What if the German army stay on the defensive in 1943

pochepiller

Banned
It was the plan that Guderian had in mind if I remember correctly. Imagine that he can convince Hitler to stay on the defensive in 1943 to launch a game changer attack in 1944. Would it be possible to grind to soviet for a full year? Will it changes the allies tactic? Will it rain tomorrow?
 
The Germans pretty much were on the defensive in 1943, and despite the post-war talk by some generals about how Hitler was to blame for losing the war. The Heer couldnt hold back the Allied attacks in North Africa and Italy and the Red Army was simply too powerful to stalemate.

Assuminhg Hitler dosnt gave his ''last-stand'' orders the war lasts a few months longer and Germany might get nuked instead of Japan...
 

pochepiller

Banned
But with no kursk offensive those extra ressource could make live difficult for the allies in Italy.

Also the ressource the german divert to the western front will most likely stay there when the russian attack because they will be already engaged with the allies.

With more tanks could a kursk like offensive work in 1944 or the russian are just too much experienced at defeating blitzkrieg at this point?
 
waiting is death for the germans in the east... the soviets where grossly outproducing them on a month to month basis, so every month you wait, the soviet numerical superiority increases
 
I think the best German strategy is Manstein's backhanded method.

This is the last time I will discredit this overall idea

Hitler (Rightly) rejected this idea for the following reasons

1. The donets basin was vital to keeping the nazi war machine fueled with vital materials, abandoning it was tantamount to death for the war effort

2. There was no garuantee the Russians would attack where Manstein wanted them to... 2800 miles of front leaves only a few kill zones, and a lot of room to advance... this is exactly what happened in otl, after kursk, the russians attacked in the far south on the mius, manstein caught them in the flank and destroyed them, however in doing so he uncovered his left flank, and zhukov obliterated him with 3 army groups

3. The days of great sweeps of German armor being effective where over, not only because they couldn't keep air superiority over the battlefield generally, but also because the newer generation of german armored fighing vehicles where no reliable or practical over long distances
 
This is the last time I will discredit this overall idea

Hitler (Rightly) rejected this idea for the following reasons

1. The donets basin was vital to keeping the nazi war machine fueled with vital materials, abandoning it was tantamount to death for the war effort

2. There was no garuantee the Russians would attack where Manstein wanted them to... 2800 miles of front leaves only a few kill zones, and a lot of room to advance... this is exactly what happened in otl, after kursk, the russians attacked in the far south on the mius, manstein caught them in the flank and destroyed them, however in doing so he uncovered his left flank, and zhukov obliterated him with 3 army groups

3. The days of great sweeps of German armor being effective where over, not only because they couldn't keep air superiority over the battlefield generally, but also because the newer generation of german armored fighing vehicles where no reliable or practical over long distances

Plus Soviets were learning. Fool me once shame on you. Fool me twice shame on. Fool me three times and they'll ship me to gulag so I'm not faling for that again!

Soviets had troubles planning large scale operations because purges removed good people and 1941-42 gutted what remained. After mid 1943 those who knew how to do things survived and were in proper places. If you look at offensives from this time onward they were planned to reach what was reachable and not overstretch.

If Germans wait soviets build up then go on the offensive. It may be launched somewhat more to the north to smash AGC, which Soviets considered biggest threat.

Once Germans start thinning front to deal with Italy it's go time!
 
Plus Soviets were learning. Fool me once shame on you. Fool me twice shame on. Fool me three times and they'll ship me to gulag so I'm not faling for that again!

Soviets had troubles planning large scale operations because purges removed good people and 1941-42 gutted what remained. After mid 1943 those who knew how to do things survived and were in proper places. If you look at offensives from this time onward they were planned to reach what was reachable and not overstretch.

If Germans wait soviets build up then go on the offensive. It may be launched somewhat more to the north to smash AGC, which Soviets considered biggest threat.

Once Germans start thinning front to deal with Italy it's go time!


Indeed, and their mid level officers, and the rank and file infantry where much more seasoned by this point... for the rest of the war, thy only blundered into these sorts of traps 3 more times; and it was never the disaster ofr 2nd and 3rd kharkov

the previously mentioned mius thing, which was a prelude to a tremendous victory several hundred klicks to the north, only cost the russians 5.5 divisions destroyed; the kaments break cost them about the same amount, but was actually a tactical draw since they where able to inflict heavy losses both on the relief force and the trapped first panzer army; the only time it was disproportionate was Model/Hossbach's east prussian counter offensive which gutted 9 divisions that Zhkov foolishly over extended (as compared to over 50 destroyed in 3rd kharkov)
 
Would a gradual retreat of forces to a narrower front make a difference? I know getting such a move to happen is pretty much ASB, but suppose the resources and forces gathered for Citadel are used as a reserve while strong defensive lines were built along a Gdansk - Lvov - Odessa axis. Would it be enough to stop the Soviets?
 
The problem with Hitler's refusal is that Germany does not have the forces to handle his (Hitler's) plan, and attempting to hold more than is defensible will just lead to OTL's consequences.

How much did the Donets Basin actually send to the Reich? How much was sacrificed holding it a little longer than would have been the case with Manstein's plan?

1943 is not going to be a good year for Germany whatever is decided. And no line Germany can build is going to be unbreachable.

It may delay the advance of the Soviets, but it won't win the war.
 
Would a gradual retreat of forces to a narrower front make a difference? I know getting such a move to happen is pretty much ASB, but suppose the resources and forces gathered for Citadel are used as a reserve while strong defensive lines were built along a Gdansk - Lvov - Odessa axis. Would it be enough to stop the Soviets?

Not really, because even the 1941 border is so large (because you have to include Romania as well) that the force to space ratio was always going to grossly favor the Russians.

How best to put this... the Citiadel forces where at parity if not slightly superior to 2.5 Soviet fronts (army groups)... and in order for Citadel to have as much strength as it did, they had to ruthlessly strip all other sector's of the eastern front of armored support, fresh infantry, and airpower whereas the Soviets had 1 million men and a thousand tanks in reserve at Kursk alone AND had 3 other army groups at full strength ready to attack in other sectors besides Kursk

Manstein's plan might have allowed AGC and AGS to defeat two or perhaps even three Soviet fronts, however with all of their strength concentrated in these battles, their wings are hopelessly vulnerable and will be crushed and a general retirement will be compelled

Kursk represented the same mistake as Stalingrad, namely concentrating too much of your theater level striking power in one place, which left the flanks vulnerable to destruction
 
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