1
- Thread starter jw4097jw
- Start date
-
- Tags
- japan pacific war
A limited border war type deal might be doable at the time. Basically a number of skirmishes with attempts at mobilization on both sides before diplomats save the day.
Wasn't really an either-or, the Kōdōha was supportive of the invasion of Manchuria after all.
A war with the US makes absolutely no sense for Japan in 1934, no matter how aggressive a position they take in China. The US is not going to do anything that risks war for the sake of China. Even in 1941 the US only resorted to oil sanctions not because of China alone but because Japan was a threat to the French, British, and Dutch possessions (and their resources) in southeast Asia, and the western European powers had been defeated or drastically weakened by the war with Germany.
Yes but Manchuria is on the path for an invasion of the Soviet Union along with more importantly being part of the Japan sphere of influence before 1931.
The correlation of forces does not favor Japan. In terms of battleships, not only are the Japanese outnumbered 15-10, but their battle fleet is riddled with deficiencies. Hiei is still demilitarized; Haruna and Yamashiro are stuck in dock undergoing deep modernizations; Kongo and Kirishima are still slow 26-knot ships after their first reconstructions; and the Nagato and Ise classes are still in as-built condition. In contrast, the US Navy has modernized the first 7 Standards by 1934, though depending on the time Idaho may still need a few more months in dock.
Considering the US battle line was superior to Japan's even after the Japanese modernizations, any sort of battleship clash is going to end very poorly.
Their carrier fleets are on paper equivalent, with Akagi, Kaga, Hosho, and Ryujo matched up against Langley, Lexington, Saratoga, and Ranger. However, Lexington and Saratoga were far superior carriers to their Japanese counterparts, who were still in their three-deck design - oh, and Kaga is also laid up in dock being modernized.
Cruisers? Advantage US. Destroyers? Advantage US, though no modern ships as opposed to 27 Japanese.
Considering the US battle line was superior to Japan's even after the Japanese modernizations, any sort of battleship clash is going to end very poorly.
Their carrier fleets are on paper equivalent, with Akagi, Kaga, Hosho, and Ryujo matched up against Langley, Lexington, Saratoga, and Ranger. However, Lexington and Saratoga were far superior carriers to their Japanese counterparts, who were still in their three-deck design - oh, and Kaga is also laid up in dock being modernized.
Cruisers? Advantage US. Destroyers? Advantage US, though no modern ships as opposed to 27 Japanese.
It doesn't have to be Japan that starts it.
What if Hoover seeks a short victorious war to stem the tide of the New Deal revolution? A few incidents manufactured in China and maybe a bit of skullduggery here and there and maybe he can go before Congress wrapped in a bloody shirt to regretfully, sorrowfully, yet with steadfast purpose and unshakeable American will demand that these innocents be avenged (and we'll have the Mandates as well thank you very much).
After all, the IJN is way behind in the refit cycle and the carriers are only equivalent on paper.
Plus you get a bunch of naval construction orders to try to hang on to some of the coastal electoral votes.
What if Hoover seeks a short victorious war to stem the tide of the New Deal revolution? A few incidents manufactured in China and maybe a bit of skullduggery here and there and maybe he can go before Congress wrapped in a bloody shirt to regretfully, sorrowfully, yet with steadfast purpose and unshakeable American will demand that these innocents be avenged (and we'll have the Mandates as well thank you very much).
After all, the IJN is way behind in the refit cycle and the carriers are only equivalent on paper.
Plus you get a bunch of naval construction orders to try to hang on to some of the coastal electoral votes.
raharris1973
Gone Fishin'
Would need a brain transplant for the Quaker Hoover, and in any case would be a gross miscalculation of the American electorate.
Not to mention the fact that that 1934 is over 1 year after FDR became the President of the USA so Hoover has zero involvement.
Stimson then, historically a supporter of American armament prior to WW1 entry, convinced of Japanese enmity during the Naval Conference, opposed to Japan's Manchurian action, decides that Tokyo is not run by gentlemen and so decides it's all right to read their mail, and then that Something Must Be Done!
Bywater's book was in 1931 so go from there.
The Japanese were so worried that war might break out after the Panay incident, they immediately offered an apology, reparations, and court martial for the people involved. You are dealing with the China Lobby at this time. This was,IMHO, the in the top 3 foreign lobbies in the US.
This was also the only one the isolationists would support intervention overseas.
They really need not have worried so much. The actual effect of the Panay incident in OTL was to strengthen isolationism in the US.
As David M. Kennedy writes in Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945, p. 402: "But the Panay was not to be a modern Maine, nor even a Lusitania. Its sinking produced a cry for withdrawal, not for war. 'We should learn that it is about time for us to mind our own business,' Texas Democrat Maury Maverick declared in the House. A few months later, a Fortune magazine poll showed that a majority of Americans favored getting the United States out of China altogether. When Japan tendered an official apology for the Panay incident and paid some $2 million in reparations, the crisis swiftly blew over.
"The principal residue of the Panay affair in Congress was not more bellicosity but more pacifism [citing the boost the incident gave to the proposed Ludlow Amendment]... https://books.google.com/books?id=UQlEq9GILRgC&pg=PR111
Americans did sympathize with China--but not enough to go to war for her. As a Hearst press headline put it: "WE SYMPATHIZE. BUT IT IS NOT OUR CONCERN." https://books.google.com/books?id=qTCOAwAAQBAJ&pg=PT67
Theoretically I wonder if the domestic response to Panay was because of the small size of the incident and casualties. It's one thing to have a "Lets get the fuck out of there" reaction with less then half a dozen dead on a gunboat. If it was say a few hundred dead on a cruiser I wonder if the reaction would have been more violent. Or say over a thousand if on a battleship.
Japan was stuck in a no-win in 1941: if they don't attack the United States, then the Philippines sit on the shipping route to the Japanese conquests (most importantly, the oil from the Dutch East Indies), which would pose an existential threat to Japan. If they do attack, they need to win hard enough to secure immediate peace, which as OTL showed was impossible.
marathag
Banned
choice between a possible US attack on shipping in the future, vs guaranteed War right now, that goes totally according to plan, against the Dutch, UK&Commonwealth, plus the USA.
since they were into gambling, should have stuck just the Dutch and UK for War. Tht gives at least 6 months with the USA out as an unfriendly neutral
One of my favorite alternate histories. Remember this was written in the mid 20s (I think written in 24-5 and published in 26) So the ink on the Washington agreement was barely dry and everyone was still figuring out what to do with their carrier tonnage