What if Marcus Aurelius Had Died in 175

The empire needed stronger central authority, and needed soldiers loyal to it. Severus created a more autocratic system, although in the end if it hadn’t been him it would have been someone else. The Roman Empire was always meant to become a military autocracy, since it had no deep cultural ties to bind it, nor any fixed loyalty to a single dynasty, that boat sailed long ago with Nero.

The empire ideally should not have seen major changes away from the successful model operated by emperors Domitian to Aurelius. The idea that emperors were above being merely chosen by soldiers was important for long run political stability, the fiction of the principate was important to maintain in the eyes of soldiers and equestrians. Severus undermined that fiction and emperors gradually became seen as merely chosen by soldiers and who could be replaced, cajoled into giving higher pay, the whole institutional framework of the system was exposed as being mere sand, and it came crashing down when his successors proved less competent.
 
Before Severus --> One man had absolute power legitimized by the armed force of the legions
After Severus --> One man had absolute power legitimized by the armed force of the legions
Therefore --> "Severus made the empire more autocratic"

Maybe I'm the only one who doesn't understand the problem? The empire was always a military autocracy. Augustus didn't win the civil wars with his enlightened worldview or impressive public works, he did it by force of arms, and none of that changed after his death.

Yes obviously all emperors have to rely on the legions, but Severus was more autocratic than his predecessors in the sense that he had no time for traditional Roman institutions. Previous emperors were careful to rule through the Senate in appearance, and they elevated the body's prestige and importance, by integrating new powerful/militarily capable equestrians into the body, and thus established the terms of "relative equality" between them and the emperor. Without this move, and with the Senate completely marginalized, all powerful equestrians could make a play for the imperial purple at any time and have perfect perceived legitimacy in doing so.

"Be harmonious, enrich the soldiers, scorn everybody else." This shows he only cared about the army, and when you abolish any distinction between civil/state and military, the military gets to decide 100% the next emperor, and they know it and are willing to use this power to excess, and political stability becomes impossible.

2. The Western elites wouldn't back Commodus because he was young: The late western empire proves that backing child emperors was certainly a popular move by generals of all stripes, and its unlikely that the military elites of the early and middle empire would be any different.

I think generals loyal to Marcus Aurelius, Pompeianus and Pertinax may have fought for Commodus.
 
Uh no. Having Egypt doesn't guarantee a a civil war victory though I would grant it's likely as Cassius is militarily gifted. But the war would be as detrimental as the one waged in 193, probably worse as the Marcomannic Wars were still in full swing.

That would've been the case if Cassius revolted in 175 as in OTL but I envisaged a more patient and cautious approach--wait til Aurelius is really dead and then wait more til Commodus screws up. By the 180s the barbarians, despite being spared a final beating, were quiet again.

Cassius was also not above looting, as his eastern campaign showed he brought back a ton of spoils...

If he did it to enrich the empire, instead of himself personally, I doubt anyone then would've had a problem with it.

Also the point is that his whole career has been military orientated so his rule would probably favour the army excessively, over and above say Hadrian, Pius, Aurelius who did not have military backgrounds.

I'm not under the impression he favored the army, as opposed to making good use of it. He certainly didn't seem inclined to pamper the soldiers.

Cassius strikes me as one who is super ambitious like Severus (declaring for emperor immediately after the death of Aurelius), and ambitious people are generally fond of conquest.

He sure jumped the gun in 175, and his armies did go far a decade earlier. But he was, after all, just reacting to Parthia's first moves. And he seems to have just rested on his laurels for several years after 166 CE, and again for a few years after 172.
 
I'm not under the impression he favored the army, as opposed to making good use of it. He certainly didn't seem inclined to pamper the soldiers.

My point is more in line with the fact that he comes from a more humble background and thus will look to the equestrian order, the army as pillars of support while seeing the Senate as a potential/real threat, marginalizing it. The effect thus could be somewhat similar to Severus, although obviously we have no way of knowing. By favouring the equestrian order and the army solely, he would be setting the stage for Rome's unstable 3rd century when ambitious equestrians made plays for the purple and soldiers felt they could choose emperors at a whim. Even if he doesn't pamper the soldiers himself, by increasing the importance of the army relative to the state, he is empowering his successors to pamper the army excessively to gain/maintain power. The political fiction of the emperor having legitimacy other than simply being chosen by his soldiers would come under serious stress. Rome depends on this fiction to get by during reigns when emperors are mediocre or not particularly militarily distinguished (examples Hadrian, Pius, Aurelius).
 
