What if the US launched a first strike during the Cuban missile crisis

After spending many an hour researching this out of pure curiosity over quite a few months; here is a small portion what I have found:

For the US:
- B-52s were concentrated in 37 Squadrons consisting of 15 aircraft per squadron. 33 Squadrons were initially assigned to 1/8 Airborne Chrome Dome alert consisting of 2 sorties per day with a 24 hour mission. 4 B-52H Squadrons were undergoing Quick Clip fuel tank modifications and were not initially assigned but as they became available were added until by 05 Nov there were 75 bombers assigned to airborne alert. All other B-52s available in the squadrons were put on ground alert with a planned wheels up response time of 15 minutes; excepting unplanned maintenance issues of course. B-47s on REFLEX missions were on ground alert at overseas and CONUS bases. Other B-47 squadrons in North America not assigned to REFLEX were dedicated to follow up strikes.

- On 27 Oct, there were 65 of 67 planned B-52 Bombers on Chrome Dome missions with a schedule of 28 flying the Northern and 36 flying Southern Routes along with 2 aircraft on Thule guard. Each was equipped with 4 Mk 28 or 2 Mk 36 weapons. The G and H versions also carried a total of 22 GAM-77 Hound Dogs.

- 113 Atlas, 54 Titan 1, and up to 4 Minuteman were available at various missile bases and Vandenberg on 27 Oct. Response time from receipt of launch message to lift off varied from 3-5 for the Minuteman to 7 to 12 for the Atlas and Titan. 112 SLBM were available in 7 SSBNs in the Atlantic with 8 Regulas available in the Pacific.

-There were also the Thor, Jupiter, alert Fighter Bombers and CVs in various areas that I won't go into.


For the Soviets, which was a lot harder to get info on:

- 6 SS-6 (R-7) were available in two bases on the launch pads with warheads mated. Approximately a 6 hour response time with a fueled standby time of about 3 hours.

- 32 to 36 SS-7 (R-16) at 25 launch bases. I found the hard number of the bases but not how many missiles were available during the crisis. These are the generally agreed numbers I found. The bases were soft sites with 2 launch pads about 1000ft apart with a central launch control site between them. Under normal circumstances the missiles were stored in soft buildings besides the pads with the warheads in storage under KGB control nearby. For response time it took about 3 hours to mate, erect and launch the missile from a cold start. If the missile was mated with its warhead and erected, this was reduced to 1 hour. If also fueled, 15 minutes. I have seen the fueled standby as both 3 days and 30 days. Regardless; if the missile was fueled and not launched, it would have to return to the factory for full refurbishment due to the red fuming nitric acid used as an oxidizer. I'm am assuming they were mated and erected during this time but not fueled. NO missiles were in silos, though a test program was underway for this.

- About 60 M-4 Mya bombers and 100 Tu-95 Bear bombers, with about 35 of them set up as a KH-20 Kangaroo missile carriers. They were all located at 5 airbases and from what I have read none were dispersed or put on alert though I have not seen any documentation on this. As typical, the bombs were under KGB control. Response time in hours.

- They had approximately 500+ R-5M, R-12 and R-14 located at around 125 soft missile bases with a normal 4 launch pad configuration in similar circumstances as the R-16. A handful of R-12 were silo based. No idea of the alert status.

- Very little information on SSBs and SSBNs and patrols but normally they were only detected in the European area.


The biggest issue for the Soviets is that they had NO missile warning system. They had just started a research program and the first radars were operational in the mid/late 60s. Any attack by the Americans would be a bolt out of the blue. Any US attack could have been launched within minutes of the order but I can see a planned attack set up over a few hours. Casually launch a few B-52 from each squadron over the space of a few hours to give them a head start and coordinate the missile launches over a few minutes so they a impact near the same time along with the Thor and Jupiter and surge the rest of the alert bombers. If the US attacks first, the Soviet Union is even more screwed if that is possible.

I'm probably forgetting info I wanted to put down but I have a headache so I may edit.
 
Bomber Command was on continuous strip alert during the Cuban Missile Crisis, so could take off in about two minutes (at least the first aircraft from a given runway could). I'm not sure if they were on high-level or ultra-low-level attack at that point.

After their recent success at penetrating the US defences, I think they are still doing high-altitude.
 
