What if the CP won? German domestic politics only!

Would H+L even be in a position to take the reins in the first place?
Imo a German win would likely keep Falkenhayn (sp?) in charge for longer as he would be more successful. So the terrible two would be the heros of the east, but not be in a position to "ursurp" the whole thing.
 

trajen777

Banned
I think the most likely military victory consists of :
1. AH defends the East
2. Germany (in another POD) destroys the French 5th - or drives deeper into france on the coast.
3. If 1+2 then Russia falls out earlier
4. Germany does not do Zimmerman and USW - America stays neutral

So with this a Germany Victory - but like other earlier wars a negotiated peace

1. AL goes to a vote in 5- 10 years
2. German fleet agreed to a % decrease vs Britain (33% - 50%) - Germany gets its merchant fleet back
3. BL holds and Russia is massively diminished
4. AH breaks up -- Austria joins Germany
5. The Kaiser had already promised a more British type Monarchy as a promise to the socialists in 1914 - i think this holds and after he retires in 5- 10 years the German monarchy becomes British like
6. Germany goes through 10 - 15 years of investment in the East
7. The Euro zone comes to Europe in 1918 - 22
8. Germany focuses on colonizing / investing / increasing its presence in Poland - Baltic States - Belorussian - & Ukraine. These areas are either part of Germany or tied to Germany
 
Would H+L even be in a position to take the reins in the first place?
Imo a German win would likely keep Falkenhayn (sp?) in charge for longer as he would be more successful. So the terrible two would be the heros of the east, but not be in a position to "ursurp" the whole thing.

That might be the case, depending upon how exactly the war progresses. If the win is fairly quick (not sure when H-L became the effective "wartime dictators" of Germany, but I assume it was fairly late) then there is no junta in a position to assert postwar domination, anyway.
 
It may have effects in certain regions. Though agrarian interests would likely be under the thumb of Junkers who, like the aristocracy in the UK, got a lot of income from food. Perhaps they even try setting up trade barriers with new Eastern states, leading to trouble if the price of food falls only to have it raise up with tarriffs.

Clearly the members of the Reichstag would be aware of this possibility, and many other potential sources of domestic conflict and disruption that could result from large annexations being made. This is one of the reasons I think the Reichstag would prefer to keep away from largescale annexations.

I think I've read that the German constitution gave the Kaiser the sole authority to make peace treaties. Now, as the war winds down, it must occur to some of the Kaiser's ministers (and to the Reichstag) that it's time to start thinking about the necessity for postwar constitutional reform. The question is, does the Kaiser try to get the peace terms that HE wants before any constitutional reforms can be enacted, or is the Reichstag permitted to be involved (or pushes itself in)? If the Kaiser establishes the treaty terms, what does the Reichstag do about it postwar if they disapprove of the terms?

Second question: we all know about the September Program. It was actually a "dream sheet" compiled from input provided by military, industrial and financial leaders, not an approved policy document. But would the Kaiser try to implement it? Would the Reichstag agree to this?
 

NoMommsen

Donor
That might be the case, depending upon how exactly the war progresses. If the win is fairly quick (not sure when H-L became the effective "wartime dictators" of Germany, but I assume it was fairly late) then there is no junta in a position to assert postwar domination, anyway.
Falkenhayn was already "knocked on" in summer 1916, 'cause Verdun wasn't the hoped/expected vicory (not by Falkenhayn himself but the public and political majotity - including the Kaiser). When Romania declared war his fate was done, 'cause he hadn't forseen it. Turning August to September 1916 the 3. OHL (H-L) was installed.

In this TL, there - very probably - wouldn't be a Verdun, making a peace or armistice likely in 1916 (with France in 1914/1915 already on the brink of defeat Italy most likely woudn't join on Wallies side, may stay neutral, enough for a bit better performace of A-H in the east).
Ergo : no 3. OHL of H-L.

Wiht w CP victory late, 1918/1919, things will be different. 3.OHL in place ... BUT also a now very vivid political thrust in Prussia as well as in the Reichstag pushing for political reforms.
 
Wiht w CP victory late, 1918/1919, things will be different. 3.OHL in place ... BUT also a now very vivid political thrust in Prussia as well as in the Reichstag pushing for political reforms.

Seems like a good assessment.

I think the Reichstag was going to insist on political reforms postwar, anyway (that had been a theme for the last several decades). But yeah, by 1918/1919 it was a case of "We won't wait". Understandably.

I think this implies that the later the victory, the less the likelihood of annexations.
For one thing, in 1917 the Reichstag had already adopted its Peace Resolution. For another, I really do think the Reichstag would be less keen on largescale annexations than, say, the Kaiser, the military, the great industrialists, etc.
 
The Reichstag Peace Resolution was no annexation at all by anyone (but also no annexation of A-L;)).

True, but it indicated that the Reichstag was not so very keen about annexations. Or at the very least, it showed that by the later war period they wanted peace badly enough to be willing to forego them. Along with reparations.
 
Much depends on the speed of German victory, and how dominant Germany is in Europe.

A quicker, more dominant victory bolsters the conservative faction in the short term. But the overall trend is still towards the SPD and democratic factions. This is a harder scenario to foresee because much depends on future events than the POD.

