What if Qianlong kept expanding Qing empire to Caspian or Aral Sea?

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
in OTL Qianlong completes the defeat of the dzungars and established xinjiang province. At its height Xinjiang included the southeastern section of modern Kazakhstan all the way to Lake Balkash. What if Qianlong resumed western expansion after 1763 to extend the frontier to the Aral Sea and conquer the syr darya valley? Or went further, to reach the Caspian Sea while subduing Kokhand, Bokhara and Khiva?

The Qing would have about 30 more years to do this in Qianlong’s lifetime, and 50 more years if we include the reign of Q’ s successor and have the Qing keep expanding till the end and f the Napoleonic wars in 1815.

What happens from there?
 
The Qing would probably lose it very quickly to the Persians or the Russians, or to rebellion. China's western border has plenty of mountains and is easily defended, while Central Asia is huge and open. Besides, it was around this time that China's military really began to stagnate compared to the west.
 

RousseauX

Donor
The Qing would probably lose it very quickly to the Persians or the Russians, or to rebellion. China's western border has plenty of mountains and is easily defended, while Central Asia is huge and open. Besides, it was around this time that China's military really began to stagnate compared to the west.
OTOH if they have to fight the Russians or the persians in central asia on a regular basis, their military might not stagnate
 
He could always try, though he isn’t likely to succeed.

Why though, it might be asked. After all, they’re the Qing, aren’t they? The dynamic and active dynasty that invited Jesuits and generally stayed at the forefront of military and geographic science during this time-period? If I may, I would like to present why I believe, in my humble opinion, this wouldn’t work out, which is a mixture of both the reasons against the campaign in the first place and why the long-term feasibility of the conquest is dubious. Apologies beforehand for all the text.

First of all, there’s a crucial difference between the Dzungar and the Kazakhs, even though they’re both neighboring nomadic powers. The Dzungar were Tibetan Western Mongols, with imperial ambitions and links to the Tibetan lamas. The Qing invested a tremendous amount of effort into presenting themselves as legitimate inheritors of the Genghisid imperial tradition and as patrons of Tibetan Buddhism, in order to link themselves to and win the allegiance of the Mongols, succeeding the most with the Eastern Mongols. The Dzungar, aiming to unify the Mongols and with their strong links to the Tibetan lamas, represented a direct threat to the Qing imperial project because they too could claim to be rightful inheritors of the Genghisid imperial tradition and patrons of Tibetan Buddhism, beyond the fact they were situated uncomfortably close to the 18 provinces and were raiding them. As long as the Dzungar remained, they could always call upon rebellious Mongols and point out their commonalities and religious links and thus threaten the Qing hold on the steppe. This wasn’t just Qianlong thinking he wanted to solve this problem in one stroke; the Qing invested themselves into a multi-generational effort at subjugating Tibet and weakening the Dzungar, of which Qianlong’s campaign was just the- admittedly impressive- culmination. The Kazakhs, on the other hand, were Muslim Turkic nomads without any real interest in trying either to threaten the Qing hold on Tibet or even for that matter presenting themselves as the next re-unifiers of the Mongol empire. They wanted trade, and the Qing were happy to engage in tribute with them. From the Qing side, there is no reason to engage in a long and arduous campaign against a power that does not threaten their interests. If the Kazakhs did engage in war against the Qing, then yes, it would be possible to see the Qing engage in said long and arduous campaign against them, but even then, the Qing have more pressing issues back home in China and would most likely sue to for a return to status quo ante bellum, or a subservient Middle zhuz at the very most. Against the Dzungar, the Qing were waging a war to bring about the final victory of their imperial ambition on the steppe, and after what was effectively their genocide of the Dzungar, that was as far as they needed to go. Even if Qianlong decided to push westwards during the Dzungar campaign, which he nearly did, the most it would amount to would probably be a few expeditions and then probably peace as the two realize they have nothing to gain from it. The Senior zhuz itself is effectively split between the Qing and Kokand without any real problems.

Second, the khanates and emirates. Kokand is not a threat. In fact, the Qing worked out their differences and let Kokand alone, which acted as a kind of passive-aggressive frenemy to the Qing. There is no reason, unless Kokand for some reason feels threatened and attacks the empire, for Qianlong to engage in a campaign against them. Same for Bukhara. Both of these powers paid tribute, neither really engaged in attacks against the Qing, and even when Kokand harbored the Khojas, the Qing often preferred to solve the Khojas themselves and grudgingly overlook the Kokandi involvement; while admittedly, this was under some of their less vigorous moments, and it is probable that Qianlong could act against Kokand more vigorously, and would if the Khojas had presented a really serious threat, there is little reason the Khojas would try and do this with Kokandi blessing if the Qing were that strong and vigorous in the first place. Khiva not only never presented a threat, it is even further away, leading to the next point.

