What if the Russians (and maybe Austrians) escalated to war with the Ottomans in 1849?

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
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Monthly Donor
By the fall of 1849, Austrian and Russian troops had crushed the
rebellion in Hungary. The rebellion's leaders, including the
Hungarian leader Kossuth and the Polish general in charge of the
Hungarian armies, Dembinski, slipped over the border into European
Turkey. Austria and Russia demanded that the Turks hand over the
refugees. The Turks refused, and appealed to England and France for
help. The English reacted by demanding that the Russians and
Austrians withdraw their requests, and by moving their Mediterranean
squadron to the Dardanelles. In France, Prince-President Louis
Bonaparte quickly promised support to the British, against the advice
of his Foreign Minister, Alexis de Tocqueville. In the end, however,
Tsar Nicholas I backed down, avoiding war.

WI Nicholas I had decided to make a stand? Aside from the forces in
Hungary, the Russians also had an army in the Danubian provinces,
which had entered in 1848 to prevent revolutionary disturbances. The
Russians and Austrians could probably have swept over the border and
captured the refugees. England and France would probably respond by
declaring war, at which point, the Russians will probably drive on
Constantinople. The British fleet could quickly take the Black sea
and menace Russia's southern coast, but the Russians and Austrians
have the advntage on land. At this point, I see a stalemate until
spring, when the British and French try a landing, either on Austria's
coast, or around Constantinople, or possibly even in the Crimea. What
next?

What would be the maximum gains that could be made against the Ottomans? How might such gains be divided between Russia and Austria. Or would the Ottomans be able to repulse the invaders?
 
Neither the Russians nor the Austrians are ready to fight this war, at all. It would be a very dumb and regrettable idea, which ends in further headaches if not outright losses in Italy for A-H and a Crimean War-like humiliation for Russia. 1848 Ottoman Empire is weak, but not so weak that Russia can walk all over it without internal help and against international opposition.

The most interesting consequences are a French-dominated North Italy, and even more agitations in the Habsburg dominions.
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
A contrary view from a discussion on the same PoD on soc.history.what-if:

Well, there could be a problem. In 1856 the Brits and French had an obvious
and overwhelming advantage of the Russian navy because they had steam (and
quite a few of them screw-driven) and the Russians were still overwhelmingly
sail (couple steamers would not make critical difference). My impression was
that by 1849 most of the British ships were not screw-driven and some of
them even being pure-sail so the difference would not be as great as in 1856.



> but the Russians and Austrians
> have the advntage on land.


An overwhelming one, unless Little Nappy decides to attack Austria in Italy.
But this would mean that the French are nowhere close to the main theater
and, anyway, the most important thing is that the bulk of the Russian army
is not guarding the border with Austria (as in OTL). On their own the Brits
would not be able to accomplish too much on land (they did not in 1856) and
the naval attacks on the Black and Azov sea ports were pinpricks, strategically.
OTOH, if the Austro-Russian troop are marching reasonably fast to the
straits (as they did in OTL before and after 1849), then the British/French
naval presence on the Black Sea is over: they are sailing back not to be
cut off their bases.



> At this point, I see a stalemate until
> spring, when the British and French try a landing, either on Austria's
> coast, or around Constantinople, or possibly even in the Crimea. What
> next?

The practical scenario for this ATL would be the French and Brits covering
Istanbul and Straits area (and their own posteriors) and from here proceeding
"judiciously but expediently" (one can't beat Al Gore :)) somewhere inland
always being aware of their inferior numbers and generally vulnerable rear.




>
> What would be the maximum gains that could be made against the Ottomans?

What would the Austrians and Russians want at that point?
Most probably, Russia would have a second front on then Caucasus with a desire
to get something there (pretty much along the OTL lines). It also may want
Moldavia.

Austria may want some of the usual things it wanted: some God-forsaken area
on the Balkans which produces nothing but goat's s--t.



>How might such gains be divided between Russia and Austria. Or would the Ottomans be able to repulse the invaders?

The Ottomans would not so the relevant question is how much and for how long
the Brits and French would be ready to get involved in that mess. Unlike the
Crimean War, it would be a big engagement with a wide front of the operations
unless the B/F are limiting themselves to covering Istanbul, in which case
the war is lost by the Ottomans as soon as it started. The numbers required
and the losses suffered would have to be much higher than in the Crimean War
so it is reasonable to assume that the public opinion both in France and in
Britain may get upset much faster than in the case of the Crimean War,
especially if there are not too many victories to report.

Yes, IIRC, there was an offset (at Shumla, off the top of my head, so I can
be wrong) but this was not something unique. During the 2nd Russian-Ottoman
War of Catherine II Potemkin spent disproportionally long time looking at
Ochakov's walls, there was more or less static campaign which ended in 1812
and probably you can find more examples (well, in 1877/78 - Plevna).

In this case AFAIK 2 factors contributed: 1st, a fear of the Austrians, which
forced to keep a big chunk of the Russian army elsewhere and 2nd, by 1856
Nicholas managed to almost completely destroy his army as a fighting tool while
in 1849 it was still reasonably operational. Look at performance of the
Russian generals in the field battles of the Crimean War. Short of a small
scale diversion at Balaklava, they were all examples of a lousy generalship
(everything must be done according to the regulations and prescribed "standard"
dispositions, initiative was practically forbidden).

Of course, there were exceptions like Muraviev's performance on Caucasus but
(a) he was openly at odds with Nicholas' "acrobatics" (term used by fieldmarshal
Paskevich to describe training of the Russian army) and (b) a big part of his
troops were the units with the history of almost permanent engagement (Caucasus
was not, yet "pacified"). The same goes for the defense of Sevastopol where
"control" was not that strict.
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
In the event of an Austro-Russia wank here,

the map of Southeast Europe could end up looking like this:

http://imgur.com/o3BbZCR

Losses by Austria in Italy could take place whether Austria does poorly or does well on the Balkans front

Of course if the Austro-Russians did badly they could end up with no territorial gains at all. Less likely (mainly because of Austrian alignment with Russia as opposed to OTL's Crimean War), Russia could even lose territory in Bessarabia, with the Austrians possibly losing territory in Dalmatia in addition to Italy.
 
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