What if the USA realised that the Sherman was not fit for use in Europe and decided to copy the T34 and the IS2?

No, the first T-34s that went to Arab countries died faster than those at Kursk. It was only when those produced after the war in Poland and Czechslovakia began to arrive that Arab tank owners could use them in any way.
 
Going to ask this question again, would it have made any sense for the British to adopt the T-34?
While the basic design was sound, and British tanks of early war often had ergonomics almost as bad as that of the T-34, it would only be an improvement if the British improved the design, such as adding a three-man turret, cupolas, etc.
 
Too late at the time the British could have adopted it, they're better off just doing better with the A27. But yes from 1940 to 1942 the T-34 compares on very favourable terms to British cruisers.
While the British tanks weren't great when compared withe T34, the problem was mainly due to shortages post fall of France which prioritised quantity over quality. There was also the unfortunate decision that had delayed start of 6 pounder production so there was no available manufacturing capacity during that period.

Having knowledge of the T34, or even full drawings won't help solve the problem that Britain had to churn out a lot of tanks and AT guns - that they knew weren't quite good enough - before they could shift production to improved models.

As for effectiveness, until the Afrika Korps and its 50mm AT guns arrived, British tanks had been doing extremely well in Africa despite the post-Dunkirk issues. Even after the AK arrived, the poor performance of British tanks was often due at least in part to poor command decisions, and having T34s won't fix that part.
 
Thanks for that lay out of the problem in tank design. You have to understand the tank's mission to give it the features it will need to carrier it out. That was the beauty of the much-maligned Sherman, it was a general-purpose tank. It wasn't as fast as a cruiser tank, or as well armored as a heavy tank, or had a high-powered anti-tank gun like the Germans long 75mm, or 88mm. It was actually better armored than the Pz IV, was faster than most tanks, its medium 75mm had a good HE round, a devastating WP round, and an AP round that could kill even Tiger tanks from the side. All things considered the Sherman was a good tank well suited for service in Europe.

Interesting that you mention Sherman Assault Guns with 105mm howitzers for infantry support. I've never found much about what effect it had on other tanks. All though it wasn't an AP round, but I have read that the impact was so powerful a few hits could batter a tank and disable it. A 105mm has a lot of kinetic energy that can damage the structure of the tank even if it doesn't penetrate the armor.
......
I was under the impression that there was a 105mm HEAT round available in WW2 ?

IMHO for an army that is planning to go on the offensive having to rely on side shots to take out at least some enemy armor doesn't seem like the best plan to me, but I suppose the best can be the enemy of the good when making these types of trade offs.
 
I was under the impression that there was a 105mm HEAT round available in WW2 ?

IMHO for an army that is planning to go on the offensive having to rely on side shots to take out at least some enemy armor doesn't seem like the best plan to me, but I suppose the best can be the enemy of the good when making these types of trade offs.
The solution for front shots on the Tiger I was the 76mm Sherman with tungsten cored HVAP rounds. They could penetrate the frontal armor of a Tiger I and parts of the frontal armor of the Panther. The problem was a shortage of HVAP rounds in WWII. Most of this scarce ammo was issued to 76mm armed M18 Hellcat TDs with most tanks in late 1944/45 only getting 4 in an ammo load. The Panther had a very thick and well angled glace plate, and the Tiger II was in a class all its own. The limitation of the Sherman was it was 33 tons, the Panther 46 tons, the Tiger I 56 tons, and the Tiger II 70 tons. Sherman size limited the size of guns and thickness of armor.

There were factory and field up armored Sherman's with about 1" more armor up front giving Tiger I level protection. The U.S. Army fought many Panthers but not many Tigers. By the end of 1944 it was clear that a more powerful tank was needed which finally ended the debate about the M26. The army started shipping pre-production 46-ton M26 90mm gun Pershing Tanks to the ETO to join the M36 Jackson 90mm TDs that was already entering service. That's why the British who fought most of the Tigers in the West wanted to replace their Sherman's with new A34 Comet I Tanks armed with a 17-pound gun as fast as possible.

