You're new(ish) here so I'll respond to this before I Blame Communism can blast you with the holier-than-thou tone he likes to use so much whenever anything pertaining to Russia is brought up. (He's a decent chap and undoubtedly very intelligent; he can just be rather...brusque...at times).
It's nice to have an indepedent reputation at last!
I generally
try and be nice and welcoming to new chaps. I'm sure I often fail...
It's not just Russia. I have tendency to get acidic quickly about any issue touching me at all personally, I know. But we hardly ever see "Austrians were never German" or "Jacobites: Scottish national liberation Army" any more. "Russians want to nationalise our women" is pretty pervasive; but I see none of it here.
If the Soviets manage to take Warsaw, you will probably see some sort of Soviet Poland. However, a Soviet victory over the Poles will, frankly, scare the ever living shit out of the rest of Europe.
Definitely true; however, Susano asserts that France was still more scared of Germany, and I'm inclined to agree. It's pretty understandable, given what had just happened to them. Of course, French foreign policy goals in 1920s eastern Europe were never exactly
modest...
Since Poland is now Red and the Soviet hordes seem unstoppable, the newly-victorious Entente will most likely allow Germany to ignore or outright revoke a lot of the Versailles Treaty, especially the bits about Germany losing its Polish territories
That's and interesting one. The Soviets basically said that everything that was Russia in 1914 was theirs until they signed a treaty giving it away (they
never formally abandoned their claim to Besserabia right until they got it back), and they were generally pretty scrupulous about not expanding beyond these borders, thus the rather absurd tale of independant socialist Tannu Tuva
.
On the other hand, they had a Galician Revolutionary Committee, and it appears they wobbled on this when it looked like Warsaw was about to fall and they could potentially just barge right on to Posen.
So you could see a number of things: the Soviets hedge their bets and stick to the borders of 1914 (plus Galicia) and try to sponsor Germany while using its internal communists to exert influence, and Germany plays along; the Soviets grab Great Poland and try the same trick; the Germans move in themselves and try to cosy up with Britain as anti-communist bulwark...
The Germans are getting Silesia, though. The partition there wasn't clarified yet, and I'm pretty sure that, even if enough Poles do prefer the Polish People's Republic to Weimar's rather exemplary minority rights (not very likely at all), Britain and Germany can certainly conspire to pretend they don't.
and having to reduce its army (the German navy will still probably take a hit since the Reds aren't at all a naval force). The main reasons for France, Britain, etc. allowing this is because if there was one thing that scared them more than a strong Germany, it was stronger Bolsheviks.
Certainly true for Britain; perhaps less for France. Bolsheviks hadn't just invaded and looted their country, after all. France doesn't
like Bolsheviks, but whereas Britain will take this as "we have to strengthen Germany against Bolshevism!", France may be more inclined to think "We should occupy the Ruhr! You never know."
There may be a few Communist revolts/uprisings in Germany, but they'll most likely be much smaller than the fiascoes that were the Spartacist Uprising and the Bavarian Socialist Republic and easily put down by either the army or the Freikorps. Also expect the Freikorps to play a bigger role in Germany proper as what's left of the newly-growing army is headed off east to stabilize the front and reassume authority over its former Polish lands so as to make sure the Soviets don't make it to the Fatherland and beyond.
Certainly, Germany's commies are sufficiently neutered that they can't take over by themselves.
Whether the Russians would invade, well... my reading of Lenin is that he was one of those rare figures like Napoleon who matched limitless, unattainable ambitions with sufficient pragmatism and skill to continually make progress towards them. He wanted world communism, but while he was waiting for it he would rebuild Russian power like an old-style statesman. The "western offensive" was basically a ginormous recon-in-force: let;s see what we can get away with. If we gan get away with grabbing Lwow, cool. If we can get away with the 1914 border, still cool. If we can Sovietise Germany and begin the world revolution, awesome. But Lenin will sell out the revolution in Germany as quickly as he did in Estonia, Latvia, or Fnland if it suits the sober goals of his immediate foreign policy.
Not that the Soviets will be able to make it a whole lot farther than Warsaw; their supply lines etc. were already stretched pretty thin as it was. The best they can hope for is a stalemate with Germany and the worst case is that the Germans beat them badly and roll them back to the east bank of the Vistula.
This is an important detail. Even there winning it is quite a tall order: the Red Army was a pretty ragtag force at that point, and stretched way out. If I'd been the Soviets, I'd have stopped at the Curzon Line, but I'm not, and if we align everything just right, they can probably win at Warsaw.
Since Germany is now the West's first line of defense against International Bolshevism, you'll see stronger solidarity amongst the Western nations, a more polarized political situation in Europe, and possibly an even greater tolerance for fascism in Europe than existed IOTL. We will probably see Britain and France pouring as much support as they can into the Baltic States...if the Soviets don't manage to gobble them up first.
The precedent of 1940 is that when Germany and the Soviets eat up Poland, the Baltic leadership can prepare for a trip to GULAG.
If Germany is hostile to Russia, it's a differant story. Germany can certainly keep Lithuania independent with its forces (they pretty much did that anyway...), and take Memel for their trouble. Estonia would
want to play germany against Russia, but the problem is that Latvians, who were majorly pissed about how a bunch of Freikorps, reactionary Teutonic Knights, and Whites had tried to take over their country. There was some worry in London that the Latvians would turn Bolsh in 1919; but it Britain is willing to commit decisively (and we were majorly involved in the Baltic OTL), we can keep it independent, I should think.
With the Reds literally at the gates, France and Britain (as mentioned before) are going to be pretty indifferent to Germany remaining militarized (on land). An alliance will probably even be formed between France, Britain, Germany, Italy, and perhaps a few former A-H nations to hold back the Soviet tide.
I'm still unsure about France... Britain would keep
telling them to follow such a course, but we weren't very keen on their invading Germany in 1923 and that didn't stop them.
Romania is going to have a fit and look for an alliance with everyone. Whether the Bolsheviks really want to make things even tenser by invading Besserabia (which is rough country, and the Romanians were not slouches) or not, Romania is going to be
very uncomfortable.
There will most likely be an earlier rise of the far-right in German politics and harsher crackdowns on leftists. We could see the country either become a military dictatorship or fall under the control of some far-right group similar to the Nazis (perhaps not so anti-Semitic/racist/etc., more an emphasis on anti-Communism and the need to utilize every German citizen available or something like that).
Well, I make a habit of optimism about Germany and the Germans, and I'm inclined to think anti-communist hysteria was exagerrated. The Social Democrats had it in for
their commies, but I don't think this would extend to backing a far-right regime against the Soviets. And the army, that bastion of 19th centuy thought, had no qualms about testing tanks in Ukraine and eagerly anticipating the next partition of Poland.
So, I predict fairly "normal" German political development (which doesn't preclude disaster, obviously) if the Soviets stop at the border like good boys, especially if it happens to be the border of 1914. If they invade, that's a recipe for Wilhelminism, though...
Chances are there will be an earlier WWII, but Germany probably won't be the one to start it. Assuming Stalin still becomes god-king of the USSR (and let's face it, he is clever enough to pull it off), you'll probably see the Soviets instigate it. Perhaps during the Great Depression (assuming that still happens, too) or a bit later. It'll probably spring from some pesky little conflict that springs up between the Soviets and Finland or Romania or the Baltic States if they're still around.
Stalin was scared pretty shitless at the prospect of a capitalist alliance against Russia. I have trouble seeing him going Red Alert, to be honest; not that a war can't start by accident.