(Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 168th Conclusions, Minute 5.)
9. The Minister of Health said that, in the course of the 3 1/2 hours' conversation which he had held with Mr. de Valera on Monday, the 17th June, he had impressed on the latter that the war against Germany was one in defence of the freedom of every democratic country, including that of Ireland, and that His Majesty's Government thought that Eire was in imminent danger of invasion by Germany. Their reasons for this were—
(a) That there was evidence from the "Held" papers and other documents that there was a plan for the invasion of Ireland;
(b) That the experience of other neutral countries showed that Germany did not hesitate to use this weapon against her enemies; and
(c) That Eire was next on the list of neutral countries through whose territory an attack could be launched against Great Britain.
His Majesty's Government were grateful to Mr. de Valera for having agreed to the staff conversations which had taken place; but the measures agreed on were not nearly enough to ward off the lightning attack which Germany was likely to make. The enemy was now in possession of the West Coast of France, on which he could base a seaborne attack. Troops landed by parachutes or aeroplanes could easily swoop upon Irish territory, which was sparsely populated and ideal for the purpose. Moreover, the large number of German citizens and members of the I.R.A. at large would provide an effective Fifth Column.
Irish troops were not sufficient to deal with ruthless attacks on the German model, and, under the plan drawn up by the military advisers of the two countries, reliance would be placed on (a) the vigilance of British naval patrols (which could not use the ports of Eire); and (b) the arrival of reinforcements from Northern Ireland, whose support might well be hindered or prevented by the sabotage of road and rail communications.
In these circumstances, the view of His Majesty's Government was that there was great danger of the Germans being able to carry out an effective landing by sea and air; that they could overwhelm the resistance of the Eire troops; and might be in effective occupation of the Twenty-six Counties within a few hours from landing. The wisest course for Eire would be the immediate abandonment of her neutrality and complete co-operation with us in resistance to Germany. This advice was given in the interest of Eire herself, because, although an invasion of that country would embarrass us, it would be disastrous to her. To this suggestion Mr. de Valera had returned an emphatic negative. He said that the whole force of public opinion was against any abandonment of neutrality a moment before it was inevitable.
He (Mr. MacDonald) had then asked whether it was possible for the Eire Government, with the support of the Opposition, to invite British warships to use Irish ports, and to call in British troops to guard strategic points in the defence of Eire's neutrality. Mr. de Valera had replied that there was no possibility of agreeing to this course, as the national unity which had been achieved between the various parties in the country was based on the continued maintenance of the policy of neutrality and on a firm resistance to the forces of either belligerent who became the aggressor. To permit the occupation of Ireland by the forces of one belligerent would provoke Hitler to carry out his aggressive schemes; it would destroy the national unity which had been achieved with such difficulty in Ireland. It would make no difference to his answer whether the forces which came in were British, French, Polish or Dominion troops. The position might have been different if there had been a United Ireland.
Mr. MacDonald had then suggested that a step might be taken towards the project of a United Ireland by the establishment of a joint council for the defence of the whole island. This, however, Mr. de Valera had rejected as a step involving a decisive breach of neutrality and as a blow to the national unity of Eire.
The further suggestion was then put to Mr. de Valera that something could be done to improve the immediate prospect by arresting and imprisoning the I.R.A. leaders and by interning suspect Germans and Italians. He had replied that, while all the leaders of the I.R.A. outside Dublin were under detention, the authorities could not lay their hands on all the prominent I.R.A. members in Dublin itself. As regards Germans, the documentary evidence available had not been sufficient to establish a conspiracy against the State, and there was no evidence of an unneutral act in favour of one of the belligerents.
Mr. de Valera had made it plain that the Irish people intended to put up a stout resistance to any invasion from whatever quarter; he had asked whether material assistance could not be afforded in the shape, for example, of anti-tank weapons and aircraft. To this Mr. MacDonald had replied that we were not confident of the power of the local forces in Eire to prevent any material we might supply from falling into the enemy's hands. We would, of course, send help the moment we were asked to do so, but, in the circumstances which had been envisaged, this might have to be limited to the operations of our Air Force.
Summing up his impression of the interview, Mr. MacDonald said that Mr. de Valera was undoubtedly impressed with the view of His Majesty's Government as to the imminent danger of an invasion of Eire, which had previously been represented as somewhat of a bogey. He would, however, emphasise his conviction that in his determination to resist either that Mr. de Valera was genuine belligerent to the utmost limit of his power; this resistance would be directed against any attempt on our part to seize the Atlantic ports by force.
