Again, I'm confused about what the RA in the 8th Army was doing wrong.

British combined arms including artillery worked well for setpiece operations eg

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Bardia#Break_in

IIRC the general criticism is that Eighth Army tended to operate as separate brigade groups each with a battalion of artillery under command. These tended to be located in "boxes" outside of supporting distance of each other, so central divisional control of artillery was lost. eg 150th Brigade of 50th Division in the Sidi Muftah box at Gazala. These were then picked off by divisional+ size attacks from DAK.

1024px-Map_of_siege_of_Tobruk_1942.jpg
 

Errolwi

Monthly Donor
British combined arms including artillery worked well for setpiece operations eg

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Bardia#Break_in

IIRC the general criticism is that Eighth Army tended to operate as separate brigade groups each with a battalion of artillery under command. These tended to be located in "boxes" outside of supporting distance of each other, so central divisional control of artillery was lost. eg 150th Brigade of 50th Division in the Sidi Muftah box at Gazala. These were then picked off by divisional+ size attacks from DAK.

This isolation of brigades is one of the things Freyberg argued about (as he fully understood the need for supporting artillery etc), and played his 'Dominion' card to avoid.
 
....

IIRC the general criticism is that Eighth Army tended to operate as separate brigade groups each with a battalion of artillery under command. These tended to be located in "boxes" outside of supporting distance of each other, so central divisional control of artillery was lost. eg 150th Brigade of 50th Division in the Sidi Muftah box at Gazala. These were then picked off by divisional+ size attacks from DAK.

...

That is a clue, tho looking at the scale & events it may not be complete. The war time editions of the JRA have .their limts. I need to search post war editions & other sources for more information.

The identification of the seperation into small brigade group has some traps that can not only cripple the artillery, but the other arms as well. But it does not explain the entirely failures within the context of these brigades.
 
It was the assertion that the DAK could and the 8th Army couldn't do indirect fire I was querying. I suspect both sides had problems with indirect fire in mobile phases, but could cope when things were more static.



6 in howitzers January 1941 - 64th medium regiment.

I looked at that photo, with some care and compared it with the German 17 cm Kanone 18. The German 17 cm GUN is elevated somewhat at about 30-35 degrees elevation. (Hard to tell for sure). Depending on the charge used (1 through 4, according to Zabecki) that parabola trajectory implied could be anywhere from 14,000 to 18,000 meters or more to the target on the other end. Indirect fire implied.

Now the British 6 inch HOWITZER, is indeed capable of high angle indirect artillery fire. That is exactly what it is designed to do.

105MMM2A1.png


Notice the US howitzer^1 is firing at about 18-23 degrees elevation? Up at what appears to be hills? Indirect fire can usually be inferred from howitzers when the elevation angles approach 20 degrees or higher and you can see a terrain reason for that elevation.

^1 For purposes of definition I ascertain a howitzer is a rifled breech loading tube of less than 25-30 times the length of the bore diameter (calibers) capable of high angle fire up to 45 degrees or more, but not as steep an elevation as a mortar barrel (< 70 degrees or less for many a howitzer.). A gun I ascertain as a rifled breech loading tube of more than 25-30 times the length of the bore diameter (calibers) also capable of high angle fire sometimes rarely exceeding 45 degrees elevation, but not as steep an elevation as a mortar (Up to 70 degrees or more. A mortar is usually a 45 degrees elevation or more capable emplaced and sited-in shell-throwing tube approaching 70 degrees barrel elevation capability in many models. Not to be confused with a AAA GUN by the way as the mortar is a short; as in 20 calibers or less length tube.). The definition differs amongst many artillery authorities but Ian Hogg seems comfortable at that arbitrary limiter and I think I can agree with him, since the USN also seems to think that is the definer. The caliber is the main difference since a gun is designed for much longer reach and a howitzer is designed for more rapidity of cyclic operation. The gun is generally more of a precision point obliteration weapon, while the howitzer is more a saturation area effect weapon in the classic artillery sense as I understand it.

