What if no Panther Tank

  • Thread starter Deleted member 1487
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Hmm, just realized I forgot myself to quote the net increase in Germn AFV output from scrapping Panther production.

Probably something like 1.5-2k additional not 3-3.5k. Significant but not war-changing.

It would be a lot more significant than those numbers imply, because the Panzer IVs and Panthers (if the DB is chosen) that are being produced ITTL actually work, as opposed to spontaneously breaking down all the time like OTL Panther.
 

Deleted member 1487

Just look at the research done by Nipe and Schrank on the German side and by Valery Zamulin from the Red Army perspective, It is pretty clear by now that Red Army tank losses were high compared to the German losses. Added to that the Germans, being on the offensive tended to be in control of the battlefields and were therefore in a better position to recover knocked out tanks many of which would not be total losses. The T-34 however, due to factors such as ammunition storage was more likely to suffer a catastrophic explosion when knocked out

Yes but the upshot was that ultimately the Russians were left in possession of everything so it was they who were in a position to 'control the battlefield' in fact in control of the entire front.

What I am asking is that its clear that 9:1 disparity in tanks losses suffered at Kursk and the subsequent Russian Counter attacks across the front is unsustainable - even with Russia's greater production capacity.

Despite this the battle turned the tide on the Eastern front massively in their favour.

So my suspicion is that the Russian losses is more a case of differences in the way in which tank losses are counted and ultimately recorded - and was not actually 9:1 across the whole period of the war in the east regarding 'total losses' i.e. tanks that were not recovered and put back into service.

Now that being said I still believe that building an improved PzIV in greater numbers in place of the Panther would serve Germany better.

A given Heer infantry formation would be more likely to have Armoured support as a result in a given attack / counter attack and as I said in other posts I believe that this would translate to lower overall casualties

As for a heavily armed SP with the long 7.5 or even the long 88.....

I disagree - I think the Heer would be better served by providing as many anti tank guns with a decent prime mover as possible across the entire army - thus giving a given infantry formation a better chance of defeating a Russian Armoured attack.

The problem with an SP AT gun is that the gun is lost if the vehicle is lost/breaks down.

So my opinion is spamming wheeled 75/48's anti tank guns across the German armed forces.

I think this was a better use of the gun and resources.
 

Deleted member 1487

I disagree - I think the Heer would be better served by providing as many anti tank guns with a decent prime mover as possible across the entire army - thus giving a given infantry formation a better chance of defeating a Russian Armoured attack.

The problem with an SP AT gun is that the gun is lost if the vehicle is lost/breaks down.

So my opinion is spamming wheeled 75/48's anti tank guns across the German armed forces.

I think this was a better use of the gun and resources.
Far more towed AT guns were lost due to the inability to extract them from ambush positions in the heat of combat with prime movers than SP guns lost to the AFV chassis breaking down. StuG loss rates for example or Marders/Nashorns were not lost to break down in significant quantities AFAIK, they were lost to combat damage; towed AT weapons were more lost to retreats due to the inability to move them once the fighting started, as unarmored or lightly armored prime movers couldn't get to them. Hence the OTL attempted solution:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raupenschlepper,_Ost
By 1943 infantry anti-tank units at the front complained strongly that it was almost impossible to move their guns using trucks at daylight under enemy fire, leading to enormous losses of equipment during emergency relocations (at the time a euphemism for withdrawal), and their opinions reached the top ranks. OKW explored a previously considered proposal to fit the 7.5 cm PaK 40/1 anti-tank gun - by then the standard Pak used by the Wehrmacht - on top of an RSO chassis. After seeing the blueprints, Hitler ordered a limited production run for combat testing, before the prototypes were completed.
Having it on a Pz III, III/IV, or IV chassis would have the same effect for the big guns, who were too tough to move in combat. Having an RSO based PAK40 is just fine IMHO.
 

Deleted member 1487

yes, battle changing but not war outcome.
Depending on how things play out then the post-war would could be quite different if say the Soviets suffer worse and end the war further east; even though they get occupation zones they miss out on looting Germany first. For civilians they could get out before the Soviets get there and do what they did and if the Soviets arrive once the war is over the behavior might be significantly different than arriving during fighting and having a different attitude.
 
I disagree - I think the Heer would be better served by providing as many anti tank guns with a decent prime mover as possible across the entire army - thus giving a given infantry formation a better chance of defeating a Russian Armoured attack.

The problem with an SP AT gun is that the gun is lost if the vehicle is lost/breaks down.

So my opinion is spamming wheeled 75/48's anti tank guns across the German armed forces.

I think this was a better use of the gun and resources.

