What If : Selimyan Reform/Earlier Tanzimat

Okay, it's been suggested about Tanzimat beginning 3-4 decades earlier under Selim III. Say, had Selim gathered loyal forces to crush Janissary rebellion in 1807 instead of hesitating, how much will change ? A lot is the short answer. Let's dissect the topic of how his reform and would have proceeded.

Compared to Mahmut II, he was not as strong a personality. But had he survived assassination he could've lived much longer. He died at 47 IOTL. So he could've ruled until like 1830s, for better or worse. In his quest for reform, we can assume Alemdar Pasha will have major role in it. Janissary institution will might survive this way, although severely reduced. Or maybe the loyal remnants will just form the backbone of the modern force, while escaping stigmatization it got IOTL.

Here are the points that I consider of immediate effects :
1) By this time Muhammad Ali was already in Egypt for 2 years. Will he be deterred by the success of reformists in capital from going his own way ? Or will he try it anyway and get crushed ?
2) How will the sectarian affairs play here vis a vis OTL ? The subjugation of conservative clergy and turns towards secularism are giveaways. Very related to question #1 because a lot of OTL Ottoman debt came from the wars against Muhammad Ali, and thus how Europeans started intruding into Ottoman affairs. Also, because the empire should be in much stronger position against later balkan rebellions, if the PoD won't prevent them entirely.
3) Related to #2, is about Ottoman relations with Europe. Personally, I'm optimistic this OE can avoid the OTL entanglement with capitulations. OTOH, I don't think she can escape it entirely either. The roots of capitulations originated way back from the days they were still over-confident most gracious. But perhaps, they could've ended up with less debt and perhaps confine protectorate rights over Christians to a few or even just one most favored nation of sort, most likely either France or Britain. Also Napoleonic war was still on going as well as war with Russia. I don't think the latter will unfold much differently though. However, the next war in late 1820 can be easily prevented. That can remove Russia as one of the biggest screwers of the empire, though it will still remain a security threat.
4) How will this affect the empire's surroundings, especially that of muslim countries such as Persia and Barbary States ? We can safely assume Tunis will be re-annexed to the empire. But what about Algiers ? As for Persia, Ottoman will provide a natural model for them but a) how long until they will realize it's a necessity and b) how much of their internal condition was for and against the reform by then ?
 
Due to somewhat shaky knowledge about said subject(which however is very fascinating) I can't say much except wonder about the following:

* Imagine how very different Islam ITTL will be with being the main religion of one of the great powers(and therefore the cultural power it entails)!

* With imperialism kicking into high gear in the 19th century and North Africa/Middle East not being divided amongst European powers, where might that manpower/energy/drive be directed?

* As always the thought of a surviving OE is awesome, so a stable, centralized OE during the Age of Imperialism and the Industrial Revolution would be very cool.
For reference, see Nassirisimo wonderful TL "With the Crescent above us".
 
I would think that the centrifugal forces of budding nationalism (or at least ethnic greviance) would still be a destabilizing force in the Empire that could be played upon by outside powers and be a drain on the Porte's resources.
Part of the reform and modernization process would somehow be recognizing this --perhaps bow to the inevitable and pull back from the periphery. A tough act admittedly for a number of reasons.
 

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The main benefit is that the bureaucracy, army and the economy will be stronger, all with obvious benefits.

I would think that the centrifugal forces of budding nationalism (or at least ethnic greviance) would still be a destabilizing force in the Empire that could be played upon by outside powers and be a drain on the Porte's resources.
Part of the reform and modernization process would somehow be recognizing this --perhaps bow to the inevitable and pull back from the periphery. A tough act admittedly for a number of reasons.
What would you define as periphery in this case? The Balkans?
 
The main benefit is that the bureaucracy, army and the economy will be stronger, all with obvious benefits.


What would you define as periphery in this case? The Balkans?

Some of the Balkans (Greece and Wallachia come to mind), North Africa (which was nominal rule in any event). Some areas along the Persian frontier.
Ottoman rapprochement with the West (especially Britain) could be a counter to Russia would be important. Some fallback from or change of governing status of some of these areas would make it more possible.
 
Ironically it was Alemdar Mustafa's death which IOTL paved the way for the relative centralization of the Empire and annihilation of the most independent-acting local notables. So his survival as a powerful force on the Ottoman political scene could hinder, rather than help, this aspect of the reforms.

Still, he's a better and more competent strongman to have around than many others. And an early abolition of the Janissaries (arguably the most backwards and cancerous element of late Ottoman society) would be a considerable long-term boon for the state.
 
Frankly, what I think would happen is that Alemdar Pasha would probably do too much in too short a time and get everybody killed in the process.

1) I think Muhammad Ali will still try to go his own way, and it's not a given that he'd be crushed. After all, as an ambitious, powerful local notable , I don't see how Alemdar Pasha can tolerate the existence of another ambitious, powerful local notable in Egypt. Most likely we'd see some semi-unintentional 'provocations' that cause Muhammad Ali to go his own way. The distances required to conquer Egypt, plus the large domestic issues reform will inevitably create, make any re-annexation very far from a done deal.

2) Alemdar Pasha might actually push for a strong subjugation of the clergy, since this would fit in with his ambition of being the only center of power around. But then again, since a lot of the reformist agenda 'on the ground' needs to be done through local networks, Alemdar Pasha might well be shooting himself in the foot with a hasty subjugation of the clergy. 'Ottoman-ism' will probably have to be developed as a substitute for them, and will be similarly unsuccessful. I don't think there's any way for you to get take 'secularism' without the 'nationalism' bit as well.

3) Definitely not. The Europeans by the 19thC were already treating the Ottoman Empire as their plaything, rather than as a Great Power in its own right. Part of the reason why Napoleon's alliance with Russia failed was because he wasn't willing to concede to Russia France's 'traditional' spheres of interest in the Ottomans. Britain similarly has tremendous interest in keeping the Russians cooped up in the Black Sea, and Russia has an interest to not let that happen. As the Ottoman Empire reforms and develops, additional issues like increased sectarianism, and the increased strategic importance of the region after the Suez Canal will provide more reasons for European powers to intervene.
 
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