What if Operation Dragoon were aimed at Antwerp instead of the French Riviera?

Could a post D-Day amphibious landing on Antwerp and the Scheldt work

  • Yes, and it would have net positive results for the Allies

    Votes: 2 6.9%
  • Yes, but it would be higher cost than OTL's Dragoon

    Votes: 13 44.8%
  • Yes, but it would be less beneficial than OTL's Dragoon

    Votes: 7 24.1%
  • No, it couldn't work, it's Arnhem on a beach, Dieppe all over again

    Votes: 7 24.1%

  • Total voters
    29

raharris1973

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The Dragoon operation of August 1944 ultimately did not tie down the German forces in southern France as originally intended because D-Day in northern France started in June. Ultimately though, it did provide a side benefit of opening up the French Mediterranean ports and supply lines up the Rhone for Allied forces in France.

However, could the shipping and forces employed for Dragoon have been more usefully employed in an amphibious invasion of Antwerp and the Scheldt (and maybe Ostend too)? Not having use of Antwerp port is often described as the major logistical bottleneck preventing the Western Allies from crossing the Rhine in 1944. Even after the city was cleared, the port was not usable for a long time because German troops and artillery still held out on the islands of the Scheldt. Could an August (or July) Allied invasion of Antwerp, the Scheldt and maybe Ostend storm these ports, capture them intact and put them into full use by fall of 1944? Or would such an attempt be too much risk to the invaders for too little potential gain in terms of time gained using the port?

I have heard the southern French ports were important for supplying the Western Allies in France. Perhaps without Dragoon the Germans could have holed up in them into the end of the war like they did in Brittany's ports. But were those southern French ports crucial for operations in the summer and fall of 44, or only from the winter onward into 1945? If you can make a "trade" and get earlier use of Antwerp, it seems worth it.
 
While I confess that I am no expert on Antwerp or the 21st Army Group's sector in general, I would argue that the loss of benefits from a canceled Operation Dragoon would outweigh the benefit of capturing Antwerp early. I can help but think that you are underestimating the benefits gained by Operation Dragoon. While it is true that the German 19th Army got away due to Allied logistical problems, it did not mean that they escaped unharmed. The losses suffered by Army Group G was staggering, by the 14th of September Army Group G had suffered 143,250 casualties. The 19th Army was also effective crippled by the relentless pursuit by the Allies, with all of its divisions understrength and underequipped. The only thing that saved it from collapse was the defensible terrain of the Vosges mountains.

Secondly, the Sixth Army Group was also protecting the 12th Army Group's southern flank; without them, the 12th Army Group would have to be stretched or shifted southward towards the Swiss border. In this case, it may be that the 12th Army Group suspends all offensive action towards the Siegfried line until the 6th Army Group clears and captures Antwerp and the Scheldt.

As for the southern French ports, Marseilles and Toulon were vital for the Allied logistics, having been captured nearly intact and fully operational by late September, and made up at least 20% of the Allied supply capacity. There is always the French perspective to consider; I doubt that the French would be happy with the idea of having the French First Army liberating Belgian soil over the southern part of their country still under German control.
 
However, could the shipping and forces employed for Dragoon have been more usefully employed in an amphibious invasion of Antwerp and the Scheldt (and maybe Ostend too)?

Do you mean:
A) "Dragoon" should have been planned for Antwerp from the start?; or
B) Given the progress of Overlord, Dragoon should have been diverted?
as they are very different questions.

A - remember that the original pre D-Day plan had the Allies at the Scheldt at D+270 (from Eisenhower's Crusade in Europe). Therefore a secondary invasion in August cannot be expected to join up quickly with the main front. If you're planning to help open up more ports, then either Brest or Le Havre - Dieppe would have been sensible.

B - various diversions were considered OTL, including Bordeaux. However remember that the Allies had deception operations in place to convince the Germans that a second seaborne invasion would be launched in France/Belgium which helped keep German divisions away from Normandy. Actually launching an operation similar to the deception operations might not have been a great idea.

Not having use of Antwerp port is often described as the major logistical bottleneck preventing the Western Allies from crossing the Rhine in 1944.

Not really correct. The biggest bottleneck was the lack of transport companies to get stores from the port areas to the front which was a longstanding argument between the ETO and Washington (see Ruppenthal's Logistical Support of the Armies). This was exacerbated by splitting supplies between US 1st and 3rd Armies and allowing both to advance and get stuck at Aachen/Metz. If supplies had been concentrated behind either then a Rhine crossing might have been possible.
 
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Marsallies had the advantage that the railways north to eastern France were intact. Those leading from Antwerp were in such bad condition port operations had to be slowed drastically in December to clear the backlog from the docks and city.
 
Marsallies had the advantage that the railways north to eastern France were intact. Those leading from Antwerp were in such bad condition port operations had to be slowed drastically in December to clear the backlog from the docks and city.

According to Ruppenthal, the major problem of port clearance at Antwerp were due to blocked canals, rather than just railways. Canal transport was important in Europe, but discussions tend to just focus on Rhine barges in 1940. ;)
 
They had been hoping to use the canals on realizing the railways were a problem. One of the major blockages of the canals were... Wait for it.... Destroyed bridges.

Bottom line was the transport system was trashed.
 
