What If: Stalin was sincere?

archaeogeek

Banned
'course, IIRC the OTL note suggested that Denazification would be stopped.
Heh, that would be an interesting turn of events - someone else than Adenauer is in power (maybe a SPD-FDP-possibly Zentrum [if we get clear information on how they were in '52] coalition led by a Schumacher that missed the concentration camps), the Note is considered seriously, a Four Power Conference is convened... and flops as the Soviet Union fails to provide terms acceptable to the West Germans or the Western Allies (in this matter, I expect the Wallies to listen careful to the FRG if they say no, though not necessarily if they say yes).

That was basically Adenauer's fear; gaining the east back = CDU/CSU isn't in a position to dominate anymore because of heavier SPD (and Zentrum) regions where the CDU can't hope significant gains: have a more organized "Anti-Adenauer" coalition and the main reason it flopped isn't there anymore, instead you end up with reunited germany and today's multiparty politics and both the KPD and CDU have to learn to play nicer earlier.
 
That was basically Adenauer's fear; gaining the east back = CDU/CSU isn't in a position to dominate anymore because of heavier SPD (and Zentrum) regions where the CDU can't hope significant gains: have a more organized "Anti-Adenauer" coalition and the main reason it flopped isn't there anymore, instead you end up with reunited germany and today's multiparty politics and both the KPD and CDU have to learn to play nicer earlier.
Well, not in the 'interesting turn of events' I mused about - the basic idea was that the CDU didn't dominate in '52 (for whatever reason), the Note is seriously considered due to that, but re-unification still fails, just at a later stage (of course, in another interpretation of Stalin's intentions, the Note would have been a no-go in the proposed scenario) - that negotiations start over a matter isn't the same as an agreement being reached, after all.
 

Susano

Banned
'course, IIRC the OTL note suggested that Denazification would be stopped.
Heh, that would be an interesting turn of events - someone else than Adenauer is in power (maybe a SPD-FDP-possibly Zentrum [if we get clear information on how they were in '52] coalition led by a Schumacher that missed the concentration camps), the Note is considered seriously, a Four Power Conference is convened... and flops as the Soviet Union fails to provide terms acceptable to the West Germans or the Western Allies (in this matter, I expect the Wallies to listen careful to the FRG if they say no, though not necessarily if they say yes).
Since the Americans were in theory ready to entertain the notion, what conditions would there be that they find inherently unacceptable? if Stalin suggests a neutral Germany, he wont suggest anything like Soviet troop stationing rights or so at the Conference, so in purely strategic terms I dont know what could be unacceptable to the Western Allies.

That was basically Adenauer's fear; gaining the east back = CDU/CSU isn't in a position to dominate anymore because of heavier SPD (and Zentrum) regions where the CDU can't hope significant gains: have a more organized "Anti-Adenauer" coalition and the main reason it flopped isn't there anymore, instead you end up with reunited germany and today's multiparty politics and both the KPD and CDU have to learn to play nicer earlier.

That might be part of it, but I think it was more. Even before the war Adenauer has said that Siberia begins beyond Magdeburg. And dont forget he entertained contact with the ridicolous Rhenish seperatists (all 3 of them...) during the French occupation of the Rhineland interbellum. Yes, publicalyl he advocated seceding Rhineland-Westhalia from Prussia, but I think he wouldnt have minded it being seperated from Germany, either. So I think he simply hated East Germany - so an independent Rhineland would be acceptable to him, as was an independent West Germany, basically an enlarged Rhineland. In short, I think the guy simply was an authoritarian jackarse and had some issues...
 
