What if the American Constitution created Roman-style consuls and a dictator option?

Thande

Donor
OTL the American founding fathers were influenced by a variety of classical sources (as well as more contemporary ones such as Paoli's Corsica) in drawing up their republican constitution. As we know, OTL produced a system with a single elected chief executive, the President. However, a few years later in Revolutionary France, their French counterparts decided to implement a system of multiple Roman-style consuls in order to act as checks on each others' power. What if the Americans, a little earlier, had also opted for this?

The Roman system includes the option for the consuls to appoint a temporary dictator, who has the power to override the entire judiciary and possesses supreme military command, as well as being absolved of all responsibility for any legal transgressions committed during his term in power (which the Romans limited to a maximum of six months). This would only be resorted to in times of great trial, when the fate of the republic was at stake and argument was not an option. In theory at least, the dictator could only be either a serving or former consul himself.

We know the Americans were influenced by the Romans as well as the Athenians and others, so what if a similar (but updated) system had been implemented in the United States? Assuming all the states would agree to it, of course.
 
There would have to be some heavy guards on a dictator option, so soon after the Revolution. Probably somethings such as needing a fraction (say a majority of one and a substantial minority of the other) of both Congress and the Supreme court to agree with the imposition of the dictator option (also, judges appointed by the Dictator don't count, nor do emergancy/appointed representatives in Congress). Probably some penalty as well: no dictatorship can last more than X years (say at the end of the third presidential term), after assuming dictatorship the individual is ineligible for future office, etc.

That said, I'd say that while Lincoln would be sure to use it if he felt that he couldn't continue the war any other way (such as if he lost to Little Napoleon), Jackson would be the first President of OTL to use it, likely during the South Carolina Crisis, during which Texas also threatened to secede/invade federal lands. Jackson was already a firm believer in that while the Executive sphere should be small, it was absolute inside it. Invoking Dictatorship to force down secessionism would be a small step.
 
The Founding Fathers were students of the Roman system, and created the Constitution with Roman history very much in the front of their mind. If you read their letters, and essays attacking each other, villians from Roman Republican history are used as insults. Phrases like "American Caesar" were being used with a full historic knowledge of everything that term meant. They saw the shortcomings of the Roman system, and made sure to avoid them in the Constitution.

So my question is why would they include this part of the Roman system, so heavily abused in Roman history, in the American Constitution?
 
So my question is why would they include this part of the Roman system, so heavily abused in Roman history, in the American Constitution?

Thats a good point. Since I don't quite see them going off on such a radical tangent. They were originally meeting to discuss reforms to the Articles of Confederation and there are other Presidents of the United States - if in Congress Assembled or other BS - before Washington. They are operating from a set position already and only refining it and I think it would have been very hard to compromise into such a different form of government. There is also radification by the individual states needed.
 
this may only be possible without the revolutionary generation, who were understandibly wary of such concentrated power
 

Thande

Donor
Let's focus on the consular aspect for a moment. That's division of power rather than concentration, after all. Would the Americans have gone for two or three? Who would have filled them - a balance between southern and northern interests perhaps? Given that in the early days the Vice-President was the runner-up in the presidential election, if there were two consuls, presumably the first few would be the president and vice-president from the opposing parties in OTL (assuming no butterflies, which is a bit of an erroneous assumption, but for the sake of argument).
 

Jasen777

Donor
If there's a multi-person executive it would make since that more than two major parties would develop. I think 3 makes more sense than two, but the Roman model was 2, so they might go for that if they're going Roman. The electoral college system might be different.
 
Let's focus on the consular aspect for a moment. That's division of power rather than concentration, after all. Would the Americans have gone for two or three? Who would have filled them - a balance between southern and northern interests perhaps? Given that in the early days the Vice-President was the runner-up in the presidential election, if there were two consuls, presumably the first few would be the president and vice-president from the opposing parties in OTL (assuming no butterflies, which is a bit of an erroneous assumption, but for the sake of argument).

