What if Russia vetoed the Gallipolli Operation?

raharris1973

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What if Tsarist Russia said it found any British or western intervention objectionable?

They want it themselves as a spoil of war, and they just do not trust that the British or any other power would leave them to Russia or leave them at all once they possess Constantinople.

The model for this Russian "logic" or illogic as it were, is the OTL French objections to a British landing at Alexandretta.

The problem with landing in Alexandretta was that it was in the French sphere of influence and they were opposed to the British landing there. It appears they went ballistic when a RN ship landed a raiding party and blew up a train and some buildings. Sean McMeekin talks about in his book, the Ottoman Endgame. Strategically, it was an excellent place to land and it would cut off the Ottoman armies in Syria/Palestine, Mesopotamia and Arabia. While it wouldn't open a passage to Russia, it might have knocked the Ottomans out of the war much earlier.

So, with Russians blocking the Gallipolli operation and the French blocking the Alexandretta Operation, what do the British do with themselves?

Feed more men into France? Men into Italy when she joins the war?

Provide better support to their Mesopotamia campaign and perhaps not suffer siege and defeat there?

Accelerate the Palestine campaign?
 
Interesting question but is it very likely? I get your reasoning but I was under the impression that there were a bunch of Russian merchant ships stuck in the Black Sea and their inability to participate in trade was really hurting them?
 
Interesting question but is it very likely? I get your reasoning but I was under the impression that there were a bunch of Russian merchant ships stuck in the Black Sea and their inability to participate in trade was really hurting them?
Yeah, the Russian desperatly needed the strait to be open for supply, petty post war politic would not be the first thing on their mind
 
What if Tsarist Russia said it found any British or western intervention objectionable?

They want it themselves as a spoil of war, and they just do not trust that the British or any other power would leave them to Russia or leave them at all once they possess Constantinople.

The model for this Russian "logic" or illogic as it were, is the OTL French objections to a British landing at Alexandretta.



So, with Russians blocking the Gallipolli operation and the French blocking the Alexandretta Operation, what do the British do with themselves?

Feed more men into France? Men into Italy when she joins the war?

Provide better support to their Mesopotamia campaign and perhaps not suffer siege and defeat there?

Accelerate the Palestine campaign?

Pumping more men into any Near Eastern campaign this early on would be a logistical nightmare; the Palestine front can't get sufficent fresh water over the Sinai to supply a large offensive across the desert, Bursa is too underdeveloped a port to insure sufficent cargo capacity for a larger offensive, ect. Perhaps by 1916 they'd be in a better position, but my money would be on a stronger push for establishing a Salonika front to provide support for Serbia and pressure the Balkan nations into the Entente (Enforce it on Greece, scare/impress Bulgaria, and provide proof of Entente military might to Romania), since those troops were looking for "Elsewhere" after seeing the meat grinder that was the Western Front.
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
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Interesting question but is it very likely? I get your reasoning but I was under the impression that there were a bunch of Russian merchant ships stuck in the Black Sea and their inability to participate in trade was really hurting them?

Yeah, the Russian desperatly needed the strait to be open for supply, petty post war politic would not be the first thing on their mind

Well that is how it worked out in OTL, the Russians were content to secure their claims to the straits by secret treaty at the very same point that the British were trying, and failing, to occupy that ground.

But I'm not sure that had to be inevitable. If Russia felt threatened by *Bulgaria* potentially occupying Constantinople in 1913, how much more risky, in the long run was having Britain occupy it?

Pumping more men into any Near Eastern campaign this early on would be a logistical nightmare; the Palestine front can't get sufficent fresh water over the Sinai to supply a large offensive across the desert,

Yes, I guess that just took a lot of time and engineering to ultimately make Allenby's campaign possible.

Bursa is too underdeveloped a port to insure sufficent cargo capacity for a larger offensive

Since Bursa is just on the Asian side of the straits, I assume you're saying that even winning in the Gallipolli campaign does not provide an opportunity for an exploitation campaign, at least in 1915. In case of any confusion, Bursa is far, far closer to Gallipolli and Constantinople than it it is to Alexandretta or Antioch. Not that there was necessarily any confusion :).

but my money would be on a stronger push for establishing a Salonika front to provide support for Serbia and pressure the Balkan nations into the Entente (Enforce it on Greece, scare/impress Bulgaria, and provide proof of Entente military might to Romania), s

That is where I would say to put the money. I first read a suggestion to do it this way in an issue of Command Magazine in the 1980s.

It strikes me that strategically, keeping Serbia in the fighting and pressing Austria-Hungary where it lives is far more decisive to overall victory than anything one can do to the Ottomans.

When I have brought it up in the past, I did face some skepticism though--- "The Entente and Serbian forces could never have sufficient logistic support flow through the single railway and Dinaric mountain range to keep Serbia going...grumble grumble..professionals talk logistics...grumble grumble" :extremelyhappy:
 
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