Interesting.Too late at the time the British could have adopted it, they're better off just doing better with the A27. But yes from 1940 to 1942 the T-34 compares on very favourable terms to British cruisers.
Interesting.Too late at the time the British could have adopted it, they're better off just doing better with the A27. But yes from 1940 to 1942 the T-34 compares on very favourable terms to British cruisers.
While the basic design was sound, and British tanks of early war often had ergonomics almost as bad as that of the T-34, it would only be an improvement if the British improved the design, such as adding a three-man turret, cupolas, etc.Going to ask this question again, would it have made any sense for the British to adopt the T-34?
While the British tanks weren't great when compared withe T34, the problem was mainly due to shortages post fall of France which prioritised quantity over quality. There was also the unfortunate decision that had delayed start of 6 pounder production so there was no available manufacturing capacity during that period.Too late at the time the British could have adopted it, they're better off just doing better with the A27. But yes from 1940 to 1942 the T-34 compares on very favourable terms to British cruisers.
I was under the impression that there was a 105mm HEAT round available in WW2 ?Thanks for that lay out of the problem in tank design. You have to understand the tank's mission to give it the features it will need to carrier it out. That was the beauty of the much-maligned Sherman, it was a general-purpose tank. It wasn't as fast as a cruiser tank, or as well armored as a heavy tank, or had a high-powered anti-tank gun like the Germans long 75mm, or 88mm. It was actually better armored than the Pz IV, was faster than most tanks, its medium 75mm had a good HE round, a devastating WP round, and an AP round that could kill even Tiger tanks from the side. All things considered the Sherman was a good tank well suited for service in Europe.
Interesting that you mention Sherman Assault Guns with 105mm howitzers for infantry support. I've never found much about what effect it had on other tanks. All though it wasn't an AP round, but I have read that the impact was so powerful a few hits could batter a tank and disable it. A 105mm has a lot of kinetic energy that can damage the structure of the tank even if it doesn't penetrate the armor.
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The solution for front shots on the Tiger I was the 76mm Sherman with tungsten cored HVAP rounds. They could penetrate the frontal armor of a Tiger I and parts of the frontal armor of the Panther. The problem was a shortage of HVAP rounds in WWII. Most of this scarce ammo was issued to 76mm armed M18 Hellcat TDs with most tanks in late 1944/45 only getting 4 in an ammo load. The Panther had a very thick and well angled glace plate, and the Tiger II was in a class all its own. The limitation of the Sherman was it was 33 tons, the Panther 46 tons, the Tiger I 56 tons, and the Tiger II 70 tons. Sherman size limited the size of guns and thickness of armor.I was under the impression that there was a 105mm HEAT round available in WW2 ?
IMHO for an army that is planning to go on the offensive having to rely on side shots to take out at least some enemy armor doesn't seem like the best plan to me, but I suppose the best can be the enemy of the good when making these types of trade offs.
Ok, were the first Soviet tanks sent to the Arabs T-34/76 rather than T-34/85's? If so, that was a bad deal. The Arabs were taken by a crooked used tank dealer.No, the first T-34s that went to Arab countries died faster than those at Kursk. It was only when those produced after the war in Poland and Czechslovakia began to arrive that Arab tank owners could use them in any way.
Respectfully what is being asked in this thread is would an American clone of the T-34/76 be more effective in the ETO than the M4 Sherman. I don't think it would. What I was addressing was the debate in tank design between those who thought a tank has to be able to defeat other tanks or if that's a minor consideration. If you don't think you need to defeat Tigers or Panthers, you didn't need more powerful tanks, if you do you need a tank like the M26. The Sherman held its own well enough to do the job but clearly if the war had gone on longer tanks like the M26 Pershing, and the British A34 Comet would be needed to cope with the rising numbers of German heavy armor units.Fundamentally, this disagreement in this thread is not about tactical issues like you are trying to make out. It concerns the operational deployment of the Armored Division on the offensive, but the issue is confused because the US did not use Soviet terminology that only appeared in Western circles late in the Cold War. McNair viewed the armored division as explicitly and solely filling the role of an operational maneuver group at the corps or army level. The Armored Corps with its heavy armored divisions and motorized infantry division was intended for mobile warfare, including the assault, breakthrough, and exploitation. McNair wanted to reduce the proliferation of specialized units at the division level and above by essentially making the Infantry Division, with reinforcing armor, cavalry, artillery, and combat service support, the standard unit of action. With this way of thinking, any infantry division could be reinforced with tanks and trucks to make a motorized division capable of executing the assault and breakthrough phase of an offensive and then supporting the breakthrough into the mobile phase of the offensive. The armored division, stripped down to enable it to maneuver more freely in the enemy rear area with less logistical support, would then push through the gap and into the enemy rear to engage whatever it found there, including the logistical units and the assembly areas of enemy reinforcements, which could include enemy armored units attempting to close the breakthrough or maneuver against the exploitation force.
