Another comment by Anarch King of Dipsodes, Overlord of All Thirst is worthy of response; in the context of “There is no way that the Allies could stage a major amphibious operation in North Africa in June”. Again, I believe an Allied operation is not possible in June of 1942, but an American only landings outside of the Mediterranean is; especially since it had the full support of President Roosevelt. After the surrender of the Philippines, Roosevelt needed victories in the field as a political matter. He could not anticipate Midway. If Malaya were held, the strategy of “Germany First” would only be strengthened.
What delayed Gymnast into Torch was the inability of the British to execute their portion involving landings at Oran and Algiers in June 1942. This begs two questions, where was the bulk of British amphibious shipping; and how did British amphibious options materialize?
With the exception of assault landing craft employed during the Norwegian Campaign from both warships (in lieu of floatplanes, and handled by aircraft cranes) and passenger liner davits; British amphibious techniques had not been given much thought until after Dunkirk. Initially it was hoped to get back on the continent through the acquisition of an ally – hence the desperate shipment of British Expeditionary Force-Greece in March-April 1941. Once an assault from the sea became the only option, the first LSTs (HMS Bachaquero, Misoa and Tasajero) were converted from shallow-draft oil tankers and passenger ships were refitted as LSIs (Landing Ship Infantry) during 1941. Techniques were developed largely by trial and error.
The provision of specially trained troops came in the form of Combined Operations HQ and No 1 through No 9 and No 11 (Scottish) Commando in July-August 1940. The six existing Royal Marine battalions were largely employed on defensive duties at major naval bases and did not assume an offensive role until 1943. The main punch was 29 Independent Infantry Bde formed from four battalions hastily withdrawn from India in July 1940.
The first target for Combined Operations HQ was the Canary Islands in the event Spain entered the war on Germany’s side. Planned for execution on a contingency basis between October 1940 and January 1941, it is fortunate that no actions were carried out as planning and training were both in their infancy. The next targets selected were the islands of Pantelleria and Lampedusa in the Central Mediterranean. Both could support fighter bases to cover convoys to Malta, but the success of the venture was totally dependent on the capture of Tripoli. Both islands have no natural sources of fresh water, and slow water tankers would not survive the voyage with Axis aircraft operating from Libya. (Note: Italian water tankers on the short haul from Sicily had a draft to shallow to be hit by submarine torpedoes.) With the success of the Afrika Korps in the summer of 1941, the hopes of amphibious landings on Pantelleria and Lampedusa faded. The Commandos were used for raids on Continental Europe, notably Vaagso and St Nazaire, while 29 Independent Infantry Bde continued to hone techniques and added support units.
The organization of British Expeditionary Force-Greece brought into focus the necessity of capturing the Italian held Dodecanese Islands (especially Rhodes). No 7, No 8 and No 11 (Scottish) Commando were sent to Egypt in March 1941, the first two in time to be misemployed and chewed apart on Crete; No 8 was disbanded and No 7 reformed as No 62 Commando in July 1941. It eventually became 1 SAS Regiment in January 1943. After extensive reconnaissance of Rhodes and superb contacts with the largely Greek population of Rhodes, landings were abandoned in October 1941 and No 11 (Scottish) Commando was disbanded.
The next stirrings came after the Japanese entry into the war. 29 Independent Infantry Bde was alerted for employment on the other side of the world with the idea that an amphibious strike somewhere in the rear of the rapid Japanese advance would force the Japanese to slow their timetables and act more conventionally. By early January 1942, it became clear that a single brigade would do little good, and as a follow on force, 5 Division was selected, and the command structure increase to a small corps size and designated Force 121. As delays in transport were sorted out, 5 Commando was added after the St Nazaire Raid to 29 Independent Infantry Bde; and extra shipping allocated to pick up 7 South African Bde before the entire force departed the UK in mid-March 1942. While en-route to South Africa it was decided that the Far East was lost, and Madagascar was selected as a new objective. Operation Ironclad was carried out in May 1942.
The presence of the bulk of British amphibious shipping in the South Indian Ocean in May 1942 is the prime logistical reason I do not include any British forces in an invasion of French North Africa in June 1942. Since the Madagascar campaign dragged into September 1942, these ships (joined by a number of newly constructed and converted ships) would not be available until November.
It is now appropriate to incorporate the probable course of action if Malaya were firmly held in April of 1942. Instead of an assault on Madagascar, the only two likely options are somewhere in the Far East or the Mediterranean. I examined options on the Kra Peninsula, but none appear logistically sustainable. Rhodes becomes a viable option for several reasons. First, PM Churchill strongly believed Turkey could be cajoled into the war and a supply route to the USSR opened through the Black Sea if Great Britain controlled the Aegean. Since the Napoleonic Wars, British strategy focused on littoral operations, and Rhodes fit these strategic preconceptions. Third, control of Rhodes could force Axis air power away from attacks on Malta convoys and support of Rommel’s attacks on the Eighth British Army at Gazala. Fourth, it would act as a diversion from the U.S. landings in Morocco. All of these also support the “Germany First” adopted at the Arcadia Conference.
