What if the Nagasaki bomb was delayed ten days?

[raharris1973]

would Japan have surrendered on OTLs date?

Would it’s surrender have been delayed?

If delayed, what would have happened on the conventional battlefield in the intervening week and a half?

For example- firebombings? Carbonado on the China coast? Commonwealth ops? Momentum and progress and challenges of Soviet campaigns? ChiCom and ChiNat ops?

 

[The Red]

The double shock of Hiroshima and the Soviet declaration of war likely would have been enough to create the stalemate in the Japanese regime that led to the Emperor’s intervention IOTL. Anami’s assertion that The Bomb was a one-off would have held more weight but at the same time the extent of the Japanese defeat in Manchuria would also have become clearer.

 

[History Learner]

The double shock of Hiroshima and the Soviet declaration of war likely would have been enough to create the stalemate in the Japanese regime that led to the Emperor’s intervention IOTL. Anami’s assertion that The Bomb was a one-off would have held more weight but at the same time the extent of the Japanese defeat in Manchuria would also have become clearer.

Defeat?

 

[The Red]

Defeat?

In Manchuria, yes.

 

[Baldrick]

Beijing and Seoul fall to the Red Army. Japan mobilises for invasion, probably thinking that the Hiroshima bomb was designed to weaken them prior to a conventional assault. Maybe the Royal Navy bombards a few Japanese cities.

 

[I want to learn]

I thought that there was a serious argument to be made that if Nagasaki had been delayed, Truman wouldn’t have dropped the second a-bomb, at least not on a civilian target. Roughly that Truman had trusted military planners to do something of military value and was horrified when newspaper headlines came out (too late for Truman to stop Nagasaki) reading “Hundreds of thousands of civilians vaporized”

At any rate, Japan’s military position was in free fall so I think they would have surrendered pretty soon regardless of Nagasaki.

 

[Johnrankins]

I doubt it. The death toll of the firebombing of Tokyo was even worse and it didn't stop the bombings. After the war Truman said

The atom bomb was no “great decision.” It was used in the war, and for your information, there were more people killed by fire bombs in Tokyo than dropping of the atomic bombs accounted for. It was merely another powerful weapon in the arsenal of righteousness. The dropping of the bombs stopped the war, save millions of lives.

https://www.azquotes.com/author/14817-Harry_S_Truman/tag/atomic-bomb

 

[marathag]

The double shock of Hiroshima and the Soviet declaration of war likely would have been enough to create the stalemate in the Japanese regime that led to the Emperor’s intervention IOTL. Anami’s assertion that The Bomb was a one-off would have held more weight but at the same time the extent of the Japanese defeat in Manchuria would also have become clearer.

No, took two bombs and getting thumped by the Soviets for the Emperor to move the Cabinet to surrender.
Just one?

Not enough

 

[Monter]

No, took two bombs and getting thumped by the Soviets for the Emperor to move the Cabinet to surrender.
Just one?

Not enough

There is little evidence of Nagasaki actually influenced the Japanese decision of surrendering, news of the Nagasaki bombing came when GHQ was discussing the effects of Hiroshima and Manchuria, in which they sent the offer of conditional surrender that the US refused, few days later Hirohito broke the deadlock and conceded to the Postdam declaration of unconditional surrender, before the extend of the damage in Nagasaki was even fully reported.

 

[aaronupright]

I doubt it. The death toll of the firebombing of Tokyo was even worse and it didn't stop the bombings. After the war Truman said https://www.azquotes.com/author/14817-Harry_S_Truman/tag/atomic-bomb

It led to Henry Stimson directing the USAAF that they would need his personal authorization for the nuclear attacks, the civilian leadership was horrified at the Tokyo attacks.

Truman ordered a stop to further attacks on the morning of August 10th as the first detailed assessment of Hiroshima came in.
http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2018/01/19/purely-military-target/

 

[marathag]

in which they sent the offer of conditional surrender that the US refused,

You mean the one where they wanted a 'White Peace' and roll everything back to November 1941, and Japanese Courts would handle any War Crime Trials?

Yeah, I'm sure they wanted that kind of Conditional Surrender

In the same way as the Damned in Hell wanting Icewater.
Wasn't going to happen.

 

[marathag]

ruman ordered a stop to further attacks on the morning of August 10th as the first detailed assessment of Hiroshima came in.
http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2018/01/19/purely-military-target/

LeMay kept the mining and conventional attacks going, after both atomic attacks.

 

[aaronupright]

LeMay kept the mining and conventional attacks going, after both atomic attacks.

Yes. And was told to stop on August 12 if I recall.

 

[Monter]

You mean the one where they wanted a 'White Peace' and roll everything back to November 1941, and Japanese Courts would handle any War Crime Trials?

Yeah, I'm sure they wanted that kind of Conditional Surrender

In the same way as the Damned in Hell wanting Icewater.
Wasn't going to happen.

Yes, that one, you still didn't prove how Nagasaki influenced the decision for unconditional surrender though, Hiroshima showed the USA could obliterate Japan (and its people) without landing a single soldier in the islands and the Soviet invasion of Manchuria stripped them of any diplomatic option, there is no evidence of Nagasaki influencing Hirohito decision to drop conditional surrender in favor of submiting to Postdam.

Summing up, I just repeated what I said, read clearly now.

 

[marathag]

Yes, that one, you still didn't prove how Nagasaki influenced the decision for unconditional surrender though, Hiroshima showed the USA could obliterate Japan (and its people) without landing a single soldier in the islands and the Soviet invasion of Manchuria stripped them of any diplomatic option, there is no evidence of Nagasaki influencing Hirohito decision to drop conditional surrender in favor of submiting to Postdam.

