What If Stalin Was More Prepared In 1941?

What if Stalin would have, for whatever reason, actually took the pre-Barbarossa warnings of an impending Nazi German invasion of the Soviet Union seriously and thus tried implementing whatever precautionary measures he could as fast as possible just in case these warnings of a pending invasion turned out to be accurate? How much less successful would Operation Barbarossa have been in such a scenario? (In real life, the Nazi German advance in 1941 stopped very close to Moscow; where exactly would the Nazi German advance in 1941 have stopped in this scenario?) In addition, how quicker would World War II have ended on the Eastern Front in this scenario, and how much less casualties and specifically deaths would the Soviet Union have endured during World War II in this scenario?

Any thoughts on this?

Also, Yes, if this isn't already clear enough here, Stalin still purges the Red Army in the 1930s in this scenario as much as he did in real life.
 

LordKalvert

Banned
How much notice does Stalin have?

72 hours could work wonders- spare parts used to bring equipment up to speed, canceling leaves, setting up defensive perimeters and falling back from exposed positions so the German strike falls on air.

A week, and the Soviets might even get in the first strike and totally throw the whole thing out of synch
 
How much notice does Stalin have?

72 hours could work wonders- spare parts used to bring equipment up to speed, canceling leaves, setting up defensive perimeters and falling back from exposed positions so the German strike falls on air.

A week, and the Soviets might even get in the first strike and totally throw the whole thing out of synch
I wasn't really talking about notice here as much as about Stalin simply being prepared months in advance for the possibility of an Axis invasion of the Soviet Union in the very near future.
 
Imo the short answer is the germans suffer much higher losses and advance much less in USSR, so then you have something like the OTL battles of Moscow and Stalingrad further west. So possibly you can have Berlin taken by the Red Army sometime in 1944.
 
Imo the short answer is the germans suffer much higher losses and advance much less in USSR, so then you have something like the OTL battles of Moscow and Stalingrad further west. So possibly you can have Berlin taken by the Red Army sometime in 1944.
All of this certainly makes sense! :) Also, though, would the Allied invasion of Italy and/or the D-Day/Dragoon invasions have occurred earlier in this TL than they did in our TL?
 

LordKalvert

Banned
I wasn't really talking about notice here as much as about Stalin simply being prepared months in advance for the possibility of an Axis invasion of the Soviet Union in the very near future.

Well, how much further in advance does Stalin start to prepare- a week would do wonders, months even more. Properly prepared, the German attack would have struck against air, with the Soviet equipment properly prepared and ready for combat, German losses in the opening days would have been huge
 
Well, how much further in advance does Stalin start to prepare- a week would do wonders, months even more. Properly prepared, the German attack would have struck against air, with the Soviet equipment properly prepared and ready for combat, German losses in the opening days would have been huge
At least a couple of months in advance, I suppose. :)
 

LordKalvert

Banned
At least a couple of months in advance, I suppose. :)

Then the Germans get a nasty, nasty surprise and suffer some pretty bad casualties, the Russians aren't pushed back anywhere near as far and the Soviets have a lot of punch in 42 and 43. Germans don't make it past 44
 
Then the Germans get a nasty, nasty surprise and suffer some pretty bad casualties, the Russians aren't pushed back anywhere near as far and the Soviets have a lot of punch in 42 and 43. Germans don't make it past 44
Do the Western Allies have enough time to both invade Italy and invade France in this TL, though?
 
A week, and the Soviets might even get in the first strike and totally throws the whole thing out of synch

While I agree with the rest of your post, I have to contradict you here. A major Soviet attack would make it extremely easy for the Germans to destroy the bulk of the best of the Red Army (because that's what the Soviets would have to send) in their own territory, while benefiting from the home ground advantage, and pressed up against their own lines of communication. This gives them a massive tactical and operational advantage, and when you consider that a German army strung out across Russia on bad roads and with failing logistics STILL managed to repeatedly maul the Red Army in 1941, well, in this case the result will be fantastically more lopsided. Seriously, Glantz pretty much wrote Stumbling Colossus to make it clear the result would not have been in doubt. The Germans would have won in one of the most lopsided victories in military history.