If we are talking about a last minute win in 1918 with an exhausted Germany, then fairly quickly the SPD will assume real power, perhaps in concert with the Centre and national democrats. A lot of those war veterans are going to vote SPD, and they are going to demand changes to government and military to break the stranglehold of the officer corps. The SPD was supportive of the war effort, and they'll have proven their "loyalty" to the country. It will be hard for the Kaiser to demonize them although any independent anti-war socialists are open game (but they are likely marginalized in this scenario and quickly disappear except as a small, extremist group). Nobody really liked Ludendorff. He will be jettisoned as soon as possible. Hindenburg won't be interested in politics. So Kaiser Bill is on his own. He'll eventually make enough concessions to the democrats in the Reichstag that they'll become a constitutional monarchy early in the 1920s.
 
Maybe a bit off topic but did Falkenhayen make much use of the 1851 Law of Siege that became the legal basis for H & L's 'dictatorship'?
 
Maybe a bit off topic but did Falkenhayen make much use of the 1851 Law of Siege that became the legal basis for H & L's 'dictatorship'?

The Kriegsrohstoffsamt (KRA) was actually formed by Falkenhayn's instructions, upon Rathenau's recommendation, on 13Aug1914.

It was a state-run government department, though largely staffed by people seconded from industry. It mostly carried out admin tasks, such as collecting statistics, maintaining accounts and managing requisitioned Belgian resources.

The KRA in turn created the Kriegsrohstoff-Gesellschafen to manage distribution and allocation of raw materials to specific industrial sectors. The Kriegsrohstoff-Gesellschafen were actually established as joint stock or limited liability companies and run by businessmen, though any profits accrued were to revert to the Reich at war's end.

H-L's innovation seems to have been tightening up the system and extending it as far as possible into management of the entire economy.

But yes, Falkenhayn used it in a more limited capacity.

See Hew Stachan, To Arms for an extended discussion.

One might note that H-L's "dictatorship" thus had legal standing only for economic management, not for political decisions. Therefore when Bethmann-Hollweg decided to reform the Prussian franchise system, H-L couldn't touch him; they had to appeal to the Kaiser for his dismissal (and were refused, though he then resigned to avoid further conflict). In this arena, they were completely dependent on advising the Kaiser, whose authority remained unquestioned. Of course, if a political matter could be plausibly shown to have economic consequences, then I suppose their advice would carry great weight.
 
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So H & L used the KRA to squeeze the economy and govern but does that make them political leaders to decide war and peace policy? IIRC H & L advised the Kaiser after battlefield defeats in August 1918 that the latest conscript class wasn't enough to prolong the war and peace should be sought. Does this make H & L akin to government ministers, replacements for Bethman?
 
So H & L used the KRA to squeeze the economy and govern but does that make them political leaders to decide war and peace policy? IIRC H & L advised the Kaiser after battlefield defeats in August 1918 that the latest conscript class wasn't enough to prolong the war and peace should be sought. Does this make H & L akin to government ministers, replacements for Bethman?

I think the best illustration of the sort of political "control" that H-L exerted is this:

In 1918 Bethmann-Hollweg resolved to reform the Prussian franchise, as I have mentioned before. H-L did not like that at all. They tried to get the Kaiser to fire him, but Wilhelm withstood them. Bethmann then resigned, and H-L were able to at least get the Kaiser to appoint a pliant "non-entity" named Michaelis.

As nearly as I can tell, this was the form of control they exercised in non-economic matters -- they couldn't do anything on their own, but as the architects of Germany's war effort, their advice carried great weight (and I assume there would be great reluctance to ignore their advice, since in the new Total War, everything seemed to have impact on war-fighting capacity; which I guess made the military leaders seem like the subject-matter experts on nearly everything).

I haven't found, in the materials available to me, a single instance where H-L implemented any political or domestic governing decisions on their own. Note the italics, though. Numerous writers make claims like "the authority of both the Chancellor and the Kaiser declined during the war, and the military came to dominate" (Ferguson, The Pity of War ), but I haven't found anything to indicate that the ascendancy was anything more than a moral one. They didn't usurp authority, but instead had too great an influence on the authorities.

But if anybody has evidence otherwise, I really want to hear it! I'd hate to get it wrong in my planned TL.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
As far as I know the only ... domestic/political action they pushed - via the "national" parties and the chancellor - was the "law about the patriotic supportservice" (Gesetz über den vaterländischen Hilfsdienst) in the frame of the Hindenburg program to - somehow - moblize enough workforce to get the existing workers into the army. But even this was - in their view - watered down in its parliamentary process (first time ever implementing something like an institutional labor participation):eek:.

Other than that they had no direct impact. They only tried to rationalize the military organisation at home, changing some authority distributions and creating (together with the civilian realm) some new institutuions like the "War department" (Kriegsamt) under Groener, only adding to administrative chaos. About the civiclian they just set their wishes and let them alone. All the other war-economy institutiones were run by the civilian service and never under direct military and with that H-L command.
 
When the revolution happend it shocked the nobility to the bones. With what had happend in Russia, and was still happening there and in the Baltics, in mind there was huge fear of getting murdered.

So those who had something to lose besides their lives thought it best to keep a low profile and wait for things to calm down. Members of political parties decided to leave the party was best. They never regained the pull even in conservative parties that they had before. Most notably those who left the Centre party and catholic nobles in generell were later too unhappy with the course that one had taken and looked to the far right for an alternative.

That won't happen if the CP win so at least expect a stronger conservative wing in the Centre party. And no, they won't just roll over when people claim they are discredited by the war. Nearly a quarter of those over 18 were dead by the end of the war. They will point to that and say it proves that they did their duty to the fatherland (as they did OTL). This is a group that became radicalised by the war to an extreme degree. They'll be trouble that much is certain.
 
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