That is a good question. I know there was some concern over bridges - especially with German heavies from the Tiger on-up - but those aside I can’t recall any case where it was a truly major concern…
What if the USA realised that the Sherman was not fit for use in Europe and decided to copy the T34 and the IS2?
- Thread starter Lambtotheslaughter
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That is a good question. I know there was some concern over bridges - especially with German heavies from the Tiger on-up - but those aside I can’t recall any case where it was a truly major concern…
France did, up to 1940 obviously and mostly concerning their own infrastructure (and partly Belgian as well).
They had 3 actual categories for roads and bridges which differ from their chosen tank weight classes, but to sum up:
- 13 tonnes for light military bridging, hence the focus on keeping 1935 type light tanks roughly below that weight
- 20 tonnes for common civilian and military bridges and rolling stock (D2, Somua, future infantry support tanks, early G1 program)
- 35 tonnes is the limit for satisfactory road transport, bridges and special rolling stock (B1 Bis and final G1). This limit is reassessed to 40, then 45 tonnes in 1940 without reinforcing anything (future battle tank) based on infrastructural progress and a better testing methodology regarding the effect of tracked vehicles on infrastructure.
For dimensions, the restriction was 2.94m width and 2.85m height over like half of the width, and 2.6m over a small part of the width.
Anything beyond that requires reinforcements or splitting the tank in multiple parts.
Your right about the T-34M. It would've had a 3-man turret but with a 76mm gun. I don't know if that turret could've handled an 85mm because it wasn't made for it. The 17 lb. gun was really too big for the British Firefly Sherman which effected performance. The Soviets might have needed a new turret anyway. But yes, the T-34M would've been much more effective but time didn't allow for. I don't think it would've been ready for production till late in 1941, but after June 22 they had to make do with what they had ready. The Germans made a big mistake by committing Tiger Tanks in drips and drabs on the soft ground around Leningrad instead of introducing them in mass at Kursk.
Right again, but until the Red Army defeated the German summer offensive in 1943, they were worried about any drop in T-34 production. Soviet production numbers of armored vehicles were amazing, but considering their loses they needed huge reserves to sustain their offensive operations.
Again, numbers count, and they didn't know what the Germans would throw at them in the summer of 1943. All they knew was they'd never been able to stop a German summer offensive before.
It was a major concern everywhere Tiger's were employed. They needed special flat cars for transport. They needed to check bridges to see if they could handle the load. They needed to worry more about soft ground than most other tanks had to. Moving between trees off road could be more of a problem leaving them road bound and subject to ambush. Their maneuverability issues along with their mechanical unreliability, and high fuel consumption made them impractical for most missions. The Tiger II was far worse and never should've been built. It was a WWII tank in the same weight class as the modern M1A2 which is too heavy even by today's standards.
The T-34M had a 1600mm-wide turret ring so would more readily accept a new T-34-85 style turret than the basic T-34 (no hull mods required), but the turret itself wasn't as big as the T-34-85's, so while it would work better than the T-34's hexagonal turret to use the Zis-S-53 gun, it still wouldn't be as practical.
Intended armament was indeed the 76, with a proportion of the tanks using the 57mm Zis-4 gun to provide better antitank support, but this would only suffice against a Tiger I.
They didn't expect to start production until October 1941 anyway at Kharkov, and not until January 1942 at STZ.
This keeps slipping my mind, unfortunately.
In the here and now, where 'tank as multipurpose combat vehicle' is the norm, it is very easy for somebody like myself to overlook that once upon a time, armoured vehicles were segregated according to what opponents they were meant to fight.
I think that segregation is partly a limitation of the technology as much as a planned split. Guderian clearly puts the primary target of tanks as enemy tanks, for example, but at the time it wasn't possible to mount a powerful dual purpose gun on a well armoured fast chassis.
Armour mean slow, infantry support tanks needed armour vs AT guns so the Matilda Val S35 and Char B1 were developed, or you could have moderately armoured lighter tanks like R35, Hotchkiss.