The problem with HEAT rounds in WWII was the difficulty of making a fast enough fuse for proper detonation. HEAT warheads in lower velocity weapons like Bazooka Rockets worked fine. No one had effective HEAT rounds till the 1950s.
 
No, the first T-34s that went to Arab countries died faster than those at Kursk. It was only when those produced after the war in Poland and Czechslovakia began to arrive that Arab tank owners could use them in any way.
Ok, were the first Soviet tanks sent to the Arabs T-34/76 rather than T-34/85's? If so, that was a bad deal. The Arabs were taken by a crooked used tank dealer.
 
Fundamentally, this disagreement in this thread is not about tactical issues like you are trying to make out. It concerns the operational deployment of the Armored Division on the offensive, but the issue is confused because the US did not use Soviet terminology that only appeared in Western circles late in the Cold War. McNair viewed the armored division as explicitly and solely filling the role of an operational maneuver group at the corps or army level. The Armored Corps with its heavy armored divisions and motorized infantry division was intended for mobile warfare, including the assault, breakthrough, and exploitation. McNair wanted to reduce the proliferation of specialized units at the division level and above by essentially making the Infantry Division, with reinforcing armor, cavalry, artillery, and combat service support, the standard unit of action. With this way of thinking, any infantry division could be reinforced with tanks and trucks to make a motorized division capable of executing the assault and breakthrough phase of an offensive and then supporting the breakthrough into the mobile phase of the offensive. The armored division, stripped down to enable it to maneuver more freely in the enemy rear area with less logistical support, would then push through the gap and into the enemy rear to engage whatever it found there, including the logistical units and the assembly areas of enemy reinforcements, which could include enemy armored units attempting to close the breakthrough or maneuver against the exploitation force.

These issues that McNair pushed for had very little to do with the tactical employment of tanks on the battlefield or the tactical-technical requirements tank designs would need to meet to accomplish the tasks envisioned for them. His role in Army Ground Forces was to design and deliver the fighting force overseas, which was essentially a strategic role, so he was far more concerned with the overall training and equipping of the force than with the tactical employment of its components. The idea that American tanks on the battlefield would make any attempt to avoid engaging enemy tanks is absurd. If there was an enemy armored threat on the front line, the relative weakness of American infantry anti-tank capabilities, which relied on 57 mm towed guns and bazookas, would have meant that tanks, even Shermans with 75 mm guns, were the best AT weapons on the front line. The Tank Destroyer branch, which included both mobile and towed TD units, was not meant for fighting on the front line. That unit was specifically formed to confront the Sickle Cut, where enemy armor was maneuvering freely behind friendly lines with little infantry support, despite the fact that the Germans no longer fought in that manner. The only operational-level breakthrough the Germans made against the US was in the Ardennes, and that was really the only scenario that the US encountered in northwest Europe that matched what the TD branch was designed to face. Ultimately, the design of the Sherman was dictated more by McNair's strategic concerns, which included designing a passable tank in terms of firepower, protection, and mobility that could be manufactured cheaply, would be reliable overseas, and could be shipped and moved easily.
Respectfully what is being asked in this thread is would an American clone of the T-34/76 be more effective in the ETO than the M4 Sherman. I don't think it would. What I was addressing was the debate in tank design between those who thought a tank has to be able to defeat other tanks or if that's a minor consideration. If you don't think you need to defeat Tigers or Panthers, you didn't need more powerful tanks, if you do you need a tank like the M26. The Sherman held its own well enough to do the job but clearly if the war had gone on longer tanks like the M26 Pershing, and the British A34 Comet would be needed to cope with the rising numbers of German heavy armor units.
 
While the basic design was sound, and British tanks of early war often had ergonomics almost as bad as that of the T-34, it would only be an improvement if the British improved the design, such as adding a three-man turret, cupolas, etc.
Another old pic I originally made for the "Alternate Armoured Fighting Vehicle" thread.
~Crusader Mk V British T34 with 17 pdr.png

British built T-34 with T-34/85 turret armed with 17 Pdr. gun.
 
