Many thanks for the warm welcome; one and all !!!
The comments made by Anarch King of Dipsodes, Overlord of All Thirst also deserve a lengthy explanation. Literally taken, his statement “There is no way that the Allies could stage a major amphibious operation in North Africa in June” is correct. I used the term Operation Torch, which is more familiar than its predecessor plan, Operation Gymnast. Operation Gymnast was approved at the joint British-American Arcadia Conference in Washington DC, in December 1941. President Roosevelt ordered its execution in January 1942, and the invasion date was set as 16 June at that time. Gymnast was not an ALLIED operation, but was allocated only US troops. Gymnast did not target the more heavily defended objectives of Oran and Algiers. Gymnast was postponed in late April 1942 in favor of the much larger scale Operation Torch. It was the British, not the American components that required delay in order to assemble shipping. The American shipping assembled for Gymnast was actually used to send all of 1st U.S. Armored Division to Great Britain, plus additional ground crews for the USAAF. (Note: This shipping was then sent to the Pacific to support Operation Shoestring – the invasion of Guadalcanal in August 1942 – and then returned to the Atlantic for Torch in November 1942.) With this in mind, a rereading of my analysis may make more sense.
“Another probable side benefit from holding Malaya is an earlier, albeit smaller scale execution of Operation Torch. Torch originated from President Roosevelt’s fear that the Japanese use of Vichy French Indochina to attack American would be replicated by the Germans or (to a lesser degree) Italians in the French West Indies and French West Africa to threaten American interests in Latin America. It was opposed by General Marshall, as a sideshow from opening a Second Front in France, and endorsed by the British for that very reason.
“Launched on 16 June 1942 to seize positions from Northern Morocco south to Dakar utilizing Combat Command B of 1st U.S. Armored Division, 1st and 34th U.S. Infantry Divisions, 2nd U.S. Cavalry Division (with only 9th and 10th U.S. Cavalry Regiments – the remainder remained at Ft Riley KS as cadre for 9th U.S. Armored Division), and the French speaking 156th U.S. Infantry Regt from the Louisiana National Guard. The entire invasion, including USAAF aircraft and temporarily naval assets, is commanded by LTG Dwight D Eisenhower, with MG George Patton’s I U.S. Armored Corps as ground force. Once control of Vichy French bases on the Atlantic Coast is obtained, Patton’s troops will advance rapidly into Algeria against opposition strong enough to secure political and military honor, but insufficient to exceed the level of resistance given the Japanese in French Indochina or to provoke an American declaration of war.”
It should be noted, that the forces allocated to Morocco (one armored combat command, elements of two infantry divisions) are identical in combat strength to those actually employed during Operation Torch with the addition of two horse cavalry regiments. With a substitution of battleship USS Washington (at Scapa Flow March-August 1942) for USS Massachusetts, US Navy escort and covering forces are identical to the historical strength. I therefore anticipate a similar outcome to the historical. The follow-on arrival of USAAF P-40 aircraft would be reduced in number, as only two, not four escort carriers are available. The difference would have to be made up by merchant ships carrying crated P-40s to India during the same time frame.
The French defenses at Senegal were negligible. The garrison consisting of the 1st and 7th Colonial Senegalese Regiments backed by a single battalion of Colonial French soldiers had atrophied in equipment, training and logistics since becoming isolated in September 1940. Other than coastal defense guns, the French had no artillery. The 25 Curtiss Hawk 75A fighters were also devoid of spares, only three were still operational in November 1942, and the nine Potez 63 reconnaissance planes and 12 Dewoitine 510 fighters ceased flying by the end of 1941. US troops would land well out of range of the three operational 15-inch guns of battleship FS Richelieu. A reinforced regiment landing on the excellent beaches at Rufisque and two additional battalions at Port St Louis is an ample force. If not, two brigades of British West African Colonial troops were available in Gambia to assist. I therefore conclude that an American-only invasion limited to only the Atlantic Coast region of French North Africa is likely to succeed.
An understanding of GEN Marshall’s reaction to the postponement of Gymnast and the cancellation of Operation Sledgehammer (an invasion of France in 1942) is very enlightening. In June 1942, Marshall sent two divisions slated for early deployment to Europe, the 40th and 43rd U.S. Infantry Divisions to the Southwest Pacific, and ordered the 2nd U.S. Cavalry Division broken up. In January 1943, when the Casablanca Conference postponed the Normandy invasion until 1944, Marshall released the 1st U.S. Cavalry and 6th, 7th, 31st, 33rd and 38th U.S. Infantry Divisions to the Pacific. With the exception of 7th US Infantry Division, none of these eight divisions made it into combat before 1944 in order to fully reconfigure and retrain from European tactics to those suitable for the Pacific. It is my assessment that with Malaya stabilized in June 1942 and US troops engaged in combat in North Africa, probably only one of these divisions (43rd – to New Zealand), already trained for combat in Europe would be diverted to the Pacific; and possibly none.
I postulate the IJN would never reach Guadalcanal in May 1942 if Singapore were held. Therefore there is no need to send transport ships to the South Pacific and back. Instead in July and early August 1942, they would bring the remainder of 1st U.S. Armored Division and II U.S. Corps (Probably 6th, 31st and 40th U.S. Infantry Divisions) to complete the conquest of Algeria and meet the British Eighth Army in Tunisia. Attention would then turn to the final steps in reopening the Mediterranean to Allied shipping, because an end to lengthy convoys via the Cape of Good Hope to Egypt is a key to sustaining the supply lines to Singapore.
