What if - RAF unleashed the big boys in BofF ?

i am currently reading the excellent third book from Greg Baughen "The RAF in the Battle of France and the Battle of Britain: A Reappraisal of Army and Air Policy 1938-1940" in which he is very critical about the non use of the RAF Bomber Command 'heavies' during the critical phases of the Battle of France.
https://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/product/1781555257/ref=oh_aui_detailpage_o05_s00?ie=UTF8&psc=1

this got me thinking - what difference would another 250 bombers have made

  • more casualties if used in daylight ?
  • more damage on the choke point bridges at Maastricht and Sedan ? A Hampden or Wellington carries 4 x the bombload of a Battle or Blenheim
  • bombs scattered around countryside if used at night ?
  • fighters having to do close escort (didn't work for the light bombers)
leaving aside the doctrinal almost religious devotion to strategic bombing which meant the equipment was not suited for tactical or even interdiction bombing could they have made a material difference.
 

Deleted member 1487

In 1940 minus air superiority BC would have been slaughtered and the kernel of it's trained manpower would be lost. Given the operational turn around time of the RAF and ALA in 1940, it is unlikely they would actually achieve much through their actions either even if they unleashed their full force. They'd need not only more fighters, but a much better Command and Control system coupled with excellent links to units in the field to actually understand what was going on. Generally the reason the Allies didn't respond in time was because they lacked the necessary information.
 
this got me thinking - what difference would another 250 bombers have made

I suspect the answer would be 'Another 250 smoking holes in the ground'. Fighter Command won't be 'coming out to play' in numbers larger than otl, and with good reason.
 
The RAF Bomber Command was in a catch-22 position, if they attacked in daylight - they get slaughtered, if they attacked at night they can't find the target, let alone hit it.
However, what I think could have been tried, was a combination of attacks against the Sedan crossings. It was defined by the water, so navigation is improved, if arrival is timed to before dawn. Wellingtons, and perhaps Whitleys, bomb the area above the French line, with the whole range of bomb sizes from the 20lb ant-personnel to the larger 250 & 500 pounders. Yes, it would be a lucky hit to get the crossings, but should cause disruption, and hit flak positions, so when the Battles arrive to do a more accurate attack they have less AAA to worry about.
 

Deleted member 1487

The RAF Bomber Command was in a catch-22 position, if they attacked in daylight - they get slaughtered, if they attacked at night they can't find the target, let alone hit it.
However, what I think could have been tried, was a combination of attacks against the Sedan crossings. It was defined by the water, so navigation is improved, if arrival is timed to before dawn. Wellingtons, and perhaps Whitleys, bomb the area above the French line, with the whole range of bomb sizes from the 20lb ant-personnel to the larger 250 & 500 pounders. Yes, it would be a lucky hit to get the crossings, but should cause disruption, and hit flak positions, so when the Battles arrive to do a more accurate attack they have less AAA to worry about.
Only problem is the navigation issue, which was a major problem in pre-daylight hours.
 

Deleted member 1487

Granted, it may not be easy, but surely easier following a river, rather than going just overland.
You'd think that would have helped them find the Rhein river and follow it at night in 1941...but then the Butt Report.
 
The "heavies" weren't that heavy, and couldn't operate in daylight without losing too large a portion of the force. The Whitley was accepted as a night bomber only from the very start, and events validated the night policy for Wellingtons early on. The Hampton proved to be no good for low level, and was restricted to higher altitude, which wouldn't hit a tactical target. The later Martin Marauder, with much higher performance, earned the same judgment in its debut, being largely slaughtered unless above the lower flak levels, and heavily escorted. The Hampden was never going to be heavily escorted, if at all. The best moon for bombing is the best moon for fighters, and the friendly forces on the ground would likely take a pasting in any effort. The trick would have been to strike the bridges early, before flak moves in, an impossible task without infrastructure and comms, and with orders coming from England.
 
