What if Mussolini joined the allies in Wolrd War 2?

I find this post sums up my view. However i do think we will see france fall just because I suspect that they are very likely to make the same mistakes. however, we will see one major difference the cost it will cost the germans alot more especially with the disadvantages set against them. It might be bad enough for it too also remove their capability to go on any major offensive against say italy or russia for a while. Which is the real killer as it buys the allies time to prepare and move industry into safer areas it also means you won’t see as large as bombing campaigns.

Thank you.
On France falling, it's still a possibility specially with the abysmal performance of OTL French High Command. My point is that German chances of winning OTL were not 99,99% like some might say or think, it was more close to 60%. ITTL, I would say it's closer to 50/50 with, simply because France and the Allies have some more margin of error and the German less. It's all come down to the capacity of the Wehrmacht to break the line and exploit it versus the capacity of the Allies to plug it.
From a strategic point of view, if the Allies plug the hole (and the next one or two), they have won (maybe not the war, but close enough). The Germans don't have the resources to sustain an attrition war. And, some time during 1940, the Allies will have the material advantage (and the gap will widen in their favor). That's why the German chose to attack in May OTL.
What makes me (more) optimist is the very steep learning curve of the French Army OTL when you compare May and June fights. During Case Red, the French defensive strategy was sound and well implemented, but the 61 (!) divisions lost in May were too much to preserve France. ITTL, if the Sickle Cut succeeds, the extra-reserves won't be enough, but the French Army might collapse more slowly and/or later. This means they might be able to hold parts of the Alps, Corsica and maybe Provence* with the help of the Italians.

My question is do you think germany will still be bold or crazy enough to take russian on if france does manage to fall? Or will they focus on italy?

I think they will, at least, need to neutralize Italy and Britain to even consider invading the Soviet Union. They might content themselves with an aerial campaign on Italy to force an armistice, but I highly doubt it would suffice.
For an invasion of Italy, the "best" entry point is through Yugoslavia (now Slovenia), but it means expending the war and the terrain is still not ideal.


* Provence has only 2 entry points, one from Marseille and one from the Alps (the famous route Napoléon). Plus, the region is very rugged with ridges everywhere, so it's possible to hold it (for a time). Even more so when you consider that the logistical tail of the Wehrmacht will be 1 000km or more at this point.
 

Deleted member 1487

@wiking
I don't understand why you consider that France's Fall is a given in a scenario with Italy in the war on the Allied side since 1939.
Per OTL with Italy in the war it is impossible, France won't surrender like IOTL with Italy to retreat to if the Germans breakthrough. That said it is unlikely that Italy alone would butterfly the May 1940 breakthrough.

And we do have to consider that Italy may make the Allies too overconfident and Operation Pike happens ITTL:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Pike


1. The Allies have far more units on Theater than OTL :​

The French have the units from the Armée des Alpes (it's two Corps and five first line Infantry Divisions even if you disregard the four Forteresse Sector and the F-17 tank battalion) and from the Armée d'Afrique (Without the forces in Morocco and the garrison troops, it's two Corps, four or five second line Infantry Divisions, one Cavalry Division, a number of Cavalry regiments and two D1 tank battalions).
The UK have, at least, one more Infantry Division from the Middle-East and they might have the 1st Armoured operational by taking personnel and equipment from what will become the 7th Armoured.
I don't know what the Italian will sent for sure, but I think a five division expeditionary force is a minimum with one Armored, one Celere and three Infantry Divisions in two Corps.
That's a non trivial amount of forces (16+ Divisions) and most will be in strategic reserve.
You're literally inventing forces that didn't exist as combat units. All the stuff left in North Africa/Syria at this point wasn't combat ready in Europe and needed to be kept in North Africa for training and garrison duty regardless of Italy. Other than the Alpine forces nothing in Africa that wasn't already stripped out IOTL was fit for fighting in Europe. Besides with the Italians and the Alpine army, there wouldn't really be a need to bring even more less than worthwhile forces from the colonies home. Especially the shitty D1 tanks; they were exiled to the colonies for a reason.

In terms of the Alpine forces redeploying the 5 divisions/2 corps would be reasonable, even the FT-17s.
The question is where they would be deployed if not on the Italian border; I think considering they were building up forces in Syria to land in the Balkans they may well send those forces to Syria:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polish_Independent_Carpathian_Rifle_Brigade
On 12 April 1940 the brigade was officially formed in Syria, with Colonel Kopański as its commander. The main base of the brigade was established in Homs and the new unit instantly entered the ranks of the French Armée du Levant. As a unit specializing in mountain warfare, the brigade was thought of as a Polish addition to Allied plans for landings in the Balkans.
Mountain and colonial troops were needed for the planned Balkan operation. Would be highly interesting if the French got the necessary forces along with Italy to land in the Balkans in Spring 1940 before the invasion of France to put pressure on Turkey to join the Allies...