If you wanted speed, you couldn't have much armour, so the cruiser tank was the other option.
Also in the late 30s and very early 40s most AT guns were small high velocity weapons optimised for poking holes, backed with larger diameter HE throwers - 2pounder/ 3.7" or 3" combo, panzer 3/4 and later Sherman/105, Sherman/ firefly.
Also, cost and fabrication were big limitations in the early and mid 1930s when ideas were developed, along with minimal experience of how to fight other tanks, so the functional limitations became a feature because at the time a balanced tank meant no good at anything at the time.
Short version is that offensively a tank IS mainly an infantry support weapon, but since you need speed to exploit success - or to counter it - you either have to have two types of tank or one type that's a bit of a compromise. And as the first line of defence should be AT guns, tank vs tank combat should then be mainly between faster lighter tanks.
Of course the real world doesn't respect neat plans and good intentions, but there is an element of truth in the view that if your tanks are fighting other tanks then something has already gone wrong.
This keeps coming up and it is false. US Field manuals state the priority target for tanks is enemy armor. The desired outcome for the Armored Force is the role of exploitation force in the enemy rear area (ex Nancy Breakout) but on the offense the tanks are the primary anti-tank weapon. Tank Destroyers were to be the primary defensive antitank weapon when the main concern was massed German armored assaults. As it turned out there weren't many of those after Normandy so the TDs got parceled out in company and platoons for direct support.
For example, four Panther Brigades got annihilated by mostly 75mm Shermans (US 4th Armored, French 2nd) and a US infantry regiment. PzBrigade 112 lost 69 of 90 tanks, 350 dead, and 1,000 wounded. French losses were 5 M4 tanks, 2 M5 tanks, 2 halftracks, 2 Jeeps, and 44 killed, with a single P47 shot down. In three days of fighting against PzBr111 and 113, CCA 4th AD lost 14 M4 tanks, 7 M5 tanks, and 25 men killed. In return, they effectively shattered the 2 Panzer Brigades. PzBr106 drove headfirst into a regiment of infantry, by the end of the day, 106 PzBrigade was finished as a fighting unit, down to a quarter of its manpower, with 764 men captured. The Brigade had lost 21 Panthers and JgPzrs, 60 251s, and more then 100 support vehicles. Only 9 of the 47 original AFVs were operational at the end of the fighting. Total 3rd Army losses for all of September included 49 light tanks and 151 medium tanks and tank destroyers. However, they were issued 392 tanks during this period. The Germans committed 616 tanks and assault guns to the fighting in September; only 127 were operational at the end of the month. 101 PzIVs, 118 Panthers, and 221 assault guns were lost, with a further 148 awaiting repairs.
While the Panzers tried to use shock tactics that had been successful on the Eastern Front, the US ate the Germans lunch, burped, and moved on.
Yeah, the head long advance was not the thing to do. Blame the commander who was having difficulty coping with a poorly equipped and trained formation. The Brigades were created out of training units and were inadequate as such. They lacked a proper command staff at brigade and battalion level, lakes sufficient comm equipment for proper HQ/control, lacked a reconnaissance unit, lacked a integrated artillery and AT formation. Yes they has shiny new tanks and small arms, but nothing else needed for a proper combined arms unit. The veterans of the brigade/battalion/company cadre were too few to cope with the speed and complexity of the task they were handed and the recent students of the schools even less capable. So, roll down the roads it was until contact was made. then hope the enemy was even less capable. Against Red Army of late 1944 I doubt these brigades would have been significantly more successful. The Red Army of September 1944 was not the army of 1941 or 1942.
I've looked for information on why these men and machines were not handed over to the pz div retreating to the Reich. What I found is not very satisfactory and more on the subject would be useful.
I got this wrong too. Tanks as primary AT weapon on offence and TD as primary AT weapon on defence makes more sense. Tanks on offence stopping and waiting for TDs to show up sounds unworkable. I think they would more likely call on artillery or air for support. Not that some countries did not have unworkable doctrine, but this wasn't one of those cases.