It is the physical characteristics of time the propellant has to exert push on the shell, the time the rifling bands have to work to impart spin, that defines the effective designed distance the howitzer or the gun can reach to a target and throw the shell and of a drift error one can expect in the projectile trajectory that occurs (See further). Guns generally might be more accurate at the maximum edge of their effective reach than howitzers, but that cannot be assumed as a hard and fast rule. A lot of variables go into these general observations (weather, barrel wear, barrel manufacture techniques, crew competence and training, terrain effects, quality of shells and propellants, etc.)and I defer to my betters to correct me where I am wrong.

f70ca39f26bb3ac4a470a5505a4de3e8.jpg
US Long Tom GUN (15.5 cm long barreled artillery piece more than 30 calibers.). Note angle of elevation? That appears to be about 30-35 degrees, but the ground slope makes it hard to be certain. Definitely indirect fire parabola profile and definitely "some" distance depending on the charge used.

6_inch_howitzers_Tobruk_Jan_1941_AWM_005610.jpeg


British howitzers at Tobruk. Note low angle of barrel elevation? Actually proves nothing as I think the guns are emplacing or not engaging. Need better evidence.

Better evidence.

upload_2019-8-17_12-11-27.png


Served gun in evidence.

It appears to be somewhat borderline at 10-15 degrees elevation; but "could" be an indirect fire lay depending on the charge used. I would be willing to bet that is evidence of indirect lay and fires at Tobruk from a fixed position; but if it is, that is a mighty flat parabolic trajectory shell thrown at something fairly close, not more than 3,000-5,000 meters away.

If it is tanks and they are using AT shells; that is possible direct/indirect fire at those targets. If it is infantry in the open and AP shells, I think it could be the same thing. Opportunity fire?
 
Better evidence.

View attachment 481133

Served gun in evidence.

That's a 25pdr, not a 6in howitzer. 25pdr is L28 so unclear whether you would classify it as a gun or howitzer. :)

I assume that it would be very unusual for a barrage supporting an infantry assault to be done as direct rather than indirect fire; look at the narrative for the assault on Bardia I linked to earlier where a classic combined armed assault (including artillery barrages) took out prepared defensive positions.
 
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The identification of the seperation into small brigade group has some traps that can not only cripple the artillery, but the other arms as well. But it does not explain the entirely failures within the context of these brigades.

Agreed; the "official" explanation at the time was Rommel was brilliant and German equipment was much better. ;)

Gazala was a disaster; the obvious issue was the failure to properly co-ordinate brigade groups in time and space. But the failures run deeper with poor command and control, exacerbated by divisional command groups getting overrun. Similar issues run through Crusader the previous autumn.

Whether it was poor information flowing up to commanders, poor staff work, or poor command judgements is unclear to me.
 
That's a 25pdr, not a 6in howitzer. 25pdr is L28 so unclear whether you would classify it as a gun or howitzer. :)

I assume that it would be very unusual for a barrage supporting an infantry assault to be done as direct rather than indirect fire; look at the narrative for the assault on Bardia I linked to earlier where a classic combined armed assault (including artillery barrages) took out prepared defensive positions.

I knew what it was when I picked it. It is neither fish nor fowl.

25-Pounder Field Gun/Howitzer

Workmen constructing 25-pounder guns in Sorel, 1941.
Photo by Nicholas Morant. National Film Board of Canada / National Archives of Canada, PA-174507.

The 25-pounder was one of the most satisfactory field guns used by British and Commonwealth armies during the Second World War, and it equipped most field regiments of the Royal Canadian Artillery. Many of these guns and much of their ammunition were produced in Canada, at Sorel, Quebec. Intended to replace both the 18-pdr field gun and the 4.5 inch howitzer, which had been important weapons during the First World War, the 25-pdr resulted from the desire to design a gun which could combine the “high angle fire of a howitzer and the flat trajectory fire of a field gun”.(^1 McP.)The first 25-pdrs were made by relining existing 18-pdrs to accept a larger shell. Most of these guns were lost at Dunkirk and were replaced with true 25-pdrs. Where the 18-pdrs had used fixed ammunition-with the projectile and propellant charge contained in the same casing-the 25-pdr loaded the shell and cartridge case separately so that different charges could be used to engage targets at varying ranges. With the introduction of the “super” charge to increase the gun’s range to 13,400 yards, extra stresses on the carriage necessitated the adoption of a muzzle brake to relieve pressure inside the barrel.

