What if Napoleon the Third had backed the Confederacy?

[TFSmith121]

Don't forget massed indirect artillery fire and aerial observation by WW I;

You're welcome.

It was the nature of 1860s warfare in North America that two armies would bash away at each other until one side had had enough and retreated, and the other side was too badly bloodied to pursue. Rifled infantry and cannon producing a level of defensive bloodletting capability that would time and again prevent a successful opponent from any serious exploitation. Too much firepower for a Napoleonic-style massed infantry attack to work, and no threat of mechanized and armored forces threatening easier and faster overruns. And with the coming of machine guns, it would only get worse, not better for the attacker. IOW, World War One.

This is why I chuckle at the American Civil War "experts" who say that if Grant had done this, or Lee had done that, they "would have been destroyed". Uh, no. Beaten back in disarray at worst.

Made life even worse in the PBI...the best strategy was to maneuver to a point where the other side had to (or was dumb enough to) attack. Malvern Hill, Fredericksburg, Gettysburg, etc.

Nice summary.

Best,

 

[Anaxagoras]

This is why I chuckle at the American Civil War "experts" who say that if Grant had done this, or Lee had done that, they "would have been destroyed". Uh, no. Beaten back in disarray at worst.

The WWI analogue to this is the "one last effort" concept. If the Germans had made only "one last effort" at Verdun, or if the British had made only "one last effort" on the Somme, or whatever, the lines would have broken and the war would have been won.

Sheer nonsense.

 

[TFSmith121]

Yep - "One last effort" usually translated to

The WWI analogue to this is the "one last effort" concept. If the Germans had made only "one last effort" at Verdun, or if the British had made only "one last effort" on the Somme, or whatever, the lines would have broken and the war would have been won.

Sheer nonsense.

One more needless effusion of blood by the attacker exposed on the glacis in front of an alert defender.

Best,

 

[usertron2020]

The WWI analogue to this is the "one last effort" concept. If the Germans had made only "one last effort" at Verdun, or if the British had made only "one last effort" on the Somme, or whatever, the lines would have broken and the war would have been won.

Sheer nonsense.

Indeed. Wait-a-minute...

The Somme!?

 

[TFSmith121]

Hey, the Italians this to the ultimate extreme in

Indeed. Wait-a-minute...

The Somme!?

Hey, the Italians this to the ultimate extreme in 1915-18 on the Isonzo...

The Isonzo: When Just One Unwinnable Effusion of Blood Isn't Enough...

Best,

 

[Rich Rostrom]

Logistically, how does the French Navy compel the US Navy to offer battle?

Steam into Norfolk, and patrol Hampton Roads.

Norfolk was the USN's biggest base, or near to it; but would have fallen to Virginia.

Beyond that, the French Navy can break the U.S. blockade anywhere in the Gulf, and with CSA assistance take any U.S. outposts on the Gulf Coast - including Fort Jefferson and Fort Pickens.

The USN could maybe sustain Union enclaves on the Atlantic coast, but they would have to fight for them. Savannah, Charleston, and Wilmington aren't great ports or naval bases, but they're a lot closer than New York.

 

[von Adler]

I recap an at least decently likely scenario.

The French do not go to war with the USA. They do not sent troops to the CSA, except for maybe a thousand instructors and volunteers.

They do it to keep trade open and weaken the USA for Napoleon's grand schemes in the Western Hemisphere.

Napoleon III checks with the British, first, who OK it - they will allow the French to trade with the CSA, break the US blockade but not blockade the US or interrupt trade.

1. The French navy can base of S:t Pierre and Miguelon as well as Martinique and Guadeloupe. I am sure the CSA would be happy to provide them with supplies from their ports as well. They can enforce a no-blockade policy on the CSA coast without too much trouble.

2. This means no cotton blockade (as the CSA has already been recognised), continued export of CSA goods (especially cotton) and free imports, making the CSA financial situation and military supply situation much better, even before speaking of any loans.

3. The CSA will not lose New Orleans and will not need to fight along the coasts to the same extent. The Vicksburg campaign will thus be a gruelling slow down the Mississippi with no forces coming up from the south. The CSA will keep several of its most populous and industrious cities (New Orleans and Jackson).

All these factors mean that the CSA will be much better off financially, which might mean that the US decides that it has had enough for the 1864 election.

 

[Cymraeg]

Umm not much, because Lincoln wouldn't care.

Also best Confederate TL

The only problem with that scenario is that I'm not sure that the North would have allowed Kentucky to stay neutral. At some point someone like Grant would have pressed the point.

 

[TFSmith121]

"This is war"!

Break the US blockade but not blockade the US or interrupt trade.

"I trust I need not express how profound is my regret at the conclusion to which (your) Majesty's Government have arrived . . . . It would be superfluous in me to point out to the Emperor that this is war."

