What if the 15 air groups and shipping diverted to the Pacific in July ‘42 stayed in the ETO?

If the 15 air groups and shipping were not diverted from ETO to PTO in July '42...

  • a. More air support to Battle of Atlantic from patrols along coasts

    Votes: 2 66.7%
  • b. Stronger start to Combined Bomber Offensive

    Votes: 2 66.7%
  • c. early decimation of U.S. pilot corps, rebuilding takes longer

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • d. a shifting forward by just a few weeks of campaigns in ETO throughout the war

    Votes: 1 33.3%
  • e. Additional shipping helps win Battle of Atlantic a month or more ahead of OTL

    Votes: 1 33.3%
  • f. Quicker win in N. Africa - additional shipping allows Torch landings to extend to Tunis

    Votes: 2 66.7%
  • g. Quicker win in N. Africa - additional airpower prevents German success at Kasserine Pass.

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • h. Earlier invasion of Sicily, (Feb-June 43?) i

    Votes: 1 33.3%
  • i. simultaneous Sardinia, Sicily ops

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • j. grabbing Rome in the initial invasion of Italy

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • k. Grabbing Italy & Italian Balkans soon after Italian surrender

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • l. simultaneous Normandy & Riviera invasions

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • m. Successful D-Day, liberation of France, in 1943

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • n. Earlier or better supplied invasions cascade to finishing Germany before end of ’44.

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • o. no domestic political impact

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • p. lack of Pacific turn makes midterms worse for FDR

    Votes: 1 33.3%
  • q. possible earlier Torch, or GYMNAST, makes midterms better for FDR,

    Votes: 1 33.3%
  • r. faster win in ETO puts more of Europe under WAllies at VE-Day

    Votes: 1 33.3%
  • s. faster win in ETO leaves iron curtain in same spot as OTL

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • t. Delays in Pacific & speed-up in ETO means earlier USSR v. Japan, more Soviet grabs in Asia

    Votes: 0 0.0%

  • Total voters
    3

raharris1973

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The US diverted 15 air groups and shipping intended for the preinvasion buildup in the UK (Bolero) to instead go to the pacific in July 1942, after the UK made clear it’s opposition to a court cross channel invasion in 1942.

What if instead, those forces still went to the UK or anywhere else in the ETO or Atlantic ?

What could that extra increment of US forces accomplish in 42 or 43 that was not accomplished in otl “?

In their absence from the Pacific, what would US forces *not* be able to do that they historically accomplished in otl 42 and 43?
 
The US diverted 15 air groups and shipping intended for the preinvasion buildup in the UK (Bolero) to instead go to the pacific in July 1942, after the UK made clear it’s opposition to a court cross channel invasion in 1942.

What if instead, those forces still went to the UK or anywhere else in the ETO or Atlantic ?

What could that extra increment of US forces accomplish in 42 or 43 that was not accomplished in otl “?

Possibly the GYMNAST Operation. The various iterations GYMNAST I. II, & TORCH were postponed repeatedly for emergencies elsewhere

In their absence from the Pacific, what would US forces *not* be able to do that they historically accomplished in otl 42 and 43?

Have to track down exactly where those were used. Also exactly what the air groups were composed of? Were they Army or Navy? I suspect those contributed to the severe attrition of the Japanese air arm in the S Pac in latter 1942 & early 1943. The cargo shipping is a bit more flexible. Probably its presence contributed to the build up of the essential base structure in the S Pac in latter 1942. None of that would have arrived before the execution of Op WATCHTOWER, to the lack would not have prevented it. The lack may have weakened the ongoing battle in the Solomons in latter 1942 or 1943.
 

raharris1973

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I am pretty sure the air groups were army air. Of all the chiefs, Hap Arnold was most opposed to the diversion.

I wonder if the shifting of the forces destination was a state secret, an open secret, or publicly announced, at least in broad outline. If it was classified I wonder if any Congress critters were told.
 
...

What could that extra increment of US forces accomplish in 42 or 43 that was not accomplished in otl “?

In their absence from the Pacific, what would US forces *not* be able to do that they historically accomplished in otl 42 and 43?

OTL Germany suffered two thirds of its 1943 air losses in the West, including the MTO. Adding in fifteen air groups is liable to accelerate those losses and run down the combat power of the German AF farther & sooner. What other strategic gains might come from this I can't say at the moment.
 
Have to track down exactly where those were used. Also exactly what the air groups were composed of? Were they Army or Navy?

This would be interesting to know. I also would be very interested to know how much (mostly) air-power was sent to ETO with anticipation of Bolero during the first 6 months after US entered the war. This was during the time Japan was stretching its limits all over the PTO and Kido Butai did not have much rest. How much more forces would be needed e.g. in the South Pacific area to stop Japanese advance earlier and provide better starting point for counter offensive after 42?
 
This would be interesting to know. I also would be very interested to know how much (mostly) air-power was sent to ETO with anticipation of Bolero during the first 6 months after US entered the war.