Third, logistics. Balkhash is an incredible distance not only from Mukden, but more importantly from Beijing and even Xi’an and Lanzhou. While the Qing did have amazing logistics in the campaign in Xinjiang, the simple fact is that beyond Kashgar, it gets awfully difficult to project power. Balkhash was conquered because it was part of the Dzungar khanate to begin with, and even then, the Qing tolerated Cossack forts and camps in the overall border region, and even areas nominally in Xinjiang, such as Zaysan. The Aral Sea is an even greater distance than that. Presuming they could even fight the Kazakhs that far away, how are they going to hold it? They’re going to have transport men, supplies and weapons over vast distances, without much in the way of roads and under constant threat of attack in pretty unfriendly terrain, to which the bulk of their armies are not used to. Even though the Qing armies at this time were still pretty darn good, they aren’t likely to pull off such a feat. The Caspian is this many times over, without even counting the other issue of hearts and minds.

Fourth, religion. The Dzungar had to deal with the fact that half of their empire was effectively in revolt against them, thanks to them being Buddhist Mongols and the Tarim being Muslim Turkic, in addition to high taxes. The Tarim was happy to switch sides, a minor revolt notwithstanding, to the Qing, which they preferred to their old Dzungar masters- the new heathen, basically, was preferable to the old one. There is nothing of that out west. All of the powers can call upon a natural justification for war, which is going to lead to the Qing facing tough opposition, against people who have been living in their own states, under their own laws and can call upon religious brethren-in-arms, as they are suddenly being invaded by the heathens from the east. While it is true that the Qing were able to be a chameleon of rulership- khans, patrons of Tibetan Buddhism, Confucian emperors, and having mosques honor their name- this is unlikely to fly against people who already have a conception of the Qing as heathens, and especially so when they are at war against them.

Fifth, Russia. Russia is not going to let someone just waltz into what is effectively their sphere of interest, especially not after they have already decided that they’re going to work out their differences through negotiation. The Qing went to great lengths to show the Russians that the Senior zhuz was in fact their vassal, and even the Middle zhuz, but importantly, they did so while acknowledging that the Junior zhuz was in the hands of the Russians; when they had disagreements, such as over Ablai, they and the Russians negotiated under a framework that recognized the Kazakh zhuz as effectively divided between them, even though where the dividing line was located was always up for question. But they’ve already gone to war with the Russians in the past- and though they might technically have won that time- they are not in an appetite for more, and the Qing have already decided to honor the Russians as geopolitical equals in practice if not in name. It’s a mere thirty years after Kyakhta, they’ve already worked out their differences and spheres, and have a framework for renegotiation and peaceful settlement of their disputes- why waste all of that now? For glory? Qianlong was a vain man, sure, but he wasn’t foolish, at least not that much.

Sixth, ‘domestic issues’. Beyond the simple fact of funding, how is Qianlong going to justify this to the scholar-officials? Against the Dzungar, the Qing made a great propaganda effort at presenting themselves as civilizing the Western Regions and reintegrating areas from the Han and Tang times, but even then, scholar-officials often regarded being sent to Xinjiang as a form of exile- which it in may cases often was- because it was still seen as outside of ‘civilization’. There’s not even that here with the areas beyond Kashgar- while the Han and Tang held control of the Tarim for centuries, the Tang alone only held control over areas beyond that for a few decades. Even if they try and pull the civilizing card, most scholar-officials are likely to interpret the fact that the Kazakhs and khanates were willing to offer tribute as good enough already. There are no resources which the Qing urgently need, and unless they have attacked the empire, for the scholar-officials, there is simply little to no reason for Qianlong to start attacking states that by all accounts are happy to give tribute; they will likely send memorial after memorial to the throne urging him to show restraint worthy of a sage-ruler. Back home, there are rebellions, internal campaigns inside frontier areas, and even- stretching the definition of ‘domestic’- campaigns against states closer to home, and most importantly, the perennial rebellions that plague the empire are still going to break out, whether it is late during Qianlong’s reign or under that of his successors, which will necessitate a retreat of imperial power from the frontier.