The 25-pounder’s main ammunition was the High Explosive (HE) shell, but it could fire smoke shells, star shells, and special projectiles containing propaganda leaflets. A versatile weapon, the 25-pdr could also fire 20-pound armour piercing (AP) steel shot, and the carriage was equipped with a circular track that was dropped onto the ground to permit a 360-degree traverse in the anti-tank role. The trail was box-shaped to allow the elevation necessary for firing as a howitzer. As opposed to the Sexton self-propelled gun (SP), the standard version was towed, with its limber, usually behind a gun tractor called a Quadruped. The first true 25-pdrs entered service in early 1940 (issued to the Royal Canadian Artillery) and were not retired until 1967. Even then, they remained in use as training guns until 1975. George Blackburn’s The Guns of Normandy (Toronto: McClelland, 1995) recounts a number of instances when the 25-pdrs of his regiment fired until their barrels glowed red in support of Canadian infantry. They were undoubtedly much-appreciated by Canadian soldiers.


Members of “B” Troop, 5th Field Regiment, firing 25-pounder near Malden, Holland, 1 February 1945. From left to right: Sergeant Jack Brown, Bdr. Joe Wilson, Gunners Lyle Ludwig, Bill Budd, George Spence, and Bill Stewart.
Photo by Michael M. Dean. Department of National Defence / National Archives of Canada, PA-146868.

25-Pounder Gun/Howitzer Mark 2 and Mark 3
Ordnance
Weight with breech mechanism 454 kg
Total weight in action 1800 kg
Length 2.71 m (with muzzle brake)
Calibre 88 mm
Rifling one turn in 20 calibres
Breech vertical sliding block
Elevation -5° to +40°
Traverse 4° right and left
Performance
Projectile Mark ID S/L Mark ID S/L Mark ID S/L Mark ID S/L
Type HE HE HE HE AP
Weight of Projectile 11.3 kg 11.3 kg 11.3 kg 11.3 kg 9 kg
Charge 1 2 3 Super Super
Muzzle velocity 200 m/sec 300 m/sec 450 m/sec 520 m/sec 610 m/sec
Penetration at 400 yards (0° impact) 70 mm
Maximum range 12,250 m
Suggested Reading:

  • L.W.C.S. Barnes and Fred Gaffen, “25-Pounder Gun/Howitzer,” Canadian War Museum Fact Sheet No. 14.
  • Ian V Hogg, British and American Artillery of World War 2 (London: Arms and Armour, 1978)

I note with some surprise the British idea that a 25 lber "gun" had or should have a flatter trajectory than an 18 lber howitzer as if they thought the gun should be used in the direct fire role that way.
 
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Gazala was a disaster; the obvious issue was the failure to properly co-ordinate brigade groups in time and space. But the failures run deeper with poor command and control, exacerbated by divisional command groups getting overrun. Similar issues run through Crusader the previous autumn.

Whether it was poor information flowing up to commanders, poor staff work, or poor command judgements is unclear to me.

But it kept happening, month after month, year after year. 7th Armoured didn't exactly shine in Italy or in Normandy
 
...

6_inch_howitzers_Tobruk_Jan_1941_AWM_005610.jpeg


British howitzers at Tobruk. Note low angle of barrel elevation? Actually proves nothing as I think the guns are emplacing or not engaging. Need better evidence. ...

Even at that low elevation the point of impact could be 2000 meters out. More if the ground continues to fall off. Those vertical intervals can have some surprising effects. Anyway 3000 meters, 2500, or 2000 are beyond the common useful range of the direct fire sights on field artillery. The useful range for those vs point targets was generally 1200 meters, often less. Once you get beyond that its range drums, gunners quadrants range tables, ect.. ect.. Doesn't matter if the gunner can see the target, even at 2000 meters range from most of these weapons the probable error range or elevation means you are better off cutting loose with a battery two or four or whatever at that tank.
 
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I knew what it was when I picked it. It is neither fish nor fowl.



I note with some surprise the British idea that a 25 lber "gun" had or should have a flatter trajectory than an 18 lber howitzer as if they The Tabular firing tables thought the gun should be used in the direct fire role that way.

It looks like a function of range @ whatever charge. For a longer range you have a higher MV & less curve in the initial portion of the parabola/trajectory. Its something the gunner can take advantage of when using his DF sight, but its unlikely anyone was thinking otherwise when they designed the weapon.
 
