What if Muhammad Ali of Egypt had more competent successors ?
Please only answer my questions.
Here are my questions:
1)Would Egypt still fall to European powers ?
2)Would the Sudan develop as a sort of Wild west for such a growing nation(I am a firm believer in the Nazi philosophy that, to be powerful, a nation needs huge wide open lands, the people of those lands should offer no resistance, lebanserum) ?
3)In such a case of Ali having competent successors, what would happen if Germany won WW1 ?
4)What would happen to the Ottoman empire.
And lastly
5)How would him having competent successors change the fact that most Europeans had supported Turkey in the oriental crisis ?
While the competence of a ruler is important, it is not the end-all, be-all when it comes to the success or failure of a nation-state. Muhammad Ali was a visionary and a very capable administrator, but one of his strengths was adapting to a more modern (and more European, though only in the sense that European states had taken to it, not that it was inherently European) structure of government. An excellent example of this is Ali's military reforms, inspired both by the Egyptian experience of Napoleonic soldiers and also by Prussian professionalism, putting a greater emphasis on structure and order compared to individual strength or capability, or his weakening of the ulama and the Mamlukes by redirecting waqf profits to state coffers. Long story short, a core aspect of Muhammad Ali's reforms was the creation of a centralized, bureaucratic, modern state, which reduces (but does not eliminate) the value of a highly competent crowned head - compare the effects of Henry V on the English state to Victoria on the British state.
The upshot of all this is that you don't necessarily need another Muhammad Ali - that is, a visionary reformer - to continue his work. Consider the Taisho Emperor of Japan, Meiji's successor - he was not the man his father was, but the rapidly changing Japanese system of government kept up its revolutions and kept European influence at bay. A more successful Muhammad Ali Egypt would require more of a "Zaibatsu" class, perhaps - a wealthy, powerful, western-oriented upper class with a vested interest in both preserving Egyptian autonomy as a state and in preserving the modernizing trends of the government.
Of course, the Japan analogy can't be taken too far, and while Egypt's proximity to Europe is part of that, the Suez Canal is, too. An exceptionally skilled diplomat as Prime Minister would be required to not make the Suez Canal a far too tempting prize for ambitious European nations to try and make Egypt a client of theirs.
To answer your questions directly, however
1) There are far too many variables here to make a full decision, mainly because a more competent successor does not eliminate the reasons a European nations would want to occupy Egypt, nor does a single man make enough of a difference to the institutional strength of a nation to decisively stop any foreign threats. However, an Egyptian state which transforms into a modern nation-state between the 1850s and 1870s could hypothetically remain independent and uncolonized. Could is the operant word here.
2) This depends heavily on the Egyptian policy towards Sudan and the Sudanese people, since (much like the Wild West of the United States or anywhere that the Nazis thought they could implement lebanserum - also, just a tip, maybe don't out-and-out say you agree with Nazi philosophies) there are people living there with thousands of years of their own history, culture, and livelihoods. You could get anything in an Egyptian Sudan from a sort of Anglo-Scottish relationship where the Sudanese aren't too fond of playing second fiddle to the Egyptians but also have substantial feelings of connection, both economic and cultural, to an American West situation where the native inhabitants are driven out, killed, and forcibly "converted" to "Egyptian culture" while prime territories are set aside for Egyptian settlers. This would also serve to make Egypt rather vulnerable to European powers, who could very easily play Egyptian expansion into Sudan as an example of the myth of "Oriental Despotism" and use that as a convenient casus belli for more imperial expansion in the region, just as the British in OTL did in "restoring the Khedive's power in Sudan" when they occupied it for themselves. Of course, should such a thing happen, I'm certain TTL's Edward Said would have some choice things to say about it.
3) Assuming WWI even happened as it did OTL (which it likely wouldn't, especially given how a strong, independent Egypt would impact Britain's relationship with the Raj, and thus their relations with Russia, France, China, and Japan), and assuming that Egypt was either actively supporting Germany or neutral (which is likely, since Perfidious Albion is likely to alienate the Egyptians in their quest for easier access to India than any other European powers), one can assume that Egypt might continue on as a semi-European industrial power, up until decolonization starts and they're put in the uncomfortable position of being an African power with African colonies in the form of Sudan.
4) There are many possibilities of what may happen to the Ottomans. One shouldn't put all their stock in the decline thesis and claim that the Ottomans are doomed, but the diplomatic repercussions of Egypt's independence could be interesting. Egypt would be coming into its own right in the height of the Concert of Europe's grand counterrevolutionary phase, and any shift in the balance of power would be keenly felt by Europeans. At worst for the Ottomans is a total occupation and division of the Empire between the various European powers - one can imagine Austro-Hungarian Bosnia and Bulgaria, a German prince as King of Greece in Constantinople, Russian Anatolia, and British and French mandates in Syria, Lebanon, and Arabia. However, such a total collapse of the Ottoman Empire would be ignoring the fact that this was still an intercontinental empire capable of projecting power across thousands of miles and undergoing its own period of modernization. An interesting result could be a diplomatic revolution surrounding India, in which the British Russophobia of the 1860s and 1870s translated into an Turcophilia, thus resulting in further deterioration of Anglo-Russian relations, and the potential scuttling of the Grand Entente (such an anti-Egyptian attitude may also result in the British looking at the American Civil War a bit differently). This could result in a totally different map of European alliances come the turn of the 20th century, hence my doubt that WWI would happen in exactly the same manner.
Within the Ottoman Empire, Egypt's modernization could very well spark a more intense modernizing trend within the Ottoman domains. Returning to the Japan comparison, this could turn out as poorly as Chinese attempts to modernize in the late 1800s, sparking conflict between conservative traditionalists and modernizing reformers, but it could also turn the Ottomans into a leaner, more competent imperial structure, especially if a European power (likely the British) decided that it was in their best interest to prop up the Ottomans as a modern power in the region to check British rivals in St. Petersburg and British opponents in Cairo. Of course, given the nature of later 19th century modernization, this might end poorly for many ethnic and cultural minorities in the Ottoman Empire, but the same is true in a modernizing Egypt.
In short, while I'm not sure that framing the question as simply "what if Muhammad Ali's successor was more competent?" is precisely the best way to go about forming a modernized Egyptian state, I do think the underlying issue of such a state would have profound impacts on the history of the late 19th and early 20th century and many of the adjacent empires, nations, and peoples.