I expect that at least in the few minutes of terminal phase the missiles could probably be detected by the air defense radars, at least enough to know something was incoming of not predict targets. Based on the data above it is entirely possible that >80% of Soviet ICBMs and bombers would not make it off the pad/runway. The IRBMs and tactical nuclear bombers would be cut down but I can see a higher percentage of them being launched - a lot depends on availability, alert status, launch time, and also how well the bases with missiles/nuke capable aircraft were known so they could be targeted. The USA in this scenario could get off extremely "lightly", Europe/NATO probably takes more hits (the question is how much of the short range nuclear arsenal was for tactical rather than strategic use), the disruption of command & control will hurt the Soviets badly allowing more time for tactical sites to be hit.

Using date from the previous post you have ~200 delivery systems (40 missile, 160 bomber) excluding the few SSB, SSBN. Assuming an 85% availability rate (which would be very good for the USSR) this means 170 systems up (34 missile, 136 bomber). If 75% are hit before launch you now have 53 systems on their way to the USA (8-9 missiles, 34 bombers). It seems that consensus is 80-90% of the bombers would not make it to target, so 3-7 bombers get through. Given the best guesses, maybe 20% of the Soviet missiles have some sort of failure or warhead malfunction, which means about 6-7 missiles hit and the warheads go off. Of course these warheads have a CEP of 3-5km, meaning 50% of them (3-4) hit within 3-5km of their target, and the other 50% (3-4) it anywhere from 1 cm outside that circle to somewhere far away. Putting all these numbers together the US/Canada gets hit with 6-14 weapons from bombers (2 each) which can be expected to be pretty much on target, and 6-7 weapons from missiles of which half hit between 0 to 3-5km of the aiming point, the rest who knows. Added up it means 12-21 detonations in North America (most of the weapons in the 1 MT range).

The SSBs & SSBNs will be for 2nd strike if ever ordered to do so - there were roughly 20 SSBs and 5 SSBNs in commission at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, missile range was roughly 300+ miles, missiles were fired from the surface, 3 missiles per submarine. Assuming 1/3 of the force at sea at any one time this would be 7 SSB and 2 SSBN (27 missiles total) at sea, more could be surged but given the distances from bases to launch points and how noisy they were none would be close to launch points and once things started very susceptible to detection/destruction. Those at sea would not be that close to the US coast and would need to transit and avoid detection to launch. If the USSR was planning a first strike they would surge subs and move those at sea towards launch points - but that would not be the case here. Any subs not at sea would be destroyed by the US strike. One of the subs getting all three missiles off would be doing well in this scenario - so add 2-3 more hits somewhere, almost certainly a coastal target with a 1-2MT warhead per missile, under middle case scenario - and this assumes the subs get launch orders or have a deadman order.

How bad this is depends on what the targets are for the weapons that get though. For example New York could get trashed but DC do OK with the one missile that got launched for it missing ground zero by >5km. Likewise if bombers that might be headed for cities get shot down, but some of the remaining ones go for SAC bases in relatively remote areas (like Loring AFB) then casualties and infrastructure damage is not too bad. Certainly there will be wide areas and large segments of the population in the USA and Canada that will be untouched by detonations, and depending on winds and whether air or ground bursts fallout could be none or minimal for those areas. On the other had, the USSR is toast. Europe and the WP countries, well WP does worse, Europe could be not so bad or very bad...
 
I originally was replying to the replies when I realized a mistake, I'm seeing that we're not all on the same page with the proper background so let me undertake trying to simplify while not being to vague...(It could happen :) )

WARNING! This could be a very long post... (Having said that I have been know to state the obvious on occasion, you've been warned ;) )
This is only a forum post and therefore is not a deeply researched, peer reviewed document with ample citations and based on extensive use of actual documentation. In other words I CAN be wrong :) Having said that I do have experience and knowledge from an military career during the Cold War and working with and around everything from unguided rockets and bombs to "the big ones" and doctrine and policy on their use. I've also read and studies history though not to the extent I'm anywhere near an expert but I can extrapolate and opinion from what I do know. And I can still be wrong, but that's part of the fun right? :)

Ok, some background. First and foremost we must understand that what Pearl Harbor was to the US, Barbarossa was to the USSR. A lesson in the ever present possibility of a devastating "first strike" by the other. This colored the most basic thinking on both sides and was the heart of planning at every stage. Not so much in the attack but very much in defense.
Next you have to keep in mind that "response" time was very different in 1962 than it was in 1952 and more so in 1972. Nuclear weapons meant that the sooner any attack was detected the better. Having said that, most militaries were familiar with and biased towards the "lessons learned" in WWII and though the introduction of the nuclear weapons had significantly changed many of the fundamental principles that had won that war, their actual employment was still mostly theoretical.

