What if Stalin ordered a dash to Salonica in Sept 1944?

raharris1973

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What if Stalin decides he wanted Soviet influence over at least northern Greece and ordered some units of his forces taking the surrender of the Bulgarians in Sept 1944 to drive into Greek Thrace and Macedonia ahead of the British?

Would I be correct in assuming that for logistic reasons he could not hope to beat the British to Athens, Piraeus, the Peloponnesus or any islands?

Obviously if Stalin is doing this he is going to be demanding more than the 10% share of influence in Greece that Churchill offered him on a napkin in October 1944.

Assuming Stalin supports Communist-led political control of northern Greek cities and regions and regularization of Greek Communist guerillas without formally calling for a partition or total exclusion of British influence, what kind of price will Stalin pay for this in terms of relations with FDR and Churchill?
 
1) Probably yes; the Soviets don't have their own naval presence in the Med. or Aegean and the road network through the northern moutains is terrible, which means they can't hope to supply a large, fast attack down into the Greek core regions. And if Churchill has any intention of argueing the nation should be under British influence despite Red presence on the ground any sign the Soviets were preparing for a major offensive down into the region would result in a rush to get WAllied troops into as much of Greece as possible in order for Britain to have leverage for the final negotiations scheduled for February.

2) Well, you likely see both taking a stronger interest in aligning Turkey and supporting her interests in the Balkans as the only viable counter-weight to Communist influence in the southern Balkans post-war and who's control of the Straits would keep Stalin from efficent (either explicently or covertly) supplying those guerillas on a large scale in regions under British military control during the war or within her/the 1st world's sphere of influence post-war. You're also likely to see a firmer stance taken at Yalta on the matter of Austria; I can see Churchill at least insisting the nation be aligned to the West,,
 
1) Probably yes; the Soviets don't have their own naval presence in the Med. or Aegean and the road network through the northern moutains is terrible, which means they can't hope to supply a large, fast attack down into the Greek core regions.

What was the status of German forces in the region? The impression I generally have is that after Romania and Bulgaria capitulated and the Soviets started moving into Yugoslavia and Hungary, German forces in Greece booked it north as fast as they could. If there aren't any Germans left, an armored dash down the mountain roads with some tank brigades and a few supporting rifle divisions is entirely feasible. Difficult terrain, bad roads, and the associated logistical hiccups that entails only really matter if there's an enemy to seriously oppose you, as the Soviets themselves would demonstrate several times throughout the war...
 
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What if Stalin decides he wanted Soviet influence over at least northern Greece and ordered some units of his forces taking the surrender of the Bulgarians in Sept 1944 to drive into Greek Thrace and Macedonia ahead of the British?

Would I be correct in assuming that for logistic reasons he could not hope to beat the British to Athens, Piraeus, the Peloponnesus or any islands?

Obviously if Stalin is doing this he is going to be demanding more than the 10% share of influence in Greece that Churchill offered him on a napkin in October 1944.

Assuming Stalin supports Communist-led political control of northern Greek cities and regions and regularization of Greek Communist guerillas without formally calling for a partition or total exclusion of British influence, what kind of price will Stalin pay for this in terms of relations with FDR and Churchill?

Just violated the percentages agreement. The West and particularly Churchill are not going to be amused. That said Tolbukhin''s troops are moving into territory already liberated by ELAS Macedonian Group of Divisions under general Euripides Bakirtzis and (a much smaller part) Antonis Fosteridis EOA (national guerrilla groups ) so the act is clearly political. Same thing further south actually, when the British landed the place was already in control by the resistance.

So the question is whether Soviet entry in Greek Macedonia with the explicit goal of backing ELAS leads to an Immediate breakdown of the Kazerta agreement and civil war. The likely answer is yes. In which case the British do not have where to land, ELAS controlled for the most part southern Greece with the part exception of Athens where the Nationalist organisations had significant numbers but hardly sufficient to survive all out fighting. The British probably have to help evaquations of the anti -ELAS factions from the mainland and Greece is split in two between a people's Republic in the mainland and a "Hellenic Republic" ruling from Crete, Crete itself, the Ionian islands and most of the Aegean islands. Why republic? The territory of the Western aligned state is dominated by Venizelist republicans. So are the most militant elements immediately evaluated of the 1944 civil war.
 
