What if Stalin had not been greedy in 1939?

Jukra, except Finland's regular army in 1939 was @33,000 men. That there was a large and effective reservist system doesn't change that the regular army was half of Sweden's.

Artillery, particularly of the anti-tank variety was very limited, although they may have had adequate ammunition for what little existed, hence the invention of the Molotov Cocktail, while the air force had perhaps 100 obsolete planes and armor effectively non-existant.

Pointing out that the less threatened(or so they thought) Norway and Denmark had even smaller armed forces isn't that valid.
 
Jukra, except Finland's regular army in 1939 was @33,000 men. That there was a large and effective reservist system doesn't change that the regular army was half of Sweden's.

Swedish Army "regulars" were conscripts serving their 6 month national service. In Norway the length of national service varied between 70-90 days (IIRC). In Finland the time was 1-1 1/2 years with additional refresher training and popular volunteer defense organization. While the forces mobilized were not spectacularly trained by late war standards in September 1939, as a whole, they were among the better trained military forces on the planet. In many other countries with longer conscript service time, such as France and Soviet Union, the time was simply not utilized as effectively while German armed forces were in midst of radical expansion.

Pointing out that the less threatened(or so they thought) Norway and Denmark had even smaller armed forces isn't that valid.

We might take the example of Netherlands, then, which had much less prepared air and ground defenses in May 1940 than Finland in September 1939, even though the country had about same GDP per capita, twice the population and eight months to prepare. It might be roughly paraphrased that in the interbellum period there were two democratic countries which took defense seriously and those were Finland and Belgium.

Larger countries, such as France, Britain, Germany and Soviet Union in 1939 did not have to mobilize as large portion of their population like Finland and thus had more lavishly equipped (and, as proportion to population, smaller) forces available. They had also domestic aircraft production which enabled the said countries in 1939 (bar Soviet Union) to have latest generation of fighters available, while small countries like Finland and the Netherlands had to rely on older generation planes.

Of course one may take a WI on whether it would had been better for Finnish Armed Forces to equip smaller but better equipped force for the Winter War, but that's entirely different question.
 

Old Airman

Banned
Had there been no 'Winter War' against Finland how certain is it that Finland would have remained neutral (if not actively anti Nazi)
I would say, less than 50%. DrakonFin has many valid points here. I'd like to add, however, that Finland's ruling regime owes it's existence to German military invasion, the country had been pathologically anti-Soviet in interbellum (think Castro's anti-americanism plus direct support of militancy on the big neighbour's territory) and Finland is ideally placed strategically to screw Leningrad (and big chunk of Soviet industry with that). Push for Finns to join the Axis would be great. However, Turkey didn't give up to similar push IOTL, so OTL development (Finland joining Axis in all but formal signature) is not a foregone conclusion.
How much difference would it have made to Barborossa if Hitler had started from the old Eastern Polish border?
A lot. Again, I'm not saying that it would ultimately change the outcome, but it took Germans at least a week to go from the new border to old one. And "Stalin Line" would not change a thing to Soviet advantage. It had been built as a chain of brigade-sized strongpoints to protect narrow defiles between Belarussian swamps. Guess what? 1941 was the driest summer of 1900-1950 period. Swampt dried up and Panzers just went around the strongpoints.
If the only example of the Red Army in action available to Hitler is the beating Japan suffered in 1938 might plans have been delayed?
Doubt it. IOTL Nomonhan just went under the Hitler's radar, although the battle and accompanying logistical challenges were much more impressive than Winter War (which also ended in Soviet tanks standing at the end of unprotected highway with Finnish capital on the other end of said highway; the fact that Soviets resolutely smashed the Finns in the end escaped Hitler completely).
As people have said some of the flaws in the Red army may not be detected without the winter war.
Nomonhan did a lot to reveal those flaws too (and this fact didn't escape Soviet leadership). Actually, a lot of changes within Red Army, usually attributed to lessons of Winter War, had been initiated in Autumn 1939 (i.e. before the Winter War, but after the Nomonhan). I would say that without the Winter War changes would be somewhat slower, but they would be there nonetheless. In fact, Red Army might not be in such state of disarray due, in part, to hurried reforms, as it was IOTL in June 1941.
What would have happened to the Baltic states had they not been occupied 1939-40?
They would be taken by Nazi
Assuming this stuff does not FUNDAMENTALLY alter the outcome of WW2 does it prevent the Cold war?
Nope. By 1945 Allies recognized the Curzon Line border, and Baltics are too small to ignite a world war. Polish issue was Stalin's refusal to allow free elections there.
 
