What if the Soviet Union during WW2 only sent in fully trained and fully equipped men?

Well, the Germans didn't make it to Moscow, so for whatever the penalties were for the lack of training it kept the Soviets in the war in their most vulnerable period.

My argument is they wouldn't have made it anyways, and probably stopped them farther away from Moscow.
 
On that we can agree to disagree.

We can never be sure but if the men don't flee as much nor surrender as much because the untrained men that flee at the first sight of battle aren't there the Germans might have been slowed down much more as the real soldiers aren't panicked at the sight of others fleeing even if they are fleeing because they are an untrained mob.
 
Some men are made to be soldiers. A few of the others can be indoctrinated to handle stress of battle and can ultimately prove their mettle.
The rest are basically Observers. As a determinant, the length of the training has much less relevance if the Cadre contains a high percentage of true soldiers to begin with. This has been proven over and over again. The only way to turn a marginal candidate into a soldier is to give him meth. Which is what the Germans did with all of their marginal Infantry.
You can check this kind of evaluation on any paintball field. There are people that are simply there to be killed. They think they are warriors because they spent a ton of money on cool camo and a great gun but they do not know how to survive and kill other people.
I can go out as weekend warrior with a rented gun and hunt and kill these individuals liberally.
I would not need three months training to go out and kill people. Many do, and some will never get it, regardless of how many months training they are given.
This (in my honest opinion) is the Crux of the matter.
You cannot make a soldier out of every man inducted.
The proper psychology has to be present in the first place.
Just my opinion.
 
Unfortunately I don't have the expertise on the Eastern Front. This http://www.operationbarbarossa.net/the-siberian-divisions-and-the-battle-for-moscow-in-1941-42/#Red Army Divisions Transferred West from August to December 1941

... analysis of the 'Siberian Divisions' is aimed at a bit of myth busting, but is a bit of back story concerning the OP proposition. Spcifically the units identified as the Siberian Divisions were mostly reservists ordered activated In June-July & later, but were in part not transferred to battle for several months

To be fair to the Soviets they mobilized their reservists, who had previous training, but in 1941 generally did not get time for refresher training before being assembled and thrown into battle. IIRC it was only militia units that didn't have previous training when mobilized. ...

As noted above these reserve divisions had some training previous to June 1941. That provided a foundation for the next few weeks or months of training these formations received before their transfer west.

Not in personnel numbers. In division terms, of the 109 mobilization divisions formed in July 1941, 81 were deployed in July or August and another 20 in September, with only 8 being held back for more then the three months minimum. The second wave of mobilization divisions, formed up mostly in August were much more fortunate, with around half of them being held back until December or later (these formations constituted the main spearheads of the December counter-offensive). After that, the number of formed up divisions seriously drops off, with 20 formed in September, 18 in October, and 11 in November. Of the September divisions, only one was deployed prior to December, but all but two of the October divisions were dispatched to the front within a month of being formed. All of the November divisions were deployed within the same month of being formed.

By comparison, another 143 divisions were formed during the course of December 1941 to May 1942, of which around 25 were deployed with less then three months between formation and deployment.


That the Soviets were panicked enough to rush out prematurely trained forces is not mutually exclusive with it being a necessity. It's worth noting that the first wave mobilization formations were the ones who blocked Army Group Center's thrust eastward in August and forced the diversion to Kiev, so without at least some of them the Germans would have had a free shot at Moscow.

There is also a middle ground argument here, where one can say the Soviets did have no choice but to rush at least some of these divisions out, but they may have overdone it. One can certainly argue that they did themselves no favors by demanding these formations undertake immediate large-scale counter-offensive action, which is a more difficult task then defensive action especially when one is operating with undertrained personnel.

Three months is more on the order of 9-12 weeks.

This & the link i posted are similar to the description the Soviet historian Merekov provides. My best guess at this point is of the 230 odd reserve divisions activated June thru December 1941 perhaps 30-50 were held back for 10-16 weeks for preparation before commented to battle up to December 1941.Getting a more accurate take would probably taking a survey of each and every 'division' HQ activated in those months. In any case these 'held back' divisions (and corps or army support formations) seem to me to fit the criteria of the OP.
 