In the Constitution as presented in 1787, the Vice-President can be seen as about as much of co-executive as might be though practical by former subjects of a monarchy. The Senate's powers of advice and consent might have given it quasi-executive authority to promulgate foreign policy; the Vice-President empowered as President of the Senate would have substantial ability to shape that policy. As things worked out, the Vice-President didn't have much influence in managing the Senate, unlike the independently elected Lieutenant Governors of many States (for example, Texas) whose deputy-executives wield substantial power to set the legislative agenda. The US Senate in this way would mirror the function of the old Colonial Councils rather than function solely as a second house of the legislature. This also preserves more of the Articles of Confederation since the country under this interpretation would still be jointly run by a body in which all the states enjoyed equal representation. Indeed, for many years, state legislatures sent instructions on how to vote to their Senators, as they had their representatives in the United States in Congress Assembled from 1778-1783 and to the Continental Congresses before that.

The primary reason why the Senatorial power of advice and consent did not become an active way for the Senate to mandate foreign policy (and thus empower the Vice-President as co-executive and President of the Senate) is the story of the "Treaty of New York," between the Creeks and the US. This was the first treaty concluded by the US under the 1787 Constitution and thus set much precedent. The Treaty was the outcome of an effort by Washington and Henry Knox (Secretary of War) to protect Indian tribes from demographic engulfment, prevent Indian Wars, and preserve the honor and legacy of the Spirit of '76. Washington before beginning the negotiations for the treaty actually asked to appear before the Senate to ask for their advice and consent. Joseph Ellis' new book, American Creation, contains a good account of what happened next: the Senators spent a full day trying to decide whether or not they should applaud Washington when he entered, whether they should all stand up and other matters of pomp and circumstance. When he arrived and asked them policy questions, they again began discussing matters of procedure. Washington was infuriated. Since then, Presidents have simply submitted treaties to the Senate for ratification.

Add to that the infighting between John Adams and Thomas Jefferson during Adams' Presidency (and TJ's Vice-presidency) and Aaron Burr's attempt to "steal" the election of 1800 from Thomas Jefferson, even though it was fairly clearly understood by the Democratic-Republican party that he was to be Vice-President. The 12th Amendment to the Constitution then separated the election of Vice-President from that of the President. In some armchair histories, this is understood to mean that the 12th Amendment stipulated the election of one ticket. It only does so to the extent to which it does not call for separate electors for both offices; it says the electors will each have two votes, one for VP and one for President.

This only de facto created the idea of a ticket, primarily because both parties were interested in winning the Presidency and began to use the Vice-Presidency to shore up support. The first time this didn't happen is arguably Dick Cheney, who it was fairly obvious was never going to run for President on his own nor was he crucial in bring Wyoming's valued 3 electoral votes. He has become more of "Deputy President" than any previous American VP, to my knowledge. If the party situation had been different in 1800 (quite possible since the Republic was so new), the 12th Amendment even with its current wording might afford the VP enough power to be more than just the spare tire.

Some people at the Constitutional Convention and later Anti-Federalists protested at the idea of single executive, since it's inherently monarchical. They wanted an executive committee. Some states had tried this model under their preliminary revolutionary constitutions, drafted between 1776 and 1777, prompted by a pamphlet written by John Adams entitled Thoughts on Government, which recommended a three branch government, bicameral houses (to represent both the many and the few, a demonstration of the extent to which Classical categories influenced his thoughts). The similarity of this template to the colonial regimes they would replace was key in Adams' mind to ensuring a peaceful transfer of power rather than all out social revolution. Nonetheless, revolutionary constitutions commonly created executive committees. The clearest example was Pennsylvannia. The committee their proved extremely hard to manage; it provided insurance for neither emergency rule (because of the need for a quorum) nor effective government (because of constant bickering). IMHO, the spirit which led Adams to urge similarity to the previous colonial state of affairs is part of why the former subjects wanted to preserve the elements of efficiency inherent in a monarchy: a single locus of command in a war and an effective source of leadership in a crisis.

By 1787, it may be too late for the Constitutional Convention to chose a genuine dual (or triple) executive, apart from one eventuality: the presence of George Washington. Apart from the theoretical arguments (which to some extent are inexhaustible either way), the fact on the ground was that most Americans in Philadelphia and in later ratifying Conventions fully expected that Washington would become the first President. Washington's prestige, particularly his peaceful relinquishing of military command in 1783, allayed most fears. If Washington is killed before the elections, then perhaps if America survives after something like an election of 1800 caused by the rise of Party Politics not anticipated by the founders, a dual executive would be introduced. For Washington to have died earlier requires a much different Constitutional Convention, since the first major coup of the Convention-callers was to secure Washington's attendance, thus legitimating their deliberations.