I would say, less than 50%. DrakonFin has many valid points here. I'd like to add, however, that Finland's ruling regime owes it's existence to German military invasion,

Finnish ruling regime in 1939 owed it's existence to Finnish voters. The main parties sharing cabinet responsibility were Social Democrats (which had started the Civil War rebellion in 1918) and Agrarian party (which had large support base among those who fought for the Reds during the Civil War).

But OTOG, the current German ruling regime owes it's existence on American invasion :)
 
As a rough summary, Finnish defence prospects were bound to improve radically towards summer of 1940 even if Norway was attacked by Germany as in OTL due to armament deliveries (both bought and domestic) coming online. They would steadily decrease as both Germany and Soviet Union were in process of acquiring more modern weaponry and doctrine but the moment of diminishing defense prospects would come perhaps by 1942. If Norway was not attacked, a sustainable transshipment trade might be developed by 1940-1941 dramatically changing Finnish economic prospects as both exports and imports to Western states could be kept at fairly high level.

Oh, I would not dispute that Finland was in a better position for war, militarily, than Sweden, Norway and Denmark were. It would be wrong to say that Finland was neglecting defense in the 30s, in comparison to our Western neighbours (or many other Europan nations). What I am talking about, mostly, is the actual transition into a war-time economy, both de jure and de facto. What kind of a threat would be enough to push the country over the edge into militarizing the economic life like the events of the latter part of 1939 did IOTL? The problem with Cajander, for example, was not that he was unwilling to bolster defense (which he wasn't), but rather that he assumed there was plenty of time to do it. I would not want to underestimate the power of a (relative) calm in the Baltic area and the politicians' ability for self-deception and wishful thinking.

If YH and the Winter War don't happen on schedule and Finland stays on peace-time footing well into 1940, many things that would prepare the country for a possible blockade by Germany (or both Germany and the USSR) might happen later than would be healthy for Finland. You can say that Germany won't invade Norway, fine. It would make the Finnish position so much easier. But if a *Weserübung takes place, Finland ITTL might be in a spot of trouble beginning in 1940 if Germany blocks both the Baltic and the Norwegian ports, puts pressure on Sweden and the whole Petsamo route is still in a pre-war condition.


Old Airman said:
DrakonFin has many valid points here. I'd like to add, however, that Finland's ruling regime owes it's existence to German military invasion, the country had been pathologically anti-Soviet in interbellum (think Castro's anti-americanism plus direct support of militancy on the big neighbour's territory) and Finland is ideally placed strategically to screw Leningrad (and big chunk of Soviet industry with that). Push for Finns to join the Axis would be great. However, Turkey didn't give up to similar push IOTL, so OTL development (Finland joining Axis in all but formal signature) is not a foregone conclusion.

While I'd like to thank you for your kind words, I'd also like to point out what you call Finland's "ruling regime" was in fact the most functional parliamentary democracy among the countries who gained independence in Eastern and Central Europe post-WWI. By 1939, the republic was well-accepted by virtually everybody, only discounting a small fringe in the both extremes. It most definitely did not owe its existence to Germans. (Though, as I like to say, the German intervention in 1918 probably made a big contribution towards creating a stable democracy in Finland. Without it, ceteris paribus, we might have seen a more rightist, even dystopically so, Finland in the interbellum).

As to Finland being pathologically anti-Soviet: even if somewhat true for a part of the population, it did not mean that Finland was pro-Nazi. Remove the Winter War, and you make Finland allying with Germany that much harder. Mannerheim et al. did not want to mess with Leningrad even IOTL and the Continuation War was less than loved among your average Finnish soldier: I think in a No-Winter War scenario, big parts of the Finnish army would be close to open rebellion if forced to cross the 1920 border and invade the USSR. ITTL, a possible German-aligned Finland would be a very unwilling partner.
 