That and where and what the Italians would send. I think an armored division is a good bet, but perhaps something like the Italian expeditionary corps in Russia with an extra armored division:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian_Expeditionary_Corps_in_Russia

The forces the Brits had in the Mediterranean in 1940 before Italy entered the war were needed in the region anyway to hold it down and potentially deal with Russia.

In the air, the French will have more units in Northern France, kipping only reequipping units in the South. It's not much, but it's something.

2. The German forces are more stretched than OTL :​

Even if, like you said, the German don't need much forces to cover Austria, they will still need to deploy more forces there. It will be probably five to ten Infantry Divisions, mostly third line with maybe one or two first line.
What significant extra air units will the French have?
And why do you think it would take more than 5 division to hold the Brenner Pass? 5 low quality ones that weren't doing much else anyway? Frankly Volkssturm with WW1 weapons could hold the pass.


Plus, the Luftwaffe will need to cover Austria. With 20/20 incite, we know that the Italian Air Force was a paper tiger, but the Luftwaffe don't know that for sure (They might suspect it). So that's some Fighters (maybe 1 or 200) staying in Austria.

That's some (minor) more forces tied up outside of the Western Front. It's not much, but those will be missed, specially if the French Front isn't pierced immediately.

3. You can't squeeze much more forces on the Dyle-Breda Maneuver :​

OTL, the British were already making noise that they didn't have enough terrain to deploy correctly with the 7th French Army on their left.

4. The Allied reserves will be more effective :​

OTL, the French reserves were split in four parts : 1 to support the forces in Belgium, 1 to support the Maginot Line, 1 to cover the Swiss option and 1 central in Champagne.
Given the quality of the Italian air force and it's need to commit forces to France, potentially the Balkans, and defend it's own territory, it is entirely possible to defend Austria with little more than FLAK, as at the time bombing of cities wasn't the policy of the Allies. The French refused to even bomb Germany for fear of retaliation, the British did the same after the heavy loses in their 1939 Kiel raid, as well as hope to avoid bombing of cities in general:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phoney_War
https://allthatsinteresting.com/phoney-war

Not seeing how and where the extra Allied forces would be deployed in the West other than as reserves, which per OTL were not effectively used anyway. Not only that, but the extra forces may well end up used in a hare-brained operation in the Balkans as the French were quite serious about it and had an expeditionary corps building up in the Levant for such an operation; here they don't even need to form those forces, just use their Alpine Army for the operation, while having the extra air units with Italy in the war to bomb Soviet oil as they had planned to do IOTL, but now have every reason to not wait on thanks to Italy removing the need to maintain a reserves and actually adding forces for a potential operation.


OTL, the Luftwaffe effectiveness against the reserves was magnified by two factors.
First, the French reserves came piece-meal. It's a strategic and doctrinal mistake from the French High Command which might only be change on the margin : with more reserves directly at hand, Gamelin and Georges might be more willing to engage more rapidly and massively the reserves.
Second, after the first few days of fighting, the reserves came form afar (mostly from the Maginot and the Swiss pools). They were dropped disorganized at some train station, needed to concentrate and reorganize, and then walk into the front threw predictable path. All that under the total air dominance of the Luftwaffe.

I suppose that the "new" ITTL reserves will mostly be deployed in Champagne, including the Italian Expeditionary Force. It's central and it have the military infrastructure to accommodate those forces (OTL, the 7th Army was stationed there before the Breda variant was chosen).

5. It can snow ball :
I'm aware of the advantages of the 1940 German Army OTL, but even with them OTL, the Battle of France was far from a walk in the park with some very close calls (the Landser who took an unfinished bunker in Sedan making it possible to roll the line, the two survival of Rommel, the multiple times were German generals disregarded the orders to stop during the Sickle Cut, ...).

If you take into account all those changes, the German breakthrough is not a given at all, simply because the Allies have organized reserves in place.
Likely the extra reserves get used for the planned operation in the Balkans with Italian assistance and operations against the USSR's oil.
The French weren't exactly keen on fighting the Germans head on in Europe, hence the Phony War, planned Balkan operation, and planning bombing of Soviet oil. They wanted a peripheral strategy and actually having the reserves to launch those before the Germans could invade France may well mean they do to distract Germany from invading France, but in the process end up screwing themselves badly.

If we are going to talk about butterflies we need to talk about ALL of them, not simply the ones you think will give the French the best change with minimal changes to OTL, as well as the understanding that per OTL the French may well still shit the bed when it comes to using the extra forces they have even in France.

