What if the U.S. embargoed Japan 10 months early, and it lacks the "window" for the PH raid?

If the U.S. embargoed Japan 10 months earlier, Japan will react by:

  • a) giving in to U.S. demands (withdrawal from China or unilateral ceasefire, plus pledge to leave)

    Votes: 1 2.0%
  • b) Attacking Southeast Asia and the U.S. battle fleet at PH, as in OTL's December 1941

    Votes: 6 12.2%
  • c) Yamamoto attacks the ABDA powers in western Pacific (including PI), but not Hawaii

    Votes: 19 38.8%
  • d) Yamamoto refuses to lead if he can't do Pearl, another Admiral leads the "strike south"

    Votes: 5 10.2%
  • e) Japan bypasses U.S. possessions and only attacks the British & Dutch because it can't hit fleet

    Votes: 12 24.5%
  • f) Japan is strategically immobilized, doesn't attack or withdraw, gets poor & starvy

    Votes: 6 12.2%

  • Total voters
    49

raharris1973

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The biggest difficulty with moving the Pacific War around is the window where Japan had the smallest chance of success is so small. They needed six decks to deal with the Pearl Harbor attack; it was a miracle that the Shokaku & Zuikaku were both worked up and ready by 12/7/41 as was (Zuikaku was in commission for just 60 days when it set off with the rest of the Kido Butai).

The Zero wasn't available in numbers until mid 1941, prior to that date the A5M was the primary IJN carrier fighter and there were exactly ZERO D3A in the as late as mid 1940 leaving the dive bomber duties to the D1A with its smaller bomb load and 500 mile range as the fleet dive bomber. This would have forced the Fleet to move within 100 miles of Pearl Harbor to amke its attack, assuming that any attack would even be attempted.

So what if the U.S. did the total oil embargo on Japan and total asset/dollar freeze in reaction to the September 1940 Japanese occupation of *northern* French Indochina instead of October 1940, instead of waiting until the Japanese occupation of *southern* Indochina in July 1941, to put the freeze on in August 1941?
 

nbcman

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The IJN would most likely omit a PH strike and use their 4 fleet carriers to support operations in the South China Sea such as the invasion of Malaya and the Philippines. The invasion of Malaya would need to rely on carrier based airpower as Japanese would not have the airbases around Saigon. Then the IJN would still try to get the US into the Decisive Battle in the Central or Western Pacific per their pre-war doctrine.
 
E) is idiotic as that would mean they are going to ignore the Philippines. Thats strategic suicide.

i'm going with C, although their idea of naval warfare against the giant won't be different, they'll do an earlier battle of Midway-like operation to get the decisive victory they need. Chances are the American haven't broken the naval codes then, making the operation possibly succesfull, if done properly and the Americans aren't aware of Japanese capabilities because there was no Pearl Harbour attack.
 
E) is idiotic as that would mean they are going to ignore the Philippines. Thats strategic suicide.

i'm going with C, although their idea of naval warfare against the giant won't be different, they'll do an earlier battle of Midway-like operation to get the decisive victory they need. Chances are the American haven't broken the naval codes then, making the operation possibly succesfull, if done properly and the Americans aren't aware of Japanese capabilities because there was no Pearl Harbour attack.
I went with "C" also, if for no other reason than Taranto attack isn't until quite late in '40, and would supply no impetus for Pearl attack, but, the US has to be the main focus sooner or later (it is their ultimatum, after all). +Yamamoto's not going to refuse to do his duty, and can't leave the PI in your rear = C.
 
F2A-1 and even -2 Buffalos would chew up the IJN of 1940, though. It was the -3 of 1941 that was the overweight slug. SBDs were being deployed mid 1940. The SBC Helldiver, was actually capable, unlike its successor
Hey, they fixed the problems with the second Helldiver. Eventually. Kind of.
 