This my post from the Whale has Wings thread on US AT Guns

Original TOE for US infantry regiment was 18 guns, with Beeps or Jeeps as prime movers for 37mm in Africa, didn't work well, but AGF blamed crews for not using them properly, not that 37mm bounced off Mk IIIs, let alone Mk IV F panzers.

Finally, AGF agreed with critics in late May 1943 that half the guns should be 57mms, towed by 1.5 ton trucks, over Infantry Board objections that the 57mm was too heavy, but reason took hold, and 37mm were for Pacific deploying units only, and M3 Halftracks for prime movers.

During the Sicily landings, units were still transitioning to the 57mm, so some lucky US gunners got the experience of bouncing shot off of Hermann Goering div. Tigers. Some 5th Army units didn't have the 37mm replaced until late 1944.

Oh, and the US had a shortage of HE rounds for the 57mm, and had to use British stocks of HE ammo until after the Race across France was well underway, the Canister round so liked with the 37mm was not available till 1945

McNair was originally a Red Leg, so never got over his attraction to towed guns.

General Bruce(who wanted more M10 TDs) was overruled by McNair to deploy the 3" AT gun. It was the T9 tube from the AA gun from WWI, and was no lightweight. So the M5 3' gun came to be. It was over 200 pounds heavier than the towed 17 pounder, that itself was no lightweight. The PaK40 was 1500 pounds lighter.

General Devers while still at Armored Force, tried to get the 76mm T2 AT gun in its place, that had the same performance as the 3' gun, but over a thousand pounds lighter. One again, out maneuvered by McNair, the 76mm development was paused after he left AF.

Tank Destroyer Battalions would have a towed component, converting self-propelled units to towed, on March 31, 1943 using M3 halftrack as Prime Movers.

By time of D-Day there were 11 towed AT battalions and 19 self-propelled. The towed TD battalion was often permanently attached to an Infantry divisions on a one for one basis, SPs attached as an as needed basis.

before and during the breakout, the US AT guns were more often used in the direct fire infantry support role, remembering that the 57mm had limited HE supply

Major General Eddy, commander of VII Corps, called the 57mm guns 'virtually useless' a month after D-day.

And that was before Panthers were encountered in number. Along with HE rounds, US units began to draw the APDS from British stocks.

After Mid-July, AAA 90mm units were moved forward for AT use in First Army, attached to the TD Battalions HQ, and used mostly for direct fire infantry support and interdiction fire, being better at that job than the divisional 105mm howitzers.

In September 1944 General Bradley wanted only 12 towed AT Battalion in France, and then only if the would be converted to the new 90mm gun that was in development, the remaining 40 battalions to be self propelled.
Since the new towed 90mm AT was to be even a ton heavier than the 3" AT, nobody wanted it. They wanted M36s

during the Bulge, towed AT battalions had a 1:3 win loss ratio, unless the were integrated with an Infantry unit, where it improved to 1.3:1

First Army has 26% losses among the towed At units during the Bulge, vs 6-8% going across France

Of all TD losses 119, 86 of them were towed guns.

In February 1945 AGF decided that all regimental 57mm gun companies would be replaced with Pershing platoon, as available.
 

Deleted member 1487

during the Bulge, towed AT battalions had a 1:3 win loss ratio, unless the were integrated with an Infantry unit, where it improved to 1.3:1

First Army has 26% losses among the towed At units during the Bulge, vs 6-8% going across France

Of all TD losses 119, 86 of them were towed guns.

In February 1945 AGF decided that all regimental 57mm gun companies would be replaced with Pershing platoon, as available.
To be fair the US situation was quite different than the German one by 1943; the US was on the offensive, so towed AT weapons were only useful in the limited cases where they Germans counterattacked, which was far less than the US was on the offensive. Towed AT weapons were more useful for the defender, but only in the situation where they weren't being operationally outflanked, as was the German problem by 1943 and on which caused large amounts of towed guns to be ditched, especially in the pocket battles in the East. In that case having mated the prime mover to gun pretty much solves the mobility issue and if the chassis breaks down it can be towed, especially the lighter Pz III and IV ones (which the heavy Panther and Tigers generally a problem to recover). So I fail to see the advantage of towed pieces other than cost, but that generally gets offset by losses if they have to be abandoned in greater numbers.
 
Inclined to agree

Far more towed AT guns were lost due to the inability to extract them from ambush positions in the heat of combat with prime movers than SP guns lost to the AFV chassis breaking down. StuG loss rates for example or Marders/Nashorns were not lost to break down in significant quantities AFAIK, they were lost to combat damage; towed AT weapons were more lost to retreats due to the inability to move them once the fighting started, as unarmored or lightly armored prime movers couldn't get to them. Hence the OTL attempted solution:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raupenschlepper,_Ost

Having it on a Pz III, III/IV, or IV chassis would have the same effect for the big guns, who were too tough to move in combat. Having an RSO based PAK40 is just fine IMHO.
yep, I think that's correct at least for the Eastern Front, given the poor road network.