My point is more in line with the fact that he comes from a more humble background and thus will look to the equestrian order, the army as pillars of support while seeing the Senate as a potential/real threat, marginalizing it.

Cassius was the son of a prefect and was elevated to the Senate. He also sought the support of rich Syrians and, to help get it, crucified soldiers who robbed them.
 
Cassius was the son of a prefect and was elevated to the Senate. He also sought the support of rich Syrians and, to help get it, crucified soldiers who robbed them.

Also, he descended from a line of kings. Most of the stories of the humble origins of important people in Ancient Rome are fancy tales.
 
My point is more in line with the fact that he comes from a more humble background and thus will look to the equestrian order, the army as pillars of support while seeing the Senate as a potential/real threat, marginalizing it. The effect thus could be somewhat similar to Severus, although obviously we have no way of knowing. By favouring the equestrian order and the army solely, he would be setting the stage for Rome's unstable 3rd century when ambitious equestrians made plays for the purple and soldiers felt they could choose emperors at a whim. Even if he doesn't pamper the soldiers himself, by increasing the importance of the army relative to the state, he is empowering his successors to pamper the army excessively to gain/maintain power. The political fiction of the emperor having legitimacy other than simply being chosen by his soldiers would come under serious stress. Rome depends on this fiction to get by during reigns when emperors are mediocre or not particularly militarily distinguished (examples Hadrian, Pius, Aurelius).

Equestrians were all rich people, just not as rich as senators, 95% of the army’s officers were all equestrians granted their rank by royal favor or recommendation from prominent people.
 
Also, he descended from a line of kings. Most of the stories of the humble origins of important people in Ancient Rome are fancy tales.

Also also, he was the descendant of Julia the Younger through her marriage to Lucius Aemilius Paullus (and their granddaughter's marriage into the Cassii), and thus, was also a descendant of Augustus. "Humble background" indeed

EDIT: Whoops, y'all were talking about Severus, not Cassius, misread that, ignore me
 
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Also also, he was the descendant of Julia the Younger through her marriage to Lucius Aemilius Paullus (and their granddaughter's marriage into the Cassii), and thus, was also a descendant of Augustus. "Humble background" indeed

EDIT: Whoops, y'all were talking about Severus, not Cassius, misread that, ignore me

No worries, I was actually talking about Cassius, who descended from Augustus, Herod the Great and Antiochus IV of Commagene. Hell, dude was probably the most blue-blooded usurper of Roman history. I assumed @oca2073 read somewhere that Cassius was of humble origins.
 
My point is more in line with the fact that he comes from a more humble background and thus will look to the equestrian order, the army as pillars of support while seeing the Senate as a potential/real threat, marginalizing it. The effect thus could be somewhat similar to Severus, although obviously we have no way of knowing. By favouring the equestrian order and the army solely, he would be setting the stage for Rome's unstable 3rd century when ambitious equestrians made plays for the purple and soldiers felt they could choose emperors at a whim. Even if he doesn't pamper the soldiers himself, by increasing the importance of the army relative to the state, he is empowering his successors to pamper the army excessively to gain/maintain power. The political fiction of the emperor having legitimacy other than simply being chosen by his soldiers would come under serious stress. Rome depends on this fiction to get by during reigns when emperors are mediocre or not particularly militarily distinguished (examples Hadrian, Pius, Aurelius).

I like the idea that Hadrian was a mediocre emperor, but I digress.

You do have a point that the emperor's legitimacy was always going to be fragile. Severus was put into an impossible situation when Commodus was assassinated because the senate's coup in 193 was poorly planned in comparison with the one in 96. It was either A) let the praetorian guard run loose in Rome, making and unmaking emperors at a whim, and risk the political fallout killing him or B) make like Antonius did in 69 and declare Pescennius Niger (the analogue of Vespasian) as emperor, and risk the political fallout killing him, or C) make a bid for the throne to put a stop to the chaos and risk the political fallout killing him. You'll notice the common thread among the options. A lot of emperors, after seizing the throne in uncertain times (Claudius, Galba, Vespasian, Hadrian, etc), culled the more capable/ambitious generals by executing them on trumped-up charges of treason, so taking the throne was really the only way to ensure his own safety following the messy coup of 193.

