I don't know much about it, so what do you think would happen?
Well, to a certain extent it depends on how quickly and at what cost Sweden wins. Remember, the War of Spainish Sucession is going on at the same time, and a Sweden with an army and war chest still more or less intact has the ability to weigh in. Especially if such a victory comes (As id argue the best opportunity for this scenario) from an alliance/co-operation with the Ottomans. Alao, at the very least, you butterfly away St. Petersburg, which has a major conservative impact on Russian court cultureNothing: the things would be pretty much as they were before the war.
Well, to a certain extent it depends on how quickly and at what cost Sweden wins.
Remember, the War of Spainish Sucession is going on at the same time, and a Sweden with an army and war chest still more or less intact has the ability to weigh in. Especially if such a victory comes (As id argue the best opportunity for this scenario) from an alliance/co-operation with the Ottomans. Alao, at the very least, you butterfly away St. Petersburg, which has a major conservative impact on Russian court culture
Of course. I was tempted to add possibility of Charles marching to fight the Hapsburgs but decided against it: why add extra dimension to the simplistic question?
In the best case scenario Charley could manage without the Ottomans: kick Peter out of the game by successfully attacking Novgorod (which was expected in OTL) and then making a generous offer of keeping the pre-war borders and trade arrangements. Charley with the brains would give Peter Ingria (it was pretty much worthless) with the provisions limiting construction of the fortresses, etc..
As for St. Petersburg and its impact on the court culture, even before the GNW Peter's court had been wearing western costumes and danced western dances, the "western style" palaces had been built in Moscow (actually, the 1st one had been built before Peter's "reforms"), army had been wearing the western style uniforms and having western organization and the ranks (again, started before Peter). Most of his not too attractive habits (sorry, "education") Peter picked up in a "German Settlement" on Moscow outskirts.
The popular picture of pre-Petrian Russia being completely cut from the rest of the "western" world simply does not stand up to any scrutiny. To start with, port of Archangelsk had been functioning since the early 1550's (actually, an active trade in the area goes back to at least XII century with the main trade center of the area being Kholmogory on Dvina River). Then, the fact that the Swedes possessed the coast simply means that they had been getting the custom dues from the merchandise passing through the ports on that coast (Riga still remained a major outlet for the Lithuanian grain exports and for Russia Narva played the same role). Why would they kill the trade from which they had been benefiting?
St-Petersburg was a very costly experiment with no clear benefits (except for the XX - XXI centuries tourists), obvious inconveniences of governing a huge empire from a place on its border, vulnerability to the Swedish attacks (all the way till the early XIX when Russia got Finland), a need to build system of canals and sluices to provide a river way from the areas producing export goods to St-Petersburg and artificial "suppression" of the existing Baltic ports (Riga and Revel) to channel the traffic to St-Petersburg .
To be fair, the area around St. Petersburg was always an important trade gateway, and more connected to the Russian interior than the rest of the Baltic coast had been. Transport from the Baltic to the Volga clearly wasn't a new innovation of Peter the Great. Even if he hadn't built St. Petersburg and expanded the canal system, trade would have gravitated along that route anyway, as it had from Kievan Rus' to the Soviet Union. Increasing throughput would have been necessary as the population of Russia increased, so it makes sense to develop a city there. During the reigns of later Tsars and well into the Soviet period, the Volga-Baltic Waterway was continually expanded, indicating that the strategic importance of the Neva River was not just a delusion of Peter.St-Petersburg was a very costly experiment with no clear benefits (except for the XX - XXI centuries tourists), obvious inconveniences of governing a huge empire from a place on its border, vulnerability to the Swedish attacks (all the way till the early XIX when Russia got Finland), a need to build system of canals and sluices to provide a river way from the areas producing export goods to St-Petersburg and artificial "suppression" of the existing Baltic ports (Riga and Revel) to channel the traffic to St-Petersburg .