Since the Americans were in theory ready to entertain the notion, what conditions would there be that they find inherently unacceptable? if Stalin suggests a neutral Germany, he wont suggest anything like Soviet troop stationing rights or so at the Conference, so in purely strategic terms I dont know what could be unacceptable to the Western Allies.
Hm, possibly
(6) Civil and political rights equal to all other German citizens for participation in the building of peace-loving democratic Germany must be made available to all former members of the German army, including officers and generals, all former Nazis, excluding those who are serving court sentences for commission of crimes.
, although that may be more of an SPD issue, and maybe not even them - depends on how much importance is giving on continuing denazification, I guess. There is also the territorial part:
Territory
The territory of Germany is defined by the borders established by the provisions of the Potsdam Conference of the Great Powers.
Which, erm, was interpreted as 'Oder-Neisse' - though that could well be swallowed in the name of German unity, I guess. Why the West German opinion matters is that it is not in the interests of the Western Allies to enforce German unity and neutrality against the wishes of the FRG government, even if the reverse - enforcing non-unity against the FRG's wishes - could happen.
Apparently, for the Americans there is
The United States Government also observes that the Soviet Government now considers that the peace treaty should provide for the formation of German national land, air, and sea forces, while at the same time imposing limitations on Germany's freedom to enter into association with other countries. The United States Government considers that such provisions would be a step backwards and might jeopardize the emergency in Europe of a new era in which international relations would be based on cooperation and not on rivalry and distrust. Being convinced of the need of a policy of European unity, the United States Government is giving its full support to plans designed to secure the participation of Germany in a purely defensive European community which will preserve freedom, prevent aggression, and preclude the revival of militarism. The United States Government believes that the proposal of the Soviet Government for the formation of German national forces is inconsistent with the achievement of this objective. The United States Government remains convinced that this policy of European unity cannot threaten the interests of any country and represents the true path of peace.

All taken from http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org, which appears to be not entirely unreliable after a twenty-minute search.
 

Susano

Banned
The territory of Germany is defined by the borders established by the provisions of the Potsdam Conference of the Great Powers.
Which were provisional as there was no formal peace treaty, and as long as Stalins demand dont call for one, even an united Germany can do like the FRG did and mark down the silly pre-war borders on maps etc. :D

From a soviet point of view, demanding that Germany should have armed forces but not in military cooperation with others makes sense - no use in a buffer state (if that was Stalins intent) that can be just walked over.
 
Which were provisional as there was no formal peace treaty, and as long as Stalins demand dont call for one, even an united Germany can do like the FRG did and mark down the silly pre-war borders on maps etc. :D

From a soviet point of view, demanding that Germany should have armed forces but not in military cooperation with others makes sense - no use in a buffer state (if that was Stalins intent) that can be just walked over.
Well, if they are integrated into the formal peace treaty, they wouldn't be provisional anymore. That was the problem, really. Though it might well not be an important problem in the end.

And yes, but you asked for Western/American objections. That was an OTL official objection from the Americans.;)

I edited the above post to a bit more clear, though I'm not certain the edited version isn't the one you read.
 

Deleted member 1487

Did anyone really trust Germany to have an independent military only 7 years after the most destructive war in history that was started by Germany? Even without Prussia (assuming the Oder-Neisse line) Germany still represents a major economic power. France would be going nuts, Poland would be scared shitless, and I doubt most Soviet citizens would be particularly 'thrilled' with the recreation of an independent Germany.

While I'm sure most Germans would be overjoyed by independence (which I have a feeling would have tremendous strings attached), no one else would.
 

archaeogeek

Banned
Did anyone really trust Germany to have an independent military only 7 years after the most destructive war in history that was started by Germany? Even without Prussia (assuming the Oder-Neisse line) Germany still represents a major economic power. France would be going nuts, Poland would be scared shitless, and I doubt most Soviet citizens would be particularly 'thrilled' with the recreation of an independent Germany.

While I'm sure most Germans would be overjoyed by independence (which I have a feeling would have tremendous strings attached), no one else would.

Stalin supposedly did have some propaganda efforts during the second World War stating that the enemy of the Soviet Union was the nazi party, not the german people. Of course on the ground the reality probably seemed a bit different and the people who were massacred by the advancing Heer probably begged to differ.
 
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