What if significantly more African and Middle Eastern troops had been used in WW2?

What if the major combatants had decided to use Africans and Middle Easterners in much higher numbers then they did OTL in the course of the Desert War?

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Obviously, they did use Middle Easterners and Africans, even the DAK had them and units like the Free Arabian Legion the race laws were almost completely ignored.

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What would be the effect of much larger use of indigenous troops on the war there and the post war environment? I have been reading up on the situation local troops found themselves in during the war. Its kind of ironic to have three European powers including the United States each having their propagandists telling Muslims to wage 'jihad' on the other side.

Could North African and Middle Eastern Armies have come out of the war much more competent?
 
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During WW2 Britain organized Palestinian Jews into 2 Infantry Brigades. They fought in Italy during 1944 and moved to the Netherlands in 1945.
Jewish infantry brigade worked hard after WW2, smuggling immigrants to Palestine, procuring weapons, assassinating Nazi officers, etc. Many Jewish Brigade veterans later served in the Haganah.

Next question: could Druze, Kurds, Sunni, etc. Raise similar forces under WALLY assistance?
 
During WW2 Britain organized Palestinian Jews into 2 Infantry Brigades. They fought in Italy during 1944 and moved to the Netherlands in 1945.
Jewish infantry brigade worked hard after WW2, smuggling immigrants to Palestine, procuring weapons, assassinating Nazi officers, etc. Many Jewish Brigade veterans later served in the Haganah.

Next question: could Druze, Kurds, Sunni, etc. Raise similar forces under WALLY assistance?

It's worth noting that the Jewish Brigade was formed from the Palestine Regiment, which included Arabs alongside Jews (though not in the same formations). Presumably most of these Arabs were Sunni, though considering the demographics many of them might also have been Christian.
 
Well it might be interesting just how much it might change the outcome, after the War, on how these people might work to either stay in the varied Empires as Free Associated States/Dominion or have an easier road to independence.

I see France and the British Empire being able to get the best use out of its colonial troops. Of course, if somehow Germany and Italy can convince more natives to fight against their overlords, it might help them in the battles in Africa and maybe Asia.
 
Let us bear in mind that India alone was the largest volunteer army in the world and fought in France and Belgium (yes 1939/40), Ethiopia, Somalia, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Italy, Malaya and Burma so was a major player in 3 continents. French North African troops fought in France (1939/40 & 44/45), Algeria, Tunisia and Italy forming a very large part of the French Army in 1943/44. West African troops were a significant part of the army that defeated the Japanese in their major land campaign of the war in Burma.
 
So why is it that the French successfully used native African/Arab troops from its colonies, but Britain did not? Apart from having a less patronising and condescending attitude, what would Britain needed to have done, to have Egyptian & Iraqi troops fighting Rommel rather than conspire against Britain??
 
Well, for a start neither Egypt not Iraq were colonies. Both were independent states with their own army, navy and air force. Britain had treaties permitting military bases etc. and had considerable influence but these were not colonies. Technically they never were colonies. If you were an Iraqi or an Egyptian minded to a military life then you joined your own military. One might as well ask why men were not recruited in Thailand or Ethiopia. Also Egypt was formally a neutral power in the war and recruiting in Egypt would violate that neutrality.

Now Malaya was somewhere that could have benefitted from local recruiting but the tribal people had no understanding of the military, the Malays looked to their own Sultans etc., the Chinese were wary as new immigrants, of being put in a position that might antagonise the other parts of Malaya (despite China being at war with Japan) and the Indians not being from a class or caste who would think of joining the military. With regard to the latter, in the 1980s in Leicester, there were only a few recruits from the large Indian population of the city. I had one of whom I asked why he thought this was the case. I expected some concerns about being new immigrants or fears of racism but he told me that most of the local Indian population came from commercial castes/ families and the military was not something they would think of joining. My chap explained that he, and several of those who had joined, came from warrior castes/families so joining the army was something quite expected. After 30 more years I gather that this issue is less relevant to more the current youth of Leicester.
 
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Pesigalam

Banned
What would be the effect of much larger use of indigenous troops on the war there and the post war environment?
Culturally? If OTL is any indication, they probably wouldn't be remembered fondly.
Could North African and Middle Eastern Armies have come out of the war much more competent?
Why would they? If things worked like that than the most "competent" armies in the world today would be ... those within the Congo Basin, curtsey of them fighting in the bloodiest conflict since WW2.
 
