What if Mexico had accepted Zimmermann proposal?

BlondieBC

Banned
I always thought that the Zimmerman Telegram was fabricated because there is no way Germany would think of something that stupid.

Human stupidity is one of the most powerful forces in the Universe. This is a large reason we have so many ASB type arguments. There are many events that if were written as TL would be move to the ASB section. The Germans codes were key example.

Hindenburg greatest battle was won with broken codes. Even after the Russians changed to using codebooks, they were often broken. The Emden broke some merchant codes with the crew on its ship. Signal triangulation was done by all sides. Individual morse code operaters could be identified by the pace of their tapping. Several hundred German ships were captured/destroyed, each a chance to lose a code book. The German Army took extraordinary precautions to hide major offensives. Often officers in command did not know where their units were going for the attack until they had finished boarding the trains. And then their is the Navy and diplomatic services, which should have suspected their codes were broken, and used them in a very sloppy manner. The Zimmermann Telgram is stupid in multiple ways. Analysis should have indicated Mexico would not join. Two, send it by secure channels, which would be the merchant subs or on a USA flagged ship from Denmark or Norway. Three deny, deny, deny.
 
For security errors just consider the case of Wilhelm Wassmuss, who made an enormous, nearly hysterical, fuss when his baggage was seized by the British in Persia.

Not only did his German superiors not order him to be silent but Admiral Hall, who had a remarkable sense for such things, instantly guessed that this was a matter of importance and inquired as to just where this baggage now was.

As it turned out it was by then a ten minute walk from Hall's office. He went to the warehouse, opened the baggage and found a lovely code book.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
For security errors just consider the case of Wilhelm Wassmuss, who made an enormous, nearly hysterical, fuss when his baggage was seized by the British in Persia.

Not only did his German superiors not order him to be silent but Admiral Hall, who had a remarkable sense for such things, instantly guessed that this was a matter of importance and inquired as to just where this baggage now was.

As it turned out it was by then a ten minute walk from Hall's office. He went to the warehouse, opened the baggage and found a lovely code book.

We can do pages of these. They navy knew that individual ships could be identified by operators tapping pattern. Yet for some unexplained reason, the U-boat command had the U-boats signal to port when they passed Scotland. All the Germans gained was knowing how many tons of ships were sunk by an individual sub 24-48 hours earlier. The UK had a pretty exact count on the number of subs on merchant warfare at any given time, and a pretty good record of how many U-boats were lost on patrol. And all this even without any code books.

Or the Battle of Jutland. The High Seas Fleet could have left on strict radio silence. Or if a few ships need to communication, they could have swapped out the code books (really just the identifying header) and the actual person who operates the transmitter from a few torpedo boats. The signals would have looked like a small group of torpedo boats leaving port. Even by prewar doctrine, the first radio broadcast from the High Seas Fleet should have been the Flash report stating that contact with Betty squadron had been made. And it is pretty clear that the Grand Fleet was not being chatty, or the Germans would have know it was at sea by the volume of radio traffic. The same can be said for Betty raids early in the war.

Or why not do the opposite to test if codes are broken. Take a few torpedo boats on patrol, switch out operators so they British think the High Seas Fleet has sailed. With some luck, when the Grand Fleet comes out to respond, it will bump into a U-boat.

And all this assumes you believe your codes are 100% secure. If some just got curious about the codes being broken, there are a lot of ways to test for a British response. A fake message from an U-boat saying that a merchant U-boat was at location X with highly valuable cargo for the Reich, and then have Zeppelins/other U-boats see if the UK rushed to intercept. Broadcast details of bombing runs in code, and see if the UK air defenses improve. Or just some basic analysis of the actions of the UK fleet would probably have confirmed the suspicions.

Now if the Germans actually know the codes are being broken, they could have laid a trap for the part of the Grand Fleet. Invasion forces for Ireland to leave Antwerp in a few hours is guaranteed to get a response.
 
You were making a common mistake - grossly underestimating the power of human stupidity.

Among other thing Japan would never have gone to war with the US as it was complete and utter suicide. Phillip would never have sent the Spanish Armada and prayed for luck. Nixon would have made sure he edited out any criminal activity from his tapes. Bin Laden wouldn't have decided to declare war on the US and destroyed the WTC. Etc.
 
Which Mexico? There were three to four Mexico's during this time. ASB that any faction would accept such a deal as the most powerful faction (Huerta then Carranza) were backed by the United States.
 
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Some interesting ideas.

And all this assumes you believe your codes are 100% secure. If some just got curious about the codes being broken, there are a lot of ways to test for a British response...Broadcast details of bombing runs in code, and see if the UK air defenses improve...
*ahem*
Coventry.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Some interesting ideas.


*ahem*
Coventry.

We are talking about WW1, where the UK was still learning how to use the information. And the critical point is that even basic security precautions, such as not being chatty on the radio, sending out fake signals, or using hand couriers for the most secret missions, would have would have both prevented the Zimmerman Telegram and reduced Room 40 effectiveness by 50%.

For example, faking extra U-boats heading out to sea could have been as simple as a fishing boat with a radio transmitting a series of letters. The boat would not even need to know what the code was, just transmit these 30 sets of 5 letters at noon. Or U-boat returning could have sent in a message with what it killed, and then two hours later, send out of fake message using another call sign and a different Morse code operator. An why did it take a single electronic message to have the high seas fleet sail? Was it too difficult to use flags, or to simply have the ship captains have a meeting with Scheer?