Or just have BC drop Bombs instead of Millions of Leaflets during the Phoney War?
Having real raids means the LW must keep fighters back for Bomber interception, even if it's only night raids
 

Glyndwr01

Banned
Or just have BC drop Bombs instead of Millions of Leaflets during the Phoney War?
Having real raids means the LW must keep fighters back for Bomber interception, even if it's only night raids

WHAT! You may damage someone's property old boy!
 
It's the mirror scenario of 'Battle of Britain'. RAF are operating far from base, against locally based fighters. Their bombers get chopped to bits, their fighters get mobbed. Worse, given their limited navigation aids, the bombers have poor odds that they'll actually hit anything useful...
 
Total Germany Total

RAF and French bombers should have been engaged to fullest extant possible, from first day of war, attacking German air naval and army bases and war industries as well as trying to destroy every bridge on the Rhine between Dutch and Swiss border.
French fighters initially protect bombers RAF Hurricanes deploy to Europe to aid French air force.
French army attack all along German frontier, should have occupied Luxembourg first day of war.

Just my @ cents
 
Any use to anyone - Taken from the British War Cabinet weekly resume.

Western Front

23rd May to 30th May

The main effort of Bomber Command during the week has been expended in France and Belgium. Day bombing sorties have been flown by between 25 and 50 Blenheims daily, and objectives of all kinds near the head of the enemy's advance have been heavily attacked. Great damage has been seen among columns of tanks and motor transport, and roads and bridges have been damaged; attacks have also been made on advanced enemy headquarters. Our own losses have been comparatively slight, probably on account of the protection against enemyfighters afforded by ourfighter patrols. Night bombing has also continued on a very heavy scale. This has in part been directed at objectives in the enemy forward areas, in part against his communications farther back, in Belgium and in the area of the Meuse. On the night of the 23rd/24th, 24 Whitleys were engaged in the Avesnes-Maubeuge area, and 48 Wellingtons attacked Gembloux, Charleroi and the Meuse crossings. On the following night 29 Whitleys and 12 Wellingtons were engaged. Operations have been continued on a similar scale throughout the week, with very slight losses.

30th May to 6th June

The effort of Bomber Command has been equally intense and 310 day and 142 night sorties were carried out against objectives in the battle area during the week. The objectives chosen have been mainly road and rail communications, and traffic moving along them; batteries and tanks have also been attacked. On the 5th June and the following night thefield of operations was in the rear of the German offensive then developing towards the South. Successful results have been observed on many occasions, and there has been little effective interruption by anti-aircraftfire orfighters. Our losses amount to six Blenheims and three heavy bombers.

6th June to 13th June

Bomber Command has continued its effort in support of the B.E.F. and of the left wing of the French army; pressure was also maintained on rail and other communications in the enemy's rear. Aircraft of the Command carried out 14 reconnaissances in addition to 337 day and 522 night bombing sorties in operations on the Western Front and against Germany : 23 of our aircraft were lost and 4 Germanfighters were shot down. Day bombing was carried out almost entirely in the area between the Somme and the Seine, and has been successfully directed against columns of tanks and motorised troops, against bridges and focal points of communication, and against petrol supply and ammunition dumps. Considerable resistance has been met fromfighters and from groundfire. The greater part of the night-bombing effort was directed against important points on the whole length of the enemy's communications from the marshalling yards of the Rhineland to the Somme. Specially important points were communications round Amiens, the railhead at Hirson, the crossings of the Meuse, and the junctions and yards at Aaachen, Duren, Euskirchen and Rheydt. Fires and explosions followed many of the attacks, and extensive damage appears to have been done, in particular, byfiring woods which concealed parked vehicles and supply dumps. Only two aircraft failed to return, but several others crashed or were damaged on landing in this country.

