There have been other discussions on this subject. That is the resources used in the S Pac. 1943-44 used in the MTO/ETO instead. The general assumption is it means a somewhat more aggressive Allied activity in the Med or NW Europe in 1943 & later.
Really? Recall any of the thread titles or OP's off the top of your head? It's a little bit of a niche subject so the search terms would not be super obvious.
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Bringing things out to larger questions, there are many who subscribe to all the propositions I will state below, and even more who subscribe to some but not all of them.
1) The Mediterranean campaign was an indecisive sideshow. At best it inflicted some attrition on an enemy that could not afford it. Invasion of western Europe was the only decisive operation outside the Soviet front.
2) However, with any PoD from January 1942, the WAllies could not have successfully invaded Western Europe facing prohibitive casualties or being thrown off the continent, any year before 1944.
3) In the Pacific, the Southwest Pacific campaign that went from the Solomons to New Guinea and the PI was an indecisive sideshow. At best it attrited an enemy that could not afford the losses. The only decisive strategic direction was through the Central Pacific to the Marianas, Ryukyus & Japanese Home Islands.
4) However, with any PoD from January 1942, the US fleet buildup of both modern capital ships and the supporting fleet logistics train, could not have been available before late 1944, thus delaying any significant progress on the Central Pacific axis till 1944.
Accepting propositions 1 through 4 above (I would rather take them for granted in this here discussion rather than debate them), what would have been the most efficient use of U.S. resources and application of U.S. forces through all of 1942 and 1943 while waiting till 1944 for the build-ups of ships, shipping, landing craft, trained units, air superiority, etc., needed to make the invasions of France and Central Pacific advance possible?