Open to persuasion and of course the fuel requirement for an SP gun, especially fully tracked, is greater than that for a truck as a prime mover. But I'd agree that extra StuG or PzJagers would be good for the Germans.
 

Deleted member 1487

yep, I think that's correct at least for the Eastern Front, given the poor road network.

Open to persuasion and of course the fuel requirement for an SP gun, especially fully tracked, is greater than that for a truck as a prime mover. But I'd agree that extra StuG or PzJagers would be good for the Germans.
Depends, but the 75mm PAK40 required a tracked prime mover to get into and out of place.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/7.5_cm_Pak_40
The weapon was effective against almost every Allied tank until the end of the war. The Pak 40 was much heavier than the Pak 38; its decreased mobility meant that it was difficult or even impossible to move without an artillery tractor on boggy ground.

https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raupenschlepper_Ost
The RSO was 5500kg on its own, which was about that of the chassis for the Pz II and 38t without turret or weapon, so add on the gun and its about a Marder in terms of weight for a towed gun. So a SP AT gun for the PAK40 was able the same weight as the towed gun with a prime mover.

Now of course the Hetzer, StuG, StuH, and Panzerjager IV were much heavier due to armor, but they weren't SP AT guns, they were assault guns/tank hunters meant to be more than just a hidden ambush weapon.
 
Production possibilities

IOTL there were 6557 Panther chassis made, so we have that plus some extra in Pz IV and III/IV chassis.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_armored_fighting_vehicle_production_during_World_War_II
Yes, that's a bit higher than the figures I've found, (5,805 Panther and 230 JagdPanther plus some Flakpanzers) but not unreasonable. Of course, the majority will have been made in 1944-45, given the delays to full production you've noted earlier. To some extent the PzIV and PzIII/IV chassis production can be done a bit earlier but that would still be constrained by Germany's steel and other resources. Or at least whatever was being produced annually. I've no doubt some was initially allocated for late 1942 to Panther production that wasn't needed until later but I'd be doubtful that much was just left in stock until mid or late 1943. It will have been used somewhere else so we'd have to know what kit would be adversely affected by raising PzIV output much in late 1942.


Does a production possibility ratio of 1.5 to 1.6 PzIV for each Panther and similar for the Panzerjagers per JagdPanther seem reasonable? That's a bit less than the ratio of their weights (9:5 for the tanks) but you do need to make more guns and engines, where there may be problems producing so many more units per month I know the PzIV had a 300-320hp engine and the PzV one with 650hp but I'm not sure you can simply produce 2 for 1 with the same materials and tools. Guns similarly, what's the capacity of German production lines for these items? The L70 is bigger than the L48 but does the latter take significantly less time on the factory floor? How much extra tooling and man hours is needed to make 15 L48 guns than L70 ones? IDK, probably need more reading or someone who does.

Now, if we know what the expected monthly production rate of Panthers was for November 1942 to June 1943 we could work out how many extra PzIV and other AFV s the German army could have by then. Of course, any sent to line units before June could have been losses by then anyway!

Then you/we can think about what impact this would have on Kursk or the general course of the Eastern Front in late 1943 and 1944.
 
Thanks

Depends, but the 75mm PAK40 required a tracked prime mover to get into and out of place.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/7.5_cm_Pak_40


https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raupenschlepper_Ost
The RSO was 5500kg on its own, which was about that of the chassis for the Pz II and 38t without turret or weapon, so add on the gun and its about a Marder in terms of weight for a towed gun. So a SP AT gun for the PAK40 was able the same weight as the towed gun with a prime mover.

Now of course the Hetzer, StuG, StuH, and Panzerjager IV were much heavier due to armor, but they weren't SP AT guns, they were assault guns/tank hunters meant to be more than just a hidden ambush weapon.
Absolutely

Interestingly I was thinking of what we might call operational movement and fuel consumption in that rather than than tactical manouevures. I'm sure a truck on roads has better fuel consumption than a tracked vehicle, even if the latter isn't heavily armoured. :)

Which may say something about our interests. ;)

The tactical usage of towed and SP Anti-tk guns is of course very important too and I agree that the SP variety is far better, especially on the Eastern Front. But, better has a cost somewhere. :rolleyes:
 

Deleted member 1487

Yes, that's a bit higher than the figures I've found, (5,805 Panther and 230 JagdPanther plus some Flakpanzers) but not unreasonable. Of course, the majority will have been made in 1944-45, given the delays to full production you've noted earlier. To some extent the PzIV and PzIII/IV chassis production can be done a bit earlier but that would still be constrained by Germany's steel and other resources. Or at least whatever was being produced annually. I've no doubt some was initially allocated for late 1942 to Panther production that wasn't needed until later but I'd be doubtful that much was just left in stock until mid or late 1943. It will have been used somewhere else so we'd have to know what kit would be adversely affected by raising PzIV output much in late 1942.