I went with "C" also, if for no other reason than Taranto attack isn't until quite late in '40, and would supply no impetus for Pearl attac

IIRC Taranto wasn't the cause of PH the IJN took notes but I'm pretty sure the idea of launching a surprise attack on PH has existed ever since the US Japanese rivalry heck even the US Navy did it with Fleet Problem 13
 
IIRC Taranto wasn't the cause of PH the IJN took notes but I'm pretty sure the idea of launching a surprise attack on PH has existed ever since the US Japanese rivalry heck even the US Navy did it with Fleet Problem 13
Yeah, they'd been hypothesizing such an attack since the 30's, but have to believe seeing it (torps) work HAD to be an incentive...
 

raharris1973

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F2A-1 and even -2 Buffalos would chew up the IJN of 1940, though. It was the -3 of 1941 that was the overweight slug. SBDs were being deployed mid 1940. The SBC Helldiver, was actually capable, unlike its successor

The relevant question for this thread is, however: Would it be the Japanese Navy's expectation that they would be so outclassed in aviation?

Also, I noticed from the poll that nobody thinks Yamamoto would have balked at commanding the IJN if he can't do the Hawaii operation.

One question - there's talk about intangible differences in the amount of U.S. rage and determination if the the Japanese only attacked in the Western Pacific rather than Hawaii. However, might there be a little more rationality and efficiency in U.S. defense policies if there is no Hawaii attack? Less demand to spread stuff around for coastal defense of the U.S. mainland?
 
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Driftless

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Less demand to spread stuff around for coastal defense of the U.S. mainland?

By comparison, there was wide-spread local and congressional panic over the perceived threat from the Spanish fleet in 1898 - and the Spanish fleet was in terrible shape. Reality and logic don't always rule.
 

raharris1973

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By comparison, there was wide-spread local and congressional panic over the perceived threat from the Spanish fleet in 1898 - and the Spanish fleet was in terrible shape. Reality and logic don't always rule.

No, but it only has to matter a little bit in this case to possibly save a good bit of money and effort. There might have been slightly more sophistication among the 1941-42 body politic than the 1898 one. But perhaps not.
 

Driftless

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No, but it only has to matter a little bit in this case to possibly save a good bit of money and effort. There might have been slightly more sophistication among the 1941-42 body politic than the 1898 one. But perhaps not.

One would hope, but even before Pearl Harbor, parts of the American populace had been listening to the horror stories coming from China about Japanese atrocities. I think even if the proverbial "cooler heads prevail", there would be some very skittish West Coast locals that would require a great deal of careful handling by FDR and his military commanders.

However, if there's no Pearl Harbor (option C); might there be more pushback from the Isolationists? "This is why we should never have gotten involved with the Philippines in the first place...." Might some of those folks be willing to cut bait, throw the Filipinos to the Japanese wolf, and try for a negotiated settlement, even with a substantial loss of American lives and equipment? Probably not, but the resolve to fight would be far less universal IMO. Ten months earlier than historic, the sentiment that the US should avoid "foreign entaglements" was still quite strong.
 

raharris1973

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IIRC Taranto wasn't the cause of PH the IJN took notes but I'm pretty sure the idea of launching a surprise attack on PH has existed ever since the US Japanese rivalry heck even the US Navy did it with Fleet Problem 13

Excellent point, and I would add, even if it were true, a showstopper for the Pearl Harbor operation =/= a showstopper for a Japanese offensive in the western Pacific and Southeast Asia.

Western Pacific, including U.S. possessions like Guam and PI can still be attacked, it just force the Japanese to use their “traditional”, pre-Yamamoto anti-U.S. operational concept.
 
War Plan ORANGE being the only coherent plan the US has means the PI are seized in a few months, the US conducts raids, and gets into some sort fight in the S Pac alongside its allies there. ie: like Java or New Guinea of OTL. But the big fleet battles and campaigns won't occur until 1942 as per OTL. Maybe even later?
 
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