Finally, Qianlong himself. Qianlong was great and all, but the last half of his reign was a disappointment. What seems like 30 more years is in fact perhaps 15, or 20 at most. Furthermore, the issues that plagued them because of Qianlong’s own personality are not going to go away because of him engaging in some campaigns in the far west- if anything, considering the cost that they’re going to be, they’re going to increase. He’s still overseeing a Qing expanding in the Shan regions, and sooner or later he and the Konbaung kings are going to get into a dispute over which Shan chieftain owes allegiance to who; the Vietnamese are probably still going to see the Le dynasty fall, upon which Qianlong will likely jump at the opportunity to restore Jiaozhi and probably get defeated by the Tay Son; and most importantly, the rebellions are still going to break out, especially if Qianlong becomes as tired, weary and fatigued as he did OTL. With Qianlong, there’s still going to be an exhausted treasury, other campaigns he wants to execute, and thus further probable failures in Jinchuan, Myanmar and Vietnam, wide-spread corruption even if it won’t necessarily be under Heshen, and rebellions that will effectively gut the treasury. This is not to say that Qianlong couldn’t try, but even if he manages the superhuman effort to conquer the far west and also stay alert to the end, he’s going to leave his successor with even more problems- more extension of the empire’s administrative and military capabilities, more rebellious subjects, more borders inviting trouble from far-away opponents.

If any of these powers- the Kazakhs, Kokand, Bukhara- engaged in war against the Qing, then yes, the Qing would strike at them. If any of them do so when Qianlong is in his prime, then yes, it is likely that they will be conquered, though I’d say that Kokand, and a very loose Middle zhuz allegiance, is the feasible upper limit. But why would he venture so far out, and further, if he is not attacked and wants to do all the other things he wanted to do? If he tries, he will likely fail. If he tries because he has been attacked, he will likely stop before he reckons that he’ll become over-stretched, which is a far distance from Khiva and likely means punishment and annexation of the offending party, either Kokand, or the Middle zhuz at most. And even if he should succeed, there is no guarantee his successors will be able to keep it- actually, considering the quality of his successors, this might just hasten the Qing decline.

OTOH if they have to fight the Russians or the persians in central asia on a regular basis, their military might not stagnate

While I agree with Perdue’s idea that the Qing likely needed some kind of incentive to stay on the edge militarily, it would probably be better to look at a surviving Dzungar khanate as he suggested, or a Qing dynasty that decides to be far more active on its frontiers and is successful in doing so; but probably not through something as demanding as a campaign against Bukhara or Khiva, and certainly not defending those areas from the Persians or Russians, the former having advantages in both distance, logistics, morale and support, or the latter, who they already have a working relationship with and who are close to their ancestral heartland.
 

Maoistic

Banned
The Qing could always convince the Europeans in the southern ports to lend their weaponry and training, combined with Qing numbers, to invade and attempt to undermine the rising power of Russia and the still lingering threat of the Ottomans. The Manchu using English, Dutch or French rifles and cannons of the 18th century, combined with their massive numbers and steppe tactics, may very well allow the Qing to carve territory as far as the Caspian sea.
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
The Qing would probably lose it very quickly to the Persians or the Russians, or to rebellion. China's western border has plenty of mountains and is easily defended, while Central Asia is huge and open. Besides, it was around this time that China's military really began to stagnate compared to the west.

to the Persians, I doubt. Unless Nader Shah was around. Would the Zand intervene, and if so, effectively? I don't think the Qajar could pull off opposing China effectively.
 

RousseauX

Donor
The Qing could always convince the Europeans in the southern ports to lend their weaponry and training, combined with Qing numbers, to invade and attempt to undermine the rising power of Russia and the still lingering threat of the Ottomans. The Manchu using English, Dutch or French rifles and cannons of the 18th century, combined with their massive numbers and steppe tactics, may very well allow the Qing to carve territory as far as the Caspian sea.
The Manchus otl used Portuguese cannons/firearms

A Qing empire in central Asia is perfectly do-able, it's about as difficult as a Russian Empire in otl central asia
 
Even says in that Wikipedia link that "the term "red barbarian cannon" derives from the weapons' supposed Dutch origins, as the Dutch were called "red haired barbarians" in southern China. However, the cannons were originally produced by the Portuguese at Macau, with the exception of two cannons dredged up from a Dutch ship in 1621."

The issues of logistics aside, the treasury's already draining from the other grand campaigns and corruption that slowly but surely was taking hold of the Qing court. Competing with Russia over dominance over Central Asia might force some more military reform but it's unlikely to be much more than small scale conflicts due to logistical difficulties and the Qing and Russians had such conflicts in the 17th century without tremendous reform happening as a result (the Qing did win then, of course, but it took decades of constantly losing to Europeans on China's coasts and heartlands for the conservatives in the late Qing court to accept reforms).

