What if the Soviet Union got no help from the West in WW2?

That's as much a political question as it is a military question. Certainly they had everything they needed in terms of resources and geography; the question would have been how did they utilize those strengths in order to buy time to bring them to bear. And the answer to that would depend on how Stalin would have chosen to play his hand - and, whether or not Stalin would have even been able to maintain power in a scenario where they took even more severe losses than they did IOTL.

Most likely, the worst case short-term scenario would have been some sort of negotiated truce that left them most of their territory, which of course they would have used to build their strength and ultimately destroy Germany several years later than they actually did. But I think the most likely scenario would have been that they devastated Berlin in 1946 or 1947 instead of 1945, and then kept rolling all the way to the English Channel. Their justification would have been that they had spent 30 to 35 million lives saving their country, and they were doing what they had to do to insure that it never happened again.
 
With no Soviet LL, what other allied offensives would have been sped up due to increased shipping and supplies available? A lot of the early LL was actually British equipment that was sorely needed in other theaters.
More allied divisions and aircraft supported in Egypt. North Africa wrapped up by the end of 1942 perhaps, without Torch?
Second tier armor and aircraft sent to SE asia. Maybe Japan stopped in Burma?

Granted, the Soviets will be hurting badly in 1943 with no LL.

Interesting TL might be no Soviet LL until mid/late 1942, when the Wallies see that the Soviets really do need to be supported to avoid falling. Where is the tipping point where LL is to little-to late?
 
Interesting TL might be no Soviet LL until mid/late 1942, when the Wallies see that the Soviets really do need to be supported to avoid falling. Where is the tipping point where LL is to little-to late?

You'll begin seeing effects as early as late 1941, as 16% of the Soviet armor use in the counteroffensives was Western in origin. From there, it'll only get worse for the Soviets and I could honestly see a collapse as early as the winter of 1942/1943 as the food situation completely falls apart.
 
They completely collapse to starvation, either in 1942 or 1943.

There was a famine at the end of the war and it wasn't so disastrous for them. IMO it will be whoever runs out of some important raw material first that is necessary for industry, they will be the loser. That or someone runs out of manpower. Edit. Like chromium ore which I think the USSR had plenty of assuming Turkey stops sending it to Germany.

Turkey did this because of threats by the Allies and Germany was being pushed back in 1944 and the writing was on the wall.
Also, Germany'a debt was out of control and would have been ~500 billion RM in 1945 had the war continued.
 
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There was a famine at the end of the war and it wasn't so disastrous for them. IMO it will be whoever runs out of some important raw material first that is necessary for industry, they will be the loser. That or someone runs out of manpower. Edit. Like chromium ore which I think the USSR had plenty of assuming Turkey stops sending it to Germany.

Turkey did this because of threats by the Allies and Germany was being pushed back in 1944 and the writing was on the wall.
Also, Germany'a debt was out of control and would have been ~500 billion RM in 1945 had the war continued.

The situation was very dangerous during the war, with a large die off due to malnutrition running from 1943 to 1944. Allow me to share some sources:

The Bread of Affliction: The Food Supply in the USSR during World War II, by William Moskoff -

"The central fact behind the increased importance of the collective farm market was the drastic drop in food production, especially in 1942 and 1943, and the diminished proportion that went to the civilians. In 1943 overall agricultural production was only 38 percent of the 1940 level. In 1943, however, the Red Army began to recapture agricultural areas of the Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Caucasus and by the next year, 1944, agricultural output had risen to 54 percent of the 1940 level. Not surprisingly, the collapse of the food economy led to astonishing increases in prices. The most rapid rate [Emphasis by author] of increase in prices took place in 1942 and began to taper off in mid-1943."

The Soviet Economy and the Red Army, 1930-1945, by Walter Scott Dunn -

"By November of 1941, 47% of Soviet cropland was in German hands. The Germans had 38% of the grain farmland, 84% of the sugar land, 38% of the area devoted to beef and dairy cattle, and 60% of the land used to produce hogs. The Russians turned to the east and brought more land into cultivation. In the fall of 1941, the autumn and winter crops increased sharply in the eastern area. But despite all efforts, farm yields dropped from 95.5 million tons of grain in 1940 to 29.7 million tons in 1942. Production of cattle and horses dropped to less than half of prewar levels and hogs to one fifth. By 1942, meat and dairy production shrank to half the 1940 total and sugar to only 5%. Farm production in 1942 and 1943 dropped to 38% and 37% of 1940 totals."

Another good resource is Hunger and War: Food Provisioning in the Soviet Union during World War II by Wendy Z. Goldman and Donald A. Filtzer. It goes into great detail as to how bad the situation was, and directly states it was only because of Lend-Lease did the Red Army not starve.
 
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