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Unfortunately I don't have the expertise on the Eastern Front. This http://www.operationbarbarossa.net/the-siberian-divisions-and-the-battle-for-moscow-in-1941-42/#Red Army Divisions Transferred West from August to December 1941

... analysis of the 'Siberian Divisions' is aimed at a bit of myth busting, but is a bit of back story concerning the OP proposition. Spcifically the units identified as the Siberian Divisions were mostly reservists ordered activated In June-July & later, but were in part not transferred to battle for several months



As noted above these reserve divisions had some training previous to June 1941. That provided a foundation for the next few weeks or months of training these formations received before their transfer west.



This & the link i posted are similar to the description the Soviet historian Merekov provides. My best guess at this point is of the 230 odd reserve divisions activated June thru December 1941 perhaps 30-50 were held back for 10-16 weeks or preparation before commented to battle up to December 1941.Getting a more accurate take would probably taking a survey of each and every 'division' HQ activated in those months. In any case these 'held back' divisions (and corps or army support formations) seem to me to fit the criteria of the OP.

Makes sense. Just throwing people into battle without training screams "blind panic" to me but with your link, it appears that didn't happen. They were trained, just outfought.
 

Deleted member 1487

As noted above these reserve divisions had some training previous to June 1941. That provided a foundation for the next few weeks or months of training these formations received before their transfer west.
Those divisions, many of whom were pre-war formations though. Many others were (re)built with reservists without time to train first.
 
1 year of training? It takes about 6-8 months today to turn a civilian into a soldier, and that's with job training beyond basic and in an era with a hell of a lot more varied and complicated military tasks.
 
From the outset, 3 months of training was supposed to be the basic training period for Soviet riflemen, with longer training periods for specialists and officers. In 1941, however, the extreme losses on the front forced the Red Army to short-circuit their training process and toss men out to the front with weeks or even just days of training. It wasn’t until the winter of ‘41/‘42 that the Soviets had enough equilibrium to start consistently training their forces to the three-month minimum standards. During ‘43/‘44 the Soviets even slightly increased the amount of time a replacement received training before committing them to battle.
Exactly. Its a fair argument, sending untrained men into battle against veteran formations. However, the pincer moves at Brody, Kiev, etc. effectively eliminated their standing army. They had to rebuild on the fly.

It is a fair argument though, especially for specialists - communications, artillery control etc. Its also an excellent argument that, instead of the Rzhev slaughter, they held the line and trained their new formations - especially those rear echelons. At that point the crisis was over and they were just wasting lives throwing them at the meat grinder without coordination and support.
 

Deleted member 1487

It is a fair argument though, especially for specialists - communications, artillery control etc. Its also an excellent argument that, instead of the Rzhev slaughter, they held the line and trained their new formations - especially those rear echelons. At that point the crisis was over and they were just wasting lives throwing them at the meat grinder without coordination and support.
If they didn't pin German troops to Rzhev the Germans could have used them to inflict serious damage on the offensive; the loss rates were much more even when the Soviets were forcing the Germans to fight WW1 style grinding attrition battles, costly as they were, vs. letting them attack at their point and time of their choosing. The problem was more one of coordination and planning as well as adapting to changing circumstances rather than the strategic concept of attacking at Rzhev.
 
Those divisions, many of whom were pre-war formations though. Many others were (re)built with reservists without time to train first.

Pre-war formations <> untrained. Pre-war formations were trained. Their tactics might be out of date and a little rusty but they had some. It takes about 6 weeks to turn the average civilian into a soldier who isn't more of a liability than an asset. Shipping in a bunch of untrained civilians who will, most likely, flee at the first sign of danger hurts rather than helps your army. All they do is cause panic in it.
 


There is also a middle ground argument here, where one can say the Soviets did have no choice but to rush at least some of these divisions out, but they may have overdone it. One can certainly argue that they did themselves no favors by demanding these formations undertake immediate large-scale counter-offensive action, which is a more difficult task then defensive action especially when one is operating with undertrained personnel.


Yes I'm inclined to agree with this. The use of minimally trained formations in defensive actions in 1941 doesn't seem unreasonable to me given the circumstances the Soviets were in.




 
Yes I'm inclined to agree with this. The use of minimally trained formations in defensive actions in 1941 doesn't seem unreasonable to me given the circumstances the Soviets were in.




Minimally trained takes 6 weeks. Less than that and you are a schelp with a gun.
 
I think a lot of those soldiers they just threw at the front line either surrendered, retreated or hid which caused some barely trained soldiers (just the minimum 6 weeks needed) to panic as well.

Blocking detachments, Penal Battalions and execution by Commissar make a lot more sense if you take that into consideration.
 