Having said that the basic PRINCIPLES of the war still applied in that the most straight forward way to "win" a war was to eliminate the enemies ability to prosecute and wage war. As a corollary to that preventing the enemy from doing the same to you was important, but along with all this a truism was that "the best defense is a good offense" because any defense can be overcome. So rather than massive waves of bombers to destroy a target it was possible for one plane with one bomb to destroy a city. Worrying stuff and as the manned bomber was the only reliable way to deliver a nuclear weapon both defense and offense were designed around this threat. For the US this wasn't really a problem in that we'd already been working on long range delivery just in case for WWII. On the Soviet side it WAS a problem that plagued them as they lacked the ability to reach North America. They were also in effect surrounded by American "allies" any of which forward based American airpower could reach them from.
(While much is made during the time of the "Russian Atomic Threat" the REAL worry was the still massive size and capability of the Soviet conventional forces. It didn't help that the US was drawing down or focused on things like Korea either, but the US decision to counter the size of the Soviet conventional force with "tactical" nuclear weapons was especially worrying to the Soviets. The fact that American's considered them "tactical" in no way reassured the Soviets for good reason as the difference is rather more in intent rather than actual capability. This is important because it highlights a fundamental point of confusion as both sides come to very different conclusions given the same data)

Really a lot of the "assumptions" from WWII still crept into the thinking and planning in the 50s. At this point in time the focus on the manned bomber as the main means of attack drove the thinking for both defense and offense. Defense required early detection and tracking coupled with intercept and destroy capability to eliminate the bomber before it could drop its payload. Both the US and USSR therefore pushed their detection and tracking networks outward along the estimated lines of approach. The more warning you go the longer time you had to intercept and destroy the attacker. At this time detection and response were measured in hours in that any approaching enemy would be seen and warning given long before the danger actually approached. Both sides assumed the other guy was thinking the same thing and therefore most planning and deployment was based on those assumptions. As noted the actual facts weren't so clear cut as the US had the capability to reach the USSR while the USSR lacked the ability to do so to the US. (You may begin to see a pattern here) Trying to match America's industrial and production capability was not going to work for the Soviets so they had to try something else. Meanwhile America built a detection and defense network designed to counter what they US had and built it's response planning around those defenses.

Then came submarine launched cruise missiles and the realization that distance wasn't a defense anymore. It was possible now that a Soviet submarine could surface and launch an attack that could arrive within minutes of detecting the attack. While relatively slow and obviously not as numerous as the still premier manned bomber this was a credible threat in that it could in short order launch attacks with little warning against command and control or civilian and logistical targets crippling the possible response and defense against the following bombers. On the one hand one of the things that the US Navy had learned very well from WWII was how to hunt and destroy submarines, they were still harder to detect and it had to be assumed that critical response time had dropped to less than an hour. (Conversely the USSR had little capability to counter this threat and while they had were improving their system of detection and tracking in reality the West could and was overflying the heartland with distressing regularity without significant challenge. Meanwhile, again the USSR had not such capability) Since it was no longer a matter of hours warning response had to be adjusted so that if an attack we detected both defense and retaliation would be capable of responding in a much shorter time frame.

And here's where I need to make something clear: There is a significant difference between "retaliation" and "attack" though it takes some real examination to see the it. While both can be planned (and obviously are) prior to use the most fundamental difference is the defined outcome in specific areas. On the most basic level both are aimed at the outcome of "winning" (or at least ensuring the enemy doesn't survive) a conflict. But retaliation is based on the assumption that the one "retaliating", or is responding to , not initiating, an attack. As noted above "attack" planning is aimed at removing as much as possible of an enemies ability to wage war. A singularly important part of this planning is to attempt as far as possible to degrade if not eliminate the enemies ability to attack you in turn. In retaliation planning the first basic assumption is that the enemy has already initiated an attack on you which means that while you still are going to attempt to destroy his ability to attack you again, you are more focused on destroying his means of replacing or continuing offensive action against you.

