Troops within the Indian Army were generally rather wary of the professional politicians of the Congress Party and the Muslim League. So the opinion of said politicians wouldn't really (and didn't) effect troop morale. The way the Japanese treated their INA allies and the torture that befell those who refused to join convinced a good deal of the original defectors to return to the allied side. Hunger at home and the erosion of the image of British military might were the two main factors in cases of insubordination and grumbling within the ranks.
It was composed by volunteers, but their numbers were relatively small and not really trusted or respected by their Japanese handlers. Although an increase in INA numbers frightened the Raj government in Delhi, the threat of saboteurs trained and equipped by the Germans through Afghanistan (if the German Army Group A had managed to swing into Central Asia from their foothold in the Caucasus) was even more worrying, IIRC.
The only reason Gandhi was allowed to say what he was saying for so long, was because of his relatively coherent demand for peaceful non-cooperation. You'd need a pretty early and major PoD for the Mahatma to embrace violence. Maybe a different experience in the Boer War or another way for him to analyse the Bhagava Ghita. Gandhi really can't be completely eliminated from the equation of the Congress push for independence, because he seemingly was the only one to understand that the struggle for Puna Swaraj had to originate in the rural villages of the subcontinent - and not in the fancy dining rooms of Bombay lawyers.
With a enormous size totalling more than 2.5 million troops at the end of hostilities, the British Indian Army was a massive thing, but in 1939 it numbered only some 200,000. However, to bring these men away from India and to Europe is an entirely different thing.
IIRC the Azad Hind Fauj was composed mainly of volunteer indian POWs.
I can only see a ucessful indian revolt if there is no Ghandi led peacful indeopendence movement.
It was composed by volunteers, but their numbers were relatively small and not really trusted or respected by their Japanese handlers. Although an increase in INA numbers frightened the Raj government in Delhi, the threat of saboteurs trained and equipped by the Germans through Afghanistan (if the German Army Group A had managed to swing into Central Asia from their foothold in the Caucasus) was even more worrying, IIRC.
The only reason Gandhi was allowed to say what he was saying for so long, was because of his relatively coherent demand for peaceful non-cooperation. You'd need a pretty early and major PoD for the Mahatma to embrace violence. Maybe a different experience in the Boer War or another way for him to analyse the Bhagava Ghita. Gandhi really can't be completely eliminated from the equation of the Congress push for independence, because he seemingly was the only one to understand that the struggle for Puna Swaraj had to originate in the rural villages of the subcontinent - and not in the fancy dining rooms of Bombay lawyers.
Britain had understood (well, everybody but Winston Churchill) that after the sweeping victories of the Axis, India would have to be granted satisfaction on the Home Rule/independence issue in the event of war. Congress had at first supported the war, so Britain really did not need to promise anything really. However, the INC decided to escalate the issue by demanding complete independence in 1942 when German and especially Japanese campaigns were still causing major concern in both Delhi and London. Which of course was completely unacceptable to the Raj.The more interesting scenario would be:
britain sees that its reign in India is doomend and decides to trade "fully indian war support" for "free" india 5 years after end of hostilities. This would enable britain to bring enough troops to europe to blast the nazis no later than 1942... (= indian independence 1947 - wait that date has some ring to it)
With a enormous size totalling more than 2.5 million troops at the end of hostilities, the British Indian Army was a massive thing, but in 1939 it numbered only some 200,000. However, to bring these men away from India and to Europe is an entirely different thing.
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