I suspect what confuses people is the doctrine evolved 1940-1943. The idea of the cavalry raiders & fast tanks swarming the enemy rear developed as one of several competing schools interwar. Adherents coalesced during the 7th Brigade years & the idea was reinforced by a misunderstanding of the organization, doctrine, and tactical of the German Panzer Group Kliest & its corps in the 1940 battles. Note that after Devers took over from Chaffee he made a number of verbal and written statements supporting enhanced combined arms in armored corps, divisions, and smaller combat groups. As part of that he identified the need for the 'tank' to be better able to fight other tanks. The large mobile battles in Africa 19441-42 reinforced that, as did training exercises in the US. Those exercises illustrated the problems of the tank and tank destroyer doctrines promulgated in 1940-41 and gave the generals and field grade officers ideas on alternative combined arms. That training experience resulted in things like the army commanders in Europe 1943-44 declining the doctrinal tank and TD Group HQ for service in Europe and distributing the TD and Separate Armor Battalions to the division commanders, vs keeping the pooled in corps and army level Groups.
Studying the development of T20 - T26 series turns up that there were multiple schools arguing for and against the idea of the AT role included in Armor Doctrine and vehicle development. In simplistic terms the Ordnance Branch and Armor Branch were proposing better AT cannon/ammo and a AT role for the Armored formations. Which reflected the reality of what was going on in Africa 1942. Others, mostly within AGF argued in simple terms for continuation of the existing doctrine weapons.
Thanks for that lay out of the problem in tank design. You have to understand the tank's mission to give it the features it will need to carrier it out. That was the beauty of the much-maligned Sherman, it was a general-purpose tank. It wasn't as fast as a cruiser tank, or as well armored as a heavy tank, or had a high-powered anti-tank gun like the Germans long 75mm, or 88mm. It was actually better armored than the Pz IV, was faster than most tanks, its medium 75mm had a good HE round, a devastating WP round, and an AP round that could kill even Tiger tanks from the side. All things considered the Sherman was a good tank well suited for service in Europe.
Interesting that you mention Sherman Assault Guns with 105mm howitzers for infantry support. I've never found much about what effect it had on other tanks. All though it wasn't an AP round, but I have read that the impact was so powerful a few hits could batter a tank and disable it. A 105mm has a lot of kinetic energy that can damage the structure of the tank even if it doesn't penetrate the armor.
One last little know thing about the Sherman. It had a vertically roll stabilized gun; meaning that if you fired at a target from behind cover and then moved to another position the gun would lay back on the target with the correct elevation. The gunner might have to turn the turret left or right, but the elevation would be moved automatically. This feature was considered so secret it wasn't in the training manual, and most crews were never trained with it. When crews were trained with it, they loved it because it made it easier and quicker to re-acquire a target giving you a better chance to get in the first shot. This was another example of secrecy getting in the way of operations. What good is having a piece of technology that's so secret no one knows how to use it or even that you have it.
Good analysis of the evolving American doctrine in WWII. You live and learn. Post war the TD school went away, and Infantry Divisions got a whole regiment of tanks for armored support. Tanks like the Patton series were well suited for both infantry support and fighting their Soviet counterparts. However, TDs have continued on by other names. Modern armies have many vehicles armed mostly with ATGMs to destroy tanks when their own aren't around to deal with them. Today there's a version of the Stryker with a 105mm gun to fight anything up to at least a light tank.
You are absolutely wrong. My fathers peers in the US Air Force made a irrefutable case air power rendered tanks obsolete & ineffective. After all, look at how many US tanks they destroyed in Korea in the summer of 1950 
Yep, that trend started when the first German Lieutenat of artillery turned a 77mm field gun on a Brit tank and sent a round thru the side.