13th June to 20th June

In the early part of the week practically the entire effort of Bomber Command was directed against the German army and its communications in Northern France. In spite of unfavourable weather the medium bombers operating by day on the 13th and 14th June attacked the Seine crossings below Paris, troops on the move near the Seine and near Evereux, and the aerodrome at Merville, where many enemy aircraft were seen on the ground; a number of these are believed to have been damaged. On the night of the 13th-14th June our heavy bombers were intensely active in the areas behind the German lines from Rouen to Rheims; 163 aircraft were engaged, and a very large number of high explosives and incendiary bombs were dropped on road and rail communications. These raids were repeated by twenty-one aircraft on the night of the 14th-15th June. Weather conditions still further deteriorated on the 15th June and both day and night bombing operations were impossible until the night of the 17th June. On the afternoon of the 18th June six Blenheims attacked columns of motorised troops and motor-cyclists advancing on Cherbourg. The head of one column was bombed and machine-gunned, and four orfive motor vehicles were overturned; many hits were seen on the roads. On the 19th June thirty Blenheims attacked aerodromes at Rouen and Amiens, at which enemy aircraft were believed to be concentrating for night raids on England; extensive damage was done to runways, hangars and parked aircraft. The attack on Rouen was successfully repeated by twelve Blenheims on the 20th June.

During the week Bomber Command carried out 156 day and 163 night sorties against enemy troops and communications on the Western Front; ten aircraft were lost.

Attacks on Germany.

23rd May to 30th May

Although the primary objective during the week has been support of B.E.F. operations in Northern France, operations have continued against communications, oil installations and industrial objectives in Germany. Night bombing of Germany was carried out nightly up to the 27th/28th May. On the 23rd/24th May forty-six Hampdens attacked railway communications in the Rhineland, particularly in the Emmerich, Koblenz and Koln areas. On the following night twelve Hampdens again bombed railways and marshalling yards, largely in the area West of the Rhine (Luxembourg, Roermond, Maastricht), while eighteen Whitleys attacked the Ruhr. On the 25th/26th May twenty-eight Hampdens attacked Rhineland communications, eighteen Whitleys attacked blast furnaces at Dusseldorf and Krefeld and oil refineries at Emmerich and Reisholz. Twenty-one heavy bombers were employed on the 26th/27th May, and seventy-three on the 27th/28th May; the objectives on the latter occasion included oil refineries at Hamburg and Bremen. Raids have also been made by the Advanced Air Striking Force on industrial objectives in the Saarland. To judge from the reports of air crews and from information which is beginning to come in as to the results of earlier raids, the cumulative effect of these attacks must have been very great; the losses incurred have been low. There are indications that the Germans are beginning to abandon the policy of active antiaircraft and searchlight defence in favour of a more passive policy, intended to prevent accurate bombing by the combined use of smoke-screens and searchlights.

Oil tanks at Rotterdam were attacked by eight Hudsons on the night of the 24th/25th May, and by six Hudsons on the following night. It is believed that the stocks have now been almost completely destroyed.

30th May to 6th June

During the week there have been 350 night bombing sorties against objectives in Germany and only four aircraft have failed to return. The objectives attacked in Germany may be classified as follows :-

May 30-31: 18 sorties - Oil storage at Hamburg.

May 31-June 1: 0 sorties

June 1-2: 65 sorties - Oil storage at Homburg, Oil storage at Osterrnoor, Marshalling yards at Osnabruck and Hamm, and in the Ruhr.

June 2-3: 30 sorties - Hydrogenation plant at Hamburg, Marshalling yards near Rheydt and Duren, Marshalling yards at Hamm, Osnabruck, Duisburg and Soest.

June 3-4: 136 sorties - Marshalling yards in the Ruhr, Oil refineries at Monheim and Reisholz, Synthetic oil plant at Homburg, Gelsenkirchen and Kamen.

June 4-5: 57 sorties - Oil storage at Mannheim and Frankfurt.

June 5-6: 44 sorties - Oil refineries at Hamburg, Marshalling yards at Wedau and Rheydt, Railway junctions at Euskirchen and Duren.