1024px-Map_of_siege_of_Tobruk_1942.jpg


The British lost the reconnaissance battle? They had to have lost it, if they surrendered the initiative like this. (^^^). What was their cavalry doctrine like?
 
The British lost the reconnaissance battle? They had to have lost it, if they surrendered the initiative like this. (^^^). What was their cavalry doctrine like?

Not really. The marked positions were static defensive boxes, not starting points of a meeting engagement. The British knew that they had lost the logistic build-up race, and the Germans would attack first. There was quite a debate about where the Germans would attack, with most expecting a "right hook" around the open flank, but with Auchinleck writing from Cairo saying that he expected them to come through the centre.

The map emphasises the open nature of the terrain, the low force density and the fast moving nature of the battle. What it doesn't show is that the British recce units were reporting the advance round the southern flank from first light and still the 7th Armoured HQ got overrun and the general captured.
 
I'm really not sure why anyone is suggesting 8h Army never conducted indirect fire.

Here's AWM photo 00599 of 2/1st Field regiment at Bardia 25/12/40. Guns seen to have the required elevation.

3954785.JPG



AWM 00507, published in high def in p.40 C Stockings, The Battle of Bardia, Australian Army History Unit, Canberra, 2011, shows a similar elevation. P35 of ibid states that the artillery were deployed only 450m in Italian wire but this was uncommonly forward because they did not want to reposition guns to support phase 2 of the assault. P.96 that 2/2nd Field Regiment was initially deployed out of range of the Italian positions as it was not accounted for that they were only equipped by WW1 equipment.

RHA artillery at the siege of Tobruk would have been shooting uphill. There are dozens, if not hundreds, of examples of 'called in fire' during the siege in the Australian Official Histories, which can be down loaded for free at the AWM website, the OH carefully note direct fire by batteries or guns but seems to assumes that the vast majority of fire was directed, going so far as to often name the FO. This history calls out the famous action of A/E Battery of the 1st RHA against the tanks of the 15th Pz Division at a range of 600 yards over open sights, stating that they lacked AP and used only HE. The Germans still called it quits and retreated. The OH doesn't show were the artillery was deployed, but look at the published maps and the described shoots and advise me how they weren't indirect fire.

Nobodies claiming Gazala wasn't a nadir of Imperial combat performance. Richie was so far out of his depth it wasn't funny. But he had the 'Auk' telling him to be careful, and had the trickle down of Ultra saying an attack would be in the north. See Jonathan Fennel, Fighting the People's War, The British and the Commonwealth Armies and the Second World War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2019. 158 ongoing for a recent summary. Chapter 3 of Niall Barr's Pendulum of War: The Three Battles of Alamein, Plimco, London, 2004, pp 42-68, offers another summary of the difficulties facing the British artillery and other arms in mid 1942, lack of training, poor equipment and inter-arm cooperation.

This is not to say that things did not change, and quickly, after a certain typing point. To quote the war diarist of the Afrika Corps as quoted in Brynn Hammond El Alamein: The Battle that Turned the Tide of the Second World War, Osprey, Oxford 2012, p. 66. witnessing a barrage from 20 miles away noting 'particularly heavy artillery fire can be heard from the north, Veterans of the Great War say it even stronger than the Trommelfeuer of the Western Front.' This fire was the three regiments of 9th Australian Division, plus assorted batteries of three additional regiments and the 4.5 inch howitzers of 7th Medium Regiment. It's only one of many examples from the Alamein period.

 
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1) The US had very few troops ready for battle in January 1942. There was urgent need for such troops to secure positions in the Pacific against possible Japanese attacks. Also, the existing trained formations, such as they were, provided cadre for the many new formation being raised at the time. Sending all the fully-trained men to the Middle East would have aborted the planned expansion of the Army.

2) The British didn't need US troops in Egypt or Libya in January 1942; they had just defeated the Panzer Armee Afrika in Operation CRUSADER, and were pursuing to central Libya. Rommel counterattacked in late January, but was held west of Tobruk.
 