Just violated the percentages agreement. The West and particularly Churchill are not going to be amused. That said Tolbukhin''s troops are moving into territory already liberated by ELAS Macedonian Group of Divisions under general Euripides Bakirtzis and (a much smaller part) Antonis Fosteridis EOA (national guerrilla groups ) so the act is clearly political. Same thing further south actually, when the British landed the place was already in control by the resistance.

So the question is whether Soviet entry in Greek Macedonia with the explicit goal of backing ELAS leads to an Immediate breakdown of the Kazerta agreement and civil war. The likely answer is yes. In which case the British do not have where to land, ELAS controlled for the most part southern Greece with the part exception of Athens where the Nationalist organisations had significant numbers but hardly sufficient to survive all out fighting. The British probably have to help evaquations of the anti -ELAS factions from the mainland and Greece is split in two between a people's Republic in the mainland and a "Hellenic Republic" ruling from Crete, Crete itself, the Ionian islands and most of the Aegean islands. Why republic? The territory of the Western aligned state is dominated by Venizelist republicans. So are the most militant elements immediately evaluated of the 1944 civil war.

What exactly is stopping Britain from carrying out a landing, even an opposed landing, in Athens ?
 
The Americans liberated part of Tsjechoslowakia in 1945, but retreated afterwards. In the end diplomacy was decisive for the outcome. Here it will be the same. The different situation on the ground can change the negotiations. In my head I see a 'cool' division as in Korea, maybe in the form of a parallel line just to the north of Thermopylae.
 
Just violated the percentages agreement. The West and particularly Churchill are not going to be amused. That said Tolbukhin''s troops are moving into territory already liberated by ELAS Macedonian Group of Divisions under general Euripides Bakirtzis and (a much smaller part) Antonis Fosteridis EOA (national guerrilla groups ) so the act is clearly political. Same thing further south actually, when the British landed the place was already in control by the resistance.

So the question is whether Soviet entry in Greek Macedonia with the explicit goal of backing ELAS leads to an Immediate breakdown of the Kazerta agreement and civil war. The likely answer is yes. In which case the British do not have where to land, ELAS controlled for the most part southern Greece with the part exception of Athens where the Nationalist organisations had significant numbers but hardly sufficient to survive all out fighting. The British probably have to help evaquations of the anti -ELAS factions from the mainland and Greece is split in two between a people's Republic in the mainland and a "Hellenic Republic" ruling from Crete, Crete itself, the Ionian islands and most of the Aegean islands. Why republic? The territory of the Western aligned state is dominated by Venizelist republicans. So are the most militant elements immediately evaluated of the 1944 civil war.

Well, the OP only says September and the Kazerta Agreement was only finalized later in the month. That leaves a tiny window during the Soviets to make the required move, possibly as a show of force that's used more as a negotiating tactic to squeeze better terms out of the British and their local Greek allies (Wanting something on the Straits issue? I imagine the issue would then have to be hammered out at Yalta.
 
What exactly is stopping Britain from carrying out a landing, even an opposed landing, in Athens ?

That it's an opposed landing, the war is still going on and the initial forces earmarked for Greece were limited in the extreme? In OTL the battle of Athens caused a shitstorm in the house of commons and wasn't received all that well by the US public as well. How much worse is it if Britain is seen as trying to land by force in an already liberated country where it's being told "it's not necessary", while the war still goes on?
 
There is only so far Stalin can go in violating agreements while the war is still going on. The UK/US could turn blind eyes only so much, of course once the war was over what Stalin did in Eastern Europe 1945-47 more or less had to be accepted as facts on the ground. If Stalin breaches agreements then the US/UK can decide to advance as far east in Germany as they want, and the Elbe line is not restored. Likewise, Czechoslovakia can see more US occupation, and US forces only leave if Soviet forces do, changing the dynamics postwar. In fall 1944 the USSR still was highly dependent in certain areas on LL, the liberated areas of the USSR freed in basically produced no crops so food from the USA was very important. If Stalin is seen to be reneging on agreements at this stage, LL can be scaled back or even stopped.

