What if Mark Clark was captured during Operation Flagpole?

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Deleted member 1487

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Flagpole_(World_War_II)
In an extremely risky mission Mark Clark, a general that knew more than anyone about Operation Torch and knew about ULTRA, was sent to negotiate with the pro-Allied Vichy French in North Africa and was extracted successfully. What if the pro-Axis Vichy French got wind of the meeting and captured him and the pro-Allied French leaders, turning them over to the Gestapo? Would it be likely that Gen. Clark would reveal ULTRA information in addition to Torch plans? What would the Allies do knowing that he and the pro-Allied Vichy French were compromised?
 
A captured Clark might be replaced with a more competent general for the Mediterranean campaigns later on, with all the butterflies that would entail.
 

Deleted member 1487

Only if he got lucky. As it was he was nearly captured by accident and never made a move to really kill himself. Likely if a trap is planned he'd be taken before he could get over the surprise of things.
 

Driftless

Donor
IF the idea would have worked, it might have been a real coup, that would have saved hundreds to thousands of lives; but the execution was closer to a Steve Martin farce than to James Bond....

Part of the reality was the Vichy officers involved were each playing to protect their own backsides as much as anything, and their expectations were not realistic. Plus, it's doubtful how much influence they could have delivered in the situation.
 
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Deleted member 1487

IF the idea would have worked, it might have been a real coup, that would have saved hundreds to thousands of lives; but the execution was closer to a Steve Martin farce than to James Bond....
So what do you think happens to Torch with Mark captured? Do the Allies abandon it and consider going for France in 1943?
 
Re: ULTRA. A few other US and Brit officers were captured who had various levels of knowledge of the ULTRA/Engima decrypt system. None of those revealed anything to the Germans, in part because it never occured to either Gestapo or military intelligence interrogators to ask in detail about penetration of their radio security systems.

To answer what the Germans might do a look at the Armistice agreements between Petains government & Germany will suggest what actions the Germans might demand from the French or initiate themselves. & of course the actual actions taken provide indicators of the possibilities.

There is the matter of timing. How much time there might be between the revelation of the TORCH operations objectives and dates and the execution of Op TORCH. If it is only 24 hours it does not make much difference. 96 hours warning may (its not certain) lead to earlier seizure of the Tunisian ports and airfields.

There is also the weight Hitler & his yes men in Berlin placed on the information provided via the Double Cross system. There was from the start in October evidence the Allies were going to attempt some sort of coup in Africa. The Germans knew a unusually large number of convoys and war fleets were assemblying and departing the UK and eastern US ports. & they had information on suspicious conversations between the US ambassador and Petains representatives. Nevertheless Hitler & Co went for each sucessesive deception story from late Oct. is: the convoys/fleet departing the UK was headed for a invasion of Brittiany; the garrison in France was deployed to anti invasion positions. -the same group was headed for Egypt; a submarine wolf pack directed to concentrate on the West African route to the S Atlantic. -Or the target was Sardinia; orders to air force and ground forces to move in that direction. The convoys departing the US were covered by a story of reinforcements for the Pacific. Point here is the senior Germans may have rejected the intel. from Clark & Co and remained focused on the deception stories.

Te Italians conversely made a correct estimate and were attempting to prepare to counter the real operation. If they are privy to the German intel from Clarks group they may take faster and more energetic action 3-6 November.
 
So what do you think happens to Torch with Mark captured? Do the Allies abandon it and consider going for France in 1943?

No. The possibility was included in the contingency plans. I dont recall the details but in general the alternate plans shifted the three task forces around to accomodate adjusted goals. The Eastern TF may have been changed from a a assault force to a reserve and landed in follow up behind the Central TF. I'd have to search out the plans.

As for France in 43 The US leaders were still under the illusion the Brits would stick with the agreements of the previous spring and summer. They executed Op TORCH thinking THE NW Europe invasion was on. Brooke had long been against it and now that he was CIGS was busy terminating the possibility.
 

Driftless

Donor
So what do you think happens to Torch with Mark captured? Do the Allies abandon it and consider going for France in 1943?

I think Torch goes ahead, but given Clark's level of knowledge of other operational plans (regardless of his ULTRA knowledge); maybe they alter the focus or timing of other events? I dunno....

This would be a ironic parallel to the Mechelen Incident; that resulted in the Germans replacing their original plan for the invasion of the Low Countries and France.
 
I think Torch goes ahead, but given Clark's level of knowledge of other operational plans (regardless of his ULTRA knowledge); maybe they alter the focus or timing of other events? I dunno.... ...

Allied stratigic & operational objectives for 1943 were radically rethought at the January 1943 SYMBOL confrence. So anything along that line would be of very limited value after mid January. Beyond that Clark as Eisenhowers CoS had limited knowledge of the Joint Chiefs vision. His job was to supervise the task at hand & whatever future Ops were clearly assigned to his boss. Grand strategy as the Joint Chiefs had it were not known to Clark in detail useful to the Germans.
 

Driftless

Donor
Allied stratigic & operational objectives for 1943 were radically rethought at the January 1943 SYMBOL confrence. So anything along that line would be of very limited value after mid January. Beyond that Clark as Eisenhowers CoS had limited knowledge of the Joint Chiefs vision. His job was to supervise the task at hand & whatever future Ops were clearly assigned to his boss. Grand strategy as the Joint Chiefs had it were not known to Clark in detail useful to the Germans.

The intent would be to compartmentalize information shared - to some extent? Just to guard against senior officers being captured - i.e. Gen Richard O'Connor
 

Deleted member 1487

No. The possibility was included in the contingency plans. I dont recall the details but in general the alternate plans shifted the three task forces around to accomodate adjusted goals. The Eastern TF may have been changed from a a assault force to a reserve and landed in follow up behind the Central TF. I'd have to search out the plans.

As for France in 43 The US leaders were still under the illusion the Brits would stick with the agreements of the previous spring and summer. They executed Op TORCH thinking THE NW Europe invasion was on. Brooke had long been against it and now that he was CIGS was busy terminating the possibility.
How would the Allies think about the plan knowing that the Axis knows they're coming and how do the Germans then react to knowing what is coming?
 
As for France in 43 The US leaders were still under the illusion the Brits would stick with the agreements of the previous spring and summer. They executed Op TORCH thinking THE NW Europe invasion was on. Brooke had long been against it and now that he was CIGS was busy terminating the possibility.

No; the evidence shows it was the other way round. Marshall drafted CCS 94 and argued:

Paragraph c (4) of CCS 94 indicates we have accepted the fact that a commitment to the TORCH operation renders ROUNDUP (operations directly against Germany) in all probability impracticable of successful execution in 1943 and that we have definitely accepted a defensive, encircling line of action for Continental Europe except as to air operations and blockade.

The US slowed down Bolero in autumn 1942 without telling the British, who were still expecting a significant US Army to be based in the UK by spring 1943 - check Ruppenthal.
 
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