I'm plagued by the memory that an outright dual Presidency was proposed by some as a way to resolve the crises of the 1850s, but can't find any sources to that effect.

IMO, a Roman or Spartan style dual executive where both office holders have authority of command wouldn't work for the US. An executive committee may be proposed, especially if the Constitution follows Madison's original model of a bicameral Congress in which the lower house elects the upper and the upper elects the executive. This committee creates something like Cabinet government, with a Chairman/President acting a bit more like a Prime Minister in a Westminster government. The first-past-the-post system combined with the electoral college is largely credited as the reason for the endurance of a two-party system, so the previous comment regarding a multi-party system probably has much to recommend it. Again, this is very unlikely IMHO. The most plausible and likely alternative is an independent and influential VP, which is more a product of tradition than of the strict wording of the Constitution.

Finally, I think the dictator for cases of emergency is out the window. The ability for the President to become dictatorial by suspending Hapeas Corpus in time of invasion or rebellion caused enough of a stir. Even if there's a divided/committee executive, I doubt an ATL Constitution really calls for the appointment of an independent Dictator. Much of Madison's reading in classical history was in the fall of classical republics and confederacies. The tyrannies of later Greece, particularly Dionysus at Syrasue--not to mention the history of Rome herself--argue against the ability to legitimize dictatorship.
 
Let's focus on the consular aspect for a moment. That's division of power rather than concentration, after all. Would the Americans have gone for two or three? Who would have filled them - a balance between southern and northern interests perhaps?
If three, then there'd be a northern, a southern, and a western interest represented. Going further, maybe legally entrench those geographic bases? Have only the states of the north vote to elect the northern consul, the states of the south elect the southern consul, and the states of the west elect the western consul.

Most likely, the northern one would handle diplomacy and foreign relations, the southern one would handle the economy and domestic policy, and the western one would handle the military and internal security. Judging on those regions respective interests and specialities.
 

Thande

Donor
If three, then there'd be a northern, a southern, and a western interest represented. Going further, maybe legally entrench those geographic bases? Have only the states of the north vote to elect the northern consul, the states of the south elect the southern consul, and the states of the west elect the western consul.
Not straight after the constitutional convention, surely? There weren't any western states then, just territories... (unless you mean 'west of the Appalachians').

From what I've read, the biggest divide in America around the time of the constitution was that between small and large states, or to put it another way, between those states hemmed in by the others and with no room to expand to the west (most of New England, Delaware, Maryland) and those which could conceivably have expanded all the way to the Pacific, and would thus have enough people to dominate over the others if Congress was purely proportional representation (Pennsylvania, Virginia etc.). Hence why in OTL you have both the Senate, which maintains the fiction that all states are equal (inspired by a similar system in the British county constituencies of the time) and the House of Representatives in order that a state's representation is proportional to its population - it was a compromise between the large/expansionist and small/hemmed-in states.
 
If three, then there'd be a northern, a southern, and a western interest represented. Going further, maybe legally entrench those geographic bases? Have only the states of the north vote to elect the northern consul, the states of the south elect the southern consul, and the states of the west elect the western consul.

Most likely, the northern one would handle diplomacy and foreign relations, the southern one would handle the economy and domestic policy, and the western one would handle the military and internal security. Judging on those regions respective interests and specialities.

Whether the consuls/executive board becomes tied to geographic representation is tied to whether they are elected as a slate or independently. If they are elected all at once, then a ticket with informal geographic represenation may occur. It will likely be informal in 1787, though may be codified in later crises, similar to OTL's tradition about Presidents serving two terms. If they are elected independently, say a board of three, with one elected every two years, then they will not be intended to represent different constituencies. Each contest will be a national one and the staggered vote ensures the same kind of gradualism as in the Senate.