Did the US even have combat-ready, trained and equiped troops in division size in January 1942, in the continental US, available for deployment
 
From a premise that the Japanese do not attack Pearl Harbor and instead bypass the Americans in the Southern Resources Area campaign, it developed into an invade Hawaii from the get go discussion and one of the ancillary thoughts I had about it, was what would happen to TORCH? I came up with this idea.

What if the Americans send raw recruits to the Middle East to be British-trained and put into line alongside the Desert Army beginning January 1942? Do the numbers help during the mid-42 crunch in Cyrenaica and will it make a better US Army out of it?

That is the opening premise. Insane? Maybe impractical? Asking too much?

1) The US had very few troops ready for battle in January 1942. There was urgent need for such troops to secure positions in the Pacific against possible Japanese attacks. Also, the existing trained formations, such as they were, provided cadre for the many new formation being raised at the time. Sending all the fully-trained men to the Middle East would have aborted the planned expansion of the Army.

Covered it.
send raw recruits to the Middle East to be British-trained...

British didn't need US troops in Egypt or Libya in January 1942; they had just defeated the Panzer Armee Afrika in Operation CRUSADER, and were pursuing to central Libya. Rommel counterattacked in late January, but was held west of Tobruk.

… and had their asses handed to them at Gazala in June 1942. Outrunning supply and their march reach and picking the wrong general at wrong time hurt the British which explains a lot, but let's be honest, they needed help in a critical theater which is, as I explained in the OP, is where the Americans could fight right away if they started soon enough. Go to where you can where the fight is and start soon to finish that fight sooner, rather than wait to fight where you are not ready.

In the Pacific, it was New Guinea. In the Atlantic, it is North Africa.
 
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I'm really not sure why anyone is suggesting 8h Army never conducted indirect fire. ...​

I never did. I was referring to tactical & operating capabilities that were fully in place in the Royal Artillery in France or the UK in 1940, but are much in evidence in the artillery of the 8th Army during 1941 & at least half of 1942.
 
Did the US even have combat-ready, trained and equiped troops in division size in January 1942, in the continental US, available for deployment

Yes. I'd refer you to Stauntons 'Order of Battle for the US Army in WWII for a 620 page outline of the subject. The eighteen National Guard divisions had been mobilized in the autumn of 1940, reequipped, retrained, purged of political appointees, reorganized into the new triangular structure, retrained to the new doctrine again, & in Jan-March 1942 most were about as ready as any unit without combat experience could be. Note how the majority of the divisions and separate battalions or regiments sent overseas in 1942 were former NG units.

2. The 1st & 2d Armored divisions had been formed up in July 1940 & they also had 18 months training by February 1942. Some personnel were withdrawn to help cadre the 6th Armored Div in Feb 1942, but this was not so large as to disrupt training for more than a few weeks.

3. The 5th Inf Div, a Regular Army unit was never drawn on whole sale for cadres for new divisions. It was kept intact for overseas service & sent to Iceland in April 1942 to replace the Navy/Marine garrison.

4. The 1st, 2d, 3rd, 4th, 7th Inf Div were all Regular Army that were kept intact until May & June 1942. The 1st, 3rd, and 9th ID had been along with the 1st & 2d Marine Divisions part of Fleet Amphibious Forces.

5. The 6th, 8th, 9th, & 10th Regular Army Inf Div were considered fully trained & equipped at the end of 1941. They were tapped for large scale cadre transfers at the start of 1942. It took these RA divisions between 2 & 6 months to work back up to combat readiness after a cadre transfer, depending on how fast the new replacements arrived and other circumstances.

6. The 24th & 25th ID were formed out of the old Hawaiian Division & misc NG units October 1941. Since the bulk of the officers 7 NCOs had previous Regular Army, Army Reserve, or NG training these two did not require a full 18 months for work up. The 25th arrived on Guadalcanal 11 months after activation & fought there until the Japanese evacuated in January.

Not counting the two cavalry divisions the US Army had approx 30 trained and equipped divisions February 1942. The Navy had two Marine Divisions. Leaving aside the nine RA Div used for new unit cadres Feb thru July 42 that left the US with 23 divisions. Plus about 35 Separate Infantry Regiments. Two of the NG divisions had problems passing their readiness test of their training, so the count could be 21 on the low side.