Does a production possibility ratio of 1.5 to 1.6 PzIV for each Panther and similar for the Panzerjagers per JagdPanther seem reasonable? That's a bit less than the ratio of their weights (9:5 for the tanks) but you do need to make more guns and engines, where there may be problems producing so many more units per month I know the PzIV had a 300-320hp engine and the PzV one with 650hp but I'm not sure you can simply produce 2 for 1 with the same materials and tools. Guns similarly, what's the capacity of German production lines for these items? The L70 is bigger than the L48 but does the latter take significantly less time on the factory floor? How much extra tooling and man hours is needed to make 15 L48 guns than L70 ones? IDK, probably need more reading or someone who does.

Now, if we know what the expected monthly production rate of Panthers was for November 1942 to June 1943 we could work out how many extra PzIV and other AFV s the German army could have by then. Of course, any sent to line units before June could have been losses by then anyway!

Then you/we can think about what impact this would have on Kursk or the general course of the Eastern Front in late 1943 and 1944.


One thing then might be the reduction of PAK40s to make up for their use with SPGs or Panzers instead. Given how much was lost it might well end up being saved instead of left behind. You'd also need less prime movers if you have less towed PAK, along with the fuel, etc that come with it. In all while you'd be robbing peter to pay paul the end result is more equipment being rescued than lost and not needing as much towing gear.

In terms of tracked vs. wheeled fuel costs PAK 40s used tracked prime movers, so that's not much of a savings, but then the ground and road quality required greater wear and tear on wheeled vehicles in the east along with fuel usage than normal in Central/Western Europe with its quality road system.
 
To be fair the US situation was quite different than the German one by 1943; the US was on the offensive, so towed AT weapons were only useful in the limited cases where they Germans counterattacked, which was far less than the US was on the offensive. Towed AT weapons were more useful for the defender, but only in the situation where they weren't being operationally outflanked, as was the German problem by 1943 and on which caused large amounts of towed guns to be ditched, especially in the pocket battles in the East.

But it does show, per the First Army on the defense during the Bulge, Towed AT got hammered, while not inflicting many kills.

Hardly useful on the Offense, crew killers on the Defense
 
Yes but the upshot was that ultimately the Russians were left in possession of everything so it was they who were in a position to 'control the battlefield' in fact in control of the entire front.

What I am asking is that its clear that 9:1 disparity in tanks losses suffered at Kursk and the subsequent Russian Counter attacks across the front is unsustainable - even with Russia's greater production capacity.

Despite this the battle turned the tide on the Eastern front massively in their favour.

So my suspicion is that the Russian losses is more a case of differences in the way in which tank losses are counted and ultimately recorded - and was not actually 9:1 across the whole period of the war in the east regarding 'total losses' i.e. tanks that were not recovered and put back into service.

Now that being said I still believe that building an improved PzIV in greater numbers in place of the Panther would serve Germany better.

A given Heer infantry formation would be more likely to have Armoured support as a result in a given attack / counter attack and as I said in other posts I believe that this would translate to lower overall casualties

As for a heavily armed SP with the long 7.5 or even the long 88.....

I disagree - I think the Heer would be better served by providing as many anti tank guns with a decent prime mover as possible across the entire army - thus giving a given infantry formation a better chance of defeating a Russian Armoured attack.

The problem with an SP AT gun is that the gun is lost if the vehicle is lost/breaks down.

So my opinion is spamming wheeled 75/48's anti tank guns across the German armed forces.

I think this was a better use of the gun and resources.

Being in control of the battlefield is a more tactical issue. The victorious side after a tactical engagement such as Prokorovka (which by the way was actually a tactical German victory albeit a strategic defeat) would rapidly recover their own knocked out tanks and destroy enemy vehicls left on the battlefield. Most knocked out tanks by the way suffered reklatively minor damage and could be repaired in a few days. Some would obviously suffer catastrophic explosions (fuel and ammunition) and woulsd either be complete write offs or would require very extensive facory repairs

After Prokorovka German generals, doubting the claims of Sovet tanks knocked out, actually went down to the battlefield and counted the destroyed AFVs for themselves. Something that they could not have done had the Wehrmacht not been in control of the area

As for your SP AT gun proposal that is essentially what the Germans did with the Marder, Stug, Nashorn etc. In fact Panzer divisions of the late war period sometimes replaced whole tank companies with Stugs at times when replacement tanks were in short supply,
 
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