Not much as I recall, but need to get a exact count. Have to trawl through some notes, and the net, & book or two. The decisions for the GYMAST & TORCH operations redirected the attention and destination of much sent across the Atlantic in 1942.

This was during the time Japan was stretching its limits all over the PTO and Kido Butai did not have much rest. How much more forces would be needed e.g. in the South Pacific area to stop Japanese advance earlier and provide better starting point for counter offensive after 42?

Depends on how much offensive capability one judges the Japanese had remaining. Op WATCHTOWER was initiated before any of these reinforcements arrived. How they affected the subsequent battle on Guadalcanal I don't know.

After that there is the debate of if the post Guadalcanal offensive in the S Pac was really essential, or more important than attacking in Europe first.
 

raharris1973

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I figured those forces were not there at the beginning of watchtower in August, but I wonder if they provided land based air that was key to driving off Japanese attacks on Henderson field in Sept, Oct and Nov.

Also, does anybody know what the perception of the Guadalcanal campaign was by the fall of 1942 and midterm elections? Did the US public have the sense we were finally winning somewhere, or was the perception that we were just slowly slogging it out and underachieving?
 
I figured those forces were not there at the beginning of watchtower in August, but I wonder if they provided land based air that was key to driving off Japanese attacks on Henderson field in Sept, Oct and Nov.

Possiblly. As before, we need to identify those air groups and track exactly how their deployment to the Pacific affected events. My take is since the IJN aircraft carrier forces was run down by US carriers that does not change much. But, there were US Army air reinforcements to Guadalcanal island which contributed to the destruction of the Japanses air groups operating from Rabaul & New Guinea, during the same months. So the question is did any of the transferred air groups contribute to that directly or indirectly.

Also, does anybody know what the perception of the Guadalcanal campaign was by the fall of 1942 and midterm elections? Did the US public have the sense we were finally winning somewhere, or was the perception that we were just slowly slogging it out and underachieving?

This was the period when Navy CoS King was changing policy from complete secrecy of navy operations, to a cooperation with the press and a careful publicity program concerning naval ops & battles. King despised the press, but he understood he needed them to gain full public support. He started a habit of inviting members of the press, reporters and editors, for whisky and conversation one evening each week. He stroked the egos of the press by giving select members security access classifications and feeding them classified information for background, to make their stories less guesswork and lurid with errors. This also enabled enrolling the press in a few deception stories.

When the US Marines and soldiers embarked departing Guadalcanal, and the ships crews told them they were heroes back home it was a fact. The public had learned enough of the reality in the S Pac. however imperfectly that the men who fought there were understood to have been in a tough campaign. All this helped bring to general public to understanding it was going to be a long war, lasting through 1946 or beyond.
 
Given the destruction of the Japanese carrier air groups I'm guessing the likely worst case scenario is the Guadalcanal battle drags on longer, and both sides lose more men and other ships and aircraft before it sputters out & the Japanese evacuate. If the US cannot conduct any further offensive operations to isolate Rabaul, the CARTWHEEL operations, then the attrition of Japans naval and army air forces slows, and Japan is in a bit stronger position when the USN kicks off its Central Pacific offensive six to eight months later in the autumn of 1943. This means more US losses then, but the destruction of Japans naval and air strength picks up again as well, just a different location.

There have been other discussions on this subject. That is the resources used in the S Pac. 1943-44 used in the MTO/ETO instead. The general assumption is it means a somewhat more aggressive Allied activity in the Med or NW Europe in 1943 & later.
 

raharris1973

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There have been other discussions on this subject. That is the resources used in the S Pac. 1943-44 used in the MTO/ETO instead. The general assumption is it means a somewhat more aggressive Allied activity in the Med or NW Europe in 1943 & later.

Really? Recall any of the thread titles or OP's off the top of your head? It's a little bit of a niche subject so the search terms would not be super obvious.

---
Bringing things out to larger questions, there are many who subscribe to all the propositions I will state below, and even more who subscribe to some but not all of them.

1) The Mediterranean campaign was an indecisive sideshow. At best it inflicted some attrition on an enemy that could not afford it. Invasion of western Europe was the only decisive operation outside the Soviet front.

2) However, with any PoD from January 1942, the WAllies could not have successfully invaded Western Europe facing prohibitive casualties or being thrown off the continent, any year before 1944.

3) In the Pacific, the Southwest Pacific campaign that went from the Solomons to New Guinea and the PI was an indecisive sideshow. At best it attrited an enemy that could not afford the losses. The only decisive strategic direction was through the Central Pacific to the Marianas, Ryukyus & Japanese Home Islands.

4) However, with any PoD from January 1942, the US fleet buildup of both modern capital ships and the supporting fleet logistics train, could not have been available before late 1944, thus delaying any significant progress on the Central Pacific axis till 1944.

Accepting propositions 1 through 4 above (I would rather take them for granted in this here discussion rather than debate them), what would have been the most efficient use of U.S. resources and application of U.S. forces through all of 1942 and 1943 while waiting till 1944 for the build-ups of ships, shipping, landing craft, trained units, air superiority, etc., needed to make the invasions of France and Central Pacific advance possible?
 