- Message of US Minister John Bigelow to Emperor Napoleon III upon receipt of the Emperor's statement regarding the US blockade of the rebel states and the potential French recognition of the rebellion. Not surprisingly, upon receipt, the French backed down, given the state of their war effort in Mexico and the arrival of the Russian squadrons in Hanover...

from The Rise of the Russo-German Empire, Richard Conquest, Harpers & Betelmann, Berlin & New York, 1980.

====================================================

More seriously, the French already had one war in the Western Hemisphere, and all sorts of neighbors with grudges...NIII was reckless, but I don't think even he was that reckless.

Best,

 

[Perfidious Albion]

More seriously, the French already had one war in the Western Hemisphere, and all sorts of neighbors with grudges...NIII was reckless, but I don't think even he was that reckless.

Best,

This is the only part of that statement which I will dispute. Napoleon III sent an army of a hundred-thousand men (or thereabouts) into Italy on little notice, then, when they were already there and begging en masse off the locals, realised that it would be good idea to send in some supplies. Napoleon III saw a large victorious army belonging to a newly powerful neighbouring country in 1866 (in a situation where even his own experts thought that it was a matter of Prussian technological superiority over both Austria and France; they were wrong, we know with retrospect, but oh well) and decided to issue a threat to try and get more land from them, since the time when his enemy had just proven itself militarily superior to him and his army wanted time to modernise was obviously the most intelligent time to win more territory to improve France's strategic situation vis-à-vis Prussia.

I think that you give Napoleon III too much credit.

 

[TFSmith121]

Maybe, but even a stopped clock is right twice a day...

I think that you give Napoleon III too much credit.

It's 3,000 miles across the Atlantic.

The Bonapartes didn't do real well at maritime war.

Somebody will point this out, I think...might be the one thing before 1871 that would lead to (yet another) coup...

Best,

 

[usertron2020]

It's 3,000 miles across the Atlantic.

The Bonapartes didn't do real well at maritime war.

Somebody will point this out, I think...might be the one thing before 1871 that would lead to (yet another) coup...

Best,

I know its Hollywood, but in the Paul Muni classic "The Phantom Crown" they had Napoleon III crying out "If the people learn the truth about Mexico there'll be barricades in the streets...!"

As to the French and naval war (on their own), AFAIK, their last (and greatest) strategic victory at sea was Virginia Capes, under the Bourbons.

 

[TFSmith121]

Can you hear the people singing?

I know its Hollywood, but in the Paul Muni classic "The Phantom Crown" they had Napoleon III crying out "If the people learn the truth about Mexico there'll be barricades in the streets...!"

As to the French and naval war (on their own), AFAIK, their last (and greatest) strategic victory at sea was Virginia Capes, under the Bourbons.

Interesting that Les Miserables was published less than a decade before NIII went over the mountain...

Best,

 

[usertron2020]

Interesting that Les Miserables was published less than a decade before NIII went over the mountain...

Best,

Wasn't it banned in French (in France) until the Third Republic though?

 

[Perfidious Albion]

Maybe, but even a stopped clock is right twice a day...

It's 3,000 miles across the Atlantic.

The Bonapartes didn't do real well at maritime war.

Somebody will point this out, I think...might be the one thing before 1871 that would lead to (yet another) coup...

Best,

Yes. But if Napoleon III and/or his advisers were astute at noticing such things, they might have considered that it was a good idea to gather supplies before sending out a large army far from home.

We are dealing, genuinely, with a regime so terminally stupid that it was capable of sending a large army and then thinking to send supplies—with a regime where everyone in the top level of government could realise Prussian military superiority at the time (although they didn't think so for the right reason) and yet no-one stopped Napoleon from deciding that this would be a good time to try to take land from Prussia. If they're capable of forgetting the very existence of logistics, are mere logistical difficulties going to faze them much? And if they weren't willing to launch coups d'état to prevent Napoleon III's folly from causing major French defeats in Europe (which had the potential to damage France far more than any defeat in the Americas did), why would they be willing to do so to prevent that folly from causing major French defeats in the Americas?

Come to think of it, who are 'they' who are going to launch a coup d'état anyway? I don't know of anyone else in Napoleon III's inner circle who had the popular support for it to work. Some generals might facilitate an Orléanist, perhaps legitimist or maybe even republican rising against Napoleon but that couldn't be a quiet palace coup d'état, that would be spurring a huge civil war, one in which most people would probably take Napoleon's side.

So in short, I think you still underestimate what human stupidity can do.

 

[TFSmith121]

True enough - although France was probably unique in

True enough - although France was probably unique in terms of the potential rivals...

Three different "royal" families, various republicans from across the political spectrum, various regional rivalries...