The Lord President of the Council said that the War Cabinet were greatly indebted to the Minister of Health for the skill with which he had carried out his tasks; he had evidently succeeded in instilling some sense of reality into Mr. de Valera. The latter, however, had repeated the old theme that he could do nothing to prejudice his country's neutrality, on which his much-vaunted "national unity" depended.
The Lord President had seen a preliminary draft of an Aide-memoire from the Chiefs of Staff, which included the statement that there could be no security for Eire or- the United Kingdom unless proper arrangements were made which included the presence of British or Dominion troops and Air forces in Eire, and His Majesty's Ships in Irish ports. It was further pointed out that the main, and perhaps the sole, obstacle to such collaboration was the partition question.
The Lord President said that, on the basis that help to Eire after invasion had taken place might well come too late, we were compelled to consider the question of entering the Irish ports by force.
At the same time, before this step was taken he would advocate further exploration of the ground, in view especially of the possible unfavourable reaction which would be caused in the United States of America by any forcible measures against Ireland. He would, therefore, propose that the Minister of Health should return to Dublin and should speak to Mr. de Valera on the following lines: —
His Majesty's Government are satisfied that there is no possibility of making your country safe against German invasion, of which it stands in imminent danger at present, unless—
(i) you give the British Navy the use of the Irish Atlantic ports;
(ii) you allow our troops and Air forces to enter the Twenty-six Counties before the invasion occurs; and
(iii) you secure yourself against the dangers of fifth column activities by interning all the leaders of the I.R.A. still at large, as well as any suspicious Germans and Italians at present in this country (we should not press them necessarily to sever diplomatic relations with Germany).
The Minister of Health would go on to ask whether, in return for these measures, Mr. de Valera would be content to accept a declaration stating that His Majesty's Government were, in principle, in favour of the establishment of a United Ireland. This would naturally have to be followed by an. approach to Lord Craigavon, who would have to be told that the interests of Northern Ireland could not be allowed to stand against the vital interests of the British Empire. Lord Craigavon would naturally ask whether the United Ireland would form part of the British Empire. The answer to this was clearly in the affirmative, though of course full Dominion status carried with it the right to secede from the Commonwealth.
Should Mr. de Valera still maintain a negative attitude, the Minister of Health should insist that the proposition should be put to his Government, some members of which he (the Lord President) understood were likely to take a less rigid view.
If the Irish Governments refusal were still maintained, His Majesty's Government would be on stronger ground vis-a-vis the United States of America, if later on they were compelled to use force. He understood that the Chiefs of Staff had not yet studied the question whether we could successfully occupy the Irish ports in the face of resistance and thought that this question should receive early consideration.
The Prime Minister, while agreeing generally with the Lord President, said that we must avoid putting undue pressure on the loyal province of Ulster. He would not urge those who had worked self-government loyally within the Empire to join with those who wished to stay outside it. He was not convinced that the military situation was so serious as it had been represented. He was in favour of allowing the enemy to make the first move; if they succeeded in establishing themselves in Ireland our forces should then be ready to pounce upon them. The whole of Ireland, including Mr. de Valera, would in those circumstances be on our side.
The Lord President of the Council said that he had suggested the possibility of urging this course very strongly upon Northern Ireland only because he was impressed with the dangers to this country which might follow a successful invasion of Ireland.
The Lord Privy Seal said that a German invasion would furnish the best chance of securing a united Ireland, and he saw no advantage in attempting to coerce either Northern Ireland or Eire by force.
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs shared the views expressed by the Lord Pri^y Seal, and suggested that the Minister of Health should return to Dublin where he could continue the process of educating Mr. de Valera as to the dangers of invasion, at the same time exploring to what extent any advance towards a United Ireland would help Mr. de Valera in dealing with Irish opinion on this matter. If anything useful came out of these conversations, it would, of course, have to be put to Lord Craigavon.
The Minister without Portfolio thought that, after the experience which this country had had of air-raids during the two previous nights, the Irish people would be in little doubt as to the determination' of Germany to concentrate attacks on this Island. American public opinion was a decisive argument against a forcible seizure of the Irish Ports.
The Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security said that the Irish people were resolute fighters, and he thought that they would be capable of dealing with parachutists or airborne invasion. Difficulties might arise in the case of a seaborne attack, and he suggested that the Irish might be advised to protect their ports by mines, net, and boom defences, which would create difficulties for the invader. He thought that it was impossible to coerce either Northern or Southern Ireland, and that it was unlikely that any substantial advance could be made towards the project of a United Ireland.
The War Cabinet agreed—
To invite the Minister of Health to resume his conversations with Mr. de Valera on the lines suggested by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.