What if the invasion of Norway during World War 2 fails?

Umm, the Sicilian Narrows are 130 km across at the narrowest point, and the Allies controlled the entire African coast.

The Kattegat (the passage between Jutland and Sweden) is only 100 km wide at any point, and the Allies would not control any of the coast on either side. Then to get into the Baltic, one must pass through the Danish archipelago, through channels at most 25 km wide, and in places less than 10 km wide. These channels could easily be blocked with minefields and coast artillery.

Or one could pass through the Oresund between Sjaelland and Sweden, which is 25 km wide at most, and only about 3 km wide at Helsingors. Half of the Oresund is Swedish territorial waters.

Tne Allies could establish air superiority over the area, but it wouldn't be easy; their nearest bases would be 500 km away in Norway.

If you had read my posts yours might make some sense.
 
Thats very true, tho the deception operation need not stop at Denmark.

Fortitude East A: Allies diseminate evidence they are about to invade Sweden. This can be ignored, but one quick look at the map shows what a problem a Allied occupied Sweden is for Germany. Now the entire Baltic coast is vulnerable, & Allied P47 or P38 can rove all over Germany on escort missions. No need to wait on long range P51s. It may not require more than the 200,000 identified to have a rapid reaction force ready to aid the Swedes. But, the 200,000 can no longer be all second or third tier formations, static coast artillery regiments, & volks militia. To aid the Swedes at least average grade regiments must be on hand, with transport & field artillery. Some of those precious panzers must be on hand too.

Fortitude East B: Deception is Sweden is about to flip to the Allies. Same as above except there would be no friendly ports or Skagerrak ferry landings for a German reaction force. They have to be prepared to do forcible entry to secure a port. & hey! Its Sea Lion in Swedish. The beauty is the Allies can run both deceptions concurrently, carefully feeding the information to stimulate current German (Hitler) fears.

If the Allies do gain Sweden as a ally look again at the map and consider just what it takes for Germany to defend that long coast. Even if the Allies make no plans, its still Fortitude Baltic adding another large shadow for Hitler & Co to leap after.

Would Sweden (or Norway) actually support the allies or allied landings?

It was my impression from their behaviour in the Winter War and WW2 that they didn't want anything to do with the Allies or Axis and if they favoured anyone it was the Axis.
 
Consider the superficial differences in operations: -

Navy: -
Britain - second largest in the world, dwarfs yours.
Norway - not quite negligible but smaller than yours.

Army: -
Britain - Mobilised as much as possible with some armour & modern anti-tank weapons.
Norway - Almost all militia, partially mobilised (or caught in the throes of...).

Air Force
Britain - several hundred modern fighter aircraft with a modern air defence system, backed by large number of mostly-decent bombers;
Norway - road hump of second-rate aircraft.
In what conceivable scenario would Norway be fighting an invasion single-handed for more than a few hours? Whoever violates Norwegian neutrality first brings in their opponent instantly, which is one of the reasons the Norwegians were so nervous. So in every point above the Germans have to consider Britain+Norway as an entity, just as the British should have thought long and hard about just what the German reaction would be to their poking about in the fjords.
 
The biggest thing not yet mentioned is the shipment of Swedish Iron Ore. The whole reason for the Norwegian invasion in the first place:

After the capture of Norway, Swedish Iron ore shipments to Germany tripled, and stayed at much higher levels during the rest of the war, even though Germany technically had enough material from the occupied countries (France especially) to cover the iron costs, but they were not very efficient in taking the material needed from the populace or mines. This would hamper German production to a pretty heavy degree.

With Norway under Allied control, German ability to project into the northern sea lanes is gone, the bases in Norway served as a great location to station long-distance subs to harass supply shipments and annoy the British fleet at Scapa Flow.

If Barbarossa happens at roughly the same time. Not only do the Finns not attack the Soviets, thus freeing up forces to focus more on the south, but a direct line through the White sea, would allow the Allies the ability to send supplies in through places like Murmansk, a line that didn't have too much supplies coming in OTL.
 
The biggest thing not yet mentioned is the shipment of Swedish Iron Ore.

...With Norway under Allied control, German ability to project into the northern sea lanes is gone, the bases in Norway served as a great location to station long-distance subs to harass supply shipments and annoy the British fleet at Scapa Flow.

If Barbarossa happens at roughly the same time. Not only do the Finns not attack the Soviets, thus freeing up forces to focus more on the south, but a direct line through the White sea, would allow the Allies the ability to send supplies in through places like Murmansk, a line that didn't have too much supplies coming in OTL.

I think you'll find I have mentioned these very things.
 
Would Sweden (or Norway) actually support the allies or allied landings?

It was my impression from their behaviour in the Winter War and WW2 that they didn't want anything to do with the Allies or Axis and if they favoured anyone it was the Axis.

They saw the Allied campain in Norway quickly going down the drain and reckoned that the Germans were the winner then better hole up and sit out the war for the time being than go down the drain too!
 

formion

Banned
& all that makes the continued neutrality of Sweden problematic. Both side are going to be trying to leverage Sweden to their advantage. If the Germans are to return to invading Norway in 1941 or 1942 or any time is just too tempting to badger the Swedes into cooperation, or simply invade them as well to gain any strategic advantage thereof.