[QUOTE="raharris1973]

3) In the Pacific, the Southwest Pacific campaign that went from the Solomons to New Guinea and the PI was an indecisive sideshow. At best it attrited an enemy that could not afford the losses. The only decisive strategic direction was through the Central Pacific to the Marianas, Ryukyus & Japanese Home Islands.[/QUOTE]

So you are saying that defending the SLOC to Australia and New Zealand was a side show to the war?
 

raharris1973

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[QUOTE="raharris1973]

3) In the Pacific, the Southwest Pacific campaign that went from the Solomons to New Guinea and the PI was an indecisive sideshow. At best it attrited an enemy that could not afford the losses. The only decisive strategic direction was through the Central Pacific to the Marianas, Ryukyus & Japanese Home Islands.

So you are saying that defending the SLOC to Australia and New Zealand was a side show to the war?[/QUOTE]

Nah, more that turning that defense around into a major offensive op was. Also, after Coral Sea and Midway, Japan could not do much against the Australian SLOC.
 
So you are saying that defending the SLOC to Australia and New Zealand was a side show to the war?

I read that as the Offensive undertaken 1943-44 was the "side show". I tend to agree, the 'short' LoC to Australia was secure by the end of 1942. Some residual operations in the Solomons & near Rabaul were necessary to consolidate the position in the SE Pacific region, but nothing on the scale of MacArthurs return to PI operations of the next two years.

Really? Recall any of the thread titles or OP's off the top of your head? It's a little bit of a niche subject so the search terms would not be super obvious.

...

I was under the impression you had participated in two of the here in the past two years. If I can find a hour or two to search I'd post links. I participated is similar discussions on Armchair General and Axis History Forum in the past six years. Probably Con Sim World too. The main point the conversations get stalled on is no one comes up with reliable numbers for where the Allied cargo shipping was during 1942-43. At least one expert joked that the Allies probably did not know where their ships were in any reliable fashion. Klein said something similar for 1942-43 in a large number of words in his examination of US industrial mobilization 'Freedoms Forge'.

Joking aside some rough calculations indicate the cargo shipping used to supply the S Pac offensives in 1943-44 (beyond what was needed for a holding action & diversions) could have supported a extra Allied Army in the MTO in 1943. I'd be pleased if someone could locate a decent analysis on this subject. Something that showed by calendar quarter what ships of what capacity delivered to what ports. As it is all I've been able to use are some very general statistics on gross deliveries to general locations. Trying to extrapolate alternate deliveries elsewhere with the ships is difficult.
 
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BlondieBC

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OTL Germany suffered two thirds of its 1943 air losses in the West, including the MTO. Adding in fifteen air groups is liable to accelerate those losses and run down the combat power of the German AF farther & sooner. What other strategic gains might come from this I can't say at the moment.

Probably gives Soviets parity/dominance over Luftwaffe 6 months early. Might have big impacts on battles like Kursk.
 

raharris1973

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poll attached

I codified all the operational possibilities I could think of, and fit.

Choices are unlimited, because most are not mutually exclusive.

If voting for high letters in the alphabet, options in the lower parts of the alphabet may apply.

A few choices are logically mutually exclusive, but I am relying on common sense to render poll responses have internally consistent logic.
 
Might. The withdrawal of 600+ interceptors from the east to Germany in the ,Autum of 1943. Was helpful for the Red Army.

Given Soviet records at the time, they probably would have rather the Germans withdraw more of their CAS assets. The Soviet autumn offensives outran their air cover and they had to cross the D’niepr in the face of repeated German airstrikes that went unopposed because of it. Though, conducting successful offensives under conditions of enemy air superiority was something the Soviets had been doing since Uranus, so they didn’t regard it as too serious an issue...
 
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raharris1973

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My newly introduced poll choices just dealt with an array of potentially positive consequences for the progress of the ETO. I'd also like to throw out there a range of potential Delaying effects on Pacific Theater of not reinforcing with the forces in question from mid-1942:
1) slows down Guadalcanal in late ’42,
2) slows down Guadalcanal but only in ’43,
3) Slows down New Guinea campaign,
4) Aborts New Guinea campaign, 5
) Weaker, slower SWPA efforts allows U-Go (NE India) or Ichigo to be much stronger
6) Pacific advance catches up to OTL by Jan 1945, & VJ Day situation matches OTL,
7) Delays in Pacific & speed-up in ETO means earlier USSR entry, expanded Soviet ops in all Korea & China,
8) Earlier Soviet ops = #7, plus Soviet Hokkaido,
9) Earlier Soviet ops = #8 plus Soviet penetration to northern Honshu.
 
The biggest beneficiary of this airpower was MacArthur - it was Army and therefore "he" controlled it if it was headed west. Most of these airgorups were not B-17s, to what extent would more fighters do in the ETO?
 
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