What if Napoleon the Third had backed the Confederacy?

TFSmith121

Banned
Don't forget, this is the same expeditionary force the

Don't forget, this is the same expeditionary force the Mexicans beat handily at Puebla.

The grand total of French and Allied European troops was something like ~40,000; at most, the French were able to sustain a force roughly equivalent to four US divisions circa-1862.

And it took them most of 1862 and 1863 to get them there and into the field.

In Mexico, the French at least have a chance to make some gains - debts paid, strategic depth, troops, etc.

They get zip from recognizing the rebels, other than a guarantee of war with the US once the late unpleasantness is over.

And such a move might be the only decision truly nuts enough to prompt a coup/rebellion/revolution against NIII prior to 1871...

Best,
 
What if Thouvenell had not been able to convince Napoleon the Third of his folly, and the French had offered recognition to the Confederacy after their declaration of independence. How would this influence the course of events?

I guess this happens in early 1861. Does it happen before or after the bombardment of Fort Sumter?

Anyway, the main effect is that the French Navy intervenes and breaks the blockade - in the Gulf of Mexico, if not on the Atlantic coast, which is sufficient.

That means the Confederate forces are far better armed and equipped. The Confederates don't lose New Orleans, and can build or acquire a gunboat fleet for the Mississippi. (They can import guns, engines, and armor plate from France.)

On the other side... Union commerce raiders will play hell with French shipping.

As noted in this thread, France has a much larger navy than the U.S.

If the U.S. is determined to fight on, then the naval war becomes a much bigger deal. The Union will have to build and deploy a lot of ships. They have the advantage of being much closer to the theater of combat than France, although France can base ships in the CSA.

There could be some major naval battles in the Chesapeake as French ships fight their way into and out of Norfolk; the Union would concentrate there to stop them and control those critical waters.

If the U.S. makes a heroic effort, they could seize the French Caribbean colonies, and thus re-establish the blockade. This would also cut off the French forces in Mexico.

The political situation is critical. Would the Union fight on against the CSA plus France? Or would there be a volcanic eruption of anger against an Old World monarch attacking the U.S.?

Napoleon III has limits on what he can expend on this effort; how far can he go before his country balks? Not very far, IMO. He couldn't send a lot of his army to Mexico; how much of his navy can he send?

Another factor is that the Union will make an explicit alliance with the Mexican Liberals.
 
Throughout the war, Napoleon III was unwilling to move in support of the Confederacy unless and until the British did the same, even though he personally supported the South. However, there are two factors which hindered British recognition which did not hinder French recognition: there was no French equivalent of Canada (a large, valuable territory that would need to be defended at great expense) and they were not as dependent as Britain on grain imports from the United States. On the other hand, lacking British industrial capacity, cotton imports from the South were not as important to the French as they were to the British.

Lots depends on the frame of mind of Napoleon III. Not the most careful or thoughtful fellow, him.

Tacit British approval would mean political problems back home for them too. Earlier Great Reform Act?

There is also the danger of France's extreme involvement in the New World spurring the Prussians into sparking the Austro-Prussian War earlier, following up with an earlier Franco-Prussian War fought as a two front war with the USA as an Associate Power of the Prussians or even a full ally!:eek:

If the American Civil War ended like that, it could mean poisonous Franco-American relations for decades to come. Third Republic notwithstanding.:(

French troops would be irrelevant. It would be French naval power, French financial loans, and the political credibility granted by French recognition that would be important.

Does Imperial France even have the financial resources to fight TWO trans-Atlantic wars at once?
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
Does Imperial France even have the financial resources to fight TWO trans-Atlantic wars at once?

Again, it doesn't really have to fight a full-scale war. The French Navy could have dealt with the Union Navy without too much trouble. There would be no need to contribute troops. With French recognition comes loans from French banks. IOTL, a major loan to the Confederacy came from the Erlanger bank even WITHOUT French recognition; with such recognition, we might see loans from much bigger banks such as the French branch of the Rothschilds. More importantly, diplomatic recognition of the Confederacy gives it credibility that will both allow it to float loans on the bond markets of Paris, London, Amsterdam and Frankfurt much more successfully than IOTL and will give the Peace Democrats within the United States a much more credible political position.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Diplomatic recognition is not an alliance; again, what

French troops would be irrelevant. It would be French naval power, French financial loans, and the political credibility granted by French recognition that would be important.

Diplomatic recognition is not an alliance; again, what gain does France receive from going to war with the United States in alliance with the rebels?

France's strategic goal in the Americas in the 1860s was to take advantage of Mexican weakness and US pre-occupation in terms of trying to establish a friendly government in Mexico - this proved difficult enough when the US was embroiled in the Civil War and impossible after Appomattox - why in the world would the French, even under NIII, cut the legs out from under their effort to make gains in Mexico by bringing the US INTO that war?

