12 more new RN battleship from 39 the war at sea is very different,

BoA and raiders are killed faster and harder as R&R and Hood cant be let off to go support CA groups and the 10 spare Rs/QEs can guard any important convoys....

Norway, with more fast fleets available that can defeat S&G (or anything else KM has) this is far riskier RN can cover multiple options at once...(ie break out or invasion)

Med becomes a death sentence to RM as they cant run from fast RN battleship....(this has huge issues for North Africa etc)
RN will happily accept a G3 v Littorio (probably with more BBs than RM has) fight even if it takes loses the RM cant effectively deal with it by building or transferring ship afterwards and loses control of the Med.

B&T (and S&G if still alive) are forced to be far more defensive as fighting two v one against G3s will not result in good things.... This makes Atlantic and escorting to Russia significantly safer.

By the time we get to late 41 the RN is in a very different place, and that's without even thinking about what the larger industry would be able to provide come rearmament time ie more CVs than OTL due to less need for KVGs......

USN will concentrate far more on Pacific apart from sending old BBs to support landing in Med/Normandy....
 
A lot depends on who sees whom on radar and the vector merge. A great deal more depends on the ADMIRALS. Lancelot Holland had the Hood, and he had the not ready for battle PoW, so it is practical to say with a couple of G3s, it is 2 to 1. But then again, look at aspects and firing arcs and the RTL history of the likely naval artillery employed. Holland gets the boot for trying to close the range and get the Hood in close where her belt armor should have worked, but... he turned to bring after batteries to bear too late in what he knew was a 1 vs, 1 situation. (about 15 seconds too late). The G-3s in that case present a 12 gun on 8 solution, exactly the same as the PoW and Hood did and they, too, have to get close because I suspect that same defect in the armor scheme around the fore structure as Hood had will be present. Holland still has the same problem and he probably will try the same solution. Will he succeed? Depends. Rodney says "maybe". Let's look at Rodney.


The Rodney had to close to PBR to punch into Bismarck's belt and consistently hit. KGV during the same action ran into gun issues of her own reminiscent of PoW. So we have no guarantee that the G3 artillery will not have Nelson type issues, but we do have a guarantee they will not be KGV issues. I'll give it 60/40 RN with possible both G3s surviving. I sure would love destroyer support, though.



Mutsu and Nagato were tough bears. Braindead Takagi in charge, I give the RN a clear win. Anyone else Japanese (like tough old Kurita?) and the G3s die. Comes down to the torpedoes and air scouting. Japanese ones nose wander a lot. British ones are straight runners, but lack punch and range. If we go Amagis (and the Nagato type rebuilds), then even with Braindead it is an IJN victory. They were the best in the world at night surface actions. They knew how to scout and maintain a tactical plot.


RN AAA was NTG. Nobody else had decent AAA until about late 1942 either (all aspect directors and a good MAB auto cannon). I can see Repulse and Renown as CTF escorts. The QEs are too slow. The G3s would have to work in at least 4 x 8 pom poms with all asp directors and I would like to see a 4.7 in the DP battery. Modernized that way, they would be decent bodyguard ships.



One may realize that in the North Atlantic this holds true, but in the Med and in the IO in the RTL the RN needed no less than 9 BBs to cover RTL needs 1939-1942? With Home Fleet added that is 14 BBs total. If you give up 9 of that RTL lot to get 6 G3s (2 more than the 4 projected) you are going to fall one ocean short and things get very dicey even if you add 3 KGVs.

In the PacFLT there is no effective battleship support until August 1942. Insane Pye has 6 Standards, but those are stuck on the American west coast either being refitted or repaired after Pearl Harbor RTL. They won't be ready until March 1943. ITTL US fast battleship support, assuming SoDak 2.0 ITTL would be 6... probably Atlantic based as in RTL with the North Carolinas to cover RN shortfalls. Makes for an interesting what-if. I can see SoDaks running with a Wasp to Malta easily ITTL.

Hmm. SoDak 2.0 (1 or 2) with Brits as RTL and Wasp (Yorktown version.) vs Littorio and company and LW on a May Malta run 1942. I still don't like those odds at all. It should wind up exactly like it did, a fiasco.
G3 had vastly heavier armour than Hood. See all the guns forward that you described as easy to target? 14 inch main belt, over vitals 12 for the rest of the length, inclined at 18 degrees. 12 inch bulkheads and 8 inches of belt armour. Hood suffered from having it'd main belt at 12 inches, which probably would've kept out Bismarck's shells, but then having a 7" inch upper strake, which was punched clean through just as a test done in the 20s had predicted.
no21987-1920_Gunnery_trials_sketches.jpg

3 inches of extra plating could've saved Hood, at least from that Golden BB. G3 does not have the same flaw. A lot of Nelrods turret issues were down to trying to shove so much in without going over the tonnage. This isn't to say G3 would be free of issues with her guns, but regardless most of Nelrods issues were ironed out by the 30s. This would be the same with the G3s. So let's say instead of Hood and PoW we've two G3s at Denmark strait. They don't have to close at the same angle as Hood did, although RN doctrine did advocate close range, they wouldn't have to come in at such a steep angle. Even if they don't have their rear turret open in the initial stages, that's 12 16" guns that are possible not as reliable as Hoods guns, but certainly more so than PoWs, and are also both harder hitting. On top of that they would have more modern fire control than Hood, so would both be firing at Bismarck rather than PE. It had been shown time and time again, Germany ships get killed as fighting ships very quickly once large caliber shells start hitting them, due to exposed electronics amongst other things. Bismarck's final battle, Battle of Lofoten and Scharnhorsts final battle showed this. So once Bismarck's gets hit, it will probably hit something important or vital to her ability to fight, ie a turret, fire control etc, and would get knocked out. Prinz Eugen will be pretty busy dealing with both G3s 6" secondaries

G3s would absolutely trash the Kongos. Faster, more guns and bigger, vastly superior armour. It'd be no competition.
Nagato and Mutsu? Again I'd give it to the G3s if we say both sides have similar escorts. In a force Z situation the G3s will be looking towards the skies. G3s actually having a shitton of space for AA but I'd want a carrier regardless. In a 1 on 1 with a Nagato, forget escorts or fighter aircraft because there are huge variables there, where are we, when is it etc. Again G3s win out. Between 5 and 7 knots faster, heavier belt, heavier deck and an extra gun.
You really REALLY seem to be underestimating the G3s, something as fast as Iowa with better armour and the same caliber guns, although sure they aren't the much wanked over mark 7s, don't think any axis admiral would like their 16 inch shells screaming towards their battleship.
 
Top
Status
Not open for further replies.
Top