It is now appropriate to examine the opposing forces in a Battle for Rhodes. The German ground component in June 1942 is insignificant. Airfields on Rhodes were used by the Luftwaffe since the invasion of Crete in May 1941; and contained normal complements of anti-aircraft and airfield defense units. The German Assault Division Rhodes was not formed until October 1942, after Rommel’s offensive on Egypt stalled at First Alamein and Alam Halfa; and the potential for British victory in Libya would leave the Aegean vulnerable. The Germans also recognized the possibility of Turkey entering the war. The bulk of the garrison was Italian.
The 50th Regina Div HQ was on Rhodes, the 309th Regiment acting as the fortress garrison; the 10th Regiment and 24th Black Shirt Legion patrolling the remainder of the island. The 50th Artillery Regiment, two battalions of six-inch and 4.7-inch coast defense guns and most of the 50th Mortar Battalion were present as was the 23rd Antitank Company. The rest of the division, the 9th Regiment, 50th Machine Gun Battalion, 201st Black Shirt Legion, 50th Antitank Company and the 331st Regiment attached from the 11th Brennero Division are deployed to the other eleven Dodecanese Islands. There is little possibility of reinforcement. The 22 Air Landing Division is still fighting in the Crimea and did not depart for Crete until September 1942 after a period of leave in Germany. Sending troops by sea would be suicidal.
The Allied ground force would consist of No 5 and No 62 Commando as initial pathfinders/shock troops, then the amphibiously trained 15 Bde from 5 Division (available at Madagascar, but not used) and 29 Independent Infantry Bde, and 17 Bde – used in the assault on Diego Suarez despite no amphibious training. Two of the three brigades will pivot from the sheltered northern bays the Italians used in 1912 to the port and citadel of Rhodes a few miles away. The two airfields are a bit farther away, about seven to nine miles. The 309th Regiment must defend an entire perimeter, the British can concentrate their attacking infantry battalions. 13 Bde and 7 South African Bde are the second echelon, which will land in administrative fashion once the beachhead is secure. The Italians have no armor, the British have six Valentine, six Tetrarch tanks in 29 Independent Infantry Bde, and 17 Marmon-Herrington III armored cars in 7 South African Bde. 28 Daimler II armored cars and 44 Bren carriers are in 5 Reconnaissance Regiment, a part of a third echelon from 5 Division, as is 27 Northern Rhodesia Bde which with the South Africans will form a permanent garrison.
The Royal Navy will employ the battleships HMS Warspite and Ramilles; aircraft carriers HMS Illustrious, Formidable and Indomitable; heavy cruiser HMS Devonshire; light cruisers HMS Gambia, Birmingham, Hermione, Dauntless and HMNLS Jacob van Heemskerk; and 22 destroyers (four Australian and two Dutch). Initial air cover is from 32 Martlet (Wildcat), 13 Fulmar II and six Sea Hurricane IA fighters, and 56 Swordfish/Albacore biplane strike aircraft. One Spitfire V and three Hurricane RAF Squadrons are available from Cyprus, as are several Wellington and Blenheim bomber squadrons.
Although the Luftwaffe in the Mediterranean is capable of intervening, I do not believe they will. In addition to supporting Rommel’s Gazala Offensive, they are committed to covering their own major convoys to Tripoli and Benghazi; and intercepting the Vigorous Convoy attempting to resupply Malta. I see these actions remaining a much higher priority than defending Rhodes. As for Italian fighters, the Fiat G50 and Macchi 202 are vastly inferior to Martlets, Hurricanes and dead meat for Spitfires. Italian bombers were also obsolete by mid-1942.
In my scenario, this amphibious shipping will remain in the eastern Mediterranean, training British formations and carrying out the landings on Pantelleria and Lampedusa once Tunisia is secured. Reinforced by new construction and conversion amphibious ships in November 1942, they will carry Eighth British Army on to Sicily.
As I have thought this through, I am mindful of Newton’s Third Law of Alternative History – that for every action, there may be an equal and opposite reaction. If the Italians performed as poorly on Sardinia and Rhodes as I expect them to; would the Germans wise up and not leave so much of the northern flank of Sixth German Army to the Eighth Italian Army and Romanian troops? Would Hitler hold off from Stalingrad and reinforce his Mediterranean flanks? Would a more realistic view of the limits of German military power prevail?
I have no doubt these effects – Brimstone, Rhodes, an earlier invasion of Sicily are not only possible, but plausible. The question is whether they would also be a blessing for Axis strategists?