Whether or not the Soviets could take Salonika/Western Thrace not sure, however doing so risks gains in more important places and Stalin is unlikely to risk that.
 

raharris1973

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There is only so far Stalin can go in violating agreements while the war is still going on.

Just violated the percentages agreement.

Thing is, this is before the percentages agreement, Churchill wrote his "naughty document" down only in October 1944.

Earlier in the war, like 41 or 42, when the Russians were pushed much further back there might have been some undertakings between Molotov and Eden that implied Greece would be more in the British sphere. But Russia had made no undertakings with the Americans on the subject yet.

The Soviets can say with regard to Salonika, they were "in the neighborhood" anyway, didn't use too many forces and kept killing Germans across half the continent. The Americans found Britain's move suspect because they were probably thinking, "if you have any troops available, you should be using them alongside us in France, the Low Countries and Italy where we are losing people fighting the Germans." Heck, it sounds like Laborites in the House of Commons thought the same thing at the time as well.

Does it do anything more than *miff* the Americans the way Churchill's moves in Greece did? The Americans bellyached and complained, but did not begin to act any differently towards the British. Are the Americans going to adopt a less casualty-averse, more territorially hungry, policy in Central Europe over the comparatively small Soviet diversion into Greece? If the British *want* to act differently and stick it to the Soviets on their own, what can they do? Was any of the the Lend-Lease going to Russia still British-sourced at this time? Maybe they could fiddle with that.
 
Stalin would probably do what he did in Manchuria stay long enough to leave a poison chalice to the Western Allies and withdraw when the protests became to loud like in Manchuria and Iran
 
Does it do anything more than *miff* the Americans the way Churchill's moves in Greece did? The Americans bellyached and complained, but did not begin to act any differently towards the British. Are the Americans going to adopt a less casualty-averse, more territorially hungry, policy in Central Europe over the comparatively small Soviet diversion into Greece? If the British *want* to act differently and stick it to the Soviets on their own, what can they do? Was any of the the Lend-Lease going to Russia still British-sourced at this time? Maybe they could fiddle with that.

Did a draft of the agreement already exist? Perhaps, perhaps not. What IS certain is that Tolbbukhin's troops stopped right at the Greek border in OTL and that was not for military reasons. Either way the end result is still that the Soviets have sparked and supported an ELAS coup leading to a takeover of the Greek mainland by the communists. I don't quite see Churchill actig in future dealings with Stlin as if it didn't happened.
 

raharris1973

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Did a draft of the agreement already exist? Perhaps, perhaps not. What IS certain is that Tolbbukhin's troops stopped right at the Greek border in OTL and that was not for military reasons. Either way the end result is still that the Soviets have sparked and supported an ELAS coup leading to a takeover of the Greek mainland by the communists. I don't quite see Churchill actig in future dealings with Stlin as if it didn't happened.

Yes, certainly a fair enough conclusion.
 
What was the status of German forces in the region? The impression I generally have is that after Romania and Bulgaria capitulated and the Soviets started moving into Yugoslavia and Hungary, German forces in Greece booked it north as fast as they could. If there aren't any Germans left, an armored dash down the mountain roads with some tank brigades and a few supporting rifle divisions is entirely feasible. Difficult terrain, bad roads, and the associated logistical hiccups that entails only really matter if there's an enemy to seriously oppose you, as the Soviets themselves would demonstrate several times throughout the war...

They Germans were already on the run. They had been drawing down for some time. What remained were some few combat units that were near ready to leave or could not evacuate, some in Crete, and the Greek Facist battalions. The latter were to lightly armed and lacked any HQ/commanders above battalion. Those deserted en mass when the Germans fled. Some reduced groups fought the Communists.
 
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