Old Airman

Banned
While I'd like to thank you for your kind words, I'd also like to point out what you call Finland's "ruling regime" was in fact the most functional parliamentary democracy among the countries who gained independence in Eastern and Central Europe post-WWI.
OK, let me list which has similar claim among it's official history: Finland, Czechoslovakia, Poland. And it does not change basic facts of life: everybody who was anybody in Finland knew that without German intervention it wouldn't be the way it was (was it good or bad is irrelevant in this case). Army from mid-level up was staffed (should I say stuffed) with officers who were fighting WWI on German side against Russia. Would you claim that such a country didn't have a very strong pro-German and anti-Soviet pull, you would lose my trust.

As to Finland being pathologically anti-Soviet: even if somewhat true for a part of the population, it did not mean that Finland was pro-Nazi.
Forgive me, but I don't think a lot of peoples in the region thought in terms of "Pro-German versus Pro-Nazi versus Anti-Soviet" those days. If you were anti-Soviet, it didn't take long to sign you up for Anti-Bolshevist crusade, as numerous volunteer Waffen SS units proved (most of rank and file, I believe, weren't Nazi; just rabid anti-communists).

Remove the Winter War, and you make Finland allying with Germany that much harder.
This is exactly what I said.

Mannerheim et al. did not want to mess with Leningrad even IOTL
I remember thread not a month ago where either you or Jukra said that Finns didn't try to enter Leningrad street fighting due to lack of ways (manpower, equipment, supplies), not due to a lack of will.

Continuation War was less than loved among your average Finnish soldier
OK, could you show me a war an average grunt loves? May be initial stages of German invasion of Poland, but even Poles proved to be a tougher adversary than Germans expected.
 
Would you claim that such a country didn't have a very strong pro-German and anti-Soviet pull, you would lose my trust.

You left out some significant pro-German forces. Among the most pro-German politicians in Finland were Social Democrats, who were strongly influenced by Erfurt program , in fact so much that they had adopted it almost completely. Pro-German forces were also strong in culture, displayed by support for such refugees as Bertolt Brecht. Then again, if you meant to write pro-Hitler your list might be very much shorter...
 

Old Airman

Banned
Pro-German forces were also strong in culture, displayed by support for such refugees as Bertolt Brecht.
If you want to compare number of peoples saved from Finnish WWII, Stalin makes oh-so-democratic Finns look like a bunch of Hitler's best friends (after all, Goering saved Milch, didn't he? By your logic, it makes him lily-white).
 
OK, let me list which has similar claim among it's official history: Finland, Czechoslovakia, Poland. And it does not change basic facts of life: everybody who was anybody in Finland knew that without German intervention it wouldn't be the way it was (was it good or bad is irrelevant in this case). Army from mid-level up was staffed (should I say stuffed) with officers who were fighting WWI on German side against Russia. Would you claim that such a country didn't have a very strong pro-German and anti-Soviet pull, you would lose my trust.

I did not put the point about the republic in merely as a boast, as also as an important aspect to understand about Finland in 1939. While a big part of the officer corps and political elite were pro-German, that is only one side of the issue. Like Jukra already pointed out, Finland also had a very strong moderate left: in the '39 elections the SDP got almost 40% of the popular vote and was far and above the biggest single party in parliament. In comparison, the radical nationalists, IKL, polled under 7%.

The Cajander government was the first incarnation of the "Red Earth Coalition", the strategic alliance of the SDP and the centrist Agrarians, a middle-of-the-road setup that was used both before and after the war to marginalize the extreme left and right. And quite successfully so. [As a side note, the government originally included, frex, people like Foreign Minister Holsti, who actually became a subject of controversy after mouthing off against the Nazis in a diplomatic shindig (I believe the legend goes he called Hitler a "mad dog")].

What this boils down to, well, is that the strongly German-influenced officer corps, the Civil Guards leaders or conservative, pro-German politicians were not the only power brokers in 1939 Finland. The left, for the most part, had been successfully rehabilitated and readmitted into the political system since 1918. Even the right was divided internally into Germanophiles, Anglophiles and other groups besides. Famously, two of the war-time political heavies, Mannerheim and Ryti, favoured Britain and France over Germany. While anti-Bolshevik sentiments were strong, the political reality in Finland also included very strong counter-forces to a crusading "White" agenda. See, for example, the inept "Mäntsälä revolt" for a confirmation of the strength of the moderate forces.

Forgive me, but I don't think a lot of peoples in the region thought in terms of "Pro-German versus Pro-Nazi versus Anti-Soviet" those days. If you were anti-Soviet, it didn't take long to sign you up for Anti-Bolshevist crusade, as numerous volunteer Waffen SS units proved (most of rank and file, I believe, weren't Nazi; just rabid anti-communists).

