What if the Americans start sending troops to Egypt in January 1942?

[McPherson]

The Brits had a perfectly good doctrine. Why the 8th Army was not using I've not figured out. I've been back and forth through the Journal of Royal Artillery & a variety of other sources & the doctrine the RA used to such excellent effect was well along on the battlefield in France May 1940 & was pretty much set with regiments in the UK in 1941.

That's exactly what I mean. The British BEF army (France 1940) had an updated WW I set of artillery by the numbers drills while the Desert Army had more of a "Russian style" direct fires and opportunity fires system. I thought it might have something to do with the fluid nature of desert maneuver warfare, but it still makes no sense if you have gridded your solutions in on decent or even the shoddy Cyrenaica topo maps I presume the Desert Army had.

Operation GYMNAST was first proposed to the US at the December 1941 ARCADIA conference. Been second best, but still nice if that one could have been executed earlier in 1942. Allied soldiers at Oran in March sets off the butterflies.

Not enough lift and the U-boat war is situation critical. MARCH 1943 was the decisive month. If Doenitz held his nerve and Sir Dudley Pound lost his, the Battle of the Atlantic could have turned real ugly until USN HK groups swung it in late 1943. As bad as it was, the Canadians in the west Atlantic and the RN in the east Atlantic turned that around in the nick of time mid 1942 to make Torch possible in in the teeth of that horrible November 1942. November is also the earliest that Torch can navally happen. Sending troops around the Cape of Good Hope earlier, however is doable as part of the regular Egypt convoys.

 

[Errolwi]

You mean all the forces using British gear, British shipping, under British command, in a unified command structure? Adding the US forces complicates things enormous, which is what HALPRO forces ran into IOTL in 1942.

Sort of British command
It was suggested that the Scottish Division should get the Scottish Secretary on board to get the same treatment as the Dominion units.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

That's exactly what I mean. The British BEF army (France 1940) had an updated WW I set of artillery by the numbers drills while the Desert Army had more of a "Russian style" direct fires and opportunity fires system.

The JRA & assorted other Brit historians have a different description of 1940 methods. There had been a deep change from 1938, with the object of rapid massing of multi battery and multi regement concentrations. The fundamentals appear sound to me, but some changes were made in 1940 to correct some missteps. Those changes look pretty much identical to the methods they were using in 1943 or 1945.

 

[McPherson]

The JRA & assorted other Brit historians have a different description of 1940 methods. There had been a deep change from 1938, with the object of rapid massing of multi battery and multi regement concentrations. The fundamentals appear sound to me, but some changes were made in 1940 to correct some missteps. Those changes look pretty much identical to the methods they were using in 1943 or 1945.

That sounds suspiciously like French 1937 doctrine?

 

[Aber]

but it still makes no sense if you have gridded your solutions in on decent or even the shoddy Cyrenaica topo maps I presume the Desert Army had.

Nobody knew exactly where they were in the desert; there are enough stories of meetings being arranged where the participants ended up in different places.

 

[McPherson]

Nobody knew exactly where they were in the desert; there are enough stories of meetings being arranged where the participants ended up in different places.

How much was the time drift error? Celestial navigation being the obvious question? I mean before GPS, it has to be compass, sextant and watch and the reference book which lists horizon angles (local hour angles) of the stars/sun you use as your reference points according to the time tables listed where/when you are in the middle of nowhere in a truck/tank or a ship or a plane? I mean this is part of ye olde sighting of your first survey mark is. Lat/long fix to plonk yourself just before you site your guns/position?

As I think about it, surveying yourself in celestially, should have been an artillery officer's first taught skill.

 

[Aber]

As I think about it, surveying yourself in celestially, should have been an artillery officer's first taught skill.

As with time, everybody else should work off the artillery definition of position. However an error of even a few hundred yards could be lethal, while armoured units IIRC were effectively using dead reckoning based on mileage covered, while travelling 10s of miles a day.

 

[McPherson]

As with time, everybody else should work off the artillery definition of position. However an error of even a few hundred yards could be lethal, while armoured units IIRC were effectively using dead reckoning based on mileage covered, while travelling 10s of miles a day.

I know this is a dumb question to ask about 1940 tech, but did anybody in the desert think about radio-triangulation fixes from known position radio beacons in addition to celestial navigation to help survey in the first position fix? 2 check system?

I admit this now possibly explains why the Desert Army had so much trouble with indirect fires, but it sure does not explain why the DAK could do it. Nobody is actually better than anyone else after all when it comes to this stuff. Everybody human gets the same abilities in general, and they can easily figure it all out, so what was the problem? Training? Doctrine of mobile battle? What made the British sloppy here?

 

[marathag]

I know this is a dumb question to ask about 1940 tech, but did anybody in the desert think about radio-triangulation fixes from known position radio beacons in addition to celestial navigation to help survey in the first position fix? 2 check system?

Heh, GEE and OBOE for ground units.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

That sounds suspiciously like French 1937 doctrine?