It would be much better for Stalin to use all that preparation time to get ready to receive the German attack rather then attempt to pre-empt it.
 
While I agree with the rest of your post, I have to contradict you here. A major Soviet attack would make it extremely easy for the Germans to destroy the bulk of the best of the Red Army (because that's what the Soviets would have to send) in their own territory, while benefiting from the home ground advantage, and pressed up against their own lines of communication. This gives them a massive tactical and operational advantage, and when you consider that a German army strung out across Russia on bad roads and with failing logistics STILL managed to repeatedly maul the Red Army in 1941, well, in this case the result will be fantastically more lopsided. Seriously, Glantz pretty much wrote Stumbling Colossus to make it clear the result would not have been in doubt. The Germans would have won in one of the most lopsided victories in military history.

OK.

It would be much better for Stalin to use all that preparation time to get ready to receive the German attack rather then attempt to pre-empt it.

How exactly would doing this play out, though? :)
 
How exactly would doing this play out, though? :)

It won't halt the Germans, but it will certainly take a whole bunch of wind out of their sails and allow the much more of the Red Army to avoid encirclement and withdraw in a more orderly fashion then IOTL. The Soviets would initially fall back to the Stalin line, then when that is breached the D'niepr. By the time the Germans reach the latter, they'll so exhausted that they won't be able to breach the defenses.
 

Deleted member 1487

It won't halt the Germans, but it will certainly take a whole bunch of wind out of their sails and allow the much more of the Red Army to avoid encirclement and withdraw in a more orderly fashion then IOTL. The Soviets would initially fall back to the Stalin line, then when that is breached the D'niepr. By the time the Germans reach the latter, they'll so exhausted that they won't be able to breach the defenses.
Except that wasn't the Soviet plan historically. DP41 was to hold ground and constantly attack, not retreat, which is why when they did mobilize they didn't retreat when prudent they constantly attacked to wear down the Axis and try and regain the initiative. Even in 1943 and on their policy wasn't strategic retreat it was holding ground until all the defenders were either dead or had beat off the attack. So what you're proposing is an a-historical wargame strategy that was not on Stalin's or STAVKA's mind at the time. Sure it would have been the far wiser strategy, but it was not the historical one that the Soviet military leadership (especially Stalin) pursued even later during the war.
 
Except that wasn't the Soviet plan historically. DP41 was to hold ground and constantly attack, not retreat, which is why when they did mobilize they didn't retreat when prudent they constantly attacked to wear down the Axis and try and regain the initiative. So what you're proposing is an a-historical wargame strategy that was not on Stalin's or STAVKA's mind at the time. Sure it would have been the far wiser strategy, but it was not the historical one that the Soviet military leadership (especially Stalin) pursued even later during the war.

DP-41 was based on the assumption that war would not come until 1942 and thus was predicated on the Red Army of ITTL 1942 being available to implement it. When war unexpectedly came in 1941, they attempted to implement DP-41 because there was no other plan. If the Soviets accept that the Germans are going to hit them in mid-1941 well ahead of time, their going to ditch DP-41. And the Soviets did conduct retreats in Ukraine, where their better preparations slowed the Germans enough for them to recognize what was going on, ditch DP-41, and implement the relevant withdrawals.
 

