What if the German attack on Crete in World War II had failed?

I wonder how holding Crete might have played out in the second half of the war. Churchill always had a weakness for ideas proposing to strike at the "soft underbelly of Europe". Operations in the Adriatic had been toyed with IIRC. Would these speculations lead to something in this timeline?

Also, what would be the results when it comes to the Greek Civil War? The British and Greek forces in Crete might pursue the Germans once they start withdrawing in '44. The West would after all have a stronger presence in the Balkans at the end of the war.
As to the idea of landing in Greece? Doing it with British forces in pursuit of retreating Germans is fine. But an opposed landing from the start? That would require US assistance. General George C. Marshall was dead set against a major Balkan campaign. During one of the US/UK summit/staff meetings Churchill was going on and on about "the soft underbelly". Marshall responded with a ferocious: "God forbid that I should try to dictate, but not one American is going to die on that (Greek) beach!":mad: Seeing Marshall's fury, Churchill never seriously brought it up again.:(
 
I don't know about Crete becoming a strategic bomber base, the bomber offensive required massive industrial support just to provide the tens of thousands of bombs the bombers used weekly. But in 1941 there were numerous Wellingtons in the theatre, some based in Malta and more based in Egypt. With Crete in Allied hands I could see room for another sqn based on Crete and beefed up on occasion to put in a big effort like the Polesti raid or similar.

Crete would allow attacks on the rear areas of the Axis if/when they drove forward past Tobruk, this weight of attack, coupled with the great security and power of Malta I think could be decisive.
 
I agree with you in regards to the fact that once American supplies and equipment begin showing up on the scene the Allies' supply problems are solved. I also agree with your assertion regarding the fact that the allocation of air power hurts Germany more in the long run than the Allies.

However keep in mind the following things, a) That the Crete garrison is going to need to be reinforced following the Battle of Crete, thereby taking away troops from the rest of the theater. And b)Crete is going to have to be resupplied under heavy Luftwaffe attack. The latter one is the most critical to me. In OTL, the Allies had a hard enough time keeping Malta supplied, I'm not so sure if they have enough tonnage to keep both Malta and Crete supplied on a scale large enough to mount offensive operations from them.



Convoys coming from the East into Malta are still going to run into trouble though on their final approach. Getting in close to Malta they're going to be under attack by Italian naval and air forces just like OTL's Malta convoys were. This actually might be worse for the Allies as in OTL any Malta convoy coming from Alexandria was forced to turn back, in TTL they might just soldier on, perhaps getting a ship or two through but taking higher losses than OTL.

Again keep in mind that possessing Crete puts further strain on the Allied supply situation, a strain I'm not so sure they'd be able to deal with. Then again, I don't have any figures in front of me regarding the supply situation in the Med in 1941-42 so I can't say anything for sure.

All I know is that at least initially, holding Crete is far more trouble than it's worth. Longterm, assuming that the logistical problems caused by having to resupply Crete don't cause any effects on Malta or the North African theater, it's a major boon to the Allies.

All very good points. IMO, though, it's really a matter of holding out for 41/early 42. Sure, not going to be a source for immediate allied offensives, but by late 42/early 43 when the US is fully engaged (and the Liberty Ships are plopping out on a weekly basis, making moot resupply worries) you have a base capable of raiding Polesti very early in the war. Sure, belt tightning on Crete and Malta, but not enough to make either surrender. Unless the "drain" on allied resources is enough to bring Axis victory in Egypt (highly doubtful; too many other allied advantages) then by mid-to-late war you have the Germans in a much less tenable position than OTL. My gut feeling is that this could shorten the war considerably.
 
Just a simple thought....wouldn't having Crete as a base make the whole supply routes through the (Eastern) Mediterranean a lot easier, thus taking some pressure from Malta?
 
Remember, petrol is BLOOD!-Colonel Hessler....

Just a simple thought....wouldn't having Crete as a base make the whole supply routes through the (Eastern) Mediterranean a lot easier, thus taking some pressure from Malta?
You betcha. And as to supplying Crete. Possession of Crete is going to make Churchill positively drool. All you have to do to keep supplied Crete is to give them priority over any of the "seesaw" offensives in North Africa. Forget all about driving to Sirte, El Aghelia, or even Bengazi. Just maintain a strong line based at Tobruk. The resources saved should be more than enough to keep Crete sustainable. As far as strategic bomber bases in Crete? I realize now I should have been more specific. After the Axis have been driven out of North Africa. After the Axis have been driven out of Sicily. After the U-Boats have been broken. After complete air supremacy has been established of the Aegean. Then and only then does a base become workable AND sustainable.