On the Norway Campaign, the major change I can see is that the Allies have even more naval assets. After all, the Mediterranean Fleet and the French Fleet were deployed to deter Italy OTL.
So I can see ITTL an even bigger Home Fleet, possibly reinforced by the French Force de Raid, deployed in three squadrons of two battleships and one aircraft carrier and the two battlecruiser squadrons.
By adding some ships, you dramatically increase the chances of interception of the German ships, specially for the Trondheim and Narvik invasion groups.
The Mediterranean fleets were not meant to operate in the Atlantic or North Sea, where conditions are quite different. The Germans even found out the hard way that their North Sea designs for capital ships were not sufficient for Atlantic conditions, which required major modifications for an 'atlantic bow'.
Likely the Italian fleet and French Mediterranean Fleet get sucked into supporting a Balkan operation, as the French had planned and was still building up forces for in June 1940 when they were defeated IOTL; ITTL they will have the forces thanks to Italy being on side, so may well launch it in 1939 or early 1940.
Besides the Norway Operation was a Churchill scheme which the French would only contribute a limited force for, there is no reason to involve more French forces, as the British fleet was enormous and running nearly the entire thing. The French had their own plans and could leave the British to run theirs. Your reasoning for the enhanced Narvik operation is entirely based on hindsight and not the actually Allied views and plans at the time, which Italy wouldn't appreciably change, other than perhaps France being able to launch their peripheral strategy in the Mediterranean from the get-go. In fact I wonder if they might try to involve Romania in the war with their Balkan strategy.
 
The Mediterranean fleets were not meant to operate in the Atlantic or North Sea, where conditions are quite different.

The Malaya was in the Med in OTL. Since a couple of ships of her same class were active in the Norway operation somehow, I suspect it could be bothered to do the same in those inhospitable Norwegian waters.

The Dunkerque had some rough times in Icelandic waters, surely, and yet it and the Strasbourg served in the Atlantic all the same, out of the cozy, quiet waters of the Mediterranean. In the spring of 1940 the French were worried about the Italians and sent these two to Mers-el-Kébir; if the Italians are allied, they can keep them in the Atlantic.

In general, throughout the war all combatants employed all types of vessels out of the environments they were best suited for. Did this affect performance? Yes; was this considered reason not to deploy? No.
 

nbcman

Donor
The Malaya was in the Med in OTL. Since a couple of ships of her same class were active in the Norway operation somehow, I suspect it could be bothered to do the same in those inhospitable Norwegian waters.

The Dunkerque had some rough times in Icelandic waters, surely, and yet it and the Strasbourg served in the Atlantic all the same, out of the cozy, quiet waters of the Mediterranean. In the spring of 1940 the French were worried about the Italians and sent these two to Mers-el-Kébir; if the Italians are allied, they can keep them in the Atlantic.

In general, throughout the war all combatants employed all types of vessels out of the environments they were best suited for. Did this affect performance? Yes; was this considered reason not to deploy? No.
Most of what was part of the RN Med Fleet in June 1940 was in the Home Fleet or escorting convoys in April 1940. For example, Malaya and Royal Sovereign were in / around Halifax at the start of April 1940:

http://www.naval-history.net/xDKWW2-4004-13APR01.htm

And Warspite had a definite role in the Norway operation at Narvik after turning around from her original destination of the Med after the Germans invaded on 8 April 1940.

http://www.naval-history.net/xDKWW2-4004-13APR02.htm

So the RN was pretty much all in for the Norway operations IOTL.
 

Deleted member 1487

The Malaya was in the Med in OTL. Since a couple of ships of her same class were active in the Norway operation somehow, I suspect it could be bothered to do the same in those inhospitable Norwegian waters.
Funny how the Malaya was built in 1913 for the Grand Fleet. There isn't a reason that ships designed for operation in the Atlantic, even pre-WW1 couldn't operate in the more tranquil Mediterranean, it was more difficult for it to go the other way.

The Dunkerque had some rough times in Icelandic waters, surely, and yet it and the Strasbourg served in the Atlantic all the same, out of the cozy, quiet waters of the Mediterranean. In the spring of 1940 the French were worried about the Italians and sent these two to Mers-el-Kébir; if the Italians are allied, they can keep them in the Atlantic.
The Dunkerque was designed to counter the German Deutschland class cruisers, i.e. operations in the Atlantic and potentially North Sea. Again ships designed for the Atlantic had little penalty operating the Mediterranean compared to the opposite. Likely the French BBs, if not needed for operations in the Mediterranean would just do what they did IOTL in the Atlantic.

