What if the 1917 Kerensky Offensive focused on the Ottomans?

raharris1973

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This post was inspired by my recent reading of Sean McMeekin’s “The Russian Origins of the First World War”.

The author asserts that Kerensky’s mistake was not in launching an offensive in 1917, but in launching it against Austria-Hungary, where already discouraged forces were vulnerable to a powerful German counterattack, instead of against the Ottomans, with confident, highly motivated forces taking on an enemy pressed to the limit.

In fact, he asserts that Constantinople and the straits were increasingly vulnerable as Ottoman defeats in Mesopotamia and eastern Anatolia had forced them to strip troops from the capital to defend beleaguered fronts. He also shows that planning for an amphibious assault on the straits was more advanced than ever under the Black Sea fleet commander, Admiral Kolchak, and regional commander Grand Duke Nicholas’s chief of staff, General Yudenich. The ideal time to launch the operation was the second half of June. He also notes that Russia’s situation in the black sea was far more advantageous than in earlier times in the war, because Russia had activated its first dreadnought, the Empress Catherine, around the end of 1916, and in the meantime, the two sub-dreadnoughts that had done so much to protect the straits since 1914, the Goeben and the Breslau, were both down for serious repairs with their deck guns removed to serve as shore batteries.

The western allies obviously preferred a 1917 Russian offensive against Germany and/or Austria-Hungary, but as McMeekin notes, correctly in my view, nobody *made* Kerensky choose Galicia as the focal point of his offensive.

I would also add, that the Russians avoiding a summer offensive in Europe in 1917 would not have been as risky for the overall Entente cause in 1917, as it would have been in 1916, when the Russians launched the Brusilov offensive. In 1916, the Brusilov offensive was needed to put diversionary pressure on the Austrians who were on the offensive against Italy and the Germans who were on the offensive against the French at Verdun. In 1917 by contrast, the Germans were not taking the initiative on any of the land fronts. True, the French were offensively hors de combat, because of their mutinies, but they were not under a strategic German attack. If the French could not be roused to aid the British attacking in Flanders, why should the Russians? Also, America had entered the war, and although not immediately effective, all belligerents were looking forward to their strength gradually being added to the Entente by 1918.

So, in May-June strategy sessions, Kerensky’s provisional government decides to remain on the defensive in Europe in 1917, but to go on the offensive against the Ottomans at all possible points of contact, including the straits. An amphibious attack is launched on the Bosporus, while forces in northeast Anatolia resume heavy pressure to tie down Ottoman forces. A secondary thrust in the east is coordinated with the British in Mesopotamia to converge around Mosul, placing Kurdistan under Russian protection.

How does this go for the Kerensky government. Will the straits invasion succeed? Assuming the Petrograd’s optimism about its ability to put the Ottomans on the run is well-founded, how capable are the Central Powers of giving the Ottomans effective support? In particular, how might the Bulgarians factor into the battle for the Bosporus?

Does a failed offensive mean an automatic revolution? With a successful anti-Ottoman effort in 1917, would the Russians be capable of sustaining an offensive in Europe in 1918, or do they risk defeat and revolution, just later than in OTL?

Assuming the Russian side of anti-Ottoman offensives goes well, are the British and French going to be in a position to collect any of their gains from the Sykes-Picot-Sazanov deal?

…..And if an amphibious assault on the Bosporus makes you skittish, what about a less ambitious alternative. The Russians decide to keep a steady anti-Ottoman focus in 1917 for political reasons rather than in the expectation of being able to secure the straits. The reasoning is that the forces in Anatolia have better morale and are facing a weaker enemy, so an offensive in that quarter is less of a risk than in Europe. Victories in Asia can keep super-patriots, from the center to the right, reasonably satisfied, without vindicating the anti-war arguments of the far left. The Russian operational scheme against the Ottomans is to advance westward and southward in Anatolia, to reach a junction with the British in Mesopotamia, while the main thrust goes along the interior and Black Sea coast, aimed at destroying Ottoman resistance and with a line of territorial objectives to Ankara, and ultimately, Bursa on the Asian side of the straits and the “Trojan peninsula” on the eastern side of the Dardanelles. An amphibious “threat” to the straits with the Russian dreadnought and embarked forces is used mainly to tie down potential Ottoman reinforcements.

What are the prospects of such an effort? What would it mean for Kerensky, the Bolesheviks, and other Russian political players by winter 1917-1918?
 
Russia would be better off, any offensives here would be small scale due to logistics issues so any losses would be much less than the real OTL Kerensky offensive. If the Russians just held the line against the Germans and Austrians and only launched small scale actions agains the Turks maybe they could have lasted longer before revolution.

