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This was inspired by some quotes in some earlier Manchuria threads about how weak the Soviets felt themselves to be, and perhaps actually were, in 1931-32 in the Far East.

What if after occupying Chinese Manchuria and proclaiming it the "independent" state of Manchukuo in 1932 Japanese armed forces launched assaults to earn glory, funding, vengeance against the foreign and domestic enemies who forced withdrawal from the Russian Civil War about ten years earlier, and "honor for the Emperor" the Japanese Army tried to repeat the recently successful interventionist formula and press Manchukuo's historic "claim" to Soviet-held "Outer Manchuria".

Below is a map that differentiates outer and inner Manchuria.

Manchuria.png

Looking at the map that section of the Soviet Union falls within Japan's natural line of interest. Successfully occupying it helps Japan turn the Sea of Japan into an enclosed sea, and offers buffer space to protect Japan from long-term development of Russian naval or airpower capable of striking the home islands or Korea. It also simplifies the defense of Manchukuo. (this is what Japanese ultrapatriots would think).

Plus it is the most valuable piece of the Soviet Far East and still has plenty of room, in theory, for Japanese colonists.

This would most naturally be coupled with the seizure of northern Sakhalin island. Going after the littoral of the sea of Okhotsk and Kamchatka can be a strictly optional objective the Japanese possibly do not bother with.

I figure it would be Kwangtung Army officers in Manchukuo pushing this agenda, but not them alone. Officers in the Army of Korea might see the Soviet maritime province as their field of destiny, and Officers in southern Sakhalin naturally would look to northern Sakhalin.

Now before anybody brings up Nomonhan/Khalkin-Gol, I've got to preempt. That battle was seven years and 1.5 five year plans into the future, and thus not relevant to comparative Soviet-Japanese capabilities in 1932 and the short-run.

Here are some quotes about the Soviet sense of weakness at this point, and desire by Araki to launch an assault:
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