In a 1937 edition of the JRA there is a article describing the organization and methods of a French division Artillery Groupe. In his British understated and reserved manner the author expresses admiration of the speed which fires of disparate batteries were massed on single targets. I can even see bits of the new 1938 organization/doctrine directly reproducing the descriptions of the French.

Pre 1938 there was also a article about the US artillery. The different author was largely patronizing and disparaging without actually explaining anything. Maybe I should reread that one again and see if theres any clues I missed. This was the same era Brewer & Co were developing their methods for massing multiple batteries & battalions rapidly.

 

[Aber]

I admit this now possibly explains why the Desert Army had so much trouble with indirect fires, but it sure does not explain why the DAK could do it.

Evidence that the DAK could do indirect fire?

 

[marathag]

Evidence that the DAK could do indirect fire?

Rommel having a number of FK18 170mm tubes

 

[Ramontxo]

This is of course a debate out (far out) of my knowledge, but Wasn't the heavy artillery used by the DAK in Crusader hold for the siege an future investment of Tobruk? (And thus enjoying preregistered fields of fire etc)

 

[Deleted member 1487]

This is of course a debate out (far out) of my knowledge, but Wasn't the heavy artillery used by the DAK in Crusader hold for the siege an future investment of Tobruk? (And thus enjoying preregistered fields of fire etc)

That is correct, captured French heavy artillery of 155mm:
https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C990548

A German Afrika Korps heavy artillery crew with their commandeered Italian Fiat, 665NM 4x2, 6 ton cargo truck, towing a captured French heavy field gun with the German designation 15.5 cm K 417 f. These field guns were captured by the German army during the French campaign in May - June 1940 and after re chambering were impressed into German service with the Afrika Korps and with coastal artillery batteries. The men are preparing to tow the gun to a new position. This private German photograph is from an album found by NX50685 Private (later Sergeant) Norman Ashley Coleman, 9th Division Supply Company.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canon_de_155mm_GPF

15.5 cm K 418(f)
In 1940, France fielded 450 of these guns.[5] Many of them were captured and used by Germany for the rest of the war. In German service it was known as the 15.5 cm K 418(f); it served with heavy artillery battalions in the Afrika Korps and on coast defense duties. On D-Day in 1944, the German Army had over 50 of the 155 mm French guns in sites on the northern French beaches. A battery of six of these guns near four empty emplacements for larger guns was the cause of the actions at Pointe du Hoc in June 1944.[6][2]

 

[Coulsdon Eagle]

Australians, Indians, FREE FRENCH, New Zealanders, Poles, and many many others were alright? Just no Americans allowed? I wonder what the Duke of Wellington would have told them about it, if he had been alive?

Well, his armies included amongst many native Indians, Dutch-Belgians, Brunswickers, Hannoverians (KGL), Portuguese & Spanish as well as proper foreigners - the Welsh, Scots & (God preserve us) the Irish - so you could say he set the template.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Nobody knew exactly where they were in the desert; there are enough stories of meetings being arranged where the participants ended up in different places.

When I retired in 1997 US artillery officers were still trained to use their basic survey equipment to locate with star or sun shots. Our battalion survey section we're properly versed in it. A entire regiment or brigade of a dozen plus batteries and associated FO could be put on a common survey grid in a hour, using tools George Washington would have understood from his summer surveying in the Eastern Appalachia region at age 17. It's not rocket science, a few weeks at a Ft Sill class can make a 2d Lt or buck sgt proffcient. I know Brit artillerists knew this technique back in 1916.

Again, I'm confused about what the RA in the 8th Army was doing wrong.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Evidence that the DAK could do indirect fire?

You are serious?

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

... Training? Doctrine of mobile battle? What made the British sloppy here?

Given all the complaints I've read about tank corps performance in 8th Army there must have been something systemic going on across the regiments. Sloppy radio use & security is a third I've seen identified.

 

[McPherson]

Evidence that the DAK could do indirect fire?

Unrelated, DAK Artillery Crewman photographed in color firing the 17 cm Kanone 18 in North Africa.

Cited from M. Fakrey.

Not much more, but best I can do on short notice.

July/August/September 1941: On 26th July I received my routing order back to Germany for more training at the Artillery School Jueterbog (80 km S of Berlin) together with several other buddies from our regiment (Hans Meyer, Dieter Hagen, Heiner Chelius, K.H.Bunke, Hajo Mächtel, Schauß, H.G. Louis, Scheuermann, u.a.). We packed our things and started our trip back the following day, hitchhiking to Derna, the last time on the dusty trail around Tobruk. At Derna we cought a JU 52 transport plane and flew via Benghasi and Tripoli to Catania, Sicily. After resting there and cleaning up we continued by train to Naples. Again several days layover with health examination, sightseeing and hanging around. Then by train to Germany. Our trip ended at Homburg, Saar.

 

[Aber]

You are serious?

It was the assertion that the DAK could and the 8th Army couldn't do indirect fire I was querying. I suspect both sides had problems with indirect fire in mobile phases, but could cope when things were more static.



6in howitzers January 1941 - 64th medium regiment.