These issues that McNair pushed for had very little to do with the tactical employment of tanks on the battlefield or the tactical-technical requirements tank designs would need to meet to accomplish the tasks envisioned for them. His role in Army Ground Forces was to design and deliver the fighting force overseas, which was essentially a strategic role, so he was far more concerned with the overall training and equipping of the force than with the tactical employment of its components. The idea that American tanks on the battlefield would make any attempt to avoid engaging enemy tanks is absurd. If there was an enemy armored threat on the front line, the relative weakness of American infantry anti-tank capabilities, which relied on 57 mm towed guns and bazookas, would have meant that tanks, even Shermans with 75 mm guns, were the best AT weapons on the front line. The Tank Destroyer branch, which included both mobile and towed TD units, was not meant for fighting on the front line. That unit was specifically formed to confront the Sickle Cut, where enemy armor was maneuvering freely behind friendly lines with little infantry support, despite the fact that the Germans no longer fought in that manner. The only operational-level breakthrough the Germans made against the US was in the Ardennes, and that was really the only scenario that the US encountered in northwest Europe that matched what the TD branch was designed to face. Ultimately, the design of the Sherman was dictated more by McNair's strategic concerns, which included designing a passable tank in terms of firepower, protection, and mobility that could be manufactured cheaply, would be reliable overseas, and could be shipped and moved easily.
Another old pic I originally made for the "Alternate Armoured Fighting Vehicle" thread.While the basic design was sound, and British tanks of early war often had ergonomics almost as bad as that of the T-34, it would only be an improvement if the British improved the design, such as adding a three-man turret, cupolas, etc.
That is completely incorrect. Up to the Sherman U.S. tank design was an internal army function. The M26 was the first U.S. tank designed with support from the automotive industry. A T-34 clone would be produced by the same companies that built the M4 Sherman, so they'd make the same amount of money. American industry was more than willing to produce foreign weapon designs. U.S. 75mm & 155mm gun/howitzers were based on French guns. 105mm howitzers were based on captured German guns from WWI. The 1903 Springfield rifle was based on the German K98 Mauser. They even built an assembly line to produce 380mm shells for French battleships.Thing to remember is that the US (including its policy making arms) are still largely dominated by the industrial franchises (essentially still the robber barons that made their mint from the late 1800s onwards). There is no way that these industries and all-pervasive influence and lobbying power, which are essentially the precursors of today's industrial-technical conglomerates, would be amenable to adopting a communist foreign product. Essentailly they would stymie any such moves in favor of developing a local product, just to make a buck if for no other reason.
The Sherman didn't have a short 75mm gun, it was a medium gun. The gun could kill the Pz IV at normal combat ranges. It only seemed short compared to the long 75mm guns on later model Pz IV's & Panthers. Using WP rounds in fighting heavier German tanks was an effective tactic. Poisonous fumes could be sucked into the crew compartment driving the crew out, or make the crew think the tank was on fire. The smoke could blind the crew making it hard for the German tank to target you.US armoured doctrine was that the tanks were for exploiting breakthroughs. Anti-tank work was the job of the tank destroyers, which were a branch of the artillery. When American tanks encountered enemy armour, they were supposed to call in the tank destroyers, which were supposed to be near by.
The short 75mm gun on the standard Sherman was better than the longer guns at shooting HE, which was the Sherman’s main job. The premise of the OP does not really match how the US Army thought about armoured warfare at the time.
No the solution to the Tiger is the almost complete absence of of Tigers, something to do with small mammals eating their eggs apparently. There are so few built that the fate of every single Tiger on the Western front is documented.The solution for front shots on the Tiger I was the 76mm Sherman with tungsten cored HVAP rounds.
The Panzer IV with added turret armour looked quite tiger-like and I can't blame a tank crew for assuming it was one. But even a late Panzer IV was dangerous enough, and needed to be treated seriously.No the solution to the Tiger is the almost complete absence of of Tigers, something to do with small mammals eating their eggs apparently. There are so few built that the fate of every single Tiger on the Western front is documented.
The US in Normandy met no Tigers None BUGGER ALL. The Armoured forces they face are ' remnants' in the German terminology a slight exception with Panzer Lehr which has an unfortunate meeting with a couple of air forces prior to the ground force advance
There are more encounters with Tiger II, of which even fewer were produced, and1/3 of all production is lost in the Ardennes. Mainly to Geography. Its something when the almost decisive (tm) tank - this is the description given after fighting unstoppable IS2 and powerful T34/85 ( who slightly earlier ambush a Tiger II unit by sneaking round the side, like they told you to n training).
Well its a tank bullet proof and all that.The Panzer IV with added turret armour looked quite tiger-like and I can't blame a tank crew for assuming it was one. But even a late Panzer IV was dangerous enough, and needed to be treated seriously.
I have mentioned in several posts that the Americans encountered few Tiger tanks in the ETO. None in Normandy, a battalion in the Roer, 3 battalions or so in the Battle of the Bulge, (along with some numbers of heavy assault guns like Jagdtigers) a number around the Remagen Bridgehead, and mostly small groups in Central Germany. The British faced most of the Tigers in the West. The Americans did face large numbers of Panthers. They had every reason to understand that they needed better tanks to deal with what would only be increasing numbers of Tigers & Panthers.No the solution to the Tiger is the almost complete absence of of Tigers, something to do with small mammals eating their eggs apparently. There are so few built that the fate of every single Tiger on the Western front is documented.
The US in Normandy met no Tigers None BUGGER ALL. The Armoured forces they face are ' remnants' in the German terminology a slight exception with Panzer Lehr which has an unfortunate meeting with a couple of air forces prior to the ground force advance
There are more encounters with Tiger II, of which even fewer were produced, and1/3 of all production is lost in the Ardennes. Mainly to Geography. Its something when the almost decisive (tm) tank - this is the description given after fighting unstoppable IS2 and powerful T34/85 ( who slightly earlier ambush a Tiger II unit by sneaking round the side, like they told you to n training).