Anti-Communism and signing up for a crusade were still often two different things. Just last weekend, the Helsingin Sanomat ran a story about a former Finnish officer who worked for the Non-Intervention Committee in Spain during the Civil War, inspecting ships for smuggled weapons. The man was -and is- a staunch anti-Communist, but he searched all ships as rigorously as he could (with limited means) whether they were bound for Nationalist or Republican ports: despite his sentiments, that was the job he was paid to do. Reading that, I thought that was a quite Finnish way to look at it. Extinguishing Bolshevism in Russia was not the job for Finland, not in 1939, and it this was quite well understood here. Extinguishing the revolutionary left in Finland itself was a whole another thing.


I remember thread not a month ago where either you or Jukra said that Finns didn't try to enter Leningrad street fighting due to lack of ways (manpower, equipment, supplies), not due to a lack of will.

While I would concur with Jukra's assessment that the offensive force of the Finnish army was spent after the attack phase of 1941 was over, I myself would say that Leningrad simply was not a target for Finnish military planners in the 30s and 40s. The question was both political and economic: it is quite well documented that Mannerheim and the political leadership thought taking the city would rather hurt than help Finnish war aims. One thing was the possibility of the USSR rebounding and taking its revenge on Finland; another the fact that Finland would in no way be able to feed the population of a conquered Leningrad. Small nations, with the resources of small nations (and a more or less sane leadership), tend to have war aims most well fitting to their actual capabilities.

OK, could you show me a war an average grunt loves? May be initial stages of German invasion of Poland, but even Poles proved to be a tougher adversary than Germans expected.

Your average Finnish soldier did not love the Winter War, but responded to the situation with grim determination. In 1941, however, several units mutinied against their officers and refused to cross the 1920 border because they did not see this as a just war. Without the morally and politically devastating loss of Karelia, the morale and battle readiness of the Finnish army (and the civilian population) would be very low if a invasion of the USSR was ordered. Protests would be commonplace. The military leadership might have to resort to draconian measures, and that could in turn lead to all sorts of nastiness.
 

Old Airman

Banned
the strongly German-influenced officer corps, the Civil Guards leaders or conservative, pro-German politicians were not the only power brokers in 1939 Finland
So you're telling that Finns have dubious distinction of being the single Nazi's ally who democratically chose to participate in war crimes (Leningrad siege). OK, I dunno enough about Finnish interbellum policy to challenge this view.
In 1941, however, several units mutinied against their officers and refused to cross the 1920 border because they did not see this as a just war.
In several months I'm following this site (with or without registration) yours (and Jukra's) statements slowly but surely mutated from "Finns grumbled about crossing the 1920 border" to "Finns mutinied". Unless you provide an example of mutiny, I would consider it myth-making in progress, sorry.
 
So you're telling that Finns have dubious distinction of being the single Nazi's ally who democratically chose to participate in war crimes (Leningrad siege). OK, I dunno enough about Finnish interbellum policy to challenge this view.

You have also to remember the difference between a democratic nation at peace and the same nation after militarization and mobilization (of both the army and the civilian society) has taken place. Many things that did not, would not fly in pre-1939 Finland were possible in the nation Finland had become in '40-'41. This is pretty much one of the points I have been trying to make in this thread. I'd argue that together the shock of the Winter War, a continuing state of national emergency during 1940 and the awakening and growth of the Finnish "military-industrial complex" (such as it was) created the immediate conditions for Finland joining Barbarossa. Together, of course, with both Soviet and German activity in the Baltic area.

After the Winter War prompted the gearing of Finland for something very much like total war, a lot of power shifted from the civilians and the parliament to the military and a small political elite.The beginning of the Continuation War, you see, was not decided by the parliament: the decision to join the war was made by the inner circle of the "war cabinet" and brought to to parliament as a fait accompli. This would not have been possible in a peace-time Finland.



In several months I'm following this site (with or without registration) yours (and Jukra's) statements slowly but surely mutated from "Finns grumbled about crossing the 1920 border" to "Finns mutinied". Unless you provide an example of mutiny, I would consider it myth-making in progress, sorry.