The popular picture of pre-Petrian Russia being completely cut from the rest of the "western" world simply does not stand up to any scrutiny. To start with, port of Archangelsk had been functioning since the early 1550's (actually, an active trade in the area goes back to at least XII century with the main trade center of the area being Kholmogory on Dvina River). Then, the fact that the Swedes possessed the coast simply means that they had been getting the custom dues from the merchandise passing through the ports on that coast (Riga still remained a major outlet for the Lithuanian grain exports and for Russia Narva played the same role). Why would they kill the trade from which they had been benefiting?
While I definitely see your points (And agree that Peter the Great wasen't the only factor in Russian modernization, though he did do some important work to make it permenantly stick long-term), my position on St. Petersburg has been that in acted in many ways as the Russian equivalent to Versailles as an answer to the "Provencals Problem"; namely, how to establish Absolutism in a state where power had traditionally been widely distributed to local power-brokers (like the Church and hereditary petty nobility) with independent power bases, perceptions of legetimacy, and interests that largely ran in a conservative/particularist rather than a broader national welfare direction (A problem, for example, that hamstrung the Commonwealth and Ottomans in the 18th century).
Glad someone else shares my hobby-horse.
I think that honestly, the truly unique Petrine innovations were 1. the (de-facto) lifelong conscription (in fact, the whole country was subordinated to the army for generations because of that, IMO) 2. amazing amounts of new gentry created (which both removed the old players in palace coups, and set the stage for the next century of palace coups) 3. the investment in the navy (obviously Alexey Mikhailovich was in favour but nothing like the Voronezh wharf resulted from that effort) and 4. the long-due abolition of the silver standard due to Russia's dearth of specie. Other aspects of so-called Westernization were already happening long before Peter, and in some cases the direction the country took under Feodor Alexeyevich and Sofia was more in line with how other European countries were developing. Even the diplomatic revolution, really wasn't. Golitsyn worked very hard to place Russia within a European network of alliances, the big difference was Peter favouring the Protestants over the Catholics.
Well, situation you described had been non-existent since at least early XVI century and probably since even earlier times: Ivan IV was simply ending the process that started much earlier and Time of the Troubles probably end it completely. In the Tsardom of Moscow the highest position was "boyarin", a member of the royal council. The boyar families grew from those serving the Princes of Moscow leaving old Rurikid "udel princes" (people about whom you are talking) out of the power circle. Ivan IV, after conquest of the Volga area launched a massive resettlement of the descendants of the "udel princes" cutting off their ties with the historic areas of their power. Ditto for the power in the provinces: the leading administrative/military positions (voyevodships) had been given to the "service" people and granting/taking them back was completely in Tsar's power. In that sense Tsardom of the mid-XVII was much more "absolutist" than France of Louis XIII where the members of top aristocracy still could have their own towns and private armies independent from the royal power.
Situation with the petty nobility was even simpler: most of their estates had been "pomestie" granted for military service (with an explicit identification how many armed people the owner must raise from that land and how exactly they should be armed), subject to the regular reviews and revocation in the case when conditions of service had not been met. A hereditary land ("votchina") was almost non-existent for the lower nobility and not adequate for independence in the case of the higher aristocracy. Plus, because it was increasingly more difficult to maintain the estates in the cases of the prolonged wars or regular mobilizations (as in the Southern border against the possible Crimean raids), government could also add some monetary compensation. In other words, there was a complete dependency upon the central power well before Peter's reign. Quite different from France of that period when noble owned the hereditary land ("votchina", in Russian equivalent) unconditionally.
The Orthodox Church was formally independent in the spiritual area but in practice it was tightly controlled by the Muscovite rulers. Granted, removal of a Patriarch was a somewhat cumbersome process requiring invitation of his peers from the Ottoman Empire but on the lower levels things had been much easier all the way to execution.
Now, notion of "a broader national welfare" did exist but it was understood, both in France (by Richelieu and Louis XIV) and Russia as a combination of "glory of the state" (mostly military glory) and "state knows better" attitude.
To be fair, the area around St. Petersburg was always an important trade gateway, and more connected to the Russian interior than the rest of the Baltic coast had been. Transport from the Baltic to the Volga clearly wasn't a new innovation of Peter the Great.