In detail, retaliation assumes that some or all of the enemy attack assets are already deployed which means they will not be available to be directly destroyed. (In essence they are already attacking YOUR bases and support infrastructure so are not where you are going) So your primary targets are the support and infrastructure that would possibly allow them to be resupplied and used again for another attack. Attack on the other hand focuses on primarily destroying both the defensive ability, as well as the offensive ability of the enemy in order to expose the infrastructure and support to further attack. Exact targets while similar are fundamentally different as is the method and detail. In context, while all appearances were that the Soviets could at any time of their choosing generate a substantial conventional attack on the West for which the only viable response was a nuclear retaliation, from the Soviet POV America had an obvious ability to generate a substantial nuclear attack on them with only a limited ability for retaliation in response. Note here that no matter what the governments and military's actually knew or did not know regarding each others capability rhetoric and posturing on both sides demanded some pretty worst case planning. So since both sides were not basing their planning on being the aggressor, (no doubt it WAS planned though that's just being thorough, but it wasn't the PRIMARY plan) retaliation not attack was the main aim. As such detection and tracking, along with reconnaissance of enemy capability, (and trying to figure intent which is guesswork based on history and stated intent, I'm sure we can all see a problem here) was of primary importance for both sides.

As an example, in retaliation mode SAC bombers were launched even if they were only marginally capable of completing the mission. Say an aircraft had engine problems so that it might very well have to shut down one or two engines after take off to keep flying. In a retaliation scenario that aircraft is launched anyway and proceeds as best it can towards its assigned target because if its not it 'dies' anyway and is fully wasted. On the other hand if it happens to actually make it to its target or draws off defenses that might be used against another bomber it is a bonus. Conversely in an attack scenario no bomber with issue that might compromise the mission is used because you require maximum effectiveness with all resources. The former is "use it or lose it" while the latter is not.

Still at this point, (the late 50s) average detection and therefore warning time is at least an hour or so at worst and likely longer as assets can be watched to give indicators of preparations to attack so ACTUAL warning time is significantly higher. (Note this applies across the board since any movement by either side to begin deploying or preparing for an attack has prequel indicators. Balancing this is the obviously idea that an enemy can, in theory avoid many of these prequel indicators if they are willing to sacrifice their a number of their own troops, population, and/or allies in order to reduce the number of visible prequel indicators... Which is why intelligence analysts are addicted to antacids)

Sputnik fundamentally changed this equation. Not because it necessarily CHANGED the equation , because by this point both the US and USSR had already deployed short and intermediate range missiles and were developing and planning deployment of ICBMs as well. What changed was more basic in that in America the public and some officials lost all faith in American technological superiority which had been an important part of our defensive mindset and therefore strategy. Americans had believed that if they couldn't, (or at least hadn't) done it then by "natural inference" the Soviets couldn't, (note not wouldn't) be able to do it. This caught not only the Soviets by surprise but the top echelon of the American government as well.

To put it bluntly while the average American was "afraid" of the threat of Soviet attack they, deep down were assured comforted by the thought that American still maintained the technological edge on the Soviets and therefore could still defeat any aggression by applying that technological superiority. Sputnik ripped that particular Band-Aid off our wounded go without warning and exposed our hidden fears to the light of day. As I said the reaction to Sputnik caught America's leaders by surprise as well and while many didn't panic, many others did. And the apparent non-reaction of the ones that didn't actually fed the fear instead of calming it. And one thing everyone was made aware of at this point was that there was no effective defense against ICBM attack. This is important because while people today actually understand this the majority of Americans had always believed that distance and our military would prevent any significant attack on America itself. Sure a couple of Soviet bombers MIGHT get through but not enough to really matter. Now suddenly there is a weapon that once launched can NOT be stopped and WILL get through no matter how much warning we have. Yep total panic.
(Now contrast this with the Soviet situation where they not only have a huge bomber threat but are already surrounded by IRBMs, cruise missiles, and probably massive numbers of one-way, atomic armed fighter bombers. And the Americans are freaking out about ICBM's we don't even have yet? Could anyone resist exploiting that no matter how badly it could end? I give you North Korea and drop the mike)

Now lets revisit how we keep tabs on the enemy to gauge not only their capability but their intent as well. And it is at this point that the "Iron Curtain" is actually becoming a thing as it is becoming harder and harder to penetrate Soviet airspace for reconnaissance purposes, leaving bigger and bigger gaps in our ability to actually gauge capability let alone intent. Ironically the US found itself in the position of the USSR where it had access only to external prequel indicators and not internal ones. So as I pointed out if the 'enemy' (Soviet Russia specifically) was willing to sacrifice some of its population, military and allies in order to gain an advantage, (and they had done just that in WWII, so recall the "historical" part of gauging intent) they could in fact be able to launch a first strike that could significantly, (but arguably not decisively) degrade America's ability to not only retaliate but prosecute a war. So our warning time is now down to an ACTUAL rather than a theoretical hours warning. Oh and the bomber is now a secondary not primary weapon system which regulates all those defenses designed to stop the bombers to a secondary role as well. As noted the Soviets have already lived with this situation for years, not happily mind you, but stoically nonetheless. Now the Americans know what it feels like so why not tweak them at every turn? (No it's not smart but it's fun so... gain NK as an example DESPITE the obvious history)