The other point worth making, of course, is that France had absolute naval supremacy over Mexico in 1861-67, and they still lost...cripes, they had absolute naval supremacy over Prussia in 1870-71 and the Germans crowned Wilhelm at Versailles.

Naval power in the Nineteenth Century was far from decisive in a continental war, as witness the results of the Franco-Prussian conflict.

Best,
 
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Anaxagoras

Banned
Diplomatic recognition is not an alliance; again, what gain does France receive from going to war with the United States in alliance with the rebels?

A useful ally in the quest to gain control of Mexico and a leg up on a valuable source of raw materials in the effort to economically catch up to Great Britain.

The other point worth making, of course, is that France had absoulute naval supremacy over Mexico in 1861-67, and they still lost...cripes, they had absoulute naval supremacy over Prussia in 1870-71 and the Germans crowned Wilhelm at Versailles.

Neither Mexico in 1861-67 or Prussia in 1870-71 was trying to blockade the Confederacy.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
How could the rebels be a useful ally to the French?

A useful ally in the quest to gain control of Mexico and a leg up on a valuable source of raw materials in the effort to economically catch up to Great Britain.

Neither Mexico in 1861-67 or Prussia in 1870-71 was trying to blockade the Confederacy.

How could the rebels be a useful ally to the French in Mexico? The rebels had no troops to spare...

No, the point is the French tried to blockade the Germans in 1870-71 and they still lost that war; how could the French Navy have any impact on the US in the Civil War?

Are you suggesting that France, simply by providing diplomatic recognition to the rebels, would result in the US abandoning the blockade of the south atlantic and gulf coasts?

Best,
 

Saphroneth

Banned
If there's actual military support, or even strong financial support, that might butterfly away the Great Germany. Without the French threat to Metz (either because they're busy elsewhere, or because they're clearly weak due to pouring money down a hole, or because they've just been given good evidence that their army at this point isn't as good as they think it is against a modern power), then the South German Federation doesn't align with Prussia; rather, it looks to Austria. Hence, Germany is smaller - if it forms at all.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
Are you suggesting that France, simply by providing diplomatic recognition to the rebels, would result in the US abandoning the blockade of the south atlantic and gulf coasts?

Obviously not. The French could break the blockade with their own navy without too much trouble, though.

If the French recognize the Confederacy but do not actively intervene, it still helps the Confederacy enormously simply by raising its credit rating. A bank like Barings or Rothschilds will be much more likely to invest in the bonds of a recognized nation than an unrecognized rebel government. And it also will strengthen the hand of the Peace Democrats as 1864 approaches.

But recognition without intervention is unlikely in any event, because Lincoln and Seward had made it clear to both the British and the French that recognition of the Confederacy was a casus belli.
 
Again, it doesn't really have to fight a full-scale war. The French Navy could have dealt with the Union Navy without too much trouble. There would be no need to contribute troops. With French recognition comes loans from French banks. IOTL, a major loan to the Confederacy came from the Erlanger bank even WITHOUT French recognition; with such recognition, we might see loans from much bigger banks such as the French branch of the Rothschilds. More importantly, diplomatic recognition of the Confederacy gives it credibility that will both allow it to float loans on the bond markets of Paris, London, Amsterdam and Frankfurt much more successfully than IOTL and will give the Peace Democrats within the United States a much more credible political position.

I think you are overestimating the willingness of European bankers to invest in something so high risk as the Confederate economy. Even if the South had won, it was extremely unlikely that said bankers would ever have seen one cent of those loans paid back. IOTL they had to eat every loan made as it was. French intervention would mean that trade (and any loans made to the US) would be lost too.

The Rothschilds would know this better by far than us.

A useful ally in the quest to gain control of Mexico and a leg up on a valuable source of raw materials in the effort to economically catch up to Great Britain.

I think you are underestimating the costs of two transatlantic wars (even if one is naval, and do they have the facilities to wage even an "easy" campaign?).

Neither Mexico in 1861-67 or Prussia in 1870-71 was trying to blockade the Confederacy.

I think you are underestimating Bismarck's skills in exploiting French weaknesses on the Continent.

If there's actual military support, or even strong financial support, that might butterfly away the Great Germany. Without the French threat to Metz (either because they're busy elsewhere, or because they're clearly weak due to pouring money down a hole, or because they've just been given good evidence that their army at this point isn't as good as they think it is against a modern power), then the South German Federation doesn't align with Prussia; rather, it looks to Austria. Hence, Germany is smaller - if it forms at all.

And maybe with less of a threat the South German Federation is more likely to go with the Prussians, who offer the indulgence of German Nationalism better than the weaker Austrians, who have the problems of ethnic distractions in Hungary and in much of the rest of the Balkans. Germany for the Germans.