The army was sharply divided on the subject of tank-on-tank combat. Many advocated for a more powerful tank to take on other tanks while others said the anti-tank role should be left to other arms. This debate was at the heart of the development of what became the M26 Pershing, with the head of the AGF Command General Leslie McNair fighting against the deployment of the new tank. From Wiki
McNair's views on the employment of tanks also factored into reorganizations of the Army's armored divisions.[159] The Armored Force had been created in 1940, and grew to include 16 divisions,[160] though McNair unsuccessfully recommended reducing the number to six.[161] The Armored Force created an armored corps headquarters in 1942, but it was deactivated at McNair's instigation after only a few months.[160] In addition to arguing against the need for an armored corps, McNair believed the task organization for an armored division to be too large and unwieldy, again presuming that tanks would primarily serve as an exploitation force for rapid advances and as infantry support, but were not likely to engage in tank-on-tank battles.[159] As a result, he played a key role in downsizing the armored divisions in 1942 and 1943, with the 1943 reorganization reducing the divisions by 4,000 soldiers and between 130 and 140 tanks.[160] The downsizing enabled the creation of separate tank battalions, which could be deployed to support infantry divisions on an as-needed basis.[159] (The downsizing did not affect the 2nd or 3rd Armored Divisions, which maintained their "heavy" task organization.)[160]
The advocates of a new tank got a partial victory when the first batch of test or preproduction M26 tanks were shipped to Europe at the beginning of 1945 and saw combat. The debate wasn't settled till after the war when the TD School was disbanded, and tanks were given the primary role in defeating enemy tanks.
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Fundamentally, this disagreement in this thread is not about tactical issues like you are trying to make out. It concerns the operational deployment of the Armored Division on the offensive, but the issue is confused because the US did not use Soviet terminology that only appeared in Western circles late in the Cold War. McNair viewed the armored division as explicitly and solely filling the role of an operational maneuver group at the corps or army level. The Armored Corps with its heavy armored divisions and motorized infantry division was intended for mobile warfare, including the assault, breakthrough, and exploitation. McNair wanted to reduce the proliferation of specialized units at the division level and above by essentially making the Infantry Division, with reinforcing armor, cavalry, artillery, and combat service support, the standard unit of action. With this way of thinking, any infantry division could be reinforced with tanks and trucks to make a motorized division capable of executing the assault and breakthrough phase of an offensive and then supporting the breakthrough into the mobile phase of the offensive. The armored division, stripped down to enable it to maneuver more freely in the enemy rear area with less logistical support, would then push through the gap and into the enemy rear to engage whatever it found there, including the logistical units and the assembly areas of enemy reinforcements, which could include enemy armored units attempting to close the breakthrough or maneuver against the exploitation force.
These issues that McNair pushed for had very little to do with the tactical employment of tanks on the battlefield or the tactical-technical requirements tank designs would need to meet to accomplish the tasks envisioned for them. His role in Army Ground Forces was to design and deliver the fighting force overseas, which was essentially a strategic role, so he was far more concerned with the overall training and equipping of the force than with the tactical employment of its components. The idea that American tanks on the battlefield would make any attempt to avoid engaging enemy tanks is absurd. If there was an enemy armored threat on the front line, the relative weakness of American infantry anti-tank capabilities, which relied on 57 mm towed guns and bazookas, would have meant that tanks, even Shermans with 75 mm guns, were the best AT weapons on the front line. The Tank Destroyer branch, which included both mobile and towed TD units, was not meant for fighting on the front line. That unit was specifically formed to confront the Sickle Cut, where enemy armor was maneuvering freely behind friendly lines with little infantry support, despite the fact that the Germans no longer fought in that manner. The only operational-level breakthrough the Germans made against the US was in the Ardennes, and that was really the only scenario that the US encountered in northwest Europe that matched what the TD branch was designed to face. Ultimately, the design of the Sherman was dictated more by McNair's strategic concerns, which included designing a passable tank in terms of firepower, protection, and mobility that could be manufactured cheaply, would be reliable overseas, and could be shipped and moved easily.
Too late at the time the British could have adopted it, they're better off just doing better with the A27. But yes from 1940 to 1942 the T-34 compares on very favourable terms to British cruisers.