What if prompt rightist victory in Spain in 1936?

[Carl Schwamberger]

AIUI OTL the British had a blue print for the operation ready and Franco in fact was sure that the first consequences of Spain entering the war would be the loss of the islands...

The US had its own plans for occupation as well. There was a reason a 2-3 division amphibious force for the Atlantic Fleet was built up in 1941.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Militarily:

1) The concept of dive-bombing doesn't get the little testing it did get (there were only three Ju-87's in Spain, first three A-models later replaced with three B-models). I still think Germany will build them though, the dive bombing concept had been tested by the USMC in Central America.

Thats one point. Another is experience at ordinary bombing. Just because its 'ordinary' does not mean there were many false assumptions and bad techniques from lack of actual combat experience. Warsaw & Rotterdam would have been less destructive without Guernica & its like.

Another is even less exerpeince, actually zero, for attacking ships. A very few German aircrew acquired experience in attacking ships with aircraft during the SCW. Their experience was marginalized by Goerings Luftwaffee, but even the tiny experimental unit of 1939-40 made a difference in the Channel & Eastern Approaches in 1940. Without that unit the foundation for the effective airstrikes of 1941 - 1942 in the Med would not have been there. So, less complete development from a later starting point

 

[mianfei]

I have long wanted on this site to ask whether Franco would have participated in the Munich Conference if he had won the war by the time it was actually held?

Would his presence have led to a more effective settlement in Europe or would he have made the sort of colonial demands that provided more opportunities to disturb the fragile peace in Europe?

 

[Anarch King of Dipsodes]

First question: how promptly does the army rebellion succeed?

If the rebellion is better planned and organized, then it may take the form of a coup d'état, with the rebel forces seizing control of Madrid before the socialist government even knows what's happening.

In that case... there is no war, not even a short one. There may be localized outbreaks of Red resistance to the coup, but nothing compared to OTL's protracted and bloody campaigns. Also, there will be no Red Terror. (OTL, the Spanish extreme left responded to the rebellion with a wave of arbitrary executions throughout the Republican zone. The exact number of killings has never been determined, but it is known that the Reds killed about 8,000 Catholic priests and several hundred nuns. So probably on the order of 50,000 all up. If that seems absurdly large - remember that these weren't Fabians, they were Leninists.)

And if no Red Terror, then no retaliatory White Terror (or at least a much smaller White Terror). There will be a crackdown on the Left, but that is unavoidable, given the hundreds of political assassinations in the previous year. (Many of these were left-on-left: the Reds did not get on with the anarchosyndicalists, nor the Trotskyites with the Stalinists.)

Another probable outcome is that Sanjurjo avoids his bizarre OTL death by excess baggage and becomes caudillo. He was the designated head of the rebellion.

Italy and Germany do not become involved, nor the USSR. Spain is not the "military laboratory" for Europe. This means a lot of lessons are not learned. Some of these were valuable: the Luftwaffe learned a lot about dive bombing. Other lessons were wrong, however. Italian biplane fighters defeated Soviet monoplane fighters in dogfights; the Italians went home and built more biplanes, but the real lesson was "don't dogfight with a biplane".

What does Spain do when the Big War breaks out? IMO, Spain is even more likely to remain neutral. The Spanish regime has no debt, formal or informal, to Germany. The regime would be headed by Sanjurjo for a while, but by 1939 might have returned to (right-wing) civilian control. Even if the generals stay in charge, ISTM that the civilian right and center would have a larger role, and the civilians would be opposed to any military adventures.

(I would add that in 1939, many Spanish rightists were disgusted by Hitler's pact with Stalin. The later Blue Division was created after Hitler attacked Stalin.)

Also, Spain would probably be less hospitable to German intelligence operations. German attempts to spy on Britain from Spain became a major part of the celebrated Double Cross system. In particular, GARBO, the greatest Double Cross agent, was a Spaniard "controlled" by the Abwehr station in Spain; and he made himself a double agent out of disgust at fascist activities in Spain.