Thing to remember is that the US (including its policy making arms) are still largely dominated by the industrial franchises (essentially still the robber barons that made their mint from the late 1800s onwards). There is no way that these industries and all-pervasive influence and lobbying power, which are essentially the precursors of today's industrial-technical conglomerates, would be amenable to adopting a communist foreign product. Essentailly they would stymie any such moves in favor of developing a local product, just to make a buck if for no other reason.
That is completely incorrect. Up to the Sherman U.S. tank design was an internal army function. The M26 was the first U.S. tank designed with support from the automotive industry. A T-34 clone would be produced by the same companies that built the M4 Sherman, so they'd make the same amount of money. American industry was more than willing to produce foreign weapon designs. U.S. 75mm & 155mm gun/howitzers were based on French guns. 105mm howitzers were based on captured German guns from WWI. The 1903 Springfield rifle was based on the German K98 Mauser. They even built an assembly line to produce 380mm shells for French battleships.
 
US armoured doctrine was that the tanks were for exploiting breakthroughs. Anti-tank work was the job of the tank destroyers, which were a branch of the artillery. When American tanks encountered enemy armour, they were supposed to call in the tank destroyers, which were supposed to be near by.

The short 75mm gun on the standard Sherman was better than the longer guns at shooting HE, which was the Sherman’s main job. The premise of the OP does not really match how the US Army thought about armoured warfare at the time.
The Sherman didn't have a short 75mm gun, it was a medium gun. The gun could kill the Pz IV at normal combat ranges. It only seemed short compared to the long 75mm guns on later model Pz IV's & Panthers. Using WP rounds in fighting heavier German tanks was an effective tactic. Poisonous fumes could be sucked into the crew compartment driving the crew out, or make the crew think the tank was on fire. The smoke could blind the crew making it hard for the German tank to target you.

The Tiger fight in Fury was nonsense. The Tiger would've taken out Fury first because it was the greatest threat. The 76mm Sherman didn't have a WP round. The Tiger couldn't drive out of the smoke cloud because the WP was burning on the Tiger. Fury would've had a few HVAP rounds and killed the Tiger. The 75mm Sherman's didn't have to hit the Tiger in the rear, the side would do. Leaving a good defensive position behind a berm to charge the Tiger from the front was crazy. The ending where they all decided to commit suicide was stupid, but other than those little thing's it was an enjoyable war movie.
 
The solution for front shots on the Tiger I was the 76mm Sherman with tungsten cored HVAP rounds.
No the solution to the Tiger is the almost complete absence of of Tigers, something to do with small mammals eating their eggs apparently. There are so few built that the fate of every single Tiger on the Western front is documented.

The US in Normandy met no Tigers None BUGGER ALL. The Armoured forces they face are ' remnants' in the German terminology a slight exception with Panzer Lehr which has an unfortunate meeting with a couple of air forces prior to the ground force advance

There are more encounters with Tiger II, of which even fewer were produced, and1/3 of all production is lost in the Ardennes. Mainly to Geography. Its something when the almost decisive (tm) tank - this is the description given after fighting unstoppable IS2 and powerful T34/85 ( who slightly earlier ambush a Tiger II unit by sneaking round the side, like they told you to n training).
 
Yeah by the time the T-34's coming along the UK would be working on the Cromwell, and the Cromwell wasn't bad at all. It was just too damn late. If the Cromwell had come out late 42 or in 43 in time to fight in North Africa, then it would have been a world beater. The 57mm gun would have punched through any tank the Germans had, including the Tiger (albeit at shorter ranges) and it fired an 'adequate' HE round, and it was fairly reliable and easy to maintain (if a fucker to bail out of).