But moreover: giving military and administrative positions to equites was a practice first established by Augustus who made sure that the two most important political positions, the praetorian prefect and the governor of Egypt, could only be held by equites. This was because "only a patrician can become emperor", and thus it was believed that these equites, despite having very real political power, never had designs for themselves on the throne. This practice held until Caracalla executed a few too many praetorian prefects and Macrinus ended up in charge (the first equestrian emperor). Ultimately, I believe that equestrian emperors are inevitable simply because they were already well-established in powerful offices, and the alternative is giving senators command of the praetorian guard, which is even less sustainable in the long-term
 
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The thing about Senators, few of
them were good generals, an emperor needed commanders he could trust, and who, while gathering prestige and power, wouldn’t hinder the emperor himself, and the great majority of those came from the equestrian order, Aurelius too employed mostly equestrians whom he had turned senators by his decree. The system Severus created worked, his successors ruined because Caracalla brought it too far and Elagabalus and Alexander didn’t do enough. We clearly have different ideas about what makes a good emperor and that’s all right, just want to say that stronger, central rule doesn’t necessarily equal evil rule in ancient times.

I know it's commonly claimed that professional equestrian officers were more competent than amateur senators, but is there any evidence for it? It was, after all, "amateur" senators who conquered the Roman Empire and "professional" equestrians who lost it (not that that's a fair comparison, of course, since a whole load of things were different other than just the senior commanders), and even (especially?) in the Late Empire, political loyalty was more important than military competence when it came to determining who got put in charge of what.

When you appoint as two co-emperors, two brothers who hate each other, for reasons of family to succeed you, that's not responsibly planning a succession.

To be fair, I'm not sure what else Severus could have done (assuming that "Raising his sons better so they didn't hate each other" isn't an option). Appointing someone else as Emperor would be almost unprecedented,* and would result in one or both of the sons rebelling, and/or the new Emperor having them executed as a threat to his rule. If he just appointed one of them as Emperor, that one would most likely have the other one executed. So I don't think we should judge Severus too harshly here, since he seems to have found himself in a situation where he genuinely had no good options available to him...


* There was Claudius making Nero joint successor with Britannicus, although note that this arrangement didn't end well for Britannicus...
 
I know it's commonly claimed that professional equestrian officers were more competent than amateur senators, but is there any evidence for it? It was, after all, "amateur" senators who conquered the Roman Empire and "professional" equestrians who lost it (not that that's a fair comparison, of course, since a whole load of things were different other than just the senior commanders), and even (especially?) in the Late Empire, political loyalty was more important than military competence when it came to determining who got put in charge of what.

The fact is that most of the “amateur” senators who conquered the empire were no amateurs at all. Most young senators did one year as military tribune, at best, then went back to Rome, their most successful peers instead decided to prolong their time in the army and gained considerable military experience (the most striking cases being Trajan and Agricola). Not saying that senators couldn’t prove their worth compared to equestrians, but the latter used to spend years as either centurions or prefects, thus they were bound to be better by experience.
At least that’s what I think Gallienus thought when he decided to appoint his own equestrians as legates, although political reasons probably played a part in that too.
 
I know it's commonly claimed that professional equestrian officers were more competent than amateur senators, but is there any evidence for it? It was, after all, "amateur" senators who conquered the Roman Empire and "professional" equestrians who lost it (not that that's a fair comparison, of course, since a whole load of things were different other than just the senior commanders), and even (especially?) in the Late Empire, political loyalty was more important than military competence when it came to determining who got put in charge of what.



To be fair, I'm not sure what else Severus could have done (assuming that "Raising his sons better so they didn't hate each other" isn't an option). Appointing someone else as Emperor would be almost unprecedented,* and would result in one or both of the sons rebelling, and/or the new Emperor having them executed as a threat to his rule. If he just appointed one of them as Emperor, that one would most likely have the other one executed. So I don't think we should judge Severus too harshly here, since he seems to have found himself in a situation where he genuinely had no good options available to him...


* There was Claudius making Nero joint successor with Britannicus, although note that this arrangement didn't end well for Britannicus...
No, Claudius making Nero joint successor with Britannicus was exactly the same as Tiberius making joint successors Caligula and Tiberius Gemellus as either by blood or adoption the two man had the same grade of kinship to the precedent Emperor (Gemellus was son of Drusus son of Tiberius and Caligula was son of Germanicus nephew and adoptive son of Tiberius so they were legally both grandsons of Tiberius while Nero was adopted by his greatuncle, stepfather and father-in-law Claudius so legally Nero was the elder son of Claudius and Britannicus the younger)
 
No, Claudius making Nero joint successor with Britannicus was exactly the same as Tiberius making joint successors Caligula and Tiberius Gemellus as either by blood or adoption the two man had the same grade of kinship to the precedent Emperor (Gemellus was son of Drusus son of Tiberius and Caligula was son of Germanicus nephew and adoptive son of Tiberius so they were legally both grandsons of Tiberius while Nero was adopted by his greatuncle, stepfather and father-in-law Claudius so legally Nero was the elder son of Claudius and Britannicus the younger)

Oh yes, I forgot about Tiberius. Though do note that that case, too, resulted in one of the heirs getting bumped off pretty quickly.
 
