What if the German U203 sunk the Battleship USS Texas in June 1941?

Would a submarine sinking the USS Texas in June 41 have led to an American DoW on Germany by July 41


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Tell me you're not suggesting Franklin D. Roosevelt would knowingly put American servicemen in harms way (at a disadvantage) in order to secure a political end he desired?
{Sarcasm dripping uncontrollably};)

Seriously why would a battleship steam into a war zone known to contain submarines with only 1 escort? (The patrols in the Caribbean had 3 destroyers!) there is only one reason in my logical world.

Oh, don't break a sweat of sarcasm over inaccurate/incomplete information.

The sub's log might have recorded one destroyer, initially, or in all. But they were... guess how many... three, the Mayrant, Trippe, and Rhind.
 
.... Ion the other hand the army had only begun doing any amphibious is training in 1938/39, ...

The US Army restarted division size amphibious training with preparation in 1939 & exercises starting Jan 1940.

Amphibious Forces Atlantic Fleet formed 1940 & had both Army & Marine divisions assigned. At least three Army div were part of AFAF. 1st Mar Div was part of AFAF through March 1942 & was part of US contingency plans for ops against Germany/Italy. 1Mar Div started departure for the Pacific April 42.

Unsure what Army units were assigned to Amphibious Forces Pacific Fleet. The Army 3Div started amphibious training in latter 1939 on the west coast.
 
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Do you think the AVG Flying Tigers will be cancelled and the Pilots and Planes returned to the US? In the summer of 1941 wasn't everything still in transit?
Would the Eagle Squadrons come under American control by December 1941?
 
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The "task" of amphibious warfare was assigned to the Marine Corps by the General Board in the 1920s and confirmed several times - the Army specifically wanted nothing to do with amphibious warfare. John Lejeune, Commandant set amphibious warfare as the raison d'etre for the USMC in 1919. In the 1930s the USMC developed the doctrine and manual for amphibious warfare (originally "Tentative manual for Landing Operations" (1935)). During the 1930s the Marines and Navy participated in annual amphibious exercises beginning in 1935. You are correct that the Army started amphibious exercises in 1939, initially these were on the west coast with one division (3rd) which initially had USMC instructors, and the Army amphibious manual was the Marine manual rewritten for the Army.

The reason the US Army (and the British Army among others) wanted nothing to do with amphibious warfare in the interwar period was because of Gallipoli, which was such a disaster. The Marines (and Navy) studied Gallipoli extensively, using it as an example of what not to do in so many ways.
 
The "task" of amphibious warfare was assigned to the Marine Corps by the General Board in the 1920s and confirmed several times - the Army specifically wanted nothing to do with amphibious warfare.

The Army continued participation in the Joint Board through the 1920s. Walther Krueger who had attended the Naval War College was subsequently assigned to the Joint Board. It might be more accurate to say the Army wanted nothing to do with the technicalities of cross beach operations. It did continue desultory thought about the higher operational & stratigic aspects of amphibious or littoral operations.


John Lejeune, Commandant set amphibious warfare as the raison d'etre for the USMC in 1919. In the 1930s the USMC developed the doctrine and manual for amphibious warfare (originally "Tentative manual for Landing Operations" (1935)).

That was for the cross beach portion of amphib ops. A subset of the overall genre of amphibious of littoral operations, which is in the larger sense a naval operation. The USN was responsible for the bulk of preparation for this, which is logical since the bulk of the matter involves a lot more men and material than just the beach storming party.

During the 1930s the Marines and Navy participated in annual amphibious exercises beginning in 1935. ...

They had been routinely doing amphib training exercises back into the very early 20th Century. During the 1920s the Army had contributed selected staff, observers, and battalions to these exercises. That tapered off in the early 1930s as the Congress cut the War Dept budget drastically. The Army made a decision to eliminate this draw on its crippled training funds.

The reason the US Army (and the British Army among others) wanted nothing to do with amphibious warfare in the interwar period was because of Gallipoli, which was such a disaster. The Marines (and Navy) studied Gallipoli extensively, using it as an example of what not to do in so many ways.

Ironic since the British Army had excelled at amphibious warfare or joint operations for several centuries. During the 1860s the US Marines were not much more than a interior guard, so entire Army Corps were used during the ACW for the many littoral operations.
 
The British Army and the Royal Navy did form a Committee inter-war to study Amphibious Operations. Which resulted in the first Motor landing craft (The ancestor of all LCMs) in 1926.
The reason the US Army (and the British Army among others) wanted nothing to do with amphibious warfare in the interwar period was because of Gallipoli, which was such a disaster.
This seems something of an over-generalisation
 
What would be America's short term priorities if they enter the war in the summer of 1941?

1. Keep the Sea lanes open to Britain? Deal with the U-boats?

2. Reinforce the RAF in England? Strike back at the Germans in France and the Fatherland itself via bombing?

3. Defend Iceland and perhaps get some boots on the ground in England to allow the British to send troops to North Africa?
 
In the summer of 1941 the USA was capable of very little more than they did OTL, with the exception (assuming that the Japanese did not attack) of the USN getting involved with more assets and action in the Battle of the Atlantic. The USA could take over the occupation of Iceland sooner, set up basing there for active operations and potentially in the Azores in aid of the naval efforts. You could see some small detachments of the USAAF going to the UK but other than some relatively short range attacks by bombers and adding some fighters to air defense, not much. Under USAAF doctrine you needed a certain mass of heavy bombers for daylight attacks against defended targets to provide the defensive fire - in summer 1941 those numbers were simply not available. As far as ground troops, you might see small detachments going to North Africa, as well as some aviation assets.

The USA in the war against Germany in July, 1941 as opposed to December, 1941 and no war in the Pacific starts the very accelerated US buildup sooner and frees up some resources in the Pacific for transfer to the Atlantic. The reality was that getting boots on the ground in August, 1941 on Guadalcanal and November for TORCH can't be moved up very much. The USA was simply just getting ramped up and trying to equip the forces it had in summer 1941, let alone larger forces. Here, unlike WWI the British (and French) can't give equipment to the US forces to make up for deficiencies
 
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