One could have a situation with different kinds of executive offices are each elected: a President with ceremonial powers and legislative veto, a Prime Minister (for lack of a better word) or domestic policy honcho, and a Commander-in-Chief (foreign policy cheif). A division of powers rather than of sections is more likely and in accord with other parts of the Consitution. Again it is doubtful, since a divided executive leads to conflicting executives which is a very easy recipe for unrest. Any executive division also empowers Congress to a far greater extent.
 
Not straight after the constitutional convention, surely? There weren't any western states then, just territories... (unless you mean 'west of the Appalachians').

From what I've read, the biggest divide in America around the time of the constitution was that between small and large states, or to put it another way, between those states hemmed in by the others and with no room to expand to the west (most of New England, Delaware, Maryland) and those which could conceivably have expanded all the way to the Pacific, and would thus have enough people to dominate over the others if Congress was purely proportional representation (Pennsylvania, Virginia etc.). Hence why in OTL you have both the Senate, which maintains the fiction that all states are equal (inspired by a similar system in the British county constituencies of the time) and the House of Representatives in order that a state's representation is proportional to its population - it was a compromise between the large/expansionist and small/hemmed-in states.

As to Western states (or lack thereof) you are correct. Though Virginia in 1787 includes Kentucky as a "district." Hapsburg's division seems kind of arbitary to me. A later informal geographic division, if the executives are all equal (ie it's a committee rather than distinct offices with distinct portfolios) may occur.

While you are completely correct as regards division between large and small states, I'd hardly call this "the biggest divide." It was the debate which produced the so-called "Great Compromise" that created the bi-cameral Senate and House that we know.

The fact that this compromise was over the shape of legislature, rather than the executive, is instructive. Hammering out the details of this structure took much of the Convention's time during the summer of 1787. Indeed, reading the first three Articles of the Constitution is almost like reading the term paper of a student who was done all of the writing the night before: the first paragraphs and section is well-developed, but by the end it's rather hurried, scant, and vague. So too the American constitution.

Second, the Framers seem to have considered Congress the more important branch (it's first, its powers are most clearly and extensively discussed and dileneated, it initiates all action by passing laws), despite the American Congress' later stunted growth and influence. This lack developed for many reasons, though probably first due to the equality that developed between the Houses. An energetic Speaker/House of Reps might have demanded that provisions stipulating all appropriations bill originate in the House in effect required all bills to originate with the lower house (since all bills require spending money at some point, even if only to print the paper they're written on). This claim is somewhat specious, but no more so than similar arguments made to expand the scope of the interstate commerce clause. As things developed, however, the House of Representatives was never this united or powerful, largely because it remained a relatively small body and relatively fractious and un-representative. Fewer members led to very loose Party loyalty.

The Framers did not anticpate the way to which the Presidency would centralize national discourse, such that the President's agenda and presidential campaign set the direction of national policy far more than Congressional ones. If they had done so--perhaps if they had spent less time debating the Great Compromise--then they might have devised a divided executive given their fear (particularly Madison's) of any one person who could claim the authority of "The People."

Changing the debate on the Great Compromise can come fairly quickly if one changes Madison's starting outline. Madison wanted to ensure that the new government would be powerful and unabashedly unitary: hence in his scheme both houses are proportional to population and the States are just voting districts. Madison thought his single greatest failing, besides conceeding the Senate, was the lack of any federal veto over state legislations and actions. All of this was singularly ironic, since Madison shortly reversed most of his arguments to argument against the power of the new government and in favor of states' rights. This switch is mostly due to the fact that he and Jefferson become convinced that Hamilton is planning something dastardly and that the North might figure out that they can use the federal government to undermine the Planter class by empowering mercantile elites (with the National Bank) and undermining slavery. If Madison has reason to be paranoid and class conscious a bit earlier, then he may wish to further dampend the President's power.
 