And based on Austria's anemic performance in the Austro-Prussian War, its likely the Prussians get their own way anyways.

Obviously not. The French could break the blockade with their own navy without too much trouble, though.

Except in terms of logistics.

If the French recognize the Confederacy but do not actively intervene, it still helps the Confederacy enormously simply by raising its credit rating. A bank like Barings or Rothschilds will be much more likely to invest in the bonds of a recognized nation than an unrecognized rebel government. And it also will strengthen the hand of the Peace Democrats as 1864 approaches.

More likely investing into the sinkhole that is the CSA makes France even weaker economically when faced by a resurgent Prussia. And I really think you are overestimating Nappy III's strategic insight.

But recognition without intervention is unlikely in any event, because Lincoln and Seward had made it clear to both the British and the French that recognition of the Confederacy was a casus belli.

And why the British were determined NOT to recognize the CSA short of a Saratoga-level victory by the South.

In the ARW, the American Rebels destroyed two major armies (Saratoga & Yorktown), and four minor ones (Trenton, Bennington, Kings Mountain, Cowpens). Five minor ones, if you want to count the shredding the British took at Guilford Court House (a British victory but a major embarrassment). The American Rebels in the ARW were not SUPPOSED to win standup fights with the British Army, certainly not to the point where the British force would be completely destroyed (or captured, if a siege). So when they did, it caught major attention from not only France, but Spain, Holland, and eventually even Russia (in their league of neutrality).

No such battles ever occurred in the American Civil War. (1) The closest I suppose would be the First Battle of Bull Run. But even there, the Confederates utterly lacked the ability to exploit their advantage. Also, the level of forces between the USA and CSA was never so imbalanced as it was between the British Empire and the Thirteen Colonies. So Lincoln had a lot more room to play with in the 'expectations game' than Lord North ever did.

1) Indeed, though not realized at the time, (2) the level of defensive firepower in the ACW versus the ARW was such that save for sieges (Fort Donelson, Vicksburg) only one army on either side was ever truly destroyed in the field of battle (Nashville). (3)

2) That this was NOT known was another of those things that the North had in its pocket without ever knowing it. So they could always play down Confederate victories to the level of "at least we survived" post-battle spin.

3) There are those that claim that the pitiful remnants that clung together post-Nashville under their new commander Nathan Bedford Forrest still constituted a real army. I do not agree.
 
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TFSmith121

Banned
Why would France GO TO WAR with the US in the 1860s?

Obviously not. The French could break the blockade with their own navy without too much trouble, though.

If the French recognize the Confederacy but do not actively intervene, it still helps the Confederacy enormously simply by raising its credit rating. A bank like Barings or Rothschilds will be much more likely to invest in the bonds of a recognized nation than an unrecognized rebel government. And it also will strengthen the hand of the Peace Democrats as 1864 approaches.

But recognition without intervention is unlikely in any event, because Lincoln and Seward had made it clear to both the British and the French that recognition of the Confederacy was a casus belli.

Why would France GO TO WAR with the US in the 1860s?

Especially when they were losing one in Mexico already...

Best,
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Nice post - along with the Rothchilds, don't forget the Warburgs

In the ARW, the American Rebels destroyed two major armies (Saratoga & Yorktown), and four minor ones (Trenton, Bennington, Kings Mountain, Cowpens). Five minor ones, if you want to count the shredding the British took at Guilford Court House (a British victory but a major embarrassment). The Americans Rebels in the ARW were not SUPPOSED to win standup fights with the British Army, certainly not to the point where the British force would be completely destroyed (or captured, if a siege). So when they did, it caught major attention from not only France, but Spain, Holland, and eventually even Russia (in their league of neutrality).

No such battles ever occurred in the American Civil War. (1) The closest I suppose would be the First Battle of Bull Run. But even there, the Confederates utterly lacked the ability to exploit their advantage. Also, the level of forces between the USA and CSA was never so imbalanced as it was between the British Empire and the Thirteen Colonies. So Lincoln had a lot more room to play with in the 'expectations game' than Lord North ever did.

1) Indeed, though not realized at the time, (2) the level of defensive firepower in the ACW versus the ARW was such that save for sieges (Fort Donelson, Vicksburg) only one army on either side was ever truly destroyed in the field of battle (Nashville). (3)

2) That this was NOT known was another of those things that the North had in its pocket without ever knowing it. So they could always play down Confederate victories to the level of "at least we survived" post-battle spin.

3) There are those that claim that the pitiful remnants that clung together post-Nashville under their new commander Nathan Bedford Forrest still constituted a real army. I do not agree.

Nice post - along with the Rothchilds, don't forget the Warburgs...

Good point on the realities of Nineteenth Century warfare, as well.

Best,
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Chernow's book is great social history and family biography

Thanks.

Tell me more about the Warburgs.