Best,

 

[usertron2020]

True enough - although France was probably unique in terms of the potential rivals...

Three different "royal" families, various republicans from across the political spectrum, various regional rivalries...

Best,

Communists

 

[Perfidious Albion]

True enough - although France was probably unique in terms of the potential rivals...

Three different "royal" families, various republicans from across the political spectrum, various regional rivalries...

Best,

Oh yes, but the question is whether they had support. Before the war, Napoleon III had the ultra-Catholics (except the most staunch legitimists) fairly well bottled up (thank you, Roman question), the liberals were mostly dangerously radical by the standards of the Army and established society (such as dismissing the entire mauvais numéro system as iniquitous), the legitimists were unpopular among everyone except themselves and certainly no Bonapartist movement that opposed him would have much legitimacy. And any regional separatism (e.g. in Brittany) would provide a golden opportunity for any more centralised faction to unite the rest of France against the separatists.

I don't think any of them had the power to depose Napoleon III before the Franco-Prussian War began in such disaster. If he started rambling about restoring the glories of Napoleon I and declaring war on the entire rest of Europe at the same time, sure, we could see a military coup d'état then (or in some similar circumstance), but short of something as extreme as that I don't think that they'd dare, for fear of the difficulty in winning—even if they did recognise that Napoleon III was acting stupidly and a takeover was necessary, which as I said earlier is far from certain due to their own incompetence.

Communists

Not a realistically considerable force, certain over-optimistically socialist TLs aside. To measure public sentiment in France, one should note that even after the downfall of Napoleon III had discredited Bonapartism the democratic elections for the legislature returned a majority of conservative royalists; the reason why there wasn't a Bourbon restoration is that the two different factions (the Orléanists and the legitimists) couldn't agree on which king to restore (flag controversy and all that), and both of them blocked each other's proposals (hence Thiers's comment "republicanism is the form of government that divides us least", if I recall the exact wording correctly), up to the point where eventually people got used to the Third Republic (which had originally only been a caretaker government) and it become permanent vaguely by accident. Crucially, the French army's opinion of socialists was, to put it mildly, not very high; the army was perfectly happy to fire en masse against socialists and break socialist communes by force. So the Communards had about as much chance of seizing power in France as the Liberal Democrats have of making the modern United Kingdom a Lib Dem one-party state. Sorry.

 

[TFSmith121]

Good points - my thought would be that

I don't think any of them had the power to depose Napoleon III before the Franco-Prussian War began in such disaster. If he started rambling about restoring the glories of Napoleon I and declaring war on the entire rest of Europe at the same time, sure, we could see a military coup d'état then (or in some similar circumstance), but short of something as extreme as that I don't think that they'd dare, for fear of the difficulty in winning—even if they did recognise that Napoleon III was acting stupidly and a takeover was necessary, which as I said earlier is far from certain due to their own incompetence.

Good points - my thought would be that war with the United States might be enough to prompt the same sort of reaction as your suggestion above...all gloire aside, I would expect there were those in the French Army and Navy who would see such a conflict as:

a) ruining whatever chance the French might have in Mexico; and
b) taking their eyes off the ball in Europe.

Obviously, de Joinville was out of power, but I'd expect he could bring some interesting perspective to bear from his location in 1861...

Best,

 

[Perfidious Albion]

Good points - my thought would be that war with the United States might be enough to prompt the same sort of reaction as your suggestion above...all gloire aside, I would expect there were those in the French Army and Navy who would see such a conflict as:

a) ruining whatever chance the French might have in Mexico; and
b) taking their eyes off the ball in Europe.

Obviously, de Joinville was out of power, but I'd expect he could bring some interesting perspective to bear from his location in 1861...

Best,

I think that that argument would hold if we took the French high command as competent leaders saddled with an incompetent Emperor (Guderian + Hitler 75 years early), but I don't think they were. They didn't launch a coup d'état when Napoleon III not only took his eye off the ball in Europe but kicked the ball straight at the nuclear-detoation button in Europe, when he issued the Mainz threat to a power that had just proven itself greatly militarily superior to France just as it was finishing off its last enemy and it still had its army fully mobilised. (In 1866 the French high command knew that Prussia had a huge military advantage over France at the time, but for the wrong reason: they attributed it to the Dreyse needle gun's superiority, which is why they in 1870, when they'd equipped the French army with the chassepot that was superior to the Dreyse, were confident that the Prussian advantage had been reversed, whereas in fact Prussia had won for different reasons and those reasons still held true in 1870.) IOTL France dodged that bullet because Napoleon III backed down, but issuing the threat in the first place carried the significant risk of a Prussian declaration of war that they knew would have spelt doom for France… and yet they did nothing to stop him from giving the threat. So I don't think they would have done in this scenario.