I reviewed the description from Merekov of the Red Army expansion 1939-40. Don't have translation of the sections for later 1940-41. Tho I have some analysis for that period from others.

Merekov describes a reasonably trained army of 1939, tho the effects of the ongoing purges were becoming apparent. The system for mobilizing reservists into new formations is described. In simple terms reservists sufficient for forming three new divisions were affiliated with existing standing units. To mobilize a new formation a portion of the standing or active units would be split off & create the cadre for the mobilized reservists. In October 1939 this process was started, but Markov describes a immense confusion created by frequent changes to this mobilization system, aggravated by many deep alterations in doctrine. These changes in doctrines at all levels are important in understanding why the Red Army performed so badly in 1941.

As it was the 65 infantry divisions of September 1939 would have created by mitosis 185 infantry divisions. Each requiring 6-9 months training to function at the level of a German formation of 1939.

Minimally trained takes 6 weeks. Less than that and you are a schelp with a gun

This is relevant at the squad level. It takes considerably longer to train platoon sgts & company grade officers. Between schools and field training you can get to some sort of minimum in a year. If your reservists have 3 years active service for sgts & junior officers you can get a company to a minimum capability in 1-2 months after mobilization. A bit longer for a rifle battalion. Once you reach regiment of any arm, it takes several years to train the command and staff & again several months to return these colonels and majors to speed when mobilized from reserve status.

The First problem for the Red Army at this point in 1939 is tho it had in theory cadre trained for a nominal 185 infantry divisions the reality was the purges were reducing that by close to 25% in 1939, & the purges were continuing. The Second bullet in the foot was the many changes in mobilization enacted 1939-41 was the expansion of the goal from 185 to 300+ infantry division, so 75% of the nominally trained cadre was being spread across 160 % greater infantry force. Even without the purges this was a showstopper. The third bullet were the numerous alterations in doctrine. These changes meant much of the training the reservist Captains, Majors, Colonels, and Generals was rendered meaningless. Rendered meaningless for the officers already on active service as well.

It took the US Army about 18 months to create what it considered a combat ready infantry division from zero. That included picking appropriate cadre from platoon sgt to general from a existing trained unit and sending him to a school specifically for his task in the new formation, then a incremental training system of 12 months. That was with a relatively stable doctrinal system, and a 'purge' confined to getting rid of elderly generals and political officers in the National Guard units. When the US Army started its mobilization in the autumn of 1940 it had between its Regular Army & National Guard NCOs & Officers and the Army Reserve Officers Corps cadre for approx 60 divisions. Over the next three years that was expanded to cadre and replacements for 90 divisions. By comparison the Red Army was asked to expand from a cadre for approx 250 Inf, Cav, & Mech divisions to over 500. & to do so in less than three years. Germany of 1934 had six years to expand to 150 divisions & seven to reach 180.
 
I'd like to point out that, historically Russian conscripts have proven themselves competent after being battered around a bit in combat; the main problem with under-trained conscripts was that not everyone survived to become competent. As for the defections part of the reason was that the Nazis didn't show how truly horrible they were yet-time which was brought with under trained divisions.
 
You'd have to go back and stop Stalin's Purge of the Red Army.

Note that a better Red Army would not have been humiliated in Finland, and Hitler would have been more cautious (in OTL he thought - not without reason - that he only had to kick down the door). So Operation Barbarossa goes differently from the other side.

Given that Stalin was apparently predisposed to underestimate Finland anyway, and thus allow less troops and resources for the attack than would have been prudent under the circumstances, I find it likely that the Red Army would have looked bad in a Winter War in late 1939 or early 1940 in any case. Everybody, the Western governments and Mannerheim himself included, expected Finland to fall in about two weeks. In the conditions, terrain and weather where the war was fought, though, even a better Red Army would have most likely not managed to overcome the Finns in that time. For a better Red Army, something like from three to five weeks to beat Finland might have been the best realistic timeframe, from the border to Helsinki. And if it took them more than three weeks to beat the Finns, they would have looked weaker than expected.

It is my belief that a Winter War fought in the OTL timeframe most likely can't make the Red Army look good. Even if they manage to beat Finland soundly in about a month, it is still worse than expected. Especially if the Finns manage even just one OTL "motti"-style tactical victory that is covered by the international press. It all would most likely only seem to validate Hitler's assessment that the Red Army is comparatively weak.
 
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