It seems like overstretching an empire already having troubles subduing its border regions (like Burma). Administering the land would be difficult and it seems like separatist movements would be a major issue, especially moving into the 19th century, with how much trouble the Qing had with rebellions in Central China, Xinjiang, Yunnan, etc. I would imagine the Qing would have somewhat more difficulty in controlling the land and moving armies there with the mountains, deserts, and lack of river systems that the Russians were able to use to their benefit (though I might be mistaken).
 
The Qing could always convince the Europeans in the southern ports to lend their weaponry and training, combined with Qing numbers, to invade and attempt to undermine the rising power of Russia and the still lingering threat of the Ottomans. The Manchu using English, Dutch or French rifles and cannons of the 18th century, combined with their massive numbers and steppe tactics, may very well allow the Qing to carve territory as far as the Caspian sea.

As RousseauX has pointed out, the Qing did have the Europeans lend them their weapons and training to fight; they effectively imported Jesuits to make their cannons, maps and even propaganda paintings of the campaigns. But there’s a problem with the idea of arming the Qing armies with European weaponry. The first is purely pragmatic, the second one more ideological.

First, the bulk of the Qing military forces are not made up of Manchu Banner armies, or even the combined Banner armies. The bulk of the Qing military forces are Green Standard armies made up of Han soldiers, and arming them with modern weaponry is not necessarily a good thing- especially considering there’s about three Green Standard soldiers for every one Bannerman. While it is true the Qing will likely use their Banner armies in the beginning, they’ve already begin to decline by this point, and sooner or later, the sheer strain of the war effort will force them to use Green Standard armies.

Second, Qing ethno-imperial ideology is not going to fly well with this. Qianlong was engaged in a conscious ideological campaign back home to try and preserve what he thought were true, traditional Manchu values, the Manchu Way, among which were archery, horse-riding, and martial values in general. This went so far as to ban his elite Solon units from using guns at all- he issued a decree in 1750 which demanded they give up their guns and practice archery. While it is conceivable- though very unlikely- that he could abandon the idea of Manchu values and arm the massive Green Standard armies that are going to be needed to wage the campaign, after he dies, what happens then? There are going to be massive armies across the empire, but in many cases still quite a distance from Beijing, possessing capable weaponry and with substantial battle experience, and most likely still harboring resentment against the Manchu for pocketing all the leadership positions. Even then, before arming the armies with modern European weaponry, what are they going to pay the Europeans with? While the Qing did permit trade, their economy was based on a massive silver inflow into China, and unless there’s something incredibly important, or various very important, resources they need, they’re unlikely to want to reverse that silver inflow.

As said, the Qing already have a working relationship with the Russians, both from before and throughout Qianlong’s reign. There is really no reason for the Qing to start fighting the Russians after having spent time and effort to create a working relationship with them, especially when they have a profitable trade in furs going on. The Russians too, were not overtly hostile, at least not after Nerchinsk; they were happy to engage in trade with the Qing, and the Russian envoys generally observed Qing diplomatic etiquette. They’d fought a war with them which they basically lost, and when the Qing decided to work out their differences with them, the Russians decided that under the current circumstances there really wasn’t any reason for challenging the favorable status quo. The Russians generally only became overtly hostile and challenged the framework after it was clear that the Qing were weak and would not resist Russian encroachment, while the Russians at the time were also locked in an overall greater power-struggle across the Eurasian continent, as well as getting that darn warm-water port they always wanted. It might be conceivable that the Qing go to war against Russia if they are attacked, or the Russians collapse and they feel they have to intervene to pacify their border, but short of the Russians deciding to throw away their past diplomatic efforts of several decades, or Pugachev being wildly successful, this is unlikely to happen. Furthermore, while the Qing certainly had a conception of the Ottomans, as one of the three great realms according to Qianlong, the Ottomans are still going to have to get through Persia first; not to mention the Ottomans have their own issues to deal with before projecting power and possibly going on a campaign that will seriously strain their war machine before they even reach Tehran.

Again, this is an incredible effort that we’re talking about. This is pushing further than any other Chinese dynasty save the Tang, and with additional issues which the Tang did not face. Already under Qianlong’s own campaign against the Dzungar, there were issues of both logistics in supplying the troops and convincing the scholar-officials of its legitimacy, the latter especially so when he began to start entertaining the idea of pressing further into Kazakh territory. Of course, Qianlong could always try, dealing then with vast distances, incredible logistical difficulties, and a generally hostile local population, but something is very likely to give in such a case.

to the Persians, I doubt. Unless Nader Shah was around. Would the Zand intervene, and if so, effectively? I don't think the Qajar could pull off opposing China effectively.

