A notable feature of Stalin's policy (and his COMINTERN surrogate) towards European Communist parties during the period of the Molotov-Ribbentropp Pact (Aug '39 - Jun '41) was that it directed those parties oppose the "imperialist war" and reject participation in the struggle against Fascism.
This had a de facto pro-Axis effect because the Communist parties in the democracies had some influence over their constituencies and had elected some officials in some of them, while the parties were fully repressed in Germany and Italy. It also delayed Communist participation in resistance movements in occupied Europe until the invasion of the USSR in June 1941.
Notably, although the USSR had a neutrality pact with Japan, that lasted quite a bit longer than Molotov-Ribbentropp (Apr '41 - Aug '45), there was no similar direction to Asian Communist parties to abstain from anti-Japanese war.
What if Stalin had decided that as part and parcel of the neutrality pact with Japan [or even the negotiations leading up to it], he would cut off aid to Nationalist Chinese and direct Communists in East Asia to stand down from anti-Japanese activities?
During the period of the neutrality pact in OTL, Chinese, Indochinese, Malay, Burmese and Filipino Communists conducted armed anti-Japanese activities.
What would happen, to international diplomacy, to the cohesion of the international communist movement, and to the various communist parties if Moscow's line was all for standing down and appeasement of Japan?
This makes the largest difference in China, with Mao forced to choose between "internationalist" ties and the party's domestically popular and useful pro-war, anti-Japanese rhetoric and guerrilla warfare.
Does this result in Chinese Communists quitting the war, the CCP explicitly reinterpreting or abandoning Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism and Soviet primacy, or Mao splitting the difference?
It makes the second largest difference to Ho Chi Minh and the Communists of Vietnam.
What do Ho Chi Minh's prospects look like if the USSR is directing collaboration with Japan rather than armed resistance for the Indochinese Communist Party? Does Ho Chi Minh become an appeaser of Japan or reinterpret or abandon his ideology?
What other effects does this have on the politics of occupied and postwar Burma, Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines?
As far as timing is concerned, the simplest version is to have Stalin impose the new international line in April 1941, contemporaneous with the signing of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact.
This is two months after Nguyen Ai Quoc's (Ho Chi Minh) return to Japanese occupied northern French Indochina and 1 month before the commencement of Viet Minh armed resistance.
Chinese Communists dropping out of the war in April-May 1941, and a simultaneous cutoff of Soviet aid and advice to the Nationalists, should have some pretty dire effects on the Chinese war effort. According to at least one historian, in OTL, the Soviet advisor Chuikov continued to help Chinese Nationalist operational planners as late as January 1942's Battle of Changsha (a ChiNat victory in OTL) before departing the country. Perhaps in this ATL with Chuikov and other advisors leaving no later than May 1941, Changsha would fall, and Japan could establish a land connection from Wuhan to Guanghou several years before it won the same ground in the late-war "Ichigo" offensive.
On the other hand, if the ChiComs defy Moscow it could play out in multiple ways. Mao could simply break with Stalin and carry the whole party with him, as Tito did in 1948, or there could be a polarizing split between "patriotic" Chinese Communists and "internationalist" Chinese Communists. Mao could also choose one path or the other and do a huge purge of party members who are real or pretended devotees of the opposite position on the Japanese war. IE, Mao purges "cosmopolitan defeatist" heretics or "national chauvinist" heretics in his midst.
An alternate version of the same scenario could have Stalin begin directing appeasement of Japan and cutting off aid to KMT China as early as 1939, and possibly concluding the Neutrality Agreement with the Japanese earlier. This gives the PoD more time to distort Asian politics and the Sino-Japanese war before Barbarossa and Pearl Harbor.
Thoughts?
This had a de facto pro-Axis effect because the Communist parties in the democracies had some influence over their constituencies and had elected some officials in some of them, while the parties were fully repressed in Germany and Italy. It also delayed Communist participation in resistance movements in occupied Europe until the invasion of the USSR in June 1941.
Notably, although the USSR had a neutrality pact with Japan, that lasted quite a bit longer than Molotov-Ribbentropp (Apr '41 - Aug '45), there was no similar direction to Asian Communist parties to abstain from anti-Japanese war.
What if Stalin had decided that as part and parcel of the neutrality pact with Japan [or even the negotiations leading up to it], he would cut off aid to Nationalist Chinese and direct Communists in East Asia to stand down from anti-Japanese activities?
During the period of the neutrality pact in OTL, Chinese, Indochinese, Malay, Burmese and Filipino Communists conducted armed anti-Japanese activities.
What would happen, to international diplomacy, to the cohesion of the international communist movement, and to the various communist parties if Moscow's line was all for standing down and appeasement of Japan?
This makes the largest difference in China, with Mao forced to choose between "internationalist" ties and the party's domestically popular and useful pro-war, anti-Japanese rhetoric and guerrilla warfare.
Does this result in Chinese Communists quitting the war, the CCP explicitly reinterpreting or abandoning Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism and Soviet primacy, or Mao splitting the difference?
It makes the second largest difference to Ho Chi Minh and the Communists of Vietnam.
What do Ho Chi Minh's prospects look like if the USSR is directing collaboration with Japan rather than armed resistance for the Indochinese Communist Party? Does Ho Chi Minh become an appeaser of Japan or reinterpret or abandon his ideology?
What other effects does this have on the politics of occupied and postwar Burma, Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines?
As far as timing is concerned, the simplest version is to have Stalin impose the new international line in April 1941, contemporaneous with the signing of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact.
This is two months after Nguyen Ai Quoc's (Ho Chi Minh) return to Japanese occupied northern French Indochina and 1 month before the commencement of Viet Minh armed resistance.
Chinese Communists dropping out of the war in April-May 1941, and a simultaneous cutoff of Soviet aid and advice to the Nationalists, should have some pretty dire effects on the Chinese war effort. According to at least one historian, in OTL, the Soviet advisor Chuikov continued to help Chinese Nationalist operational planners as late as January 1942's Battle of Changsha (a ChiNat victory in OTL) before departing the country. Perhaps in this ATL with Chuikov and other advisors leaving no later than May 1941, Changsha would fall, and Japan could establish a land connection from Wuhan to Guanghou several years before it won the same ground in the late-war "Ichigo" offensive.
On the other hand, if the ChiComs defy Moscow it could play out in multiple ways. Mao could simply break with Stalin and carry the whole party with him, as Tito did in 1948, or there could be a polarizing split between "patriotic" Chinese Communists and "internationalist" Chinese Communists. Mao could also choose one path or the other and do a huge purge of party members who are real or pretended devotees of the opposite position on the Japanese war. IE, Mao purges "cosmopolitan defeatist" heretics or "national chauvinist" heretics in his midst.
An alternate version of the same scenario could have Stalin begin directing appeasement of Japan and cutting off aid to KMT China as early as 1939, and possibly concluding the Neutrality Agreement with the Japanese earlier. This gives the PoD more time to distort Asian politics and the Sino-Japanese war before Barbarossa and Pearl Harbor.
Thoughts?