 

[Ricardolindo]

First question: how promptly does the army rebellion succeed?

If the rebellion is better planned and organized, then it may take the form of a coup d'état, with the rebel forces seizing control of Madrid before the socialist government even knows what's happening.

In that case... there is no war, not even a short one. There may be localized outbreaks of Red resistance to the coup, but nothing compared to OTL's protracted and bloody campaigns. Also, there will be no Red Terror. (OTL, the Spanish extreme left responded to the rebellion with a wave of arbitrary executions throughout the Republican zone. The exact number of killings has never been determined, but it is known that the Reds killed about 8,000 Catholic priests and several hundred nuns. So probably on the order of 50,000 all up. If that seems absurdly large - remember that these weren't Fabians, they were Leninists.)

And if no Red Terror, then no retaliatory White Terror (or at least a much smaller White Terror). There will be a crackdown on the Left, but that is unavoidable, given the hundreds of political assassinations in the previous year. (Many of these were left-on-left: the Reds did not get on with the anarchosyndicalists, nor the Trotskyites with the Stalinists.)

Another probable outcome is that Sanjurjo avoids his bizarre OTL death by excess baggage and becomes caudillo. He was the designated head of the rebellion.

Italy and Germany do not become involved, nor the USSR. Spain is not the "military laboratory" for Europe. This means a lot of lessons are not learned. Some of these were valuable: the Luftwaffe learned a lot about dive bombing. Other lessons were wrong, however. Italian biplane fighters defeated Soviet monoplane fighters in dogfights; the Italians went home and built more biplanes, but the real lesson was "don't dogfight with a biplane".

What does Spain do when the Big War breaks out? IMO, Spain is even more likely to remain neutral. The Spanish regime has no debt, formal or informal, to Germany. The regime would be headed by Sanjurjo for a while, but by 1939 might have returned to (right-wing) civilian control. Even if the generals stay in charge, ISTM that the civilian right and center would have a larger role, and the civilians would be opposed to any military adventures.

(I would add that in 1939, many Spanish rightists were disgusted by Hitler's pact with Stalin. The later Blue Division was created after Hitler attacked Stalin.)

Also, Spain would probably be less hospitable to German intelligence operations. German attempts to spy on Britain from Spain became a major part of the celebrated Double Cross system. In particular, GARBO, the greatest Double Cross agent, was a Spaniard "controlled" by the Abwehr station in Spain; and he made himself a double agent out of disgust at fascist activities in Spain.

I don't think Sanjurjo would have any control over Spain. He was excentric, somewhat of a figurehead and not taken very seriously by the other generals.
Mola or, as in our timeline, Franco are far more likely rulers of Spain than Sanjurjo if, as unlikely as it was, the coup succeeded.
If Mola ended up the ruler, the situation has the potential of being even more deadly than our timeline's White Terror. He openly admitted that the only way to pacify the country after the coup would be to imprison or kill everyone associated with the Popular Front.
I think a Mola led Spain would have joined the Axis, for ideological reasons. He wanted to keep Spain a secular republic. He was much closer to Fascism than Franco was.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Maybe a little less food but it still needs quite a lot of imports. Less damage helps a little but it does not stop trucks needing fuel etc and it has no oil internally.

It's possible that between 1936 and 1940 the TTL Spain would use some of its gold reserve and some of the money not spend on the Civil War to accumulate a reserve of oil and other raw materials that it wouldn't be able to obtain if the Country was at war with France and Great Britain.

I'm also guessing that the pre-civil war Spain had a favourable balance of payments, which would explain the existence of the gold reserve.

Also in common with OTL Spain is only going to join the war if the Spanish Government thinks the war will be over in a few months.

If Italy is in a stronger position ITTL (and I think it will be) and that translates in the Axis doing better in the central and eastern Mediterranean in 1940 that will encourage the Spanish Government to "come to the aid of the winning side" or at least the side that appears to be winning.