With Nader Shah, most bets are off; the Zand however, would likely not, considering their large problems, being basically a one-off dynasty in western Iran. The Qajar, though, are another issue. The Qajar were Persianized Turks, had an interest in holding Herat and bordered- depending on one’s definitions of borders- areas in Turkmenistan that are awfully close to the Aral, at least compared to the Qing. If the Qing are engaging in a giant campaign to basically subdue everything until the Aral, I’m pretty inclined to think that the Qajar are going to freak out, or at least maybe see this as an opportunity they can use for themselves. If the khanates and emirates are weakened, then they can grab them for themselves, and anyways, winning against the heathens in battle is going to strengthen their legitimacy. While the Russians will likely still decide to execute their designs on the Caucasus, if the Qing are being so arrogant as to ignore the existing framework of cooperation, they are likely to let the two fight it out and not bother the Qajar until it suits them. Even though the Qajar are weak, compared to the Qing, they have advantages in distance, logistics, morale and support, much more so at least, than the Qing. Even if the Qajar fail to reap any long-term reward or profit from their campaign, they will still have an easier time dealing with the local powers and rallying them to their banner than the Qing.

A Qing empire in central Asia is perfectly do-able, it's about as difficult as a Russian Empire in otl central asia

A Qing Central Asian empire is doable, but something elsewhere would have to give, and even then, there are some rather considerable differences between the Qing and the Russians, some of which have already been well pointed out by BellaGerant.

First, they have vastly different reserves of manpower. There are about 1,6 million Bannermen, of which the Manchu number around half. Combined with the Green Standard armies, this gives about 6,5 million troops. But this figure is in many ways an illusion- the Qing bannermen and Green Standard armies are still going to have to be posted in numerous garrisons throughout the empire to ensure the population do not revolt, which they in many cases will anyways, necessitating bringing more troops from somewhere else. This isn’t even taking into consideration that this is Qianlong we’re talking about, which means many more campaigns elsewhere around the same time, in addition to the revolts. Nor do the Qing have the (almost) free army of the Cossacks; the Banners are a (supposedly) professional military force strictly under the control of the imperial throne and administration, and the idea of giving weapons to Han and then letting them go off on their own on the frontiers is not something the Qing are likely to do. The Russians on the other hand, have a vastly larger reserve of manpower, one that is not going to be stretched overly thin by having to balance such an arduous campaign and garrisoning the empire, and which can rely on the Cossacks in a way which the Qing simply did not, allowing the Cossacks to subdue the area for the Russian empire without having to formally invest themselves into administrating it, requiring grain shipments, for sure, but still better than what the Qing are facing.

Second, connected to that, they have vastly different domestic issues. The Qing are a foreign dynasty; while it is true that they are very acculturated, they still considered themselves different from the Han, to which the Han were very much inclined to agree. The Manchu pocketed positions of power and enjoyed legal privileges which the Han did not; their garrisons were basically meant to scare the Han into submission through showing off their military readiness to defend their monopoly on power, becoming another sign to the Han of how favored the Manchu were by the Qing. When the Han see garrison after garrison leave their posts to go out and fight, what are they going to do? Even if they don’t rise up immediately, which is likely considering how embedded the system is, they’re still going to be aware of the system being weakened, and the longer the garrisons are empty the harder it is to keep the lid on people’s frustration. The Russians don’t have that- sure, the Russian czars during this time period liked to play up their difference from the rest of the masses, but there was never any real doubt about the legitimacy of the czars themselves and their right to rule the nation. Rebellions happened because of injustices to the people, but they often worked in the context of the czarist system and ideology itself, seeking to bond the people closer to the czar, not overthrow the entire czarist system.

Third, logistics and technology. A Russian ‘empire’ in Central Asia didn’t really form until the 1840s. They made one campaign against Khiva in 1839, which failed miserably, like every other campaign they had done against Khiva before. Even the Kazakhs proved to be pretty darn difficult to subdue, being an effort that took about a century, with much wrangling and even failures along the way, and helped by the fact that they, the Qing and Kokand together all tugged at the internal unity of the Kazakh zhuz. It wasn’t until the 1850s that the Russians were able to fully subjugate the Kazakhs, and they didn’t even take Khiva until 1873. While it is true that the Russians did have Cossack forts, they were just that- Cossack forts, more akin to a military outpost on the internal frontier than any manifestation of proper Russian imperial administration. The Russians also had the benefit of being able to transport troops and supplies from relatively close to their heartland. Astrakhan has been in Russian hands for centuries by this point, and they have the Siberian rivers, which stretch inwards into the steppe like a giant comb. There’s a reason, after all, why the Russian conquest of Central Asia not only took so long, but first went in an arch and then only began to work its way down. The Russians have the benefit of both natural infrastructure and the fact that their empire expanded when it actually had the technological ability to do so.

