What if Nazi Germany invaded through Belgium?

In 1940, as you are probably aware, Germany made the famous sickle cut through the Ardennes to the coast at Dunkirk, cutting off a huge portion of the allied army and all her best mobile divisions.

What if Germany opted for the strategy the French expected? Certainly the battle would have been much harder. Would it have ended in a French victory? What's your view?
 
German strategy would have to be pretty unoriginal to follow through with that. Hitler was aware that the German economy could not withstand a prolonged war and he wanted France to be knocked out as soon as possible, so, as history as shown, a simple invasion of Belgium would prolong the war to a point that Germany's economy can no longer withstand the war, assuming the best German commanders (e.g. von Manstein and Guderian) die due to an ASB sickness. But Hitler would refuse to surrender, so either the Allies march painstakingly to Berlin with bloodshed, or Halder and von Brauchitsch actually depose the Nazis and end the war. The 'second' World War would be much more uneventful than the first.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
I would like to remind you, that the OKH first proposed exactly this : a more or less re-make of 1914 plan.
1939-1940-battle_of_france-plan-evolution.jpg


The wallies IMO would have said : Thank you !
As this was what they expected to happen, what they were prepared to act against and what they at first also did.
IOTL it - again as 1914 - took them some time to realise the "true" intent, direction and size of the german offense.

I could see a horrific battle for Belgium ITTL with most of the county turned upside-down to artillery and aerial bombardements and by the tank tracks moving to to and frough on ... slightly changing frontlines.
The germans at some point might still decide to try a "cut" more to the south (Ardennes) but then as a diversional intent after Belgium doesn't fall as quickly as wished and with much lesser forces than OTL ... against much better prepared Wallies.

The rest might be as @ArtisticCritic said. Though I could see the drive for the german general to get rid of Hitler becomming much stronger, since he looses his aura of "GröFaZ" (greatest fieldcommander of all times) - or even didn't gain it at all.
 

There is still a possibility the Germans actually do come out on top - take the OTL battles of Hannut and Gembloux, then add the 771 panzers and 1470 aircraft that were down south at Sedan, and the French front may very well crack. Once that happens, it will be very difficult to plug the leak - the Allied High Command banked everything on the German 'Schwerpunkt' being at Gembloux and them being able to counter it then and there.
 
There is still a possibility the Germans actually do come out on top - take the OTL battles of Hannut and Gembloux, then add the 771 panzers and 1470 aircraft that were down south at Sedan, and the French front may very well crack. Once that happens, it will be very difficult to plug the leak - the Allied High Command banked everything on the German 'Schwerpunkt' being at Gembloux and them being able to counter it then and there.

Indeed, the French problem with slow reaction obviated every advantage they had at any level. If the January plan, as illustrated above is used then the French reserves are correctly placed & the Germans would be fighting through a second defense zone or line, effectively a defense in depth. Its possible, but given the operating losses in armor and aircraft of the actual campaign then breaking the second Allied defense zone may leave the Germans with nothing to exploit with.

That is the Allies can retreat to the border entrenchements or some line further south on the Somme, where the Germans are not strong enough for a third successful attack.
 
Indeed, the French problem with slow reaction obviated every advantage they had at any level. If the January plan, as illustrated above is used then the French reserves are correctly placed & the Germans would be fighting through a second defense zone or line, effectively a defense in depth. Its possible, but given the operating losses in armor and aircraft of the actual campaign then breaking the second Allied defense zone may leave the Germans with nothing to exploit with.

That is the Allies can retreat to the border entrenchements or some line further south on the Somme, where the Germans are not strong enough for a third successful attack.
Though I wouldn't be surprised if scenes like these kept repeating over and over:
The 7th Panzer Division continued to advance north-west to Avesnes-sur-Helpe, just ahead of the 1st and 2nd Panzer divisions.[127] The French 5th Motorised Infantry Division had bivouacked in the path of the German division, with its vehicles neatly lined up along the roadsides and the 7th Panzer Division dashed through them.[128] The slow speed, overloaded crews and lack of battlefield communications undid the French. The 5th Panzer Division joined in the fight. The French inflicted many losses on the division but could not cope with the speed of the German mobile units, which closed fast and destroyed the French armour at close range.[129] The remaining elements of the 1st DCR, resting after losing all but 16 of its tanks in Belgium, were also engaged and defeated, the 1st DCR retiring with three operational tanks for a German loss of 50 out of 500 tanks.[130][131]
 
Though I wouldn't be surprised if scenes like these kept repeating over and over:

They did repeat, but it still nearly undid the Germans. That Rommels 7th Pz Div arrived at the coast with just 24 operating tanks illustrated the German problem. When the offensive resumed in June only 50% of the tanks had been restored to operating condition & the loss rate in the second offensive seems to have been nearly double that of the May phase; average of 8-10% daily vs 5% daily avg. Note that this loss rate includes breakdowns. While the German tanks are considered reliable in 1940 that is only relative to average of other nations. In fact failed engines, broken tracks, damaged gear boxes, failing electrical components were exceeding the ability of the support service to repair or provide parts.

The problem is much like artillery ammunition, or aircraft and pilots. The front line German strength was the result of a maximum effort to place all available there. Leaving the Germans without material strategic depth.
 
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