Now on top of all this there is Cuba. Recently the US backed "spontaneous invasion" by "Cuban exiles" (with, honest no help from the US, we swear) has been defeated and Castro, rightly really, fears another attempt may be forthcoming at any moment. So he pleads with the Soviet for help and support. Now in hindsight there are several really obvious issues with putting nuclear weapons on an island that far away, not only well within range of even second line American weapons but VERY far outside of any kind of logistical or tactical support from Russia not to mention the obvious "panic" currently underway in American itself but the decision is made none the less. (And again if we're being honest about it, how tempting is it to do to American what they have done to the Soviets by having short and IRBM missiles pointed at our head on your doorstep? We're all humans here after all)

Now with all this background in mind we arrive at the Cuban Missile Crisis itself. Now neither side is ready to start an actual shooting war, neither has made any preparations for doing so and all preparations are still very much defensive and retaliatory NOT for attack other than American aimed at Cuba itself. While aggressive rhetoric and actions are happening on both sides they are limited to the direct theater involved mostly because neither side actually want's to go to full out war. They can get to that point but it will take specific action and intent to do so as neither side has gone either to full alert status nor fully deployed the forces they would require to attack the other. Both of them would be caught by surprised if the B-59 incident had gone nuclear. And here's our problem with either one going into attack mode from this point.

Both sides are almost in positon to respond TO an attack with retaliation mode but neither is set up to initiate attack mode and changing from one the other requires a lot of effort and planning. In order to attack instead of retaliate on the 'American side then planning and operation would have to be done before hand in the hopes that something would happen, or take such time as required to change targets and planning in order to initiate an attack.

If we want to assume someone with the authority manages to authorize the go ahead of the use of the retaliatory force in being you have to address the issue with planning and targeting differences between the two modes. In effect the "attack" will not be aimed at any of the Soviet actual "attack" capability but the command and support infrastructure for prosecuting an continued conflict. So while the Soviets would have less warning we would not be aiming to take out their attack capability itself but the support and industry behind that capability. So while we'd take out the main bases for their bombers w would not get the forward bases where they would deploy upon detection of the attack. Nor would we hit the missile bases which would allow them to launch against us. Since we'd be using the on alert weapons one might assume the first strikes would be from the nearest IRBM, Naval and tactical force, but in this case these and the main missile and bomber squadrons need time to prepare and deploy. So you need a minimum of an hour or more to launch and flight time to target. You can't hide this so right there you warn the Soviets something is up. Best case they dither away the warning, most likely they don't' and begin deployment themselves. Assuming they don't launch on this "warning" and wait till they see actual inbounds they will mange to still get most of their retaliation strike off as the inbound forces also a "retaliation" strike and will not be aimed d at those forces. "Good" news is their weapons wont' be aimed at our forces per-se but towards taking out weapons and forces for any follow on attack the same as ours, bad new is in the general scheme of things this isn't likely to be a big difference to the targets hit. Worse news is since we didn't plan on or aim to take out any of their "retaliation" strike it's not going to be stopped at all. (Bombers are still probably not gong to get through given the time lag but neither do we get any missiles on the ground) Even worse since this wasn't an actual "attack" you can figure we didn't get our Navy fully deployed either so chances are VERY much higher any Soviet missile subs can successfully launch as well. Probably won't be very effective but it only takes "one" as it were to add to the damage. likewise, as this wasn't an "planned" attack you can figure at least some of the fleet will get caught in port should any missile be target on them. (Specifically the port as planning would assume the fleet already at sea but in this case they wont' be. That's gong to hurt)

This is also the case of "someone" managing to order an attack from the top as well. While we're on "high alert" the US didn't fully deploy all out assets at any point and doing so would require time, several days at least, and similarly to fully prepare the forces overseas. All of which will be visible and noted by the Soviets, therefore negating any possible 'surprise' advantage. The only way to pull off any "surprise " at all would be to use only the airborne alert force and as noted their targeting package and numbers are less than ideal for the purpose. Again if someone is bug-nuts enough plan this prior to and looking for an excuse you can probably have those forces carrying best guess targets and load the follow on forces updated with an actual attack plan but it will take time to get the rest of the forces ready and deployed so its still chancy.