How then, are the Qing going to do this? The Qing, in the timeframe being discussed, are bound by the same logistical and technological limitations that the Russians are- and worse, because they don’t have that natural infrastructure; the Qing have vast deserts along narrow strips of oases, and great plains with little to nothing in terms of civilian infrastructure, with technology that overall can be matched by the vast distances and incredible logistical difficulties it’s going to be to transport them all the way from Xi’an and Lanzhou to Kokand, not to mention Bukhara or even Khiva. Even if they try and pull of the kind of massive grain shipments the Russians did, they will have to do so not over rivers but over deserts, and subject to attacks and raids by hostile powers. Even then, over the long term the Qing grain storages in the northwest are deteriorating, and even though there was innovation by local commanders in getting them back into shape, this is unlikely to happen on a vast uniform scale, and it’s also likely that the system might just collapse under the strains, especially considering the very real possibility of famines striking. Again, while they did have amazing logistics in the campaign against the Dzungar, beyond Kashgar it gets awfully difficult to project power; they have nothing approaching Astrakhan and the Volga, or the Siberian rivers- Kashgar itself has just been conquered less than ten years ago in 1763- and their technological benefits are not the same as those of the Russians of the 1840s or 1850s, much less so the 1870s.

They will have to transport their troops and supplies over vast distances with little to aid them, and it will not only be plagued by difficulties in executing their campaigns, but also massive internal problems as the strains of such campaigns reach home. On the whole, if they really aim for the Aral and beyond, it will either be a bunch of small conflicts without much to gain from, or more likely become a giant ulcer on the empire that will fatally weaken it.
 
Last edited:

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
@000 , thanks for the detailed evaluation of the Persians I brought up, and indeed your detailed evaluation of everything in the OP.

Of course, Qianlong could always try, dealing then with vast distances, incredible logistical difficulties, and a generally hostile local population, but something is very likely to give in such a case.

Something is likely to give. Well yes, there's certain a risk of something being unsuccessful when they try this, perhaps leading to a failing campaign. If not that, it certainly means some other governmental activity or investment made in OTL has to go undone in the ATL.

Might Qianlong have a margin for broadened and lengthened military adventures if he foregoes all his campaigns in Burma and Vietnam?

They did not win either campaign, so the resources were a waste, and they did not have a compelling security need to act in the first place in Southeast Asia. I would also say giving up Tibet, but they already had it at this point, and it was part of their Mongol-control policy to rule Tibet, the Lamaist hierarchy and the ceremonial tea trade between Tibet and the Mongols.

Interesting side effect of this I think is that the Burmese continue to dominate Siam for longer.
 
@000 , thanks for the detailed evaluation of the Persians I brought up, and indeed your detailed evaluation of everything in the OP.



Something is likely to give. Well yes, there's certain a risk of something being unsuccessful when they try this, perhaps leading to a failing campaign. If not that, it certainly means some other governmental activity or investment made in OTL has to go undone in the ATL.

Might Qianlong have a margin for broadened and lengthened military adventures if he foregoes all his campaigns in Burma and Vietnam?

They did not win either campaign, so the resources were a waste, and they did not have a compelling security need to act in the first place in Southeast Asia. I would also say giving up Tibet, but they already had it at this point, and it was part of their Mongol-control policy to rule Tibet, the Lamaist hierarchy and the ceremonial tea trade between Tibet and the Mongols.

Interesting side effect of this I think is that the Burmese continue to dominate Siam for longer.

You’re most welcome, just glad I could be useful.

Indeed, while there certainly is a margin for success in some shape and form, the Aral and beyond, in my humble opinion, is beyond that. If the campaign goes awry, Qianlong will likely pull out when he can still save face and claim ‘victory’ of a kind; while as you said, even if they manage to pull it off, if the Qing succeed here ATL something OTL will most likely be undone. Anything before 1765 means the Burmese campaigns probably get butterflied, or very much changed.