Weather conditions have not always been favourable, and it has sometimes been impossible to identify the primary objective; secondary objectives of military importance, including enemy aerodromes, have generally been found and bombed successfully. Direct observation of results is naturally difficult, but the attacks on the oil objectives have generally been followed byfires and explosions; at Mannheim and Frankfurt afierce blaze was started which was visible more than 120 miles away. On other occasions direct hits have been observed on railway communications.

6th June 13th June

In addition to the interruption of communications which has already been mentioned, attacks have been continued on industrial targets in Germany. On the night of the 6th/7th June eighteen Hampdens were despatched to attack oil targets at Hamburg and Ostermoor, and on the 7th/8th June 24 Hampdens attacked similar objectives at Hanover. On both these raids substantial damage is believed to have been done to. the main target, and successful attacks were also made on enemy aerodromes in North Germany and on the Frisian Islands.

13th June to 20th June

Night operations against objectives in Germany have continued, subject to some interruption by unfavourable weather; 416 sorties wereflown and nine aircraft lost. Raid Assessment Reports continue to indicate satisfactory results, particularly at Hamburg where aircraft works, factories and shipyards have been very extensively damaged. The aircraft erecting works of Blohm and Voss are reported to have been destroyed, and a chemical factory (believed to be that of Gesellschaft fuer Lund's Eisi/machinen A.G.) was hit, andfires and explosions continued all day. The morale of the Rhineland population is said to be deteriorating.

The week's operations are summarised as follows :-

June 14th-15th - Marshalling yards in Rhineland at Soest, Hamm, Essen, Koln, Rheydt, Duren and Euskirchen, and 24 Wellingtons bombed military objectives in the region of the Black Forest;fires and explosions were caused over a wide area.

June 16th-17th - Weather prevented operations.

June 17th-18th - Railway junctions at Wedau, Gelsenkirchen, Fallersleben, Hamm, Coblenz, Koln and Rheydt. Aerodromes at Schiphol, Heide, Wesel, and Barmen. Oil plants and storage at Homburg, Wanne-Eickel, Hamburg and Essen.

June 18th-19th - Aerodrome at Barge. Power Station at Hamburg. Munitions factory at Koln. Oil installations at Hamburg, Vastrop, Rauxel, Hanover, Sterkrade and elsewhere.

June 19th-20th - Aluminium plant at Grevenbriick. Marshalling yards at Duren and Euskirchen. Oil objectives at Hamburg, Wanne-Eickel and elsewhere.

Eighteen sorties were also flown for minelaying in the Rhine and Danube; the latter were somewhat hampered by bad visibility.
 
A new alternate history book, The Battle for England by Bernard Neeson, deals with the effective use of Bomber Command shortly after the battle for France. The POD is that the British lure the Germans into attempting Sea Lion, which the Brits intend to use as a giant trap. At first it goes well, with the Brits slaughtering the first invasion wave. But in concert with the successive waves, the Germans manage to seize a single small airbase and pack it with war planes and anti-aircraft guns to protect their nearby beachhead and the field itself. British fighter planes take unsustainable losses in largely unsuccessful day attacks on the field. Bomber Command is called in. To get around the lack of accuracy in night bombing, they arrange for villages and towns close to the airfield, both the few occupied by the Germans and those that are not, to turn on their lights and also set bonfires in a carefully timed operation as the bombers approach. Before the blacked out German base can turn on its lights to merge with those surrounding it, the bombers are able to create havoc in the black hole in the center of the villages, i.e., the airfield and its fuel and ammunition dumps. Thus is the Germans' only chance of a successful invasion foiled, their 100,000 soldiers that made it ashore in the various waves end up surrendering, the myth of Hitler's infallibility is punctured and the future looks bright for Britain and for a German military conspiracy to overthrow Hitler. It's a clever story but with one problem: the Brits only have about 200 fighter planes left at the time of the decisive battle. It seems to me inconceivable that the British High Command would go for a lure-them-in strategy unless they could hold back a much larger number of fighter planes for their counterattack. Nowhere in the book, as I recall, is there a clear explanation of how they could get down to only 200 planes so quickly.
 
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