The outcome is however not going to change much as even if you go the ICBMs with the airborne alert forces there's enough of a time lag that Soviets could still launch against Europe and Japan if nothing else. And again chances are higher that at least some subs will be able to surface and launch due to the lack of Naval presence. So while the damage to the US is variable, everyone else gets hurt badly. Not a "bad" outcome is you planned it that way but some definite downsides post-war. How so?

A common misconception is that the President can launch a retaliation with little excuse, and while at the time command and control was shaky and flawed there were some actual "rules" in that regard and that authority required a bit more provocation than a single attack on a military unit at sea.. Legally and morally even though the President is the "commander-in-chief" of the armed forces he requires active consent of the military command to prosecute a retaliation strike, more so to initiate an actual attack. Short of a confirmed incoming full attack on the United States, (and we're back to detection and warning time here) that consent might be hard to come by without a declaration of war and Congressional consent. This was a special point at this time because the time factor had been significantly reduced. This was a flow with SIOP and the existing command and control structure of which every one was aware and because of which Kennedy was so caution s with provocation and escalation. We can play with this with a POD, (it's AH after all :) but really this was a know issue all through the chain of command and specifically why there w4er some work-around built in to the same chain. (Remember General Powers? There was a reason why his aid worried about him and also why said aid was where he was. Significant questions would be asked and require answered if there wasn't an ongoing attack on the US in progress before go codes would be passed on. It was far from perfect but it was at least a check which wasn't there before) Launching an all out attack with only a single incident could be played as "better safe than sorry" especially if the US itself too at least some damage during the "war" but it would be tricky none the less. (Again if this was pre-planned not so much and frankly "winning" tends to be a big plus in favor of forgiveness, but that's balance a bit with the anger of the survivors in Europe and Japan over an 'oops" and the truth will come out eventually. Gutsy move but possibly well worth it, for a while at least)

Now on the flip side the Soviets are serious screwed if things go hot and are probably aware of this given the more open nature of he West so the most logical thing to do once they see an incoming attack of any type would be to broadcast their surrender and request for terms. And while I know that "logic" doesn't usually enter into the thinking on war and I'd expect the actual reaction to be going down fighting the same way the US would under the same conditions. There's an actual compelling logic and possible "win/win" outcome possible here. (Again if this was planned probably not and very probably a very bad outcome for anyone that survives the attack but you can't know that at this point) The basic choices here are surrender or fight simply to do as much damage as possible before you are destroyed. The alter is really pure spit but totally understandable under the circumstances, the former on the other hand not only offers a chance for survival it can actually lead to more positive outcome. How? Recall that there is shared stigma about the morality of conducting a surprise/bolt-from-the-the-blue type attack and once your surrender there is a moral-high-ground/sympathy element if you are still attacked. So even though the US might not be able to actually stop the attacks, (you surrender while some IRBM's are in flight the US can't stop them so it "looks" like they hit you when you were down, cheap shot but we're aiming for effect here not reality) the appearance is one of hammer a surrender foe. Always good for generating sympathy. So what good does this do? You surrendered but did not do so unconditionally, therefore open the door to discussion of terms for that surrender. So? Assuming you didn't fire or at least didn't fire on Europe and Asia you have a lot of relived people who expected to be toast at this point and are not BECAUSAE you showed restraint which is a plus. Additionally you plant doubt as to any claims you attacked first and this was retaliation rather than aggression on the part of the US. (Refer back to sneak attack stigma) In an case at this point the US has a choice of either agreeing to a negotiated surrender or continuing to attack and the latter is not going to go over well with the "allies"" under the circumstances, while the former will probably not matter very much very shortly on to you per-se you go with the knowledge that you've sown some serious dissent and discord down the line. (See: Revenge, Cold, entry) Now if negotiations are agreed to you have a very good chance of coming about at least as well as you were if not better because you did not in fact initiate an attack nor did you cause useless slaughter in retaliation to being attacked. And here is one of the reasons both sides PLANNED retaliation instead of attack. Open aggression plunged the world into two previous destructive wars, so that while defensive "destruction' can be forgiven in a sense, initiating a large scale war is frowned upon by everyone and both sympathy and power, (soft to be sure but power none the less) accrues to the "victim" rather than the aggressor. Defending oneself is an acceptable excuse for a war, starting one is a social no-no.

Possible? Sure. Plausible? Maybe. Likely? No but an interesting idea which I find entirely to easy to think of which worries me to no end...

Randy
 
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