According to military historian Harri Heinilä, approx. 2000 to 2500 Finnish soldiers refused to cross the old border. Mass refusals occurred in one half of the infantry regiments on the isthmus front. Most of the men were talked by officers into following orders, but about 100 men would not be swayed. For their refusal, they received various sentences in military courts, up to 10 years imprisonment. Mass refusals to follow orders, leading into courts-martial: I guess "to mutiny" is an appropriate term.
 
The winter War , the annexation of the baltic states and bessarabia and the partition of poland were not about "stalin's greed". They were aimed at improving the SU's strategic position in an upcoming war , which they did . Without the R-M pact, the starting point of operation Barbarossa would have been dangerously closer to the objectives aimed at by the germans. As for Karelia , it was too close for comfort to Leningrad, and no pragmatic thinker like Stalin would be put to ease by assurances for finnish neutrality no matter what .
 
The winter War , the annexation of the baltic states and bessarabia and the partition of poland were not about "stalin's greed". They were aimed at improving the SU's strategic position in an upcoming war , which they did . Without the R-M pact, the starting point of operation Barbarossa would have been dangerously closer to the objectives aimed at by the germans. As for Karelia , it was too close for comfort to Leningrad, and no pragmatic thinker like Stalin would be put to ease by assurances for finnish neutrality no matter what .
Err...
I'll agree with you on the Baltics. But Stalin turned a neutral into an active enemy. This WEAKENED his strategic position.

I'm not saying you got his thought-processes wrong, just saying they didn't work, in this instance.

Edit: No, I take that back. I don't necessarily agree about the Baltics. If Stalin hadn't signed the M-R pact, then when Germany invaded Poland, the USSR could have 'come to the rescue'. True, the Poles are still going to fold, and there could be danger that Germany would end up on the Belarus border, say. And, then, certainly the Baltics would be a dagger pointed at Leningrad. But if Stalin didn't take half of Poland, he would have had a solid, manned defensive line, rather than a manned uncompleted one and an unmanned partly dismantled one. One could make the case that that was flawed strategic thinking, too....
 
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Dathi is quite correct to note that Stalin traded a defense line with almost 20 years work for whatever he could put together in less than 2 years.

There is also the possibility that he could have grabbed much of Poland as a rescuer and without a pact with Hitler once Germany had invaded Poland.

At worst Hitler would need several more divisions to occupy Poland and would not have won until late October or even early November 1939. This buys time for the Allies and perhaps the French actually do something.


As for the Baltic States, how much time would it take Germany to overrun all three and what are the odds of Germany being able to take the Red Army by surprise in that area when they've had days or weeks to see Germany coming?
 
Err...
I'll agree with you on the Baltics. But Stalin turned a neutral into an active enemy. This WEAKENED his strategic position.

I'm not saying you got his thought-processes wrong, just saying they didn't work, in this instance.

Edit: No, I take that back. I don't necessarily agree about the Baltics. If Stalin hadn't signed the M-R pact, then when Germany invaded Poland, the USSR could have 'come to the rescue'. True, the Poles are still going to fold, and there could be danger that Germany would end up on the Belarus border, say. And, then, certainly the Baltics would be a dagger pointed at Leningrad. But if Stalin didn't take half of Poland, he would have had a solid, manned defensive line, rather than a manned uncompleted one and an unmanned partly dismantled one. One could make the case that that was flawed strategic thinking, too....
Had the baltic states remained "neutral" and red army free till the onset of Barbarossa, was there even an one-in-a-gazillion chance that they would not ally themselves to Germany? Had Army Group North begun its drive towards Leningrad from Estonia instead of the Memel , would it not have made a difference? My point is that the Wehrmacht had to fight its way through the Baltic states, thus sustaining casualties and losing very valuable time .
 
Without the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact Stalin would have been more alert and much less likely to be taken off guard by Hitler's invasion, thus German losses earlier would have been higher and Soviet losses lower.

Also Lithuania might have been persuaded to an arrangement with the USSR regarding certain Polish territories seen as rightfully Lithuanian.


Your position appears to be that Stalin's aggression saved Leningrad(barely) and so it was acceptable that he made himself Hitler's partner in crime.
 
I am not taking into account any moral factors in my considerations, so no criminals and accomplices . If Stavka's early war strategy was to trade space for time , the R-M pact and the USSR's border shifting westwards made sense,to them at least . (with the possible exception of the Winter War, but then again it would be hard for the finns to convince the Kremlin of their neutrality in any upcoming german-soviet showdown)
 
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