The first option, Operation Husky is the one I would apply the words of Anarch King of Dipsodes, Overlord of All Thirst to. An invasion of Sicily would be pure fantasy. Sicily had at least nine major airfields capable of supporting some 600 aircraft. Its supply routes were well protected – from Reggio on the Italian “toe” to Messina the distance is only 11 nautical miles. Unpowered barges carrying tanks and towed by tugs made the trip in less than three hours at night. Palermo and Syracuse were less than 12 hours by coastal steamer. Although Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica were all the responsibility of the Italian armed forces, most German troops evacuated from North Africa went to Sicily. The Italian garrison in Sicily contained one of the few Italian armored divisions. Although Malta (and after its capture) Pantelleria provided fighter cover for the invasion of Sicily, most Allied air power was aboard aircraft carriers, with distant support from air bases in Tunisia and Libya, both over 200 miles away from invasion beaches at Gela and Syracuse.
Sardinia, on the other hand, contained only two major airfields, and two large seaplane bases. They were capable of supporting about one-third the aircraft of those on Sicily. The air bases, near Cagliari and Alghero were on the opposite side of the island from the Italian mainland, and vulnerable to attacks from naval vessels – as early as 1940, Force H had bombarded Cagliari with 15-inch guns from HMS Renown. They were about 170 to 200 miles away from air bases in eastern Algeria and Tunisia. Sardinia was about 200 nautical miles away from supply ports at Naples and La Spezia across waters largely controlled by British submarines. From a logistical point of view, Sardinia was a liability.
These logistical constraints were reflected in the composition of the Italian garrison. Near Cagliari are the locally recruited XIII Italian Corps’ 30th Saubauda Infantry Division inland and the 205th Coastal Division on the unprepared beaches. Most troops were fed and often housed by their families. In the north was the XXX Italian Corps headquarters, which had scarcely recovered from near destruction in Tunisia. The 204th Coastal Division like the 205th in the south was a local conscript formation devoid of horse transport, artillery larger than mortars, or engineers. Although recruited from the same local forces and badly equipped, the excellent leadership of the 31st Calabria Infantry Division gave it a better chance of good performance in combat. The only combat unit from outside Sardinia, the 47th Bari Infantry Division did not arrive from Greece until April of 1943.
The American invasion forces would likely consist of V U.S. Corps HQ (sent to Great Britain in October 1942) and CCA/2nd U.S Armored Division; 7th and 9th U.S. Infantry Divisions in the initial assault and 38th U.S. Infantry Division as a second echelon. Along with 3rd Infantry Division, the 7th underwent extensive amphibious warfare training in 1941. The Italian forces, dispersed, relatively immobile and unable to be resupplied would have a tough time prolonging defeat – much less securing victory; especially as the capture of the homes of defending soldiers by American troops eroded Italian morale.
The invasion of Corsica is a necessary appendage to that of Sardinia – the naval and air bases near Ajaccio must be neutralized. Initially this requires a small invasion force: probably 3rd Infantry Division and whatever Free French units are available. As a second echelon, the two horse cavalry regiments of 2nd U.S. Cavalry Division acting as mounted dragoons would be ideal for Corsica’s topography. Additional forces to capture the remainder of the island would come only after Tunisia was fully secured and troops engaged there were rested and reconstituted.
The Italian garrison would exist only if an occupation of Vichy France occurred in early July 1942, and still be hopelessly inadequate. The VII Italian Corps’ primary mission is ant-partisan operations, not anti-invasion. The 226th Coastal Division was not historically formed until April of 1943, and then from conscripted ethnic Italians from Corsica and from areas around Genoa. The 20th Italian Division was trained for a planned invasion of Malta, and for that purpose reinforced by the 7th Italian Artillery Regiment. The 175th Italian Alpine Regiment and the 10th Mobile Regiment completed VII Italian Corps’ assets, and the latter unit had the 13th Italian Armored Car and 32nd Sardinian Bicycle Battalions attached. Not an impressive force once spread over the entire island. If Vichy troops were still in control, their numbers were limited by the 1940 Armistice to internal security duties only.
I have little doubt that Operation Brimstone would succeed. I have greater doubts as to what the German reaction would be. I invite commentary on several questions.
When would the Germans have invaded Vichy France? In April-June of 1942, the Germans exchanged all available combat formations in France for shattered German divisions from the Russian Front. These units executed Fall Anton (Case Anton) in November 1942 after they had been rebuilt. From June until perhaps September 1942, these units would have been too weak to overawe even the diminished Vichy Armistice Army. Would Hitler have withdrawn combat formations destined for Russia to pull off Fall Anton in early July 1942?
I believe that Russia would always remain top priority in German strategy, and no occupation of Vichy France would take place until after Operation Brimstone made it critical. I also rejected the German option of removing the Armistice restrictions and allowing Vichy to mobilize, equip and deploy troops to fight the Americans. There was too great of a chance that once rearmed, Vichy would join the Allied side and welcome Allied troops ashore in southern France. I believe that if Operation Brimstone were executed, the chance of the French Fleet in Toulon escaping to Corsica instead of scuttling itself is excellent.
Once Operation Brimstone was completed, the Axis would have over 1300 miles of potential invasion sites from the French-Spanish border to the toe of Italy relatively undefended. It would truly be a soft underbelly of Europe. Would this result in Hitler seeing reality, abandoning the drive on Stalingrad to go on the defensive, and redeploying enough troops to defend the Mediterranean coastline?
My analysis is no – absolutely nothing will pull Hitler away from concentration on victory in the East until after the decisive defeat at Stalingrad. However, I am nowhere near as certain that I am correct about this question as I am about others. What is the consensus of the forum?
If Hitler does not reallocate forces from Russia, then I am confident the rest of my scenario will play out, and the Western Allies will reach Berlin no later than May of 1944. If Hitler did order a shift to the strategic defensive, then the Third Reich will last another year.