Even in WW2 with all the security precautions the UK too, a good German counter-intelligence analysis could have detected the codes were being broken. In fact, the submarine forces changed their enigma machine based on the belief of possible broken codes.

Never confuse Herr ReichGenius Goering inability to do something for it being impossible.
 
We are talking about WW1, where the UK was still learning how to use the information. And the critical point is that even basic security precautions, such as not being chatty on the radio, sending out fake signals, or using hand couriers for the most secret missions, would have would have both prevented the Zimmerman Telegram and reduced Room 40 effectiveness by 50%.

For example, faking extra U-boats heading out to sea could have been as simple as a fishing boat with a radio transmitting a series of letters. The boat would not even need to know what the code was, just transmit these 30 sets of 5 letters at noon. Or U-boat returning could have sent in a message with what it killed, and then two hours later, send out of fake message using another call sign and a different Morse code operator. An why did it take a single electronic message to have the high seas fleet sail? Was it too difficult to use flags, or to simply have the ship captains have a meeting with Scheer?

Even in WW2 with all the security precautions the UK too, a good German counter-intelligence analysis could have detected the codes were being broken. In fact, the submarine forces changed their enigma machine based on the belief of possible broken codes.

Never confuse Herr ReichGenius Goering inability to do something for it being impossible.

The breadth of the points you raise suggest something basic and systemic was at work, and thus in practice probably quite hard to change without someone beating them over the head with the fact that the codes had been broken. And the British in WWI were perfectly well aware of the need to avoid tipping their hand to the Germans, hence the elaborate efforts to disguise how they obtained the plain text of the Zimmerman telegram.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
The breadth of the points you raise suggest something basic and systemic was at work, and thus in practice probably quite hard to change without someone beating them over the head with the fact that the codes had been broken. And the British in WWI were perfectly well aware of the need to avoid tipping their hand to the Germans, hence the elaborate efforts to disguise how they obtained the plain text of the Zimmerman telegram.

The Army was very concerned about intelligence leaks and went to great lengths to hide troop movements for major attacks. The army also broke codes of the Russians to great effect, and the tracked the movement of Russian units through signal analysis. And I have not found a source saying the German army codes were every systematically broken, or the German Army suspected they were broken.

The German Navy used triangulation to try to find ships from broadcast, yet the Germans themselves remained chatty. And a key point is the chattiness gives away a huge amount of intelligence, even if the codes are not broken. The navy also used broken merchant codes, yet took no precautions themselves. To me, there is only one plausible reason, poor senior leadership, probably Tirpitz. Such a systematic failure to respond to a well know threat, that junior leaders used as a weapon of war, could only have been order by the most senior admirals. Now all the problems mention seem to be the High Seas Fleet and U-boat commands, so it is possible it would be the commander of those forces.

I think the POD is simple, and obvious. Tirpitz was a low quality admiral, and should have been replace long before WW1. The poor communication discipline is not even his worst mistake. Not having a War Plan UK and under building small ships are greater mistakes.
 
American forces pour into the whole north. At best, they will get all of the Baja California peninsula, throw a massive wrench at the whole revolution (and perhaps halting it), and a stronger Synarchist movement (or something similar) in the 1940's.

However, given that the plan was a blatant use of Mexico as a pawn, no one would really go on with it.
 
We'd ben eyeing Sonora, Chihuahua, and the Baja Californias for some time. Odds are if anything is taken it will be those states and probably in that order. More likely we end up with a massive guerilla effort once our army kicks in the door and takes Mexico City, essentially setting up a friendly government and figuring out how to deal with Germany afterwards. Russia is still out of the war via Brest-Litovsk, the CP gets some more push in its 1918 Spring Offensive but not enough to win. America pours material over early and men over shortly afterwards, CP crumples like a wet paper bag by early Spring of 1919 when her reserves are exhausted and her army is in retreat.
 
Maybe you would have a situation like the Plan of San Diego come to fuition (Though this is somewhat borderline implausable) in conjunction with this? Though either way, the US has to divert resources to conquer Mexico, though the allies will almost assuradly still win. However, if the US tries to bite off a bit too much, you could see a long occupation in the future, a Vietnam/West Bank esque situation arise, though this depends on the variables of the Peace.
 
Not this myth again...

Some interesting ideas.

*ahem*
Coventry.

Coventry was not sacrificed to protect Enigma. That is a myth.

The British knew that a major raid was scheduled for the next full moon (November 14-15). But no Enigma decrypt identified the target. The best intelligence estimate was that the raid would be on London.

Churchill was so informed on Friday (11/14). He cancelled his usual weekend in the country so as to be "at his post", i.e. where the danger would be.

Late Friday afternoon, analysis of the German radio guidance beams pinpointed Coventry as the target. All possible defensive measures were taken, including night-fighter patrols, intruder raids on German airfields in France, and jamming of the guidance beams. The night-fighters had no airborne intercept radar, the intruders were ineffective, and the jamming signal frequencies were miscalculated. But nothing was withheld to protect ULTRA.
 
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