However the Germans and Austrians would have greater operational freedom too, I suspect the if the eastern front was quiet the Germans wouldn't attack there either in 1917. Perhaps the Germans and Austrians attack Italy earlier and in greater force or at Salonika or reinforce the Turks to the extent that logistics would allow.

OTL there were several Russian Black Sea naval landing projects planned for 1917 that we downgraded and shelved as things degraded over the summer. Not at Constantinople but with targets of destroying coal mines, rail lines and liberating POW etc... If they were able to pull off one of these it would have been interesting.
 

raharris1973

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effects might be local, or more wide-ranging

Russia would be better off, any offensives here would be small scale due to logistics issues so any losses would be much less than the real OTL Kerensky offensive. If the Russians just held the line against the Germans and Austrians and only launched small scale actions agains the Turks maybe they could have lasted longer before revolution.

That's what I was thinking. The emphasis on the Ottoman front tangles up the Russians on a front where they can't get themselves hurt as much.

As far as the ultimate result is concerned, it could be anything from the Russians just changing the face of the Middle East a bit before collapsing in revolution, or we could see an unraveling of the Central Powers just ahead of Russia enabling Russia to survive past the end of the war.

However the Germans and Austrians would have greater operational freedom too, I suspect the if the eastern front was quiet the Germans wouldn't attack there either in 1917.

Perhaps,but why do you think so? Maybe they'd think an offensive would relieve pressure on the Turks. Of course they would have to decide how to do it, and who contributes what forces, and I do not know how hard that would be.

Perhaps the Germans and Austrians attack Italy earlier and in greater force or at Salonika or reinforce the Turks to the extent that logistics would allow.

Definitely options that would be considered more within the realm of the achievable given Germany's limited operational reserve in 1917.


OTL there were several Russian Black Sea naval landing projects planned for 1917 that we downgraded and shelved as things degraded over the summer. Not at Constantinople but with targets of destroying coal mines, rail lines and liberating POW etc... If they were able to pull off one of these it would have been interesting.

interesting indeed.
 
A victory against the Ottomans would certainly be a vital morale booster, but the Russian economy isn't going to last much longer than OTL.
 
I think that, per Halpern, Russia's actual ability to carry out an amphibious Straits operation in 1917 was not great. For one thing, the coming of the Provisional Government pretty much wiped out the enormous gains that the Black Sea Fleet had made in 1916. Kolchak was not adequately supported in logistical terms. The advent of revolution prevented officers from using the usual barbaric means of keeping order and did not replace them with anything. Tensions between the ranks and the commissioned men increased steadily. Few of the ships were actually kept running on anything approaching a regular basis. Eventually Kolchak was shunted sideways on a wild goose chase mission to the United States because his demands for fuel, ammunition, and adequate manpower for repair and maintenance were causing problems.
 

raharris1973

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I think that, per Halpern, Russia's actual ability to carry out an amphibious Straits operation in 1917 was not great.

Admittedly, the author who was discussing this prospect, Sean McMeekin, doesn't even begin to provide a rudimentary operational sketch that we could judge the plausibility of, he just notes that it was a remarkably high planning priority, with the studies continuing to get more detailed well into 1917.

For one thing, the coming of the Provisional Government pretty much wiped out the enormous gains that the Black Sea Fleet had made in 1916. Kolchak was not adequately supported in logistical terms. The advent of revolution prevented officers from using the usual barbaric means of keeping order and did not replace them with anything. Tensions between the ranks and the commissioned men increased steadily. Few of the ships were actually kept running on anything approaching a regular basis. Eventually Kolchak was shunted sideways on a wild goose chase mission to the United States because his demands for fuel, ammunition, and adequate manpower for repair and maintenance were causing problems.

McMeekin does anticipate this type of argument relevant to military discipline, and argues that the decline in discipline was not so bad in the Black Sea fleet or the Tiflis Caucasus Command at this time.

The
establishment of Soviets, as in all the other fronts, did slow down
business and command initiative for a couple weeks in the Caucasus.
However, the theater commander, General Yudenich, noted that the
soldiers committees, while fostering an environment of endless
meetings, chose representatives and made pronouncements conducive to
law and order and pursuit of victory. The soldiers in the Caucasus
voted for ranking officers to represent them in their Soviet.


The Black Sea fleet was also briefly immobilized by mutiny, although
an interesting feature of this is that peace propaganda was not voiced
by the sailors, and they concentrated on shooting or ousting officers
with German-sounding names, whom they often accused of collusion with
the enemy.

One of his themes is that the political sentiments during the February Revolution and in its wake were a mixed bag, with a great deal of pro-war, we will fight the war better, types of sentiments.
 
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