Oh yes, I forgot about Tiberius. Though do note that that case, too, resulted in one of the heirs getting bumped off pretty quickly.
This is both pretty logical and almost inevitable... Still remember who in Rome adopted children had the same rights of the natural ones so...
 
You do have a point that the emperor's legitimacy was always going to be fragile. Severus was put into an impossible situation when Commodus was assassinated because the senate's coup in 193 was poorly planned in comparison with the one in 96. It was either A) let the praetorian guard run loose in Rome, making and unmaking emperors at a whim, and risk the political fallout killing him or B) make like Antonius did in 69 and declare Pescennius Niger (the analogue of Vespasian) as emperor, and risk the political fallout killing him, or C) make a bid for the throne to put a stop to the chaos and risk the political fallout killing him. You'll notice the common thread among the options. A lot of emperors, after seizing the throne in uncertain times (Claudius, Galba, Vespasian, Hadrian, etc), culled the more capable/ambitious generals by executing them on trumped-up charges of treason, so taking the throne was really the only way to ensure his own safety following the messy coup of 193.

Which is why coups and takeovers are a bad idea. The best case scenario is have Marcus Aurelius appoint a successor (not Commodus) and share power with him for the last few years of his life. This can even be Avidius Cassius, whereby he is legitimized and doesn't have to resort to these measures.

But moreover: giving military and administrative positions to equites was a practice first established by Augustus who made sure that the two most important political positions, the praetorian prefect and the governor of Egypt, could only be held by equites. This was because "only a patrician can become emperor", and thus it was believed that these equites, despite having very real political power, never had designs for themselves on the throne. This practice held until Caracalla executed a few too many praetorian prefects and Macrinus ended up in charge (the first equestrian emperor). Ultimately, I believe that equestrian emperors are inevitable simply because they were already well-established in powerful offices, and the alternative is giving senators command of the praetorian guard, which is even less sustainable in the long-term

It works until you make equestrians too powerful which is what Severus and his successors did. There needs to be a BALANCE of power between the emperor, senate, and equestrians. To avoid equestrian emperors simply keep the legionary commanders and provincial governors with multiple legions in hands of senators. Thus if Praetorians assassinate the emperor, the praetorian prefect doesn't get to become emperor, rather a senator will who has the most support from the legions. Severus instead appointed equestrians as legionary commanders, instead of integrating them first in the Senate. Also by increasing the central army (doubled Praetorian Guard and equites singulares + extra legion), Severus gave a larger army to potential equestrian usurpers/praetorian prefects who might assassinate the emperor.
 
Which is why coups and takeovers are a bad idea. The best case scenario is have Marcus Aurelius appoint a successor (not Commodus) and share power with him for the last few years of his life. This can even be Avidius Cassius, whereby he is legitimized and doesn't have to resort to these measures.



It works until you make equestrians too powerful which is what Severus and his successors did. There needs to be a BALANCE of power between the emperor, senate, and equestrians. To avoid equestrian emperors simply keep the legionary commanders and provincial governors with multiple legions in hands of senators. Thus if Praetorians assassinate the emperor, the praetorian prefect doesn't get to become emperor, rather a senator will who has the most support from the legions. Severus instead appointed equestrians as legionary commanders, instead of integrating them first in the Senate. Also by increasing the central army (doubled Praetorian Guard and equites singulares + extra legion), Severus gave a larger army to potential equestrian usurpers/praetorian prefects who might assassinate the emperor.

Giving armies to senators still means giving potential usurpers the means to revolt. All contenders for the the throne in 193 were senators, Gordian I, Gordian II, Decius, Trebonianus Gallus and Valerian were all Senators. Usurpers, indeed, were mostly senators until Gallienus, who wisely decided to just do away with the whole senatorial order, with no big loss for the empire. From then on, aside from Tacitus, usurpers were mostly capable equestrians, the empire got on his way for recovery under Claudius, Aurelian and Probus, and finally found stability again with Diocletian. If things nearly collapsed after him, it’s not because the equestrian order was empowered, the same thing would have happened with the Senators. The emperor, as the fourth century proves, really just needed Senators around to keep up the charade of “first among equals”. Once the empire got confident enough to get rid of them, it did, and it lasted another two centuries after that.
 
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