Yes there were some features that were a bit odd, like the stepped flat front, but this was the same in the Panzer IV, which would have been its primary opponent, and its speed would have been very handy in the desert.
But instead the tanks deployed in 44 and is the most common UK built tank deployed to fight the Germans on the continent, and by then the Panther's come along and is a considerable overmatch in the rare cases of a duel. But tank engagements don't happen in 1 v 1 duels, they happen as part of larger battles.
If the Cromwell had entered service in late 42 early 43 then the Comet could have well been around a lot earlier, with them maybe seeing service at Normandy, and they were fully capable of engaging Panthers with their 77mm guns.
 
No the solution to the Tiger is the almost complete absence of of Tigers, something to do with small mammals eating their eggs apparently. There are so few built that the fate of every single Tiger on the Western front is documented.

The US in Normandy met no Tigers None BUGGER ALL. The Armoured forces they face are ' remnants' in the German terminology a slight exception with Panzer Lehr which has an unfortunate meeting with a couple of air forces prior to the ground force advance

There are more encounters with Tiger II, of which even fewer were produced, and1/3 of all production is lost in the Ardennes. Mainly to Geography. Its something when the almost decisive (tm) tank - this is the description given after fighting unstoppable IS2 and powerful T34/85 ( who slightly earlier ambush a Tiger II unit by sneaking round the side, like they told you to n training).
The Panzer IV with added turret armour looked quite tiger-like and I can't blame a tank crew for assuming it was one. But even a late Panzer IV was dangerous enough, and needed to be treated seriously.
 
and I will remind folks that a lot of the stuff about the superiority of German equipment/Men/training/doctrine etc is a product of Post WW2 stuff where the West wanted to get the rest of the world comfortable with working alongside former enemies so they could arm the West Germans. And a lot of that propaganda comes from actual fucking nazi's.


its off topic but its a good vid to watch.
 
And yeah the 75 on the Sherman was not a 'short' gun.

TW6SjAe.jpeg


That is a Short 75mm gun the gun on the Char 1B.

The 75mm on the Sherman was a perfectly capable gun for the war as folks have said.
 
The Panzer IV with added turret armour looked quite tiger-like and I can't blame a tank crew for assuming it was one. But even a late Panzer IV was dangerous enough, and needed to be treated seriously.
Well its a tank bullet proof and all that.

But a P4 is not in fact a Tiger. It is a P4, and vulnerable to the 75mm.

The tactical criticism all seems to be that allied tanks were so crap that it took them a whole 2 months to obliterate the Panzer force in the west. Unlike the Russians in the mighty T34 maybe, who were having issues dealing with P3 around Kharkiv the year before.

There is a reasonable debate as to whether the US should have introduced the 76mm earlier. The armoured force did not see the need until July 44.
 
No the solution to the Tiger is the almost complete absence of of Tigers, something to do with small mammals eating their eggs apparently. There are so few built that the fate of every single Tiger on the Western front is documented.

The US in Normandy met no Tigers None BUGGER ALL. The Armoured forces they face are ' remnants' in the German terminology a slight exception with Panzer Lehr which has an unfortunate meeting with a couple of air forces prior to the ground force advance

There are more encounters with Tiger II, of which even fewer were produced, and1/3 of all production is lost in the Ardennes. Mainly to Geography. Its something when the almost decisive (tm) tank - this is the description given after fighting unstoppable IS2 and powerful T34/85 ( who slightly earlier ambush a Tiger II unit by sneaking round the side, like they told you to n training).
I have mentioned in several posts that the Americans encountered few Tiger tanks in the ETO. None in Normandy, a battalion in the Roer, 3 battalions or so in the Battle of the Bulge, (along with some numbers of heavy assault guns like Jagdtigers) a number around the Remagen Bridgehead, and mostly small groups in Central Germany. The British faced most of the Tigers in the West. The Americans did face large numbers of Panthers. They had every reason to understand that they needed better tanks to deal with what would only be increasing numbers of Tigers & Panthers.