Qianlong definitely has a bigger margin for broadened and lengthened military campaigns if he stays out of Burma and Vietnam, which were basically nothing but massive failures (of course, Qianlong claimed because the Burmese ‘submitted’ that he’d actually won, but we- and he too, probably- know better than that). Indeed, the Burmese and Vietnamese campaigns probably stand as one of the biggest failures for no good reason in Qianlong’s, or even the Qing’s, history. He didn’t need to intervene militarily in Burma, he could just have tried and negotiated a deal with the Konbaung kings, who were busy with Siam anyways; similarly, the Le dynasty wasn’t so special that the Qing really needed to go to war against the Tay Son, who in the end were happy to enter into tributary relations with the Qing.

At the same time however, from the Qing and Qianlong’s perspective, Myanmar was subjugating the Shan saopha which the Qing had been extending their authority over for the past 20-30 years since the 1730s; by the 1740s, most of the major Shan saopha such as Mogaung, Hsenwi and Kengtung had sided with the Qing, and had been included in Qianlong’s commissioned ethnographical studies of the Yunnan frontier. Alaungpaya and Hsinbyushin basically played a form of Russian roulette in reestablishing sovereignty over the saopha, even though they knew that the saopha had switched their allegiance to the Qing; the threatened saopha promptly complained to the Qing, who then saw no other choice but to use Tai-Shan militias, and when that failed, finally send in their own Green Standard troops. While the war itself was pretty terribly executed, there was a great deal of wrangling beforehand on whether or not to actually intervene. Finally, the Konbaung invading Siam threatened to disrupt the power of balance in the region, and Siam had been one of the more loyal tributaries to the Qing. So while the far western campaign might distract him from the issue, as long as the Qing consider the Shan saopha to now be theirs and underestimate the Konbaung military strength, and as long as the Konbaung kings want to restore or even expand Myanmar’s borders and glory as far as possible, they will have conflicting visions of the frontier.

As for Vietnam, Qianlong basically seems to have thought it would be a great opportunity to try and restore Jiaozhi, even though his efforts at doing so alienated what little support the Le had. But the problem of course is that it looks like too good an opportunity to pass up- a peasant revolt has destabilized and usurped the Le dynasty of Ming-defeating fame, who have now been reduced to begging the Qing for aid in restoring them to their throne. It would perhaps, also be a chance to regain some martial glory lost in the Burmese campaign, especially considering how badly the last invasions had failed even with the vaunted Banner troops, and how this now would be a campaign against an enemy which the Qing in terms of imperial tradition had more historical experience with. Of course, if Qianlong simply had tried to engage in tributary relations with the Tay Son, or if the Burmese campaign hadn’t happened, or better yet if the Le had not fallen- though that’s a pretty tall order in and of itself- Qianlong might think twice about repeating the same mistake every Chinese dynasty seems to have done.

The question, however, ultimately boils down to Qianlong. If he thinks he can pull off yet another glorious campaign, he’s likely to do so, and if he’s moderately successful in the far west, when he hears of yet another complaint from the Shan saopha over the Burmese once again threatening to subjugate them, or the Le begging him to help them retake Vietnam- considering this is after all Qianlong we’re talking about- he will likely jump at the chance of yet another glorious campaign. If we want him to focus on the far west, we probably need the campaign to encounter significant issues from the start, but without actually becoming unsuccessful. However, if he is busy with the far west and thus too occupied to spare troops for campaigns that do not necessarily need to be executed, and if he can come to an agreement with both the Konbaung kings (not likely, but possible), and the Tay Son (more likely), he’ll probably refrain and focus more on the far western campaign. If he does, the Qing now have not only not lost imperial prestige and money, but they have access to capable commanders that did not die, such as Ming Rui, and thousands of troops. In total, they lost around more than 70 000 troops killed and 2500 captured, and over 13 million taels; by all accounts a huge amount of men and money wasted, and one that should probably be enough on its own to defeat whatever Kokand can throw at it and bring it to the negotiating table, though beyond that or against the Middle zhuz things get a bit more complicated.

But definitely, if the Konbaung kings aren’t forced to pull back all their troops to desperately fight a two-front war against the reinvigorated Siamese and the massive Qing armies, they’ll very likely continue to dominate Siam for longer; Qianlong’s war basically saved Siam (something that’s overlooked to no end in Thai nationalist historiography). However, if I may go on a tangent, this will also depend on how well they can deal with their commanders and levies, the Siamese nobles including Taksin, and the overall Burmese-Siamese situation.