Were the need large enough some of the RA ID, could have been left intact for overseas service as the 5th ID was. This would delay the training of new divisions somewhat. There several ways it could have been worked around, but worst case is the 14 or 15 receiving divisions would not be ready until late 1943 vs midyear.

Marshall had a large officer cadre when the War Powers acts initiated mobilization latter 1940. Unfortunately the War Dept was still much divided against itself & subject deeply to the whims of congressional interests. Marshal was unable to overcome all the obstacles to reorganizing and and rationalizing doctrine during 1941. The legislation accompanying the DoW with Japan, Germany, Ialy, gave the CoS briefly the ability to act without impediment and get the reorganization completed in early 1942. Had the CoS the same power in early 1941 the Army ground forces would have been much better prepared come Jan 1942.

The overseas service of ground combat forces in 1942 was:

1 & 2d Armored: August UK; November Op TORCH

1st ID: November Op TORCH

3rd ID: November Op TORCH

9th ID: November Op TORCH

5th ID: April Iceland

25th ID: Nov/Dec Guadalcanal

27th ID: Feb/March Hawaii

29th ID: Sept/Oct UK

32d ID: April Australia; September combat New Guinea

34th ID: Jan N Ireland; November Op TORCH

37th ID: May Fiji

40th ID: Sept Hawaii

43d ID: Oct 42 Hawaii

1st Marine Div April/May Fiji

2d Mar Div May Samoa

Separate Inf Regiments

3rd: Jan 41 to Newfoundland (Yes I cross checked the date)

4th: Jan 41 Alaska

24th: May 42 New Hebrides

33d: Dec 41 Trinidad

37th: July 41 Alaska

53d: June 42 Alaska

58th: June 42 Alaska

89th: Scattered across Caribbean 41-42

102d: Jan 42 Bora Bora

118th: Aug 42 Iceland

132d: Feb 42 Australia; May New Caledonia; Dec Guadalcanal Americal Div

138th: May 42 Alaska

147th: May 42 Fiji; Nov Guadalcanal Americal Div

150th: Panama

153d: Alaska

156th: Oct 42 UK

164th: Mar 42 New Caledonia

182d: Mar 42 Australia; Dec Guadalcanal Americal Div

201st: Sept 41 Alaska

295th: Puerto Rico

296th: Antilles, Panama, Puerto Rico...

297th: Alaska

298th: Hawaii

367th: April Liberia

434th: Caribbean

503 Parachute: Oct 42 Australia

509th Para: Nov 42 UK; Op TORCH

Point here is in the Separate Regiments & independent support battalions the US Army had the equivalent of another division or two available Jan 42.

The chaos of Allied cargo shipping in 1942 had more to do with the strategic or operational constraints. The rapid escalation of events & the the Pacific 1941 left cargo ship allocation planning useless, and wrong footed for much of 1942. Then there are things like the eight separate regiments in Alaska. Add in all the affiliated artillery, engineer, & support units & there a Arctic corps of three divisions equivalent sucking up cargo shipping for 1942. One can find all sorts of missteps like that as Allied planning adjusted to the new circumstances.

Amphibious Forces Atlantic Fleet were conducting corps size exercises by Jan 1942, so there was that minimal expeditionary capability.
 
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Yes. I'd refer you to Stauntons 'Order of Battle for the US Army in WWII for a 620 page outline of the subject.

From the above, I'm more inclined to rustle up a National Guard infantry division or two and ship it off to the Transjordan and let them play with the British until they can move up to plug those holes we see at Gazala?

Ain-el-gazala-1.png


Know what I see, here? Bir Hacheim completely isolated way beyond not just artillery coverage, but out there by its lonesome with no contiguous integration into a coherent overall defense scheme. Knightbridge is too far north as deployed as a maneuver pivot. No artillery coverage for it either. It is as if Ritchie never learned how to read ground or think about mutual support.

What about the three airbases? Tobruk, Al Adem, and Bir al Gubi? You have CAS base coverage literally 5 minutes away if you want it. Where was the RAF?

Sidi Muftah and Bir al Hama scream out for Corps artillery. Concentrate armor at Bir Lefa and post an infantry screen to link the FFB with 50th.

That is one screwed up disposition.

BTW.

90_mm_Gun_M1_1000_0001.jpg


Ask for it early and often, Desert Army.

 
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