One it has become operational, Hitler will have no choice but to give a priority to stopping those Ploesti raids that exceeds any other targets. Somethings gotta give. I'm betting tactical air support over the Mediterranean/Sicily/Italy and France. In this TL, the cry "Wo ist der Luftwaffe?" will be more literal than sarcastic over these fronts.:rolleyes:
 
In comparing Crete and Malta, there are big differences - both in topography, and infrastructure.
When supplies arrive in Malta, there is an established dock, with warehouses nearby, a road network to get to other 'bases' -airfields etc., on the island. But AFAIK in Crete this does not exist, a few basic fishing ports, but nothing major. Suda bay the main anchorage for the RN is on the south of the island - the airfields are on the other side of the island, in between which is a rugged mountain range.
Hence, the first challenge, having beaten off the attack, is to be able to maintain the defenders with supplies - before they are able to reinforce with additional fighters etc.
The practicalities of establishing enough supplies for an offensive outpost, should not be underestimated.
 
If Crete was considered important enough these things would be built, after all the bomber bases if 1945 were far far more advanced than those of 1940.
 
Another major consideration is whether the British try to base heavy bombers there, which as said, is phenomenally expensive, or whether they use Mosquitos, which would be both more effective and much cheaper logistically.
 
Kind of a long shot, but if Crete stays British, might Hitler decide not to send Rommel and the AK to N. Africa? With Malta operating practically worry free, the logistic situation might seem to be hopeless for Italian N. Africa...
 
Rommel was already in Africa when Crete was lauched, IIRC he was already on the offensive.

*smacks self on forehead*
Read the books first Dave, then speculate...

Okay... so what happens to Rommel's already bad logistics if Crete stays British?
 

Cook

Banned
Another major consideration is whether the British try to base heavy bombers there, which as said, is phenomenally expensive, or whether they use Mosquitos, which would be both more effective and much cheaper logistically.

Hopefully they would have used Mosquitoes and gone for precision attacks over mass attack.
 
Crete was used as a safe haven for Axis convoys bound for Africa. When Malta got too hot they would route their convoys to Crete, then go due south to the Benghazi bulge. With Crete in British hands the Brits could use shuttle bombing to esnure that nothing was out of reach of their planes. The Axis would be forced to run their convoys through the gauntlet every time. I also suspect that aircraft could shuttle to Malta from Egypt if Crete was available for staging. Its this sort of boring shit that would make it such as asset, rather than the flashy bomber bases.
 
All very good points. IMO, though, it's really a matter of holding out for 41/early 42. Sure, not going to be a source for immediate allied offensives, but by late 42/early 43 when the US is fully engaged (and the Liberty Ships are plopping out on a weekly basis, making moot resupply worries) you have a base capable of raiding Polesti very early in the war. Sure, belt tightning on Crete and Malta, but not enough to make either surrender. Unless the "drain" on allied resources is enough to bring Axis victory in Egypt (highly doubtful; too many other allied advantages) then by mid-to-late war you have the Germans in a much less tenable position than OTL. My gut feeling is that this could shorten the war considerably.

consider however, that:

1. the Axis will have to invest a lot of resources in keeping the pressure on Crete
2. the Axis supply situation in North Africa - which was always dicey in OTL because of Malta and the higher priority the Eastern Front had - will be even more difficult here.

I think you're right that this will shorten the war, mainly by giving the Allies a base from which they can hit Polesti earlier in the war and allowing the Allies to win North Africa earlier.
 
The Axis would struggle to invade Malta with the German airborne units decimated and the Italians reluctant to use their fleet after Taranto, Crete and Matapan.
 
The Axis would struggle to invade Malta with the German airborne units decimated and the Italians reluctant to use their fleet after Taranto, Crete and Matapan.
It would never be done. Hitler ordered a halt to all airdrops after a SUCCESSFUL Crete drop. Can you imagine his fury after a Crete drop that fails? NO ONE would have the nerve to bring up an "Operation Hercules" in this kind of setting.:mad:
 
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