Basically, a German banking family of Jewish ancestry from Hamburg (more or less) with connections across Wilhelmine Germany and the United States; they were very assimilated and rivals/allies of the Rothschilds in Europe and Morgan et al in the US.

Here's the NYT review, which gives a good flavor of the book:

http://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/03/books/the-high-summer-of-an-illusion.html

Best,
 

Dirk_Pitt

Banned
I think you are overestimating the willingness of European bankers to invest in something so high risk as the Confederate economy. Even if the South had won, it was extremely unlikely that said bankers would ever have seen one cent of those loans paid back. IOTL they had to eat every loan made as it was. French intervention would mean that trade (and any loans made to the US) would be lost too.

The Rothschilds would know this better by far than us.



I think you are underestimating the costs of two transatlantic wars (even if one is naval, and do they have the facilities to wage even an "easy" campaign?).



I think you are underestimating Bismarck's skills in exploiting French weaknesses on the Continent.



And maybe with less of a threat the South German Federation is more likely to go with the Prussians, who offer the indulgence of German Nationalism better than the weaker Austrians, who have the problems of ethnic distractions in Hungary and in much of the rest of the Balkans. Germany for the Germans.

And based on Austria's anemic performance in the Austro-Prussian War, its likely the Prussians get their own way anyways.



Except in terms of logistics.



More likely investing into the sinkhole that is the CSA makes France even weaker economically when faced by a resurgent Prussia. And I really think you are overestimating Nappy III's strategic insight.



And why the British were determined NOT to recognize the CSA short of a Saratoga-level victory by the South.

In the ARW, the American Rebels destroyed two major armies (Saratoga & Yorktown), and four minor ones (Trenton, Bennington, Kings Mountain, Cowpens). Five minor ones, if you want to count the shredding the British took at Guilford Court House (a British victory but a major embarrassment). The Americans Rebels in the ARW were not SUPPOSED to win standup fights with the British Army, certainly not to the point where the British force would be completely destroyed (or captured, if a siege). So when they did, it caught major attention from not only France, but Spain, Holland, and eventually even Russia (in their league of neutrality).

No such battles ever occurred in the American Civil War. (1) The closest I suppose would be the First Battle of Bull Run. But even there, the Confederates utterly lacked the ability to exploit their advantage. Also, the level of forces between the USA and CSA was never so imbalanced as it was between the British Empire and the Thirteen Colonies. So Lincoln had a lot more room to play with in the 'expectations game' than Lord North ever did.

1) Indeed, though not realized at the time, (2) the level of defensive firepower in the ACW versus the ARW was such that save for sieges (Fort Donelson, Vicksburg) only one army on either side was ever truly destroyed in the field of battle (Nashville). (3)

2) That this was NOT known was another of those things that the North had in its pocket without ever knowing it. So they could always play down Confederate victories to the level of "at least we survived" post-battle spin.

3) There are those that claim that the pitiful remnants that clung together post-Nashville under their new commander Nathan Bedford Forrest still constituted a real army. I do not agree.

That's a very interesting insight that I've never really thought of before.

*stores it for later use*

Thank you.:)
 
Confederates? Credit Worthy?

The Confederates are badly, badly outnumbered, by a state on their continent who hate them as traitors. Their economy is about resource extraction, and focused on hinterlands to ports - read up on how terrible intra-Confederate rail transport was. This machinery of resource extraction is going to heck due to the war, as its labor force bolts any chance it gets. They cannot produce enough weapons indigenously, and have to take out loans to get the tools of war that their opponents, their more numerous opponents, can produce in North America. How good of a credit risk are they?

Logistically, how does the French Navy compel the US Navy to offer battle? How do a limited number of warships cover a massive littoral? From port facilities that aren't big enough, and probably don't have the gear to keep them in good repair?What's to prevent the USN from displaying the cleverness they historically did at building new ships, deploying new weapons, and fighting in littoral. Can that French fleet convey enough ships to compensate for the South's miserable land transport infrastructure?

It's not inconsequential for the USA, but its not British recognition, or support.
 
That's a very interesting insight that I've never really thought of before.

*stores it for later use*

Thank you.:)

You're welcome.:)

It was the nature of 1860s warfare in North America that two armies would bash away at each other until one side had had enough and retreated, and the other side was too badly bloodied to pursue. Rifled infantry and cannon producing a level of defensive bloodletting capability that would time and again prevent a successful opponent from any serious exploitation. Too much firepower for a Napoleonic-style massed infantry attack to work, and no threat of mechanized and armored forces threatening easier and faster overruns. And with the coming of machine guns, it would only get worse, not better for the attacker. IOW, World War One.:(

This is why I chuckle at the American Civil War "experts" who say that if Grant had done this, or Lee had done that, they "would have been destroyed". Uh, no. Beaten back in disarray at worst.
 
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