They had been hoping to use the canals on realizing the railways were a problem. One of the major blockages of the canals were... Wait for it.... Destroyed bridges.
:)

According to Admin History of 21st Army Group:

By the end of October the whole system of canals in Belgium was in satisfactory order, with the exception of the Albert Canal. Clearance of this canal started in October... and eventually opened to 600t craft by 15 December.

Major problem on the Albert Canal was apparently the Yserburg bridge, near Antwerp.
 
I think the whole enterprise undertaken as Operation Overlord had such an extensive impact on the deployment and logistics of the forces employed that southern England was like one big camp. The valid question Aber asks is if Dragon was to be moved at short (two months) notice or was it to be planned six months earlier.

Planning a second amphibious landing operation around Antwerp early, the planners would have had to contend with establishing good lines of communications for the camped troops in England to their logistical bases,when they assembled for these operations. The logistics of all these extra troops and equipment to be housed, the extra shipping to get them into the UK would have been huge problems. Trying to do that trick at almost a whim would have lead to an almighty mess in my opinion, and would not have been a reasonable option.

But the longer term pre planning of this follow up operation, does offer some advantages. Firstly instead of the elaborate fictional army to persuade the Germans that the Pas De Calais was the target, we would have a real life army camped and waiting, in Kent, round to Essex say, which could have also translated into a greater delay in deploying the German reserves to the Normandy bridgehead. It also could draw more German reinforcements to the Dutch coast and even the North Sea coast of Germany, in anticipation of a second landing.And secondly the redeployment of the landing craft, the LCM's, LST's and other specialist forces is a lot easier done, not having to transfer them into the Med.

However, in my opinion, The Southern France option is more attractive. Firstly we don't have to trans-ship troops from the Med theatre up to the UK. Secondly a large number of troops were French North African, and are better motivated landing to free the motherland, France, than dying in Belgium/Holland. We don't have to worry about crossing logistical lines in feeding these armies. Southern France will be supported from North Africa and the USA, and not having to land supplies in western UK ports, then train them down to Kent/Essex, crossing the massive Overlord logistical lines, is a big gain. Thirdly, the option of where they land the Med theatre forces means the Germans have to consider, a further more northerly Italian landing, as well as a Greek enterprise, and forces will have to retained to counter that threat. Mid term, the southern France landings liberates some very considerable ports, especially Marseille as Carl pointed out, they offer an admittedly poor, but never the less second Italian front, and longer term, liberated France will be able to start fielding forces, which will become quite considerable, with US arms and supplies, further aiding the allied effort.
 

raharris1973

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Not really correct. The biggest bottleneck was the lack of transport companies to get stores from the port areas to the front which was a longstanding argument between the ETO and Washington

What side of the argument was ETO and what side was Washington on? What did the side that was stingy about transport companies think they would have to sacrifice to accommodate more transport companies?

If supplies had been concentrated behind either then a Rhine crossing might have been possible.

That would be a bit controversial around here. Most times I've heard it discussed the more confident/thorough opinions tend to say breaking past the Rhine in '44 could not happen with a '44 D-Day landing.

Whereabouts would the crossing have been if the 1st Army were chosen and where would it have been if the 3rd Army were chosen?
 
What side of the argument was ETO and what side was Washington on? What did the side that was stingy about transport companies think they would have to sacrifice to accommodate more transport companies?

It was a 3 way argument.

Transportation Corps estimated that they needed 160 heavy truck companies (10 ton semi-trailers) and 80 light truck companies (2.5 ton trucks etc).

ETO thought that this was more than needed (planners are always very conservative) and planned for 59 heavy truck companies and 101 others including specialised vehicles.

Washington couldn't supply this and sent whatever vehicles they could scrape up.

Most times I've heard it discussed the more confident/thorough opinions tend to say breaking past the Rhine in '44 could not happen with a '44 D-Day landing.

Due to tactical issues or logistics?

Logistically, per studies at the time and IIRC confirmed by Van Creveld, there was enough transport to get a Corps to Berlin, starting mid September, although this requires stalling almost any other operation.

Whereabouts would the crossing have been if the 1st Army were chosen and where would it have been if the 3rd Army were chosen?

1st Army was aimed at Dusseldorf-Bonn; 3rd Army Mannheim-Coblenz. Key meeting is probably Eisenhower with Bradley, Patton etc on 2 September.
 

raharris1973

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Due to tactical issues or logistics?

Logistically, per studies at the time and IIRC confirmed by Van Creveld, there was enough transport to get a Corps to Berlin, starting mid September, although this requires stalling almost any other operation.

Logistics from what I've heard -

So a Corps gets thrusted at Berlin by mid-September 1944, does it get flanked, bogged down, or cut off, or does it start collecting PoWs once it crosses the Rhine?

By stalling almost any other operation I assume you mean operations in northwest Europe, so Italy continues, bombing continues, the Pacific front continues.
 
Logistics from what I've heard -

So a Corps gets thrusted at Berlin by mid-September 1944, does it get flanked, bogged down, or cut off, or does it start collecting PoWs once it crosses the Rhine?

The Corps to Berlin is just an indication of the logistic capacity that the Allies actually had in NW Europe. Remember a few troops from 43rd Division did cross the Rhine at Arnhem, so the Allies crossing the Rhine in force in 1944 is feasible. It just needed a concentrated attack rather than 4 different thrusts.
 
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