As for the fighting I think your referring to in Normandy; the reason U.S. VII Corps was facing the remnants of several Panzer/Panzergrenadier divisions was because U.S. ground forces had chewed them up over the previous 2 months. The Panzer Lehr Division was shifted from the British sector prior to Operation Cobra. U.S. 2nd Armored Division destroyed 64 German tanks during Cobra. During the Battle of the Bulge 2nd Armored Division attacked and defeated the 2nd Panzer Division at the tip of the German advance and defeated the relief efforts of the Panzer Lehr Division. American tankers did their fair share of the fighting in the ETO.
 
I just Wonder how many US infantry will get killed in this alt history because of fewer tanks supporting them?
We seam to be hyper focused on what was the least common use for a US tank and we seam to be willing to sacrifice the much more common uses.

i have said this before but: The real world is NOT A VIDEO GAME OR A MOVIE,

If you are in a one on one duel with any German tank much less a tiger/Tiger 2 or whatever then something has already gone wrong.

The whole point of a tank is to support the rest of the army in attacking or defending. 100% pure and simple. Yes they were used to fight other tanks. They were used against pill boxes and buildings and everything else you can think of. But the point of doing this is to support the infentry do things that are dangerous for them to do on their own. This is not a game where you win by getting you tank to the other side of the map or by destroying another tank in a one on one duel like some sort of modern day knights jousting each other.

There are a number of trade offs that have to be considered. Otherwise everyone should just build giant tanks like the Mous and we have three “landships“ on the Wallies side fight a couple gigantic supper tanks on the Side of Germany and call it a day.

This was a real war in which the Allie’s were having to March across all of Europe and push the German infantry/troops out of almost every nook and cranny and trully take over the continent.

The US had something close to Two MILLION troops in the European theater of the war. And GB and the rest of the Wallies add even more. Now how many tanks did the US have?
the US lost a bit. Over 140,000 dead in Europe in WW2
The US lost about 7000 tanks in Europe in WW2.
About 18% casualties in U.S. Rifflemen
About 8% casualties in US tank Crews.
(depending on who’s numbers you use)
let’s assume that we dropp that 8% to 7% then we go down to a bit over 6000 destroyed tanks and we save about 900 tanks. So potentially we save say 4500-5000 tankers. Assuming every tank loses all 5. If we take the average of 23-30% of the crew died when the tank was destroyed (depending on who’s numbers you use) then we are looking at 1150 -1500 actually saved lives in the tanks.
Now these improved tanks will result in fewer tanks in Europe and we have proven statistics that show a direct correlation between number of tanks available and the fatalities in infantry. Fewer tanks understandable results in higher fatalities.
So let’s guess a very minor increase going from 18% to 18.5%
If we lose this 1/2 of a percentage more casualties elsewhere then we as a result then we increase deaths by between 3000 and 5000. Even a 1/4% increase results in 1500+ more dead. or at best a break even

Yes these numbers area sort of fudged because I didn’t feel like doing a full research paper about what is in fact a POD that is based on a false assumption. (that the Sherman was a bad design) The point of my math exercise above is to show that you are more likely to end up with more dead US soldiers by changing out the Sherman then if you just left it as is,
And you CANT LOOK AT THIS IN A VACUUM. Saving 1000 tank crewmen while killing 1000 riflemen is 100% POINTLESS and saving 500 tank crewmen while killing 2000 riffle men is just plan STUPID.

So minor changes such as a more powerful gun sooner is one thing, but ANYTHING that has a significant impact on the numbers of active tanks in Europe is going to have a disproportionate impact on Non Tank troops.
And you absolutely can not replace the Sherman and keep the numbers the same. The Sherman was in part the way it was in order to nake the numbers/logistics work as well as they did. A bigger/better tanks will necessitate worse logistics and fewer produced. Even the US had limits on its production/resources/money/logistics so SOMETHING has to give if you want a more powerful tank.

And I contend that as it turns out building fewer but. Better tanks will Actually delay the end of the war and and result in more dead US sold so what is the point? Yes if German had produced a lot more of there heavies sooner it may have been a problem but they didn’t. And there is a reason for that.
If anything the argument should be about if Germany would have been better off without building the heavies to start with!
 
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