As I see it, Sweden can be invaded only in spring 1941 before Barbarossa. The German strategic objective will be the subjugation of the entirety of both Sweden and Norway, up to Kiruna and Narvik. A naval campaign like the one in April 1940 will be completely ASB, so the only choice is a land campaign. A land campaign would involve a landing in Scania and then driving north. The fight in Sweden wouln't be a cakewalk:

- The Swedish had in 1941 a total of 600,000 men in a full mobilization ( 200,000 of them would have not finished their training), with an OOB of 10 divisions.
- Decent amounts of field and AA artillery but with few tanks (135 light tanks)
- The Swedish navy was capable to protect Stockholm and can hurt the Kriegsmarine, especially after the losses they have sustained in the 1940 campaign.

All in all, nothing to sneeze at, especially in a campaign in their home turf. After the Wehrmacht has beaten the Swedish army, they will have to drive to Oslo and then start a grinding campaign over mountain terrain to reach Narvik. The Wehrmacht will have to face a fully mobilized Norwegian army of 6 light divisions (that had 1 year to properly train) and whatever British and Canadian divisions are stationed there.

A Nordic Campaign will be a major one that I cannot see happening after Barbarossa has been commenced. The only problem will be the Greco-Italian War. If indeed happens, the British will be in Greece in November 1940. The RAF may threaten both the Romanian oil and the Swedish iron ore. However, I think the British won't overextend before the Americans enter the war, so I believe they would respect swedish neutrality if only to avoid fighting in Scandinavia with open fronts in Cyrenaica and Greece. Furthermore, Greece is an open sore that cannot be squashed by Mussolini and constitutes a bridgehead that allows anti-German feelings to fester in the Balkans (think of the Yugoslavian coup). Lastly, with a reduced Axis threat, Britain can buy more and more turkish chrome.
While it is still possible for Hitler to choose Scandinavia over Balkans, I would bet on a Balkan campaign.

In general, I think Scandinavia will be spared of a land campaign, at least until USA has entered the war and has build a significant force in Norway both in terms of air power and land units. If then the Allies bully the Swedish not to sell iron to the Germans, then all bets are off. But by that point Wehrmacht will be struggling along the Volga and Caucasus...
 
With a prolonged Norwegian Campain the Danish illusion of "neutrality" won't be a possibility as the Wehrmacht won't accept the presence of armed Danish Army and Navy.
Those ships that may will flee to Sweden the rest will be scuttled. The Army will put up a short fight on day one and that will be it. However many more Danish servicemen may decide to go to Norway by way of Sweden presenting the Swedes with a slight problem though in such circumstances they probably won't mind letting the Danes through as the Germans have gotten their butt kicked.
Besides the removal of the military the resistance will surface very early to help the Norwegian brothers in the fight against Nazism. Even if France falls as OTL. ITTL will be a very different situation.
It won't of course be much of a military contribution but will be good for morale; and put Denmark in a much different light regarding the Allies.
There may even be a government in exile led by Christmas Møller in London; with the financial backing of the boullion stored in Fort Knox and the asset of the cryolite mine at Narsarssuak. Of course this prevent any permanent US or Allied bases in Greenland as any such agreement would be for duration of War.
 

Coulsdon Eagle

Monthly Donor
In what conceivable scenario would Norway be fighting an invasion single-handed for more than a few hours? Whoever violates Norwegian neutrality first brings in their opponent instantly, which is one of the reasons the Norwegians were so nervous. So in every point above the Germans have to consider Britain+Norway as an entity, just as the British should have thought long and hard about just what the German reaction would be to their poking about in the fjords.

True but those few hours practically sealed Norway's fate with the capture of the airfields around Oslo. The half-hearted initial British planning, where they can't seem to commit fully for fear of being seen as the aggressor, and the misreading of German intentions, then played as much a part as Norway's seeming delusion that the war must just pass them by and suddenly finding out too late the dangers of being a neutral between two great powers.

As it was British (& French & Polish) troops had little impact in southern Norway, while the RAF had even less. The Royal Navy mauled the Kriegsmarine but most of the damage was inflicted after the German had already won the strategic victory. The Norwegians did most to upset the German plans when they fought off the naval assault force primed with reinforcing the paras at Oslo, and even then it wasn't terminal.
 
True but those few hours practically sealed Norway's fate with the capture of the airfields around Oslo.
And that’s exactly the point. The German plan (attacking an entire country with 12,000 men spread across 7 major objectives separated by hundreds of kilometres) relied on bouncing an unprepared neutral nation and seizing it before the British could respond, and their overly risky plan only succeeded due to a long list of breaks all going their way.

I don't think that anyone is arguing that their plan could succeed as that is a historical fact. But it could have (and IMO should have) failed, and once that has happened any second german attack against a prepared Anglo-Norwegian defense is basically pissing up a rope, it makes Sealion look like a cakewalk.
 