Deleted member 1487

DP-41 was based on the assumption that war would not come until 1942 and thus was predicated on the Red Army of ITTL 1942 being available to implement it. When war unexpectedly came in 1941, they attempted to implement DP-41 because there was no other plan. If the Soviets accept that the Germans are going to hit them in mid-1941 well ahead of time, their going to ditch DP-41. And the Soviets did conduct retreats in Ukraine, where their better preparations slowed the Germans enough for them to recognize what was going on, ditch DP-41, and implement the relevant withdrawals.
Nevertheless come 1942 the general strategy didn't change, they stood their ground by Stalin's order or ran away despite of it. There was no authorized withdrawals. If DP-41 was really meant for 1942, why wasn't it called DP-42? It was meant for 1941 regardless of your pet theory. I've yet to see anything in the historiography that supports what you are writing, it was meant for 1941 and a revised 1942 plan would be DP-42 based on changes in the previous year. What you are asserting about a hypothetical Soviet plans does not come from anything written in history, its only the product of your wishful thinking and ignoring how the Soviets reacted IOTL and how they thought about war given lack of combat experience going into 1941. DP-41 was the product of their understanding of warfare after the French campaign, not what you propose as a more ideal version. I agree your plan is better than what they opted for IOTL, but the OTL plan was what they planned to do if they had to fight before they were ready in 1942. They would never be ready to fight in 1941 based on Stalin's demands, which weren't going to be altered even if he thought the Germans were coming for sure. IOTL he wasn't really sure that the Germans weren't coming (in his mind) until the supposed May 15th invasion date never came. After that he dismissed the prospect of invasion because the intelligence claiming that was D-day didn't come true. So until then he was thinking that an invasion was possible in 1941, yet they came up with DP41 before that.
 
Nevertheless come 1942 the general strategy didn't change, they stood their ground by Stalin's order or ran away despite of it. There was no authorized withdrawals.

By that point the Germans had advanced clean into the Soviet interior and Stalin felt that the USSR could not afford to give up much more ground. He was okay with the Southwestern and Southern Fronts withdrawing from Western Ukraine, where there wasn't much of value.

If DP-41 was really meant for 1942, why wasn't it called DP-42?
Because it was drafted in 1941. It's drafting technically wasn't even completed when the war came in June 1941. I suppose we should take the fact that Wacht am Rhein to mean that it had something to do with the Rhine rather then an offensive scheme for an advance through the Ardennes?

I've yet to see anything in the historiography that supports what you are writing, it was meant for 1941 and a revised 1942 plan would be DP-42 based on changes in the previous year.
Then you are obviously blind. David Glantz, Chris Bellamy, and Stephen G. Fritz, to name just a few, are all explicit in their statement that Soviet planning was done based on the assumption that there would be no war in 1941. You just want to deny that so as to deny the Soviets alternatives.
 

Deleted member 1487

Then you are obviously blind. David Glantz, Chris Bellamy, and Stephen G. Fritz, to name just a few, are all explicit in their statement that Soviet planning was done based on the assumption that there would be no war in 1941. You just want to deny that so as to deny the Soviets alternatives.
Go ahead and post quotes. Beyond that none of them support your claim that Stalin would have adopted a completely different strategy had he known war was coming in 1941.
 
Go ahead and post quotes. Beyond that none of them support your claim that Stalin would have adopted a completely different strategy had he known war was coming in 1941.

Should I also note the hypocrisy here when you repeatedly have the Germans adopt completely different approaches for even less (that is, no) reason?
 
Last edited:

Deleted member 1487

Should I also note the hypocrisy here when you repeatedly have the Germans adopt completely different approaches for even less (that is, no) reason?
Only if you admit hypocrisy for calling me out on pursuing those PODs then responding with them when it comes to Soviet strategy. At least I'm doing it as part of a POD, not as an answer to a question about what the Soviets would have realistically done. You're proposing an ahistorical solution to a question, not starting a thread with that as a POD. I'd have a lot less of an issue if you started a thread and said "hey what if the Soviets did this ahistorical thing" to see how that would play out rather than proposing an ahistorical answer to a question about how the Soviets would realistically act if they knew an attack was coming.

Plus DP41 was drafted before Soviet intelligence had really been able to provide concrete warnings about German intentions in 1941. Drafting began before German mobilization could be properly identified in 1941. A serious problem for your saying that the DP41 plan being changed is when is Stalin accepting invasion intelligence and why? IOTL it took until Spring to make a case and the May 15th date issue convinced Stalin that the intelligence was bunk.

For the OP, when is Soviet intelligence able to convince Stalin? It certainly wouldn't be until Spring at the earliest and then the Balkan campaign concealed those efforts IOTL along with the original date of May 15th identified as the start of the invasion coming and going without incident. Why is that not discrediting invasion intelligence ITTL?
 
Top