However, it might make the TTL Spanish Government think that the Axis can win without Spanish help and that it can remain neutral until just before the war ends and occupy the British and French territory that it wants.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

According to Green & Fricker the AME had 600 aircraft in 1926. However, but this had declined to 277 aircraft of all types when the SCW broke out and the Aeronáutica Naval the naval air arm had 62 front-line aircraft. Most of the aircraft in both air arms seem to have been of 1920s vintage. In 1939 the EdA inherited approximately 1,000 aircraft of all types, which had existed on both sides at the time of the surrender.

It's likely that the Spanish military and naval air arms would have undergone some modernisation and expansion between 1936 and 1940 ITTL regardless of who was in power. More would be done to develop an indigenous aircraft industry. This is because of the worsening international situation of the 1930s.

 

[thaddeus]

think a lot of the speculation (including mine) has left out the fact that a quick coup does not remove the opposition? (the Republican side)

the Nationalists would have greatly improved position vs. years long SCW but at the same time they have not removed (killed off) hundreds of thousands of their enemies?

think they would be in divide and conquer phase for most of the rest of interwar period, not launching a major naval construction program? possibly they could develop a modern air force, and that may be favored since it could be constituted with loyalists?

 

[Ramontxo]

The coup itself no. The posterior repression explicitly envisaged by Mola definitely would.

 

[Bad@logic]

The butterflies aren't all bad for the Allies. A quick victory gives a few years for the regime to be installed and it could easily drift more to the Allied orbit out of the crushing economic weight around it, and with less influence from the Germans and Italians. The French exported war material to Spain, so save some of this for themselves - although I am doubtful that that does anything, given that the stuff they exported was broadly obsolete and they badly used their obsolete material during the Battle of France, and it would have presumably given them some money and export revenue.ore importantly is that the war in Spain was a great distraction for Britain and France, whose parliaments spent much more time dealing with Spain than contemplating what to do about Central Europe, and the French in particular were terrified about the prospect of being surrounded on all fronts.

"It would be difficult to exaggerate the impact of the Spanish war on French policy making. French preoccupations with the conflict helps to explain the capitulations in central and eastern Europe in 1939. The military situation created by the conflagration was a terrifying one. It was assumed in Paris that in the event of a Franco victory, France would be encircled ba triple alliance of Germany, Italy and Spain. In August, Delbos said that 'he had every reason to fear that General Franco had offered the bait of the Balaeric Islands to Italy and the Canaries to Germany, and if that materialised good-bye to French independence'44 Sea and air links with North Africa might easily be cut by air and naval forces operating from bases in the Balaerics, not to mention the danger to the land frontier of the Pyrenees. Moreover, a third of the French army was stationed in North Africa and survival in war would depend on the speed and safety which troops could be transported across the western Mediterranean.45 For France, the Spanish war began a war of nerves which lasted until the attack on Poland in September 1939. 'Europe is on the verge of general war', declared Delbos on 28 November, 1939.46 A month later, Count Welczeck, German Ambassador, told of:

the downright hysterical nervousness which has been evident among the public here for several days and has started crack-brained rumours circulating regarding the inevitability of a war, simultaneous military attacks on France from the east and the south planned by German.47

The Spanish imbroglio had two consequences for French foreign policy. First it strengthened the dominant role of Britain in the entente. The nightmare of encirclement by Fascist dictatorships made the French cleave closer to their ally. Secondly, the strategic uncertainty created by the war practically dictated the retreat from central Europe. Presented with almost simultaneous threats to her Mediterranean position and to geogrpahically remote allies in central Europe, France inevitably gave priority to her own security."

France and the Coming of the Second World War, pg. 45

Less focus on Spain, possibly more normalized relations with Spain, and if that succeeds less fear of encirclement could lead the French to take a more proactive stance against Germany. Of course, that relies on Spain's regime mellowing, but Franco's regime mellowed rather quickly too, until the Germans destroyed France. A faster victory by the rightists would give more time for relations to stabilize with France, and so might enable the French to present a more united front against the Germans. It is low probability, but butterflies could extend to something like a Czechoslovak war.