Summing up, I just repeated what I said, read clearly now.

Some argued that the US had only one Atomic Bomb. That was disproved once the 2nd bomb was used.
Conventional bombing was already obliterating Japanese cities.

Note the surrender Broadcast did not mention directlt what the Soviets had been doing, other that in general
'Not to our advantage'-- a sublime understatement

So do you have any proof that the Sov DoW had any direct influence on the decision to surrender? If sp, post that

 

[marathag]

Yes. And was told to stop on August 12 if I recall.

SUNDAY, 12 AUGUST 1945

WESTERN PACIFIC [Far East Air Force (FEAF)]: B-24s from Okinawa bomb Matsuyama Airfield on Formosa. In Japan, B-25s and A-26s hit Chiran and Kanoya Airfields while other A-26s and A-20s and P-47s hit the towns of Kushikino, Akune, and Miyazaki; more B-25s and fighter-bombers hit shipping and communications targets on Kyushu, the N Ryukyu Islands, and between Japan and Korea; the aircraft claim several small merchant ships sunk and damaged, and numerous bridges, railroads, factories, and other targets of opportunity hit.

On Formosa, B-24s from the Philippine Islands pound Kagi Airfield and the Takao marshalling yard.

MONDAY, 13 AUGUST 1945

ALEUTIAN ISLANDS (Eleventh Air Force): The Eleventh AF dispatches its last combat mission when 6 B-24s radar-bomb the Kashiwahara Staging Area on Paramushiru Island (northern portion of Kuril Islands chain) with incendiaries, leaving huge columns of smoke.

CENTRAL PACIFIC [US Army Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific (USASTAF)]

Eighth Air Force: The 461st, 462d and 463d Bombardment Squadrons (Very Heavy), 346th Bombardment Group (Very Heavy), arrive on Okinawa from the US with B-29s.


WESTERN PACIFIC [Far East Air Force (FEAF)]: B-24s and B-25s from Okinawa pound shipping in the waters off Korea and Kyushu Island and in the Inland Sea claiming several vessels sunk and damaged; P-47s over Keijo encounter 20 Japanese aircraft and claim at least 16 shot down. B-25s attack Japanese forces near Palacian, Luzon. P-38s hit shipping in the Singapore, Malaysia area. Unit moves from Luzon: HQ 312th Bombardment Group (Heavy) and 386th Bombardment Squadron (Heavy) from Floridablanca to Okinawa with B-32s;

TUESDAY, 14 AUGUST 1945

CENTRAL PACIFIC [US Army Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific (USASTAF)]

Twentieth Air Force: 752 B-29s fly 7 missions against Japan without loss.

These are the last B-29 missions against Japan in WWII. The following 3 missions were flown during the day:
Mission 325: 157 B-29s bomb the naval arsenal at Hikari; 4 others hit alternate targets.
Mission 326: 145 B-29s bomb the Osaka Army Arsenal and 2 hit alternate targets; 160+ P-51 escort the B-29s and attack airfields in the Nagoya area;1 P-51 is lost.
Mission 327: 108 B-29s bomb the railroad yards at Marifu; 2 others hit alternate targets.
The following 4 missions were flown during the night of 14/15 Aug:
Mission 328: In the longest nonstop unstaged B-29 mission from the Mariana Islands, 3,650 miles (5,874 km), 132 B-29s bomb the Nippon Oil Company at Tsuchizakiminato.
Mission 329: 81 B-29s drop incendiaries on the Kumagaya urban area destroying 0.27 sq mi (0.7 sq km), 45% of the city area.
Mission 330: 86 B-29s drop incendiaries on the Isezaki urban area destroying 0.166 sq mi (0.43 sq km), 17% of the city area.
Mission 331: 39 B-29s mine the waters at Nanao, Shimonoseki, Miyazu, and Hamada.

 

[FasterThanRaito]

Note the surrender Broadcast did not mention directlt what the Soviets had been doing, other that in general
'Not to our advantage'-- a sublime understatement

So do you have any proof that the Sov DoW had any direct influence on the decision to surrender? If sp, post that

1. The Japanese surrender announcement was itself a product of propaganda. Furthermore, later Japanese lies spinning the narrative to the Americans reinforced the importance of the bomb and downplayed the importance of Soviet participation.

2. The actual transcripts of the Japanese cabinet and war committees clearly show that the Soviets were the main focus of concern. Additionally, the damage from the atomic bombings was not reported until too late to have much effect on the decision to surrender, and it was only fully understood post-war. Furthermore, even if the Japanese understood the nuclear attacks, they did not perceive them in any way to be fundamentally different from conventional bombings, which had already destroyed all cities to a large degree without leading to surrender.

More bombings on cities did not change the strategic situation enough to warrant reconsidering the war, but the end Soviet neutrality certainly would.
After all, control over North/East China was the reason Japan started the war in the first place. If the Soviets invade, then they loose everything on the Asian mainland, including Korea. That's the real end of the war right there.

 

[marathag]

After all, control over North/East China was the reason Japan started the war in the first place. If the Soviets invade, then they loose everything on the Asian mainland, including Korea. That's the real end of the war right there.

Not proof, but supposition.

Losing China and Korea would suck, losing all the gains since the 1890s, but doesn't do a thing for the Home Islands themselves- that had been free of foreign attack since the 1860s.
What the US was doing, with the mining and aircraft shooting everything larger than rowboats on Water, and fighter and medium bomber sweeps over anything that moved on roads, along with the B-29 and B-32, that was doing something directly to the Home Islands.