In general, throughout the war all combatants employed all types of vessels out of the environments they were best suited for. Did this affect performance? Yes; was this considered reason not to deploy? No.
Sure and there would be consequences for that, but what is the demand for French vessels for the Norwegian campaign other than hindsight? The British fleet grossly outnumbered the German navy in 1940, so why would the French waste their ships on that operation, which was in the British backyard, when they could work with the Italians to launch their planned Balkan operation and even go after the Soviets as many in the French parliament wanted?
 
Most of what was part of the RN Med Fleet in June 1940 was in the Home Fleet or escorting convoys in April 1940. For example, Malaya and Royal Sovereign were in / around Halifax at the start of April 1940:

http://www.naval-history.net/xDKWW2-4004-13APR01.htm

And Warspite had a definite role in the Norway operation at Narvik after turning around from her original destination of the Med after the Germans invaded on 8 April 1940.

http://www.naval-history.net/xDKWW2-4004-13APR02.htm

So the RN was pretty much all in for the Norway operations IOTL.

That's not the point. The point is that being assigned to service in the Med does not mean you can't be assigned to service in the Atlantic. Being a French battleship does not mean you can't be assigned to service in the Atlantic.
Obviously, I'd have to say.
 

nbcman

Donor
That's not the point. The point is that being assigned to service in the Med does not mean you can't be assigned to service in the Atlantic. Being a French battleship does not mean you can't be assigned to service in the Atlantic.
Obviously, I'd have to say.
I'd agree with that. However, you had claimed that Malaya was in the Med during Norway and she wasn't. She didn't arrive there until 3 May 1940. However, your point regarding the use of French ships could be expanded upon so MN ships could be used as escorts in the Atlantic which could allow more RN ships to be available for the Norwegian campaign in the rougher waters of the North and Norwegian Seas.
 
I must say I'm not surprised at all by your answer. It's your usual twisting of what your interlocutor says and undermining him by saying he's inventing or making up his claim(s).
That's why it's so annoying to debate with you.


I'd agree with that. However, you had claimed that Malaya was in the Med during Norway and she wasn't. She didn't arrive there until 3 May 1940. However, your point regarding the use of French ships could be expanded upon so MN ships could be used as escorts in the Atlantic which could allow more RN ships to be available for the Norwegian campaign in the rougher waters of the North and Norwegian Seas.
That's what I was thinking, plus the Dunkerque with the Home Fleet.
 
Last edited:

Deleted member 1487

You really need to reformat your post

I must say I'm not surprised at all by your answer. It's your usual twisting of what your interlocutor says and undermining him by saying he's inventing or making up his claim(s).
That's why it's so annoying to debate with you.
You're the one that brought up the butterflies that would result from having the Italians in the war due to all the extra forces available, but then conveniently neglected to look at the broader strategic plans that the Allies had that would be impacted by the availability of all those extra forces. Sorry that you only want to discuss the scenario as OTL with extra Allied forces right where hindsight says they should have been rather than the reality of where the planners of the time were likely to have placed them.

And beyond that the number of forces that the French actually had in North Africa was hashed out in another thread on France fighting on instead of surrendering, which showed that they had stripped it of all combat ready forces by June and really mostly by May 1940 IOTL anyway. I'm not twisting what you said or simply claiming that you're inventing thing, I'm pointing out you are either unaware of the state of the units left in North Africa as of May 1940 or actively ignoring their actually state.
If you like to list the specific names of the divisions you claim would be available ITTL that weren't IOTL I'm more than happy to do the research and post links about their readiness.

That said, back to the point :

1. On operation Pike :
It was never seriously
Source on that?
Here's mine that show they were prepping for the attacks:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/285962.pdf?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
https://www.jstor.org/stable/3490233?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
https://www.amazon.com/Operation-Pike-1939-1941-Contributions-Military/dp/0313313687
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Pike#Preparations_for_the_air_campaign
In March 1940, after the end of the Winter War, the British undertook secret reconnaissance flights to photograph areas inside the Soviet Union, utilising high-altitude, high-speed stereoscopic photography pioneered by Sidney Cotton.[10]

Using specially modified and unmarked Lockheed Model 14 Super Electra aircraft painted in a special blue camouflage scheme developed by Cotton (who led the RAF Photographic Development Unit (PDU), the Secret Intelligence Service launched the high-altitude reconnaissance flights from RAF Habbaniya, a Royal Air Force station in Iraq. One such mission was flown on 30 March 1940. Flying over the mountainous region of south-eastern Kurdistan, in Iranian airspace, across the coast of the Caspian Sea then north towards Baku, the flight entered Soviet airspace at 11:45 after a four-hour flight. Loitering for an hour whilst making six photographic runs with its 14 in (36 cm) aerial camera, the aircraft left Baku at 12:45 and returned to RAF Habbaniya.[11]

Another reconnaissance sortie was flown on 5 April from RAF Habbaniya, this time crossing Turkish airspace to reach Batumi. This flight encountered Soviet anti-aircraft fire and a Soviet fighter attempted an interception; the British had obtained everything they needed for photo-interpretation purposes and for mapping the Soviet petroleum centres.