I did a thread a while back about the Arab Legion in Italy. Glubb and Emir Abdullah wanted to go badly but the Allies denied their request.
 
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TFSmith121

Banned
All four major powers did; but the numbers were limited for

What if the major combatants had decided to use Africans and Middle Easterners in much higher numbers then they did OTL in the course of the Desert War? ?

All four European powers did; but the numbers were limited for a variety of reasons, most of which came down to the European powers not wanting to do so for reasons of imperial politics.

Italy raised both regular and irregular units among the (ethnically) Moslem population in Libya and Italian East Africa, and some of the Christian population in Ethiopia, but remember, the Italians had fought two very expensive colonial wars with some of the "native" Libyan and Ethiopian populations; the British, in turn, recruited some of these same men (the Senussi, largely, in Libya, and did the same in Ethiopia/Italian East Africa) but because of Egypt's legal neutrality and a desire by the British and Egyptian leadership to not strengthen the army as a nationalist force, the Egyptian Army's duties during the war were largely limited to air defense and similar rear-area tasks. The British directly recruited men in Sudan and British Somaliland, but again, their service was largely limited to security and other rear area tasks, largely in the colonies where they were raised.

The French raised units from the North African (and to a degree, sub-saharan African and Levantine) populations for service, but in many ways, these were - essentially - "professional" soldiers recruited from what (accurately or not) were perceived as "warrior" elements of the population, not unlike the ethnically Indian elements of the British Indian army. The "locals" in French North Africa included a fairly small number of French citizens (essentially, Europeans or of European ancestry) and a larger number of Moslem who were not French citizens but were (essentially) "hired" as mercenaries, and the French were cautious about the mix; not unlike the British/Indian formations, there was always a strong percentage of "European" personnel and units in every such formation.

Germany scraped up whatever manpower they could, for obvious reasons, from disaffected POWs and other locals, but the numbers were always very limited.

In sub-saharan Africa, Britain, France, and Belgium all raised "colonial" forces, but other than those men who found themselves in the MTO/ETO with the French (and who were largely replaced by FFI personnel as quickly as possible) and the three British "African" divisions that ended up in SEAC, they were largely limited to "local" security and related duties.

In southern Africa, the British potentially had a large pool of manpower to recruit from, both in the British colonies and dependencies and (of course) in South Africa itself, but for obvious reasons, that did not occur. Getting the Union of South Africa into the war and keeping it there, even with the SADF's policies regarding non-whites, was more important to Britain's war effort than any potential "African" army organized along the lines of the Indian Army, which was considered - the political costs outweighed any military benefit, obviously.

The British territories in the Levant/Southwest Asia - the Mandate of Palestine, (Trans)Jordan, Iraq, etc. - all offered additional manpower pools, but the political issues inherent even in raising volunteer forces, much less conscription, were huge, and in Iraq, which was nominally independent, just like Iran, Saudi Arabia, etc., it just was not going to happen.

In terms of formations, the British Empire's order of battle included three divisions recruited by South Africa (which saw action beginning in 1941) and three more raised in British "African" colonies, plus the brigade raised in Palestine (which didn't see action until late in the war, 1945, IIRC); that was it.

The French raised one colonial division (9th) almost entirely from sub-saharan African enlisted men, and all or parts of about six other divisions, but a large percentage of the "non-white" personnel in all these formations were repaced by FFI or French citizens who could be conscripted under the authority of the FNCL government under the Liberated Manpower Program from 1944 onwards.

Best,
 
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What if the major combatants had decided to use Africans and Middle Easterners in much higher numbers then they did OTL in the course of the Desert War?

One thing is that the populations of these areas were much smaller than now, and much smaller relative to the home countries.

Another is that many of these people weren't especially interested. Iraq and Egypt sentiment was more pro-Axis than pro-Allied, but the British were in control. Libyans mostly hated the Italians, and weren't going to fight for the Axis.

French North Africa and West Africa were neutral for most of the war; some locals were conscripted or recruited by the Allies.

However... the Allies were short of equipment, and really didn't need a lot of manpower from these areas. They raised a fair number of volunteers (and some conscripts from Algeria), but they had no incentive to go beyond that.
 
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