Keenir

Banned
Finally, I think the dictator for cases of emergency is out the window. The ability for the President to become dictatorial by suspending Hapeas Corpus in time of invasion or rebellion caused enough of a stir. Even if there's a divided/committee executive, I doubt an ATL Constitution really calls for the appointment of an independent Dictator. Much of Madison's reading in classical history was in the fall of classical republics and confederacies. The tyrannies of later Greece, particularly Dionysus at Syrasue--not to mention the history of Rome herself--argue against the ability to legitimize dictatorship.

and the lessons of Athens suggests that democracy is short-lived.

yet the Founding Fathers of the US strongly believed that they could improve and avoid the shortcomings.

why couldn't they do the same with "the dictator option" ?
 
and the lessons of Athens suggests that democracy is short-lived.

yet the Founding Fathers of the US strongly believed that they could improve and avoid the shortcomings.

why couldn't they do the same with "the dictator option" ?

1) "Short-lived"? At least 162 years (Cleisthenes to the conquests of Philip), and that's conservative: Solon's constitution was democratic before Peisistratus and the Athenian democracy would remain intact as the government of Attica until the Romans. Compared to the US, not to shabby.

2) The Founding Fathers expressly wished to avoid the creation of anything like a democracy. They were founding a Republic. The US only begins to resemble a democracy in the 1820s-1840s and the transistion takes until the 1910s if not 1960s, depending on your definitions.

3) I think it's largely a matter of mechanics. Having the post only exist in a period of emergency combined with unlimited authority for that period means that it leads a less-than-honest person to claim a prolonged state of emergency. A President who can suspend some rights and priviliges is a bit safer, since there's an instant person to step into a crisis. This is a reflection of the Continental nature of the American Republic, rather than Rome. For a dictator to be appointed, Congress would have to be summoned and the Supreme Court recalled from riding circuit (which they did in much of the early nineteenth century). This takes at least 4-6 weeks, if not longer depending on the various election laws. Hence, the need for an additional appointment would endanger the ability of the government to respond to a crisis, not to mention create the office that created the Caesars!

4) There's also a PR problem: Madison is famous for his argument that the US Constitution didn't require virtuous men to ensure stable government: he can't make that argument with the office of Dictator. Also, they can't very well call it a dictator, given the connotations in English. Instead, how about singular executive with broad powers to do protect the Union; and let's think of an innocuous title: how about that used for the head of local church board? Great idea! Hence, A President.:p
 

Susano

Banned
As we know, OTL produced a system with a single elected chief executive, the President.
As we know...? Sounds like one of those bad DBWIs where the OP already explains everything so that the DBWI goes his way :D
 
1)
2) The Founding Fathers expressly wished to avoid the creation of anything like a democracy. They were founding a Republic. The US only begins to resemble a democracy in the 1820s-1840s and the transistion takes until the 1910s if not 1960s, depending on your definitions.

4) There's also a PR problem: Madison is famous for his argument that the US Constitution didn't require virtuous men to ensure stable government: he can't make that argument with the office of Dictator. Also, they can't very well call it a dictator, given the connotations in English. Instead, how about singular executive with broad powers to do protect the Union; and let's think of an innocuous title: how about that used for the head of local church board? Great idea! Hence, A President.:p
Re: 2) I completely agree as far as the Founding Fathers were concerned democracy meant mob rule, they wanted to create a Republic run by and for the middle class.

Re: 4) Actually no, the term dictator didn't acquire its negative PR connotations for quite some time (link). If you look at the political pamphlets from that era (well at least the Napoleonic era) tyrant was the preferred term, I can't off the top of my head recall a single example of Napoleon being called a dictator, he was the 'Corsican tyrant', I don't know when the term acquired its present odium but it was after 1815.

Still I don't think they would allow the creation of a dictator, but the idea of a unicameral house elected by the states as the dominant force of a government headed by a executive consisting of two consuls (whether elected via the electoral college or via the Senate) is a strong possibility. The founding fathers were VERY keen on the idea of small government, that is why they rebelled in the first place and the idea of two equal magistrates at the top containing each other would have been very attractive.

Off course it would have been a recipe for disaster and civil strife but it wouldn't be too hard to have the pragmatists out-voted by the idealists, that is after all what normally happens during revolutions.
 
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Someone nearly touched on this above, but by a small stretch of the imagination we do have three consuls: the President, the Speaker of the House and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Perhaps if there was some times they acted in concert.

Or better yet, all three positions were subject to election, or the President being elected submittes his nominations for the other offices. It may work better in a parliamentary form of government where the party is elected first and governmental posts filled by the winners.
 
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