Not to derail the thread, (well any more than it already has been J ) but one of the main reasons for the ‘featherweight’ program was BECAUSE while no concurrent Air Force and most Navy planes could not ‘intercept’ the B-36 the Banshee in fact could with a good radar intercept crew to back it up. Whether it could actually knock said bomber down or not was questionable but quite a few ‘cocky’ B-36 crews, (who as a general rule would always ‘return’ to CONUS running an ‘attack’ profile to show off to Continental Air Command how ‘invulnerable’ they were) would suddenly find a pair of Banshee’s flying close by especially at night when the crew could not easily spot the oncoming jets.
By luck more than design the Banshee engines and wing surface was sufficient that it actually COULD maneuver at 43,000ft effectively enough to at least have a shot at the B-36 carrying a war-load and the SoD and LeMay were well aware of these incidents. The Admiral in fact had every reason to be confident it could be done. Again the ‘problem’ was if the B-36 had ‘awareness’ of the incoming interceptor(s) (usually at least 4 in two pairs) they could maneuver to very much limit the possible intercept positions and as noted while the Banshee COULD maneuver above 40kft it couldn’t do it as well as the B-36. (Hence the use of a “hammer-and-anvil” intercept pattern)
Then the main question was could the likely single pass by one or two Banshee’s actually take down the bomber? Two ‘shots’ of 8 each 2.75in Folding Fin Aerial Rockets, (
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Folding-Fin_Aerial_Rocket) with a ‘range’ of about 3700 yards but high inaccuracy the ‘chances’ without closing to point-blank range were slim. (Oddly enough the ‘consolation contract’ given to Northrup supposedly to take the ‘sting’ out of losing the XB-35/49 contract for the F-89 interceptor was specifically designed as basically an “anti-B-36” weapon with its high altitude, over 45,000ft, and high number, over 104 FFARs, of rockets in a single salvo. Further, (as compared to the Banshee) it had an onboard intercept radar to allow it to better refine its own intercept solution. Unfortunately as noted it didn’t quite live up to expectations in real life and very seldom managed anything but ‘staged’ intercepts, especially once the ‘featherweight’ models came on line
These issues taken in context finally make ‘sense’ of the Genie un-guided nuclear air-intercept-rocket. General consensus has it they were designed to take out ‘formations’ of attacking bombers but even a cursory study of the time shows that wasn’t how US doctrine operated nuclear bombers so it would be obvious that would not be how the USSR would do so either. What DOES make sense, when taking into account the literal issue of an interceptor getting only ‘one-shot’ at an attacking bomber you really need to ensure that ‘one-shot’ does the most damage possible and that’s where the nuke warhead comes in.
The inter-service rivalry shenanigans of the late-40s through 50s was a major factor in the US being behind and caught off-guard by Korea and Soviet advances but frankly it’s tough to see a way they would not have happened given the political climate of the post-war/pre-Korea “normalization” and “draw-down” doctrine. That this lead to continued efforts by politicians to find a way to ‘cheaply’ fight the Cold War till the late 70s meant that the US military was going to be handicapped in any conflict where it could not or would not bring it’s full, (up to and including nuclear and all strategic elements) might to bear on an enemy.
The open ‘preference’ of one service and one specific weapons system to the point where an appointed official is openly discussing a major service as being obsolete and needing to be eliminated while cutting budgetary and support to ALL branches is almost criminal and rightly should have been called into open question far sooner than it was.
Randy