First, while the commanders were talented and managed to forge a multi-ethnic fighting force, after such successes and drunk with victory, they engaged in what at times essentially amounted to warlordism, leading to wide-spread rebellions during the 1770s, especially by the ethnic Mon levies; if the Burmese are bogged down trying to pacify Siam, considering the majority of their troops during the war were in fact Siamese levies, a similar situation is likely to arise. While it is true that we are talking about the 1760s here, Hsinbyushin died in 1776, and toward the end of his life control over the empire’s administration began to slip from his hands as Burmese governors basically ignored his orders. Even then, if he continues to live- since he was after all only 39 when he died- how long can he engage in continuous warfare? He engaged in campaigns against both Manipur and the Laotian states before he went against Siam, and he would have to spend years trying to pacify the Siamese nobles and countryside, during which some amount of brutality will be engaged in by his commanders and produce further unrest, while the Siamese and even Mon levies probably won’t like the idea of endless pacification campaigns- and this is if he’s even able to focus on just Siam and not run off to his western border.

Second, in the aftermath of the sack of Ayutthaya, said Siamese nobles broke off and formed what were basically five major successor states across the territory of the former empire, all the way down to the south in Nakhon Si Thammarat and east in Chanthaburi, with the Burmese having little to no control over the Siamese countryside. Most importantly, Chanthaburi in the far east of Siam is where Taksin is based, far from the Burmese supply lines and past many other of the successor states. If the Burmese commanders aren’t able to get themselves together and act properly with their troops and toward the nobles and civilian population under their control- not to mention how they’re going to support their armies in such a long campaign that pacifying Siam is going to be- this will likely lead to increased support among the nobles for rebellion and support of Taksin. Even if Taksin is killed, as long as there are some successor states left around, there will be someone to try and claim the mantle of Ayutthaya, whether they will be based in the south or in the east, and when Hsinbyushin eventually dies and the legacy of his endless fighting becomes apparent to Myanmar, they will try and take the chance to restore Siam.

Third, the overall Burmese-Siamese situation is still unfavorable. While the Siamese war effort was pretty terribly executed in the beginning, the shock and trauma of Ayutthaya’s sack and effective destruction became a wakeup call and rallying cry for all of those who felt dissatisfied with the Burmese occupation; this is compounded by the fact that the Burmese did not necessarily have better weapons or more troops, but rather won because they had access to a large pool of experienced commanders, while the Siamese did not, an advantage which decreases as the war goes by. The Burmese are trying to subjugate a much larger and more populous territory with limited resources and manpower, while having to manage long and insecure borders, whereas the Siamese nobles resisting them have more potential levies available and need only focus on retaking Siam itself. Of course, the Konbaung kings could still try and settle for keeping Lan Na and getting the Tenasserim, but without the wakeup call the Qing invasions were to them regarding how limited their capabilities actually were, the considerable effort invested into Siam and elsewhere, and the desire for any successful Siamese warlord-turned-king to avenge Ayutthaya or at least engage in the traditional contest for Lan Na and the Tenasserim, this still has room to go either way depending on the circumstances.

Is expanding into this region economically sustainable?

Expanding into the region is economically sustainable if they can get the caravan trades of the region going, though to be honest, there’s very little the Qing have going for them in the area. Most of their trade is internal and from the seas, and most of their trade overland for furs and tea already goes from Kyakhta into Russia; however, while they could try and tap into the caravan trade in the region as taxmen, beyond that there isn’t much there for them to trade that they aren’t trading already, except perhaps for accessing the slave markets and areas to grow cotton, the latter of which was one of the reasons why the Russians went there themselves. That being said, the Qing did conquer and administrate Xinjiang even though the area required great expenses and was generally a drain on the treasury, so if they succeed in taking Kokand or the Middle zhuz they might just stay out of sheer imperial stubbornness.
 
...
Expanding into the region is economically sustainable if they can get the caravan trades of the region going, though to be honest, there’s very little the Qing have going for them in the area. Most of their trade is internal and from the seas, and most of their trade overland for furs and tea already goes from Kyakhta into Russia; however, while they could try and tap into the caravan trade in the region as taxmen, beyond that there isn’t much there for them to trade that they aren’t trading already, except perhaps for accessing the slave markets and areas to grow cotton, the latter of which was one of the reasons why the Russians went there themselves. That being said, the Qing did conquer and administrate Xinjiang even though the area required great expenses and was generally a drain on the treasury, so if they succeed in taking Kokand or the Middle zhuz they might just stay out of sheer imperial stubbornness.

Thanks.
 
Well expansion needs soldiers. Soldiers want pay (if you pay them by letting them keep loot instead of a steady salary, you're asking for trouble). pay comes from taxes. I don't think the Qing wanted to raise more taxes. So, I think OTL reaches close to it's limits. Much easier than trying to expanding Qing is to slow their fall.
 
Top