Does such a failure allow the German military leadership to prevent the attack on the low countries and France?

As I see it up to some time in 1941 Hitler took repeated extreme risks and seemed to get away with them.

If this did not happen well...
 

Coulsdon Eagle

Monthly Donor
And that’s exactly the point. The German plan (attacking an entire country with 12,000 men spread across 7 major objectives separated by hundreds of kilometres) relied on bouncing an unprepared neutral nation and seizing it before the British could respond, and their overly risky plan only succeeded due to a long list of breaks all going their way.

I don't think that anyone is arguing that their plan could succeed as that is a historical fact. But it could have (and IMO should have) failed, and once that has happened any second german attack against a prepared Anglo-Norwegian defense is basically pissing up a rope, it makes Sealion look like a cakewalk.

I think we are arguing from the same point. Perhaps I misread your original post as arguing that as Weserubung succeeded so could Seelowe. I think southern Norway would be difficult for the Allies to hold with the Jutland peninsular bases for the Luftwaffe but western, central & northern parts could be held by the Allies, unless they again look to pull anything out after 10 May - but who says Case Yellow will be the same after a full or even partial failure of Weserubung.
 
I think we are arguing from the same point. Perhaps I misread your original post as arguing that as Weserubung succeeded so could Seelowe. I think southern Norway would be difficult for the Allies to hold with the Jutland peninsular bases for the Luftwaffe but western, central & northern parts could be held by the Allies, unless they again look to pull anything out after 10 May - but who says Case Yellow will be the same after a full or even partial failure of Weserubung.
If Norway is not caught by surprise there is little the Luftwaffe can do , Norway starts as far from Jutland as London is from the Pas de Calais so unless they get new planes, bombers attacking Olso could only be escorted by Me-110's. With RAF help to set up an air defense system and some Hurricanes let alone Spitfires, Luftwaffe is only really night bombing.
 

Coulsdon Eagle

Monthly Donor
If Norway is not caught by surprise there is little the Luftwaffe can do , Norway starts as far from Jutland as London is from the Pas de Calais so unless they get new planes, bombers attacking Olso could only be escorted by Me-110's. With RAF help to set up an air defense system and some Hurricanes let alone Spitfires, Luftwaffe is only really night bombing.

It's not so much Oslo but the seaborne supply line to Oslo - the Kattegat is pretty much completely covered from Jutland. I'll be honest I have no idea what surface links (rail or road) were like between Oslo and the Norwegian ports out of Luftwaffe range, so could enough supplies come from these sources to meet both military & civilian needs?
 
Does such a failure allow the German military leadership to prevent the attack on the low countries and France?

As I see it up to some time in 1941 Hitler took repeated extreme risks and seemed to get away with them.

If this did not happen well...

No. I addressed this in a earlier post. Halder, Rundsteadt, Kleist were fully committed to the Sicklecut plan. They'd war-gamed on the map & the filed multiple plans from the start in 1939 right up to late March 1940. Every proposal failed to achieve strategic victory, or even a decent operational victory. However the Sicklecut plan was the one plan that showed any promise IF everything went perfectly AND the French failed to react with any normal speed. High risk sure, but its all Halder & Rundsteadt could come up with. Its a myth that Hitler midwifed the Sicklecut plan. He was impressed with his new Corps commander Manstein at that railway station meeting & dinner later that evening, but the reality is he was extremely nervous about the risks in the plans Halder & Co were developing. He kept asking about the other plans on the table, sent memos favoring this or that alternate plan, & other wise was a erratic waffling hindrance. Five times from 12 through 24 May he proposed halting Kliests Panzer Group until the infantry corps could catch up. Halder had a full time job talking the Furher down off the ceiling that two weeks. The last halt order stuck because Rundsteadt asked for it as the battle of Arras faded out. Halder was reluctant but with Rundsteadts reasoning it was tough to oppose.

I'd recommend Mays 'Strange Victory' as a good outline of the development of the Sicklecut plan and who had to do with what in it.
 
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formion

Banned
It's not so much Oslo but the seaborne supply line to Oslo - the Kattegat is pretty much completely covered from Jutland. I'll be honest I have no idea what surface links (rail or road) were like between Oslo and the Norwegian ports out of Luftwaffe range, so could enough supplies come from these sources to meet both military & civilian needs?

There were railroads connecting Oslo to Trondheim, Bergen and Stavager. The British won't have much of an issue supplying Norway.
 
It's not so much Oslo but the seaborne supply line to Oslo - the Kattegat is pretty much completely covered from Jutland.

That works both ways, but is a different discussion.

I'll be honest I have no idea what surface links (rail or road) were like between Oslo and the Norwegian ports out of Luftwaffe range, so could enough supplies come from these sources to meet both military & civilian needs?

Short answer is there were some railway connections. I found some inadequate verbal descriptios, but no handy maps yet.
 
There were railroads connecting Oslo to Trondheim, Bergen and Stavager. The British won't have much of an issue supplying Norway.
Stavager I think is actually finished by the Gernans in WW2 but the Bergen line is 1909 and Trondheim is 1921
 
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