As of 1 April, four squadrons comprising 48 Bristol Blenheim Mk IV bombers were transferred to the Middle East Command, supplemented with a number of single-engined Wellesley bombers for night missions. A French force of 65 Martin Maryland bombers and a supplementary force of 24 Farman F.222 heavy bombers were allocated for night operations during the campaign. The French were preparing new air fields in Syria which were expected to be ready by 15 May. The campaign was expected to last three months and over 1,000 short tons (910 t) of bombs were allocated to the operation: 404 × 500 lb (230 kg) semi-armour-piercing bombs, 554 × 500 lb (230 kg) and 5,188 × 250 lb (110 kg) general-purpose bombs and 69,192 × 4 lb (1.8 kg) incendiary bombs.[12]
 
Last edited by a moderator:
I guess there would be one major butterfly that hasn't been mentioned: with Italy joining the Allies, there won't be a Taranto-attack. Without Taranto, will there be a Pearl Harbor?
 
I guess there would be one major butterfly that hasn't been mentioned: with Italy joining the Allies, there won't be a Taranto-attack. Without Taranto, will there be a Pearl Harbor?
Good question!

While Taranto was a major inspiration for Pearl, I'd imagine the Japanese would eventually strike the US in some way to really piss it off per OTL. Would it be as temporarily successful as what we saw, well, that's a whole different story.
 

Deleted member 1487

Good question!

While Taranto was a major inspiration for Pearl, I'd imagine the Japanese would eventually strike the US in some way to really piss it off per OTL. Would it be as temporarily successful as what we saw, well, that's a whole different story.
Depends, if Barbarossa doesn't happen and the USSR isn't viewed as too occupied to take advantage of Japanese distraction, do they feel they can get away with it? Especially with Germany distracted against the Allies.
 
Depends, if Barbarossa doesn't happen and the USSR isn't viewed as too occupied to take advantage of Japanese distraction, do they feel they can get away with it? Especially with Germany distracted against the Allies.
That's a fair point. But since the oil embargo and expansionist policies haven't been waved away - which were driving forces in the push into the Pacific - I'd imagine Japan would eventually strike at Western holdings. Though it might be less ambitious, or either throw everything against Pearl or the RN.
 

Deleted member 1487

That's a fair point. But since the oil embargo and expansionist policies haven't been waved away - which were driving forces in the push into the Pacific - I'd imagine Japan would eventually strike at Western holdings. Though it might be less ambitious, or either throw everything against Pearl or the RN.
Would they even try Pearl without the ability to pull off the air component? I'm not as familiar with Japanese planning for that operation, so may be mistaken, but I thought the operation hinged on the ability to use air dropped torpedoes?
 
Would they even try Pearl without the ability to pull off the air component? I'm not as familiar with Japanese planning for that operation, so may be mistaken, but I thought the operation hinged on the ability to use air dropped torpedoes?
That's true, based on the topography of Pearl. So, the question would be if they come up with the idea without Taranto.
 

nbcman

Donor
That's true, based on the topography of Pearl. So, the question would be if they come up with the idea without Taranto.

It appears that it might have as the Japanese were looking in that direction pre-Taranto and though that operation may have push things of the edge it wasn't the first look at that option:
https://www.hoover.org/research/planning-pearl-harbor

The USN had already considered an attack on PH as part of Fleet Problem 13 in 1932. Note that the Japanese naval officers observed the attack and their 1941 attack took place from North and North-East exactly as Admiral Yarnell's attack in 1932 - plus the dismissal of the results of the attack by senior brass due to the attack coming in at an "inappropriate" time and the racial overtone that 'Asiatics' couldn't do the precision bombing attack.

Since 1923, the U.S. Navy had conducted large-scale naval exercises, termed "Fleet Problems," during which U.S. Naval forces would engage in mock battles with a purported European or Asian attacker. Fleet Problem Number 13 was a mock attack by a "militaristic, Asian, island nation against the military base at Pearl Harbor." The exercise was designed to test Pearl's defenses and assess its vulnerability to an attack.

The attacking force was under the command of Rear Admiral Harry Yarnell. The admiral was a qualified naval aviator, one of the few admirals to have earned his aviator wings at a time when battleship command was still the path to promotions. In 1927, he took command of the aircraft carrier Saratoga and was instrumental in developing carrier tactics. At the time, carriers were classified as "fleet scouting elements." They were not valued as capital ships and were considered expendable.

Yarnell maintained that Japan "had always started operations by attacking before a declaration of war." Accordingly, he designed an attack plan that utilized carrier aviation to launch a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. Pearl's defenders had anticipated that Yarnell would attack with his battleships. Instead, he left his battleships behind and advanced with the carriers Saratoga and Lexington to a point north-northeast of Hawaii. At dawn, on Sunday February 7, 1932, Yarnell launched his attack with a force of 152 planes from the two carriers. His attack force first attacked the airfields and then proceeded to attack the ships along battleship row.

Yarnell achieved total surprise. The airfields were put out of commission, with not a single plane getting airborne during the attack. The attacking force scored multiple hits, they dropped sacks of white flour to simulate bombs, on the battleships. The umpires declared that Yarnell's attack had been a complete success and declared him the winner. The Army and Navy brass, however, would have none of it. They complained that Yarnell had cheated. He had attacked at dawn on a Sunday morning, a time considered "inappropriate" for an attack. His attack vector from the north-northeast had mimicked planes arriving from the mainland. Most importantly, the Navy argued, low level precision bombing of battleships at anchor was unrealistic since "everyone knew that Asians lacked sufficient hand-eye coordination to engage in that kind of precision bombing."

Pressured by the War Department, the umpires reversed their decision and declared that the defenders had won the exercise. The Navy and its "battleship admirals" ignored Yarnell's contention that Pearl Harbor was vulnerable to an attack by naval air power. The exercise was widely reported in the press and was observed by Japanese naval officers at the Japanese consulate on Oahu. Some 10 years later, the Japanese Navy would launch an almost carbon copy attack on Pearl Harbor, utilizing six carriers and double the air power used by Yarnell.

The only significant innovation employed by the Japanese Navy was the use of air-launched torpedoes against the ships in Pearl lagoon. A year earlier, the Royal Navy had used slow Swordfish torpedo planes to attack the Italian fleet at its base in Taranto. The success of that attack was not lost on Tokyo. The U.S. Navy had dismissed its relevance to Pearl because Taranto's harbor was around 75-feet deep, almost double the depth of Pearl Harbor, and it did not believe that air launched torpedoes would work in shallow waters. The Japanese Navy solved that problem by modifying their torpedoes to give them a flatter glide path.

Even with Taranto, the Japanese had to figure out the modifications to their torpedoes - and the new torpedo designs that resulted in shallower running Type 91 airdropped torpedoes was started in Spring 1941 as a byproduct of their anti-rolling controller work around the same time that preliminary plans for the PH attack took place.
 

Deleted member 1487

Everyone who can get access should read this paper:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/3490233?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

The French had a serious hard on for the Balkans once the Soviets sided with Germany to split German forces. They were retrained somewhat by the British and the Italians who viewed it as their backyard and at that point the Allies were very eager to keep Italy neutral. ITTL though with the perfect troops freed up in France (the Alpine forces) and the Italians on side it is very likely the French, if the Italians approved, force Greece into allowing them into the country as part of the French belief that they could 'galvanize' the Balkan states to the Allied cause.

Although French interest in military action in the Balkans dates back
to World War I, the failure to construct an eastern front in 1939 spurred
planners to think even more seriously about the region as an alternative
second front. The basic idea was to dispatch a small expeditionary force
that would rally the different Balkan countries and armies to the Allies,
thereby creating a second front in Germany's rear. Only two days after
the Nazi-Soviet Pact, General Maurice Gamelin, chief of the French
general staff, instructed General Caillault, the French army commander
in Syria, to draw up plans for the transport of troops to Greece. Two
weeks later, with Poland reeling under attack, Gamelin told a meeting of
French military and political leaders that it would be worthwhile to
establish a 'powerful base in the East' and that four divisions would be
enough to 'galvanize the Balkans'.1o Premier tdouard Daladier fully
agreed. Now that Poland appeared doomed, he explained to ministers
on 20 September, an 'eastern front [which is] indispensable in forcing
Germany to disperse its military forces and to make the blockade as
effective as possible - can ... only be organized in the Balkans'."
.....
In the specific case of the
Balkans, Chamberlain and his colleagues also feared alienating the
Italians, who claimed that the region fell within Italy's sphere of
influence. Indeed, hoping to win over Italy to the Allied side, British
leaders remained loath throughout the Phony War to do anything that
might alienate Mussolini.12 In opposing a Balkan expedition, Chamber-
lain enjoyed the support of his military advisors. In a series of
preparatory papers for the SWC, they warned that either Germany
would overrun the region before the Allies could mount an effective
resistance or the expedition would result in an open-ended commitment
in which the Allies and not Germany might find themselves forced to
disperse their strength. Rather than an Anglo-French landing, the Chiefs
of Staff (COS) recommended that the Allies try to keep the war away
from the Balkans.
......
Just when a Balkan expedition appeared to be a dead issue, however,
interest in the operation enjoyed a resurgence. A key factor in this
turnaround was General Maxime Weygand, a former chief of the
general staff whom Gamelin in August 1939 appointed commander of
French forces in the eastern Mediterranean. From his headquarters in
Syria, Weygand became a tireless lobbyist for military action in the
Balkans. Restless and ambitious, he not only disliked inaction in
principle but also doubted that time favoured the Allies. In particular,
Weygand feared that the only beneficiary of a long war would be
communism, both inside and outside France." If the Allies could not
wage a long war, they would have to win a short one - a goal he believed a
Balkan expedition could help achieve. A small but powerfully equipped
and mobile Allied military force, Weygand argued, would knit together
the Balkan armies into a powerful force, numbering over 100 divisions.
Although careful not to speak of a pre-emptive landing, Weygand barely
concealed his hope that active preparations (assembling the necessary
shipping, reinforcing French troops in Syria, staff talks with Balkan
military chiefs) would provoke a German response and thus provide the
Allies with an excuse for a landing. An initial Allied contingent of four or
five divisions would serve as the avant-garde of a larger force that might
eventually involve up to fifteen divisions.'8 Having opened a second
front, Allied leaders would be forced to commit greater resources,
thereby creating a significant military front whose impact could be
decisive. One of his staff officers later claimed that Weygand spoke of
finishing the war in Vienna.'9

......
No one appeared more interested in a Balkan expedition than
Daladier. Ignoring his earlier promise to the British to support a neutral
Balkan bloc, beginning in November 1939 the Premier repeatedly
instructed Charles Corbin, the French ambassador in London, to press
his hosts to reconsider their position.23 Having got the British to agree to
an SWC meeting in Paris, Daladier then set about preparing France's
case. In addition to consulting with France's military leaders and with
close advisors, he recalled Weygand to Paris. Once there Weygand
predictably made the rounds of French leaders, lobbying hard for
military action.24
.....
What is most striking is the support
they received on the French side: Weygand, Daladier and Quai officials,
among others, were willing and even eager to brush aside the
considerable difficulties and risks involved in order to mount an
expedition. This support testifies to the place of a second front in French
thinking: having gone to war without an eastern front, an indispensable
element of French strategy in a war against Germany, the French hoped
to create a substitute second front in the Balkans. But it also points to a
growing dissatisfaction with Allied military inaction - and thus with the
long-war strategy. If this dissatisfaction remained fairly restrained for the
moment, doubts about whether time was an ally would soon cause it to
increase exponentially. Finally, support for a Balkan expedition was an
early sign of Gamelin's growing isolation. While successful in stymieing
Daladier over the Balkans, Gamelin would find the task harder in the
future, not least because of the Premier's frustration with him.
Gamelin's advice, Daladier irritably noted in December 1939, resembled
'sand running through your fingers'.27 Counsels of patience were clearly
wearing thin.

A Balkan expedition, however, did not tempt the French alone.
Although the British presented a solid front of opposition to their ally,
behind the scenes greater uncertainty could be detected, especially in
military circles. Among those interested in French proposals for military
action in the Balkans were Britain's delegates to the Allied Military
Committee (AMC), a liaison body between the French and British
general staffs. Working closely with their French colleagues, the British
delegates found themselves increasingly tempted by French arguments
for a Balkan expedition. The French plan, the British army delegate
would write, 'seems the logical one and, moreover, the only one that has
the virtue of a forward policy' - a view that prompted the War Cabinet
Secretary to grumble that Britain's delegates had been converted by the
French.28 Although the AMC delegates failed to alter Britain's Balkan
policy, they did succeed in pushing British planners to question their
basic strategic assumptions. Partly in response to the AMC's call for
military preparations for a Balkan expedition, the COS in December
1939 undertook an inquiry into 'possible German action in the Spring of
1940'.

There is quite a bit more, I just was able to pull out some excerpts. The ultimate reason that turned against it was the lack of resources and potential for Italian objections/entry against them. ITTL neither is really a problem.

In fact the French desire for a Balkans campaign could potentially deter Germany from moving on France in May 1940 if they launch it early enough and manage to threaten Romanian oil supplies. It would also likely deter the entire Norway/Narvik scheme in Allied planning, as according to the paper it was either/or and only came about after the Balkan campaign was shelved. So likely if the forces are available the Allies, based on the planning for a 2nd front and need to interdict German oil, would go ahead with the Balkan campaign to shut down Romania while also bombing Soviet oil, for which planning was quite advanced IOTL.

Gamelin even supported the air attacks on Baku oil and he was the OTL 'voice of reason' against the peripheral strategies (including the Scandinavian operation BTW). Reynaud loved it even more than Daladier, so by the time he became Premier it was a lock.

The deteriorating military situation in Scandinavia only stoked Rey-
naud's ardour. In addition to instructing Corbin to pressure the British
to cooperate, which resulted in the dispatch of a French planning
mission to London, the Premier pressed officials at home to undertake
concrete preparations for military operations."' As a result, in April
1940, the local French air force commander in the Levant received a
'voluminous dossier' on the Baku project with instructions to proceed
with preparations. Air bases were accordingly readied in Syria and
bomber aircraft modified to increase their range, thereby allowing them
to reach the Caucasus. By mid-April, Weygand, now back in the Middle
East, could inform Paris that everything would be ready for operations
to begin by the end of June or the beginning of July provided that
sufficient bombers were available."116

The Baku project generated enthusiasm not only in Paris but also in
London. Once again, Morton and the MEW were at the forefront of
developments. Early on, the MEW rejected the argument that Soviet
and German interests were fundamentally incompatible and that the
Allies therefore should avoid a rupture with Moscow. Criticizing FO
proposals in late 1939 for an Anglo-Soviet trade agreement, the MEW
warned that the Soviets would exploit any concessions offered to
Germany's advantage."' Scattered reports of Soviet shipments to
Germany reinforced MEW suspicions that Moscow was preparing to
export large quantities of oil and other commodities. That intercepted
telegrams revealed the Germans to be receiving almost nothing did
nothing to reassure the MEW since the danger appeared to lie in the
future. If at present 'very large quantities of goods' were not being
supplied, remarked a January 194o analysis from Morton's office, 'the
general situation in six or eight months may be very different'."
This was nightmare fuel for the Allies, who thought that the situation in the long run was getting worse for them, not better, due to the blockade being broken by the Soviets.

In fact, like French planners, MEW officials dreaded the prospect of a
German-Soviet political and economic combination that would dwarf
the Allies and render the blockade useless. Sounding the alarm, Morton
in March 1940, warned the Cabinet that, if nothing were done, the
'effect of our blockade on Germany might be largely nullified ...' by
Soviet supplies to Germany.19

For some reason I can't copy the section, but the French were prepared to do it entirely themselves if the British refused or even dragged their feet. It was only their defeat in May that cancelled the operation. The paper argues that it was probably only the defeat of France in May 1940 that stopped the Allies from making a fatal mistake by attacking the USSR and bringing them into the war as an active belligerent and ally of Germany.

It may even be that the Allies force and operation against Yugoslavia to threaten Germany's southern border and break their connection with the Balkan states, while allowing for the use of Italy's against Germany beyond having to smash them against the Brenner Pass, while opening up more areas to bombing, ports for supply well forward, and the ability to pressure neighboring states into the Allied camp; Hungary in particular would have liked to be free of sole dependence on Germany economically.
 
Last edited by a moderator:
The USN had already considered an attack on PH as part of Fleet Problem 13 in 1932. Note that the Japanese naval officers observed the attack and their 1941 attack took place from North and North-East exactly as Admiral Yarnell's attack in 1932 - plus the dismissal of the results of the attack by senior brass due to the attack coming in at an "inappropriate" time and the racial overtone that 'Asiatics' couldn't do the precision bombing attack. ...

Yarnells predecessor Bull Reeves had conducted similar operations in the 1920s with the Langley & later the Sara & Lex. The most notable was a fleet problem revolving around a threat to the Panama Canal. When Reeves took charge of the Langleys operations in the early 1920s he assembled the tiny group of Naval aviators and told them the one sortie experimental ops were over. They would imdeadiatly start operating a full squadron, and in a few weeks a full air group off the Langly. When asked why Reeves remind them two huge carriers, the largest ordered so far were under construction, and four more planned. He told them their sole task was to prepare for future carrier operations of 200-400- or even 600 aircraft striking the enemies fleet & homeland en mass. While there were other visions and doctrine in the USN there was a core group who like Yarnell held onto Reeves vision & prepared the carrier fleet for the distant future. I believe Halsey was among the junior officers Reeves was inoculating during the Langley operations in the 1920s.
 
Your underlined statements wasn't what the original question was asking. The question was whether the German forces required to occupy Italy was greater than the German forces for the Afrika Corps.
Actually the question was about resource use rather than "forces". So